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ALTERNATION IN POWER IN BUCHAREST AND CHIȘINĂU AND THE DISCOURSE ON ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN RELATIONS

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Abstract: *The article explores the political consequences of successive alternations in power in Bucharest and Chișinău on the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The main interrogation is whether and how Romania's accession in the European and Euro-Atlantic order influenced the way in which both capitals relate to each other. As the comparative research clearly indicates, predictability and consistency in foreign policy is to a large extent depending on the status of the country in relations to a stable system of values, policies and institutions.*

Keywords: Romania, Republic of Moldova, alternation in power, Romanian-Moldovan relations, European integration.

1. Introduction

Under the historical name of *Bessarabia*, the Republic of Moldova belonged until 1940 (excepting the secessionist region of *Transnistria*) to Romania. Using the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 and its secret clause regarding the “Soviet interest for Bessarabia” (Wilson Center Digital Archive, 1939), Stalin decided to occupy the region in June 1940, giving an ultimatum to the Romanian government to leave immediately the territory between the Prut and the Dniester Rivers.

In August 1991, amid the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova declared its sovereignty. Romania was the first country to recognize the new

state, as Charles King noticed, “a few hours after the declaration of independence” (King, 2004, 64), which was later seen as a very controversial issue of “lost opportunity”, still dividing politicians, historians, analysts and public opinion on both sides of the River Prut.

2. Transfer of power in the post-communist Romania and the Republic of Moldova: benchmarks and political relevancy

Once the totalitarian regimes were dismantled in both states, at the end of the Cold War (1989), respectively after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the successive transfers of power from one president/government to another, in now politically pluralistic Romania and the Republic of Moldova, have been usually non-violent and based on constitutional, democratic mechanisms reflecting the will of voters.

With the exception of the April 2009 riots in Chişinău, followed in a few months by the dissolution of the Parliament and early general elections leading to the resignation of the former Communist President Vladimir Voronin, the overwhelming majority of government changes as well as the sequence of presidential terms, both in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, were peaceful and based on the results of elections at the end of electoral cycles or changes of majority in the legislative. From this perspective, Moldova has been a notable exception among the non-EU and non-NATO post-Soviet republics, having no “color revolution” and no dramatic change of power. Taking into consideration the former Soviet Union, only the Baltic republics have had more successful political transitions but this group of countries is being part of the European Union and NATO since 2004, meeting therefore higher democratic standards. Considering Moldova the most democratic state in the post-Soviet space (with the already mentioned exception of the Baltic countries), Nicu Popescu sees the transfer of power in Chişinău as “widespread use of administrative resources and perhaps small-scale fraud (2–4 percent) here and there, but Moldova has largely avoided the massive fraud that has often canceled outright the value of elections in many post-Soviet states” (Popescu, 2012, 38).

On a different analytical tone and with a more critical approach, Lucan Way describes the Moldovan politics as “pluralism by default” and affirms that “Moldova lacks

most of the qualities that social scientists consider critical for democratic development. [...] Prospects for pluralism in Moldova would also seem to be threatened by divisions over national identity” (Way, 2002, 127-141). According to Lucan Way, local political pluralism would be therefore only the result of government fragmentation within the post-Soviet system of interests and also a consequence of the societal division between the Romanian-speaking western and central zone and a Slavic-speaking, highly industrialized zone in the separatist region of Transnistria.

It is also important to mention that Moldova revised the Constitution in 1999 and switched to a parliamentary republic. This way, Moldova grew apart from the post-communist political tradition in Central and Eastern Europe, the overwhelming majority of countries in the region choosing the semi-presidential regime, with a popularly elected president. The reshape of the Moldovan political system has had however a number of significant consequences: among the positive ones, the consolidation of the role of the legislative institution, based on political pluralism, and the limitation of the risk of having an excessive authoritarian executive branch. On the other hand, the requirement of getting at least 61 votes in favor (out of 101 MPs) to elect the President of the Republic, which nominates the Prime Minister, makes the formation of such majority a real challenge for the parties and usually creates the premise of political instability and crises. Later on in this section we shall indicate certain moments when this constitutional provision have had crucial effects.

The post-communist Romania has had so far four democratic presidential transfers of power: in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2014, and a quite significant number of government changes, most of them after general elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008) but also a few after the prime ministers’ resignations (1991, 1998, 1999 and February 2012) or, as in the spring of 2012, after a change of majority followed by a vote of no confidence. Only once, in September 1991, a Prime Minister (Petre Roman) resigned under the “street pressure”, in the context of the assault of the angry miners over the headquarters of the government. However that resignation did not mean a real political alternation in power since neither the president nor the ruling party or the majority in Parliament has been

changed. Other two prime-ministers, Emil Boc (February 2012) and Victor Ponta (November 2015) resigned amid massive protests regarding government policies, but without the imminence of a violent assault over the central institutions, like the one in 1991.

In Romania, the post-communist politics split the parties and society in a tough binary rivalry between “anti-communists” (center-right wing parties) and “neo-communists” (center-left wing parties), competing for pre-eminence (Mișcoiu, 2013, 85-101) in a deeply divided society. The cleavage became evident starting with the first free elections, in May 1990. “The ‘two Romanias’ will soon confront each other, violently, during electoral campaign and long time after” (Dorin, 2006, 304) remarks Mihai Dorin. There were basically two major victories of the anti-communist, liberal-oriented forces against the powerful and influential successor of the initial Front of National Salvation (FSN), represented by the present center-left wing Social Democratic Party (PSD). The two switches from center-left wing government to center-right wing government occurred in the general elections of 1996 and 2004. In both cases, PSD accepted the defeat and did not oppose to the democratic transfer of power.

After seven years of slow reforms (1990-1996), administrative corruption and economic decline, the so-called neo-communist regime led by President Ion Iliescu suffered a first major defeat in October 1996 presidential and legislative elections. Then-Rector of the University of Bucharest, Emil Constantinescu became President of Romania while the alliance that supported him, the center-right wing Democratic Convention won a relative majority in the Parliament. More or less surprisingly, the formation of the coalition government made up of four significant parties (including the center-left wing Democratic Party, actually a faction of the former FSN) as well as a number of small parties, ethnic and civic organizations generated political instability and severe tensions among quite heterogeneous partners. Alina Mingiu-Pippidi believes that “the victory of 1996 was too little, too late to change radically the direction and rhythm imposed by the post-communist parties” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, 60). Beyond the fact that they lacked political and government experience, the anti-communists did not win an absolute majority and had to

co-opt PD which blocked the integral restitution of properties and opposed to radical reforms. In 1998, PD prompted a severe government crisis that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea but after all remained in the coalition, under the new premier Radu Vasile.

The disagreements and crises between government partners, reflected in three changes of prime ministers during one legislature, led eventually to a significant loss of popular support for the two “historic parties”, PNȚCD (The National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party) and PNL (The National Liberal Party). In a controversial statement, President Emil Constantinescu renounced to run for a second term, admitting himself “defeated by Securitate”. The whole project of the Democratic Convention was thus politically ruined, although Romania made some essential reforms in the 1996-2000 legislature, stopped the economic decline in 1999-2000 and was accepted to start negotiations with the European Union as a candidate state, in February 2000. Nevertheless the disastrous image of the leaders and parties in power made the alternation unavoidable.

This is the main reason why PSD and its leader, the former high-ranking communist activist Ion Iliescu, returned in power in the November 2000 general election, promising again the benefits of “political peace and stability”. The second ballot of the presidential election was actually a desolating choice between a moderate neo-communist politician and the choleric leader of the nationalistic and extremist party PRM (The Great Romania Party), Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Ion Iliescu became therefore the lesser evil for Romanian democracy and was reelected comfortably as President of Romania, in his third term. It is important to mention that, despite the clear constitutional limitation to two terms, Iliescu’s candidature for the third term was accepted because the Constitutional Court, dominated at that time by PSD appointed members, did not take into consideration the first presidential term (1990-1992), started before the adoption of the Constitution in December 1991.

The promised political stability had however a heavy price. The legislature 2000-2004 was marked by a concerning accumulation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and new PSD leader Adrian Năstase. Massive corruption in central and territorial

administration, control and limitation of press freedom through financial instruments (like government paid advertisement for “friendly” media trusts), ballooning “local barons” (a terms used for the abusive, greedy and opulent PSD local leaders) and, most of all, the augmentation of the discretionary powers of the Prime Minister Adrian Năstase generated a new critical pressure for political change. Leading comfortably in the polls, PSD and Năstase were behaving like they were already winners of the next scrutiny, making plans for the composition of the new government and joking on the weaknesses of the center-right Alliance for Justice and Truth (D.A. PNL-PD).

The legislative and presidential elections of 2004 brought the second major defeat of PSD and also the unexpected, last minute victory of the center-right wing candidate for presidency, Traian Băsescu, coming only on the second position in the first ballot. With an advance of about ten percent in the first ballot and with his party PSD having already won a relative majority in the new Parliament, Prime Minister Adrian Năstase was heading towards a predictable victory in the presidential election. The mobilization of the urban, educated and young electorate, based on a persuasive anti-corruption discourse, made the opposition leader Băsescu won at last a tight but spectacular victory. The triumph of Traian Băsescu and the formation of the PNL-PD government (in coalition with two other small parties), despite the ultra-politicization of state apparatus and the pre-electoral concentration of administrative power and resources in the hands of Adrian Năstase and PSD, was an encouraging sign of a mature, functional democracy. In 2011, Adrian Năstase became the first Prime Minister of the post-communist Romania to be sentenced to prison for corruption.

The two terms of office held by Traian Băsescu ended in December 2014, being interrupted twice by the Parliament, after President’s impeachment in 2007 and 2012. Each time the referendum called for President dismissal failed and Traian Băsescu returned in office. The hostile relations that Băsescu used to maintain with the legislative made the parliament majority try to impeach him, based on accusations of constitutional infringement.

In the fall of 2014, an “epic” electoral confrontation between Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the young and promising leader of PSD, and Klaus Iohannis, the sober and respected newly elected leader of PNL and also long serving mayor of Sibiu, reproduced to some extent the pattern of the political battle of 2004. It was again the confrontation between the representative of the most corrupted party (in the eyes of many Romanians) and the leader of the opposition, recently involved in high politics, perceived rather as a non-career politician, having no dependencies and links with the eroded parties. After an advantage of ten percent in the first ballot (40%-30%), Victor Ponta saw himself confronted with a “tsunami” of unpopularity, mainly caused by the incidents at the polls organized abroad, when long queues were formed and tens of thousands of Romanian citizens, usually voting for center-right wing parties, could not vote. Instead of ceding to the pressures of diaspora and opposition, and increasing the number of polls, the government led by Victor Ponta maintained the same number for the second ballot. This uninspired decision prompted an impressive mobilization of new voters in the second ballot for Klaus Iohannis, inside and outside Romania, so that the turnout raised to a historic 64% and the liberal candidate won comfortably, with a plus of one million votes. Under these circumstances, the presidential elections of November 2014 represented a transfer of power from one president to another, but not necessarily an alternation in power, since the outgoing president and the incoming one were both center-right wing leaders with more or less the same political orientation, and Traian Băsescu supported Klaus Iohannis in the second ballot.

Just like Romania, the Republic of Moldova has currently its fourth elected president since 1991, but certainly the political story is different. Mircea Snegur, the first President of the post-Soviet Moldova, left office in 1996, after a normal electoral process. His successor, Petru Lucinschi, was not reelected in 2001, being replaced by Vladimir Voronin, the leader of the PCRM (The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova). Voronin and the communists developed a quite authoritarian regime during their two terms between 2001 and 2009, but the consolidation of power, politicization of administration

and the attempt to control media did not eventually cancelled the constitutional framework and the political pluralism.

The April 2009 general election marked the beginning of the only major political crisis that the Republic of Moldova had in its short history, when the small republic was indeed on the brink of a revolution. The Party of Communists won the election but, with “only” 60 seats out of 101 seats of the Parliament, they failed to elect the President. Following the legislative election of that month, people took the streets in Chişinău and the dissatisfaction with the results degenerated in violent riots. After two failed attempts to elect the President, the Parliament was dissolved and early elections were called for July. Comparing Moldovan riots with what happened in other Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia etc.) in fairly similar situations, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Igor Munteanu conclude that “Moldova’s Twitter Revolution had some elements of an aborted color revolution’. [...] What was missing in Moldova? The short answer is a unified opposition that could put itself in the driver’s position” (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009, 136-142).

On July 29th, after three tensioned months, the surprise came. Despite the polls predicting a new victory of the communists, the three liberal pro-European parties and a dissident faction from the Communist Party led by Marian Lupu, now under the name Democratic Party, won a majority of 53 seats and formed the government, having the liberal-democrat Vlad Filat as premier. Four parties formed the Alliance for European Integration (AIE): the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), the Liberal Party (PL), Our Moldova (MN) and the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM). In September, President Voronin resigned and Mihai Ghimpu, the Speaker of the Parliament and PL leader, became Acting President. A full alternation in power was thus achieved.

The difficulties created by the constitutional provision of the election of the head of state have not, however, ended with this episode. In its turn, the AIE designated candidate for presidency, Marian Lupu, did not pass the required threshold of 61 votes in the Parliament and, after two failed attempts, the Parliament was dissolved. New early elections were called in November 2010. PLDM, PDM and PL won again a majority of 59

seats and formed a pro-European government. In March 2011, after a political compromise and with the support of a dissident communist deputy who later on formed the Socialist Party, the independent Nicolae Timofti, a former judge at the Supreme Court of Justice, was finally elected President of Moldova.

3. The discourse on Romanian-Moldovan relations after 1991

Romania was the first country to announce recognition of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, in August 1991. This surprisingly swift movement of the Romanian government, in the context of the USSR imminent dissolution, seemed to represent only the beginning of a very substantial and promising relation between Bucharest and Chişinău.

The question of national identity, the use of the same language and the fact that Moldova was until 1940 part of Romania became very soon an asset but also a barrier in Moldovan politics, regarding bilateral relations with Bucharest. The local political elites and Moldovan society split shortly after obtaining the independence in unionists (“Romanians”) and sovereigntists (“Moldovans”).

V.G. Baleanu sees the evolution of the Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations in historical dynamics. “After a romantic period of idealistic exaltation dictated by nationalistic demands for reunification based on the ‘German model’, Romania's relations with Moldova became more pragmatic and less dominated by big words” (Baleanu, 2000, 16). According to Baleanu, the policy of small steps, despite criticism and disappointment produced to nationalists from both sides of the River Prut, helped the two parties to resume their talks on concluding a bilateral basic treaty after the 1996 general elections in Romania and Moldova.

The discourse on Romanian-Moldovan relations have had a few common, steady features during the past 25 years but also a number of variable nuances and tones, depending on individual national sensitiveness of different political leaders. While the former transcended regimes, governments and presidential terms in Bucharest and Chişinău, the latter reflected alternation and transfers of power, with some visible ups and

downs. From the euphoria of the post-Cold War era and the “flowers bridges” of 1990-1991, which very much looked like the break of the Berlin Wall, the worst moment of the Romanian-Moldovan relation was by far during the April 2009 tensions in Chişinău, when the Communist President Voronin expelled the Romanian Ambassador for “plotting a coup” (The Guardian, 2009). Later on, Voronin denied agreement for the proposed new Romanian ambassador, imposed visas for Romanian citizens and almost closed the frontier. After his resignation, in the fall of 2009, the new authorities in Chişinău resumed good relations with Bucharest.

On both sides of the River Prut there were politicians with higher or lower inclination to the question of Romanian national unity and with more or less bias for the idea of a union between the two neighboring Romanian-speaking states. However the political climate in Chişinău related to Romania had much bigger variations than the Romanian perception concerning close relations with Moldova, which was constantly positive but rather flat and not so passionate. This is somehow understandable, since the Republic of Moldova is a young state, having deep identity cleavages and a very sensitive attitude regarding its relation with the motherland.

The European “Moldovenism”, seen as a political and societal movement towards edification of a Moldovan identity under the umbrella of the official aspiration to European integration, became in the 1990s and 2000s the “democratic” adapted version but still an extension of the five decades of the Soviet ideology. Beside the fact the “Moldovan language” was invented by the authorities in Chişinău, Moldovenism has been intensively used to convince the younger generation to stay away from the idea of reunification with Romania. In fact, “Moldovenism” is partly explained by the “denationalization theory”, which states that “Moldovans” are obviously Romanians but the half-century of Soviet indoctrination made them believe that they form a distinct nation, deteriorating their sense of national consciousness and losing ties with the motherland. In the recent times, European Moldovenism became the adaptation of the same school of thinking of Soviet inspiration to new political realities on the continent, but still making everything is possible to keep away the idea of assuming the Romanian identity.

The fact that civil society has emerged quite slow in both countries didn't help the strengthening of the cross-boundaries national sentiment and rapprochement. "Romanians and Moldovans do not participate widely in civic life. [...] They have little faith in their democratic institutions and do not display the tolerance that is the hallmark of democratic citizen" were concluding Gabriel Bădescu, Paul Sum, and Eric M. Uslaner in a 2004 research (Bădescu et al, 2004, 316-341).

By far, the most important asset but, paradoxically, also the most sensitive barrier in Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations is the identity issue. The absence or weakness of a real "national identity" in the Republic of Moldova and the ambivalence of the identity issues (asset and barrier) seem a characteristic of the former post-Soviet republics, caught between their Western neighbors and Russia. Charles King approached the reflection of the disputed multiple identities in the Republic of Moldova (Romanian, "Moldovan", Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz etc.) in its foreign policy. Particularly, these tensions affected the bilateral relations with Romania. As Charles King noticed, "despite the special relationship that has developed in the spheres of education and culture, relations between political elites have oscillated between avowals of pan-Romanian brotherhood and harsh exchanges between the two capitals" (King, 2004, 71).

Once we look to the consistency of the attitude of the two Romanian-speaking states toward each other, we can easily observe much more fluctuation in Chișinău than in Bucharest, with ups and downs depending on a number of political, economic and regional circumstances. This is somehow understandable, taking into consideration that the Republic of Moldova is a small state "suspended" between the West and the former Soviet space, lacking own identity and own resources required for a proper viable state, quite frequently affected by inner crises and vulnerabilities. From the communist president Vladimir Voronin to the non-partisan head of state Nicolae Timofti there is a considerably different attitude in relation to Romania, though in such a short period of time. Even under the same president, Moldova has had dramatic variations of approaches, oscillating between effusion, indifference and reluctance/hostility. Voronin's unstable discourse on Romania, the European Union and Russia during his two terms as president (2001-2009) is

probably the clearest proof of the weaknesses, fears and confusion in which the Republic of Moldova conducts its behavior.

In the same cited article, Charles King appreciates that “relations with Russia have been both less and more complex than Moldova’s relations with Romania: less since the identity question is not significant, but more since Moldova has been historically far more dependent on Russia than on Romania” (King, 2004, 76). Analyzing Voronin’s hysterical Moldovenism and anti-Romanian discourse after 2007, Vincent Henry and Sergiu Mișcoiu remark that “the policy of massive allocation of Romanian citizenship [to Moldovan citizens] is repeatedly denounced in violent campaigns by President Voronin himself who, through the press and official statements, is accusing Romania of imperialism and of trying to violate the sovereignty of the Moldovan state” (Henry and Mișcoiu, 2015, 211-248, 231).

Not only Moldova changed time after time its political approach in relation to Romania. Bucharest has also formulated its traditional “special relationship” with Chișinău in different tones and nuances, from one president or prime minister to another, although with less dramatic and spectacular variations. However the basic idea of having good relations and offering support for Moldova was a constant element of Romanian The first two presidents, Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu, who led the Romanian foreign policy in the first 15 years after communism, had no significant benchmarks regarding Moldova, aside from the prompt recognition of the Republic of Moldova’s independence in August 1991, limiting their discourse and attitude to general assertions and clichés.

Starting with Traian Băsescu and then Klaus Iohannis, things have changed in the sense that the whole debate of the Moldovan issue in Romania became more substantive and relevant, though sometimes dividing in terms of strategic options. Băsescu and Iohannis did not act in the same way in relation to Chișinău but both influenced considerably the reflection on bilateral relations. President Băsescu wanted to make “Republic of Moldova” one of the standards of his terms. Sometimes populist, sometimes pathetic, sometimes clearly looking for electoral support from voters with Romanian passport living in Moldova, his platform was explicitly unionist to the point that he stated “union with Moldova has to become the new national project in Romania” (Gotev, 2013).

During his two terms of office, Romania implemented intensely the new legislation of “regaining citizenship”, according to which approximately 18% of the Moldovan citizens got the Romanian citizenship, based on the fact that their ancestors were Romanian citizens.

After December 2014, with a more sober and moderate political style, President Klaus Iohannis kept the principle of “special relationship” with the Republic of Moldova in the strategic priorities of the Romanian foreign policy, but changed the tone. The effusion disappeared from the presidential discourse while the EU principle in relation to associate members, the so-called “more for more”, became the dominant idea. Unlike Băsescu, Iohannis believes that “the question of the union of the two states might become feasible only when things will go very well in both countries, when political stability and economic prosperity will be achieved in the Republic of Moldova” (Popa, 2016).

With disastrous economic and political performances in the past two years, with four prime ministers in about one year, Moldova seems to have lost momentum in the process of European integration due to its structural vulnerabilities and weaknesses of its political elites. The European Commission’s representatives started to criticize Chişinău for the lack of reforms in justice, public administration and economy, and especially for the massive corruption at high governmental levels. In November 2015, immediately after a new fall of the government in Chişinău, President Iohannis vetoed the bill with regard to the loan of 150 million Euro granted by the Romanian Government to the Government of the Republic of Moldova, based on the fact that “at present, we have no certitude that the reforms in Moldova will continue” (Digi 24, 2015)

4. Conclusions

As many authors observed, in the past 25 years the question of the Moldovan identity was by far the most important issue determining the enthusiasm or, on the contrary, the frostiness of the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The fluctuations were obviously bigger in Moldova than in Romania, depending on the ideological platform of the ruling party or president in Chişinău, with a clear plus in

pro-Romanian attitude at the pro-European politicians and a rather hostile attitude of pro-Russian leaders. From this perspective, Bucharest was more constant in relation to Moldova, supporting the European trajectory of its smaller neighbor, regardless the center-right or center-left wing successive executives in Romania.

After Romania joined the European Union in 2007, the Romanian passports became more attractive for numerous Moldovan citizens, for some practical reasons like access to European labour market, higher education, business etc. Nevertheless, the differences in political attitude regarding relations with Romania got more transparent and explicit, from one party to another. The grassroots politics in Moldova fully reflected this cleavage. Useless to say that being pro-Romanian (not necessarily in the sense of union, but as identity assumed) and pro-European has soon proved to be fairly similar, as former presidential adviser and analyst Dan Dungaciu has observed (Filimon, 2015). Both the supporters and opponents of the “European option” gained arguments and relevance on local political market, so that the Moldovan foreign policy debate found itself dominated by the geopolitical dispute between Russia and the West for the European periphery. It is therefore useful to mention that the concept of “westernization of Moldova” has never been deep and complete, since Chișinău did not really open the question of accession to NATO. Moldova’s constitutional neutrality remains one of the clearest proofs of the strategic ambiguity of this post-Soviet republic, based in fact on the lack of a distinct national and cultural identity.

Almost ten years after Romania’s accession to the European Union, one of the main conclusions regarding Romanian-Moldovan relations looks to the stability and predictability of the two states’ foreign policy principles. Romania became after 2007 much more stable and predictable in relation to Moldova (with variable tones and nuances, depending on each president’s political style) while Moldova remained weak, confused and often oscillating between West and East.

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DEVELOPMENT ON THE MOVE: OPTIMISING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF MIGRATION

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Abstract: *The Romanian outflow of migrants towards EU, a massive labour flow occurring during the last two decades could be interpreted as a significant pilot case for the process of urgently conceiving adequate policy measures in the capital area of immigration towards EU. Reviewing the most important features of the Romanian emigration, we try to identify commonalities and issues that could be turned into relevant proposals for tackling this domain in the optimal way, both economically and socially. Meanwhile our paper attempts to forecast the situation of the future outflows from Romania, in conjunction with the new developments of the domestic and the EU labour markets.*

1. Preliminaries

Migration across EU, both immigration from outside countries and movements of labour and people, theoretically free to move within the whole Union, is definitely a crucial topic nowadays, for both willingly and unwillingly sending and equally willingly and unwillingly receiving countries. Any analysis and evaluation of the already historical Romanian case, if properly conducted, in conjunction with the latest developments, could provide significant lessons, relevant EU wide. But such an outcome cannot be achieved unless approaching the issue through interdisciplinary methodology, which mingles economics with sociology, demographics with finance or principles embedded in the *Aquis Communautaire* with international law, only to name a few methodological benchmarks.

The 2015 immigration unfolded towards the EU has completely shaken the state of the affairs in this respect and improperly tackled are estimated to have an even larger negative impact on EU's evolution, than the recent economic difficulties the Union went through.

Present day EU policies in this area are, either still nonexistent if we have in mind those supposedly properly tackling the massive influx of refugees from outside the Union, or heavily ignored, as in the case of the *Dublin Regulations*, also applicable to the situation, to say the least. It is our belief that the Romanian case, so present during the recent years in the European labour policy debates but also media, mostly with negative connotations, could be turned into a best or worst case of practice, with relevant follow-ups for the present day migration juncture. Though apparently the massive outflow of workforce from Romania towards the more developed countries of EU falls in a completely other category of migration, than today developments, the patterns, the solutions and some of the policies that were developed by EU countries on purpose, during the last decade, could be extremely useful within the new and unexpected European labour market's juncture.

Let us state right at the beginning that we address this issue starting from the firm belief that the core of the process occurring nowadays in Europe is mainly economic and meanwhile only reluctantly assessing and endorsing the view of the champions of free immigration that the associated risks and potential liabilities that have been forecasted by many would be overshadowed on the long run by a compensatory positive economic perspective. Otherwise it is definitely incomprehensible why clearly legally defined categories, such as migrants and refugees are so often overlapping today, even in the most documented EU texts. As *Hanna Arendt* pointed at the peak of the cold war, when refugees from Eastern Europe towards Western Europe were dramatic bearers of a clear political message of opposition to an evil system, there is an enormous difference of categories between refugees and migrants: a refugee cannot plan the escape, trajectory and destination, it simply escapes. (Bernic, 2015)

Coming to the present migratory outlook, we cannot but observe the fact that while EU official statements and documents clearly acknowledge the status of refugees only for

people originating from two destinations, Syria and Eritreea, (only unofficial sources add to these Irak and lately Afganistan), the EU specific mainframe immigration legislation (*Bluecard Framework* Of 2009, *Eurodac Regulations* of 2013, or the *Relocation Mechanism* of 2015, to mention only a few) has no provisions whatsoever about the origin countries and do not detail on peculiarities differentiating them from an European perspective. These legal setbacks have been clearly staged during the last month negotiations concerning migration with the Turkish authorities. (Economist, 2015b) For the sake of the truth one could also notice that even the UN documents of the kind lack the elaborated provisions that would turn them into *de facto* operational administrative vehicles in times of need. In the following lines we will approach only the migratory aspect leaving aside the political component.

One cannot interpret but only through metaphorically speaking “economic glasses” the fact that while the intensely disputed *Relocation Mechanism* (RM, or informally *Juncker Plan*) would be applicable to 14 EU countries that host less refugees than the approved quota, while 11 are already over and three have either opt-in or opt-out clauses embedded in their treaties, the vote for the quotas that occurred on September 21st within the JAI framework was an amazing 23 in favour, 4 against and 1 abstain. The obvious contradictory path taken by most European countries in this respect openly reflects the acknowledged political (humanitarian) motivation of the decision but obviously one could read in between the lines about the low profile attributed to the economic dimension, outlook that the free immigration champion countries are willing to induce at this stage of the story. The outcome of the *European Council* of October 15-16, focused on *EU – Turkey approach* of migration and the expectations of the following *EU – Africa Valetta Summit* of November 11-12, 2015 (European Council, 2015) are indicative for such an assessment.

It is also a fact that the econometrics of the RM, allocating country cohorts according to a blueprint that has the following parameters: population (40%), GDP (40%), number of previous application and resettlements (10%) and the domestic unemployment rate of that specific country (10%) – speaks for itself bluntly in economic terminology and

definitely only in a subsidiary way in the spirit of egalitarianism and social ecumenism. Some specialists even wrought out the term of *labour citizenship* in order to illustrate the situation. (Wagner, 2015) Is it significant to say that during 2008-2014, Romania resettled only 40 immigrants? Or that according to *Eurostat*, during the same period Germany processed successfully only 280 applications within the *Dublin System*, while the EU champion was Sweden with 2045? Or that the *EU Bluecard* was issued in Romania for less than 100 persons during the last three years, but this figure did not exceed 10.000 even in the case of Germany? It seems to us that the answer would be mostly rhetoric, therefore in the following lines we will approach the issue only and only as an economic migratory process.

2. A macro perspective on Romanian emigration

As we write these lines in late September and early October 2015, we witness a time when EU has to face a historically unprecedented immigration pressure from its near vicinity. At this precise moment we believe that analyzing and interpreting the characteristics of the flows of emigration that occurred from Romania following 1989 (INSSE, 2015) is both interesting and illustrative within the present European context and meanwhile worthwhile to study for the benefit of proper policy conceiving and accordingly decision taking. Both assets and liabilities observed in the country, or else, the volume of immigration in connection with the categories of barriers in place during the last decades, are instructive indeed. There are also plenty of sources indicating that the immigration process was overall beneficial in econometric parameters for recipient EU countries, no matter how intense and negatively branded was the public debate concerning social security costs in those countries.


But as Romania is a full EU member only since 2007, can we draw scientifically relevant and politically usable conclusions on the migration occurring on legal paths after such a rather short interval? Though this process has been gaining impressive quantitative dimensions especially since 2002, when Romanian citizens acquired the right to move without visa requirements within the *Schengen area*, the real amplitude of the migration

process, both before accession and after, on both legal and non-legal migration situations, is definitely debatable in terms of assets and liabilities for Romania as a labour exporting market. While each recipient country thoroughly measures the impact of immigration, in order to protect properly its labour market, emigration is less mirrored in the sending countries which usually have no alternative for properly buffering the domestic unemployment.

Still the answer could be affirmative due mainly to the volume of the investigated phenomenon. According to the available data, the number of Romanian migrants could be today anything between 1 and 3 million, representing around 5-15% of the population of the country. (See Box 1)

Box 1 - Official estimates of the size of Romanian emigration

The population census conducted in 2011 was the first occasion for an official estimate of the Romanian emigration. Beginning with 2014 the official statistics provide data separately on usual resident population and on permanent resident population. The first category represents all the persons with Romanian citizenship, foreigners and without citizenship who have usual residence on Romanian territory. There are considered as having their usual residence in a specific geographical zone only the persons living at the usual residence for at least 12 months before the reference moment. The second category represents the number of persons with Romanian citizenship and domicile (the address where the person declares to have the main dwelling registered in the identity card) on the territory of Romania. The usual resident population on July 2013 was 19.983m, while the permanent resident population on July 2014 was 22.299m. The difference of 2.3m represents the Romanians away from their residence for more than 1 year, which might be a quite precise estimator for the size of Romanian emigration and represent 10.4% of the permanent resident population.



Source: INSSE

The migrant population is younger than the population left home due to the larger share of the age groups between 20 and 39 and 45-49 (decreștii!). Many young people have chosen emigration during these years, instead of getting a higher education within the country.

The impact of the so called *push factors* (notably the average salary in a source country) generating emigration were obviously exceeding that of the *pull factors*, those induced by the outlook, evolution and overall dynamics of the recipient's country labour market. Let's face it: the income differential between Romania and the countries within either the *Eurozone*, or the larger *Schengen area* is sizeable and the perspectives to fill the gap seem to be today rather bleak, just as they appeared during the last quarter of century. But one should also acknowledge that the delicate *push/pull equilibrium* was and still is parameterized in EU in many ways, politically, socially or culturally. It is our point that we can use precisely this interdisciplinary parameterized approach as a benchmark for the analysis of the present day immigration influx. (See Box 2)

Box - 2 The persistence of pull factors

After 10 years of migration the pull factors are maintained. The labour market conditions in the regions with heavy migration around 13-16% of the permanent population (NE and SE) are still worse than in the low migration regions (S,SV,NV and Bucharest) around 6-8% of the permanent population with the exception of the unemployment rate for low educated persons (see Annex). The activity rate in high migration region was lower than in the low migration regions by 1.2 pp in 2013 compared to 0.5 pp in 2002, the employment rate was lower by 0.9 pp in 2013 and compared to 1 pp in 2002. Both the wage gap and income gap per persons in households widened. In 2002 in the high migration regions, compared to low migration regions, the net monthly wages were lower by 10% in 2002 and by 17% in 2013, while the income per persons in households was lower by 13% in 2002 and by 20% in 2013.

First of all, no matter what kind of statistical sources we would use, all of them point to the fact that the Romanians' average income would still be almost ten times lower than in the richest country of EU and about two times lower than in the least wealthy comparable country of the CEE area. Secondly, the Romanian EU bound economic growth cycle, which started in 2000, was harshly interrupted by the crisis and retrieved its upward move only quite recently, actually did not led to net job creation within the country, despite all the FDI that poured in. Thirdly, the job destruction which paralleled the objective restructuring process of the economy both during the transition from planned to market economy and from pre-crisis to post-crisis outlook, generated a sizeable pool of unemployed and even worse, unemployable people, under the present day market skill demand. So, the propensity for emigration still stands, despite the adversities, the most important one being the filling of the low skilled labour market by the new extra-EU immigrants.

Considering also the evolving junctures of the Romanian economy since the early 90s and up to the present, and interpreting data that indicate growth or recession time at the scale of the Union, or even wider in the world economy, pull factors were sizeable due to the fact that many developed countries faced a significant shortage of low skilled and consequently low paid workforce. During the expansionary phase of their business cycle they were easily absorbing additional workers in sectors such as construction, agriculture or tourism. To what extent would it be feasible to model econometrically these labour market influences also on Romania? The main point would be to find out if the assets derived from significantly lowering the unemployment rate of the country could match the liability of depleting the expansionary labour market of its most skilled workforce. And this script could be then expanded EU wide.

3. A micro perspective on Romanian emigration

The real essence of the micro approach of the matter would be in our opinion whether and how the foreseen path of the Romanian economy could be (politically) restructured in order to influence the migration process, also for the benefit of the national economy and society as a whole, beyond the obvious recipient countries' assets derived from this process. A few preliminary facts could be illustrative indeed in this respect: the pre-accession time migration process was mainly networking driven, in peculiar ways, either by family or by the local community and headed towards three main EU destinations: Italy, Spain and Germany. No extra-burden of any kind, such as a specific social security fee, was enforced, though examples of the kind are spread around the world when it comes to the so called migration falling in the *circular flow* pattern. (Sandu, 2004) Emigrants holding Romanian citizenship returned periodically and spent and very seldom invested their money earned abroad, mostly in residential properties and long term commodities, thus enhancing the features of the *circularity hypothesis*.

The Romanian migrants' social profile, as determined during the pre-accession period could be roughly defined as follows: mainly originating from urban areas, aged between 25 and 39, more educated than the average Romanian, often working in the

receiving country as construction workers, caretakers or agricultural workers. The education is not a comprehensive selector for Romanian migration, the emigration rate of persons with college education being around 18%, which situates Romania among the countries with an average rate of emigration for higher educated people. On the other hand the proportion of people holding a higher education degree is still significantly lower even today than in most developed countries, therefore this figure could be dramatically misleading in terms of the *brain drain* phenomenon. But this could rapidly change today, due to the fact that the lower skill labour market will soon become overcrowded, while the still expansionary cycle will demand more migrant skilled workforce across the most developed countries of EU. Consequently, the incentives for more education, both in terms of quantity and quality, at home, before eventually migrating will enhance. Under these conditions the sending countries will reap more benefits *only if the circularity of migration is maintained*.

Deepening our micro level investigation, what probably matters more from the perspective of identifying a relevant migrant's profile would be the social perspective, namely the one of the sender's social group's (family, individual, associative entities) *remittance pattern*. A previous, quite comprehensive, research of ours (Kallai and Maniu, 2009) concerning this topic, revealed that the average amount of remittances received by households sending migrants abroad was around EUR 1800 a year, meaning that the recipient families are relatively constantly enjoying the benefits of about half of the monthly average domestic salary in today's Romania. While the cumulated amount of remittances received in the country in 2007 peaked an estimated EUR 8 bn. Following the crisis the number significantly decreased, the figure being computed to be only 3.4 in 2014.

Of course these figures are rough estimations which are forwarded as double by some sociologists and macroeconomists, mainly due to the identification of several informal channels of sending money home, channels that could be tracked only through rough estimations. Such a situation, no matter if we are dealing 8 or only half the amount of remittances, in billion EUR, could be assessed at first sight as a huge economic progress

for the probably around two million Romanian receiving families. Obviously in terms of fighting against endemic poverty migration is contributing significantly to income inequality alleviation. But it is our opinion that such is not the case, if we count all the elements of the Romanian microeconomic equation. Clearly most of the remittances (4/5 according to our Survey) are used for household consumption, mostly directed towards rather expensive imports, to the detriment of investment. And this outcome induces to the domestic labour market as well as to the social security budget a plethora of liabilities to be taken care of.

One can primarily argue that following this pattern remittances significantly contributed to the expansion of demand, ahead of supply, true causing a relevant widening of the current account deficit, but forcing the other than export engine of growth of the country, namely the domestic consumption. After all, the strategic goal of convergence within EU implies such approaches. Contrary to this view, others are pointing to the fact that migration and consequent remittances are actually heavily seeding the germs of a *Dutch disease case* in the Romanian juncture, while deepening the gap between recipient and non-recipients. This situation occurs at a time when price alignment can be observed especially when it comes to food and other essential non-elastic commodities. The real estate sector, traditionally a non-elastic one in Romania, is clearly illustrative in this respect. It witnessed a spectacular bubble effect, which heralded the crisis in Romania, odd enough, just as in the United States a couple of years before.

4. Territoriality and migration

There are objective connections between the territorial (regional) origin of migrants and country and region of destination, the patterns of moving around, remittance flows and their impact, etc. managing to aggregate all these inputs into what could be described as a multi-parameter *migrant's profile function* would add significant consistence to our research. But we have to mention first that international movements of labour were preceded in Romania, just as elsewhere, by domestic ones. Re-arrangements of the economic framework generated significant moves from rural to urban and the opposite.

Nowadays, when the cycle is again upwards, we witness again domestic entropy, this time between provinces. The extreme Western counties of the country attract workforce from the poorer Eastern ones, the shortage of labour supply in various industries rationally explaining also the fast rise of minimum guaranteed and average wages in the country, despite the evident lack of equal pace of growth of the productivity throughout the country. There is no specific pattern of domestic migration except labour feed-back to investments.

But emigration would be, roughly speaking, more sophisticated, mainly a *community type of migration*, since migrants from entire regions tend to choose the same destination. This is due also to the fact that one can still notice major imbalances within the territorial framework of development of today's Romania, therefore not only the social typology of the migrant matters but also the specificity of the domestic location of the above mentioned. According again to a previous research (Kallai and Maniu, 2007), the Romanian regions, as defined according to the *Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics* (NUTS-2) might be grouped into three categories: regions where the three main migration destinations (Italy, Spain and Germany) represent the target for more than 70% of all migrants, such as North East, South East and West; regions where the three main destinations represent the target for 50%-70% of the total migrants like Centre, South West and Bucharest and one region, South West, where these three destinations is the choice of less than half of the migrants.

It is beyond doubt that a clear pool of migrants for Italy is the North Eastern region, where 60% of migrants are heading toward this destination, while the largest share of migrants towards Germany would be found in the Western region. There is no clear originating basin of migrants for Spain, since more regions (North West, Bucharest, South-East) send migrants with the same intensity both to Spain and Italy. But there is one region where Spain as destination for migration is chosen by the largest share of migrants, namely the South region. Due to this feature of the Romanian migration outlook, the development of the migrant outsourcing regions is tightly linked to the economic conditions and immigration policies of the receiving regions in specific EU countries. Moreover, the cultural peculiarities, the traditional, anthropological features such as housing, working

patter and work ethics observed in those recipient regions indirectly impact over the economic behaviour of the recipient families, especially on those returned home after a longer stay abroad.

Can we identify recurrences of various kinds, features that are pointing towards the idea of a synchronised development cycle between source and destination regions? If one would take as a relevant indicator the spread of the international junctures, or at least the ups and downs of the most interlinked markets, namely the financial ones, the answer cannot be anything else but affirmative. If one takes into consideration the EU *de facto* cluster-ization in developed and less developed countries, *Eurozone* and out of it, *Schengen* and unwillingly out of it, probably the opposite stands valid. Therefore analyzing and evaluating the Romanian domestic labour market today, could be a completely irrelevant process *in absentia* of the parallel investigation of the mirrored EU labour markets which so significantly reverberates in the country through the migratory pillar. At this point it is precisely the impact of the exogenous immigration wave that triggers the need for a more profound investigation EU wide, investigation that was postponed too long, obviously for mainly politically consistent reasons.

5. Education and emigration

Another layer of investigations of the Romanian emigration must concentrate on education, skills and other assets that could ease, or on the contrary put a brake to the outflows. “The education is not a comprehensive selector for Romanian migration” was stated by us previously in this paper and we still back this position in retrospective. All social categories and all educational levels of the Romanian society had a higher propensity to emigrate, than let’s say in comparable countries of the region. The culture of emigration was rapidly but rather deeply embedded in the very fabric of the society and the reasons for that are definitely not historical ones, because the country never faced massive waves of emigration, but mostly to be attributed to the erratic evolution of the economy and society during the transition years that followed after 1989 and the consequent unethical polarization of wealth. True, the real wage dynamics systematically exceeded the

productivity dynamics, especially since 2007, but this empirical reality was not leveraging enough, socially speaking, in order to slow the phenomenon of emigration.

At this point in the evolution of the Romanian economy there is a trend of decrease in unemployment, simultaneously with the growth of the average salary, not only the minimum guaranteed one. This is only natural considering the fact that the country has an estimated rate of growth of the GDP of 3.7%, one of the highest in EU. But the outlook of the Romanian economy, still having as a crucial growth engine the exports, could soon face the dilemma of replacing the excessively expensive workforce in the manufacturing sector with technological fixed assets that would allow keeping the pace of productivity as requested by the producers, which in most cases are part or associated with the MNC's capital. The reality that the Romanian workforce becomes too expensive for the context of profitability of FDI's happened in most CEE countries and is an overall good indicator of convergence towards EU labour market averages. But obviously the situation has a feedback effect negatively impacting on the competitiveness of the country, specifically on the manufacturing sector.

It is our point that the employment ratio, namely the proportion of occupied people cohort linked to the working-age cohort should stay fixed, situation which cannot stand but at the lower extremity – namely to create jobs for the young people, since the opposite, extending work at the other extreme could not happen but with prohibitive, in terms of efficiency, salary costs. So, under the present circumstances, either the young people would continue their studies, and Romania would make a sharp increase in number of those that would not abandon school and enrol in higher education structures, at least up to the European average, or they would face the alternative of emigration. (see Box 3) We believe that on the short run, emigration will persist, particularly due to the fact that educational reforms (skills before knowledge) are difficult to implement and as matter of fact and on the other hand we can witness the reality that more developed countries have to tackle by large more impressive figures of youth unemployment than in present day Romania.

Box. 3 Desertion from schooling

The abandon rate in high school education was always higher in high migration regions than in low migration regions since 2005 when the indicator has been computed. The possibility to migrate and earn more than at home as a low skilled worker created a kind of myopia, which hindered the valuation of medium and long term returns of schooling. Many young people did not realize that although they might gain more abroad than at home as a low skilled worker, the income is not enough to make a decent living abroad. Therefore the circulatory migration became an option.

The most lucrative solution to this domestic issue comes from the main foreign investors, notably German companies from the manufacturing sector, especially from the automotive industry, but also from industrial sectors where they can rely on local tradition, such as the wood processing industry. Foreign companies would invest and support the professional education of their future young employees, therefore securing a relatively cheap workforce and meanwhile and implicitly diminishing the outflow of workforce that would create supplementary problems on their original labour market. It is a mutually beneficial situation, which could trigger many secondary positive effects, including the one we have in mind here: the approach of “de-localizing” migration in the Romanian case could be turned into a relevant pilot for a scheme of stopping the purely economic immigration in EU, via collateral economic and social measures, probably no cheaper than the estimated cost of receiving the present day wave of immigrants, but definitely making a lot more sense for EU.

Such an outcome would be suggested by two main reasons. One the one hand analyzing the long series of demographic evolution of the country in conjunction with the estimated growth during the following decade one can easily draw the conclusion that the country would be not in the situation to sustain growth and implicitly a substantially higher standard of living without liberalizing its immigration policy. But just as recent polls

confirmed, Romania is no exception within CEE, where the mood is set by the *Visegrad Group*: the public acceptance of immigrants is lower than on EU average and there is no room here to elaborate on the historical grounds of this objective reality, though it might that due to exogenous factors (read EU pressure) the situation would gradually change. (Visegrad Group, 2015) On the other hand, if one adds the cumulative effect of the larger pool of unemployed among the younger generation, the narrowing of job opportunities throughout EU, due to the oversupply of particularly less trained and skilled workforce from outside EU, it seems the country must re-interpret its too relaxed policies on both emigration and domestic labour market control, especially on the skilled layer of it.

6. Migration comparative framework. Drawing some EU Policy blueprints

The prerequisite that confers consistence to our comparative migration discourse would mostly rely on the fact that due to the free cross-border movements, the Romanian migrants can always return home if the domestically built expectations are not fulfilled abroad and moreover, they can migrate again later in the same or other places considered more suitable. It is precisely this movement that increased in time the propensity to keep stronger tight links with the families at home and create a kind of circular and also seasonal (for specific lower qualified jobs) migration. There are plenty of empirical evidences for such types of migration during the last couple of years, both exogenously generated, such as the crisis generated shrinking of emigration was, or mainly endogenous, due to cultural or even economic factors. To what extent such an experience, occurring within the EU labour framework, could be relevant within the present day EU juncture?

This year the Norwegian government, traditionally opened to loose immigration rules adopted much tougher measures in order to confront the situation. (Newsinenglish.no, 2015) Including an attempt to limit to 5 years the acceptance in the country on political grounds and then forced repatriation provided the fact there is no more identified threat to the life of those involved. It is the first approach to our knowledge which tries to soften the *either immigrant or refugee* European governmental positioning. (Economist, 2015a) Starting from the acknowledged impossibility of repatriating millions of economic

immigrants on the one hand, on the (un-openly expressed) desire to fulfil the demands of specific labour market, allowing cheap workforce into it and not worrying about the collateral social costs, all these situations are foreseen as highly probable. Since the process of investigation of the peculiar situations has been recently extended in the No. 1 recipient country, namely Germany, from 3 to 6 months (interval when the applicants are not allowed to work) it seems that such a script that strategically provides workforce for some markets is perceived as a valid long term solution to the demographic European setback. Eventually even a circular, seasonal, or cycle driven mechanism of acceptance could be conceived.

But one should think in a more refined way to such a mechanism, than the simple quotas that were forwarded for the moment, or an undifferentiated coupling of the origin and destination countries and this not only for more cultural affinities and compatibility. After all for a significant number of years, Romanian specialists tried to deal with the issue of outflows/inflows in connection with the economic situation in the Republic of Moldova. The theoretical solution that was considered to be ideal for a log while: the labour shortage created by mass migration towards EU might be alleviated through welcoming workers from farther East. Moldova was potentially considered a natural labour pool for Romania, due to cultural similarities, proximity and social propensity to open the labour market precisely in that direction. It turned out not to be so at all, due to various geopolitical junctures, the influence of the huge Russian labour market coming first. (Lăzăroiu, 2003) But once the economic relations on that track toughened due to EU sanctions and Russian retaliation, the inflow from Moldova to Romania started to grow.

Can we asses now that Romanian emigration, and to a much lesser extent immigration from Moldova, and their implications could find proper solutions, within a larger frame than this special historic relationship? Probably no, Romanian emigrants would not be replaced on the short run by Moldovan immigrants, not because the initial conditions changed, but because they found better labour market trajectories initially in the East, mainly in Russia, and lately in EU. Our point is that one cannot plan with necessary accuracy on the issue of immigrants needed for keeping in developmental equilibrium

labour market, unless it is a quota system that works only in the case of developed, high income economies. On the contrary, less developed economies, as the Romanian ones, cannot attract specific skills and orderly conceived cohorts without a pan-European mechanism that allocates and eventually re-distributes the EU's immigrant workforce on a *circular pattern*. Since most of the CEE countries would have to face the issue of immigration sooner or later, not only due the present day imposed quotas, but simply due to the increased demand for workforce in those countries, conceiving and applying, at least as a pilot stage, such a mechanism, could be vital for controlling the unfolding of the events in this highly entropic international economic and social outlook.

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Table 1. Labour market conditions in high and low migration regions in 2013

Regions	Activity rate by education level				Employment rate by education level				Unemployment rate by education level				Net monthly wage	Monthly income / person in households	Abandon rate in pre-university education			Vacancy rate
	total	High	medium	low	total	high	Medium	Low	total	high	medium	low			Primary & secondary	High school & vocational	Post High school and foreign	
High migration	65	86	70	51	60	80	64	48	7	7	8	6	1351	776	2	3	9	0.56
Low migration	66	87	69	45	61	82	63	41	7	6	8	9	1626	954	1	3	9	0.67

Source: INSSE




Fig. 2 Dynamics of labour market indicators in high and low migration regions




Fig. 3 Abandon rate after secondary education in high and low migration regions

Section:

European identity, the idea of Europe

THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS: AN ASSESSMENT OF PLENARY DEBATES

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Abstract: *Although there have been some important contributions to the study of the relationship between the Portuguese Assembleia da República and the institutional system of the European Union, more research and studies are required in order to examine the multiple features of that relationship. Bearing that in mind, this article will analyse in particular the role of the Assembleia da República's plenary in relation to European matters, by systematizing the plenary debates particularly addressing EEC/EU matters, which took place in Parliament after Portugal's accession to the European project, from the IV Legislature (1985-1987) through the XI Legislature (2009-2011) and by assessing the intensity and the evolution of plenary sessions devoted to this subject during those 26 years. This article therefore seeks to present a quantitative analysis of the number of plenary debates dedicated to European matters held in each legislature, while also providing a qualitative approach regarding the contents of those debates. Also included is an analysis of the changing legal framework in which mandatory plenary sessions devoted to EU affairs have been held over the years, covering the latest developments introduced by the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty and of Law no. 21/2012 of May 17, which amends Law no. 43/2006 of August 25, on the Assembleia da República's monitoring, assessment and pronouncement regarding the development of the European Union.*

Keywords: debates, European Union, national parliaments, plenary, Portugal

1. Introduction

After the establishment of the democratic regime in 1974, and immediately following the process of decolonization, Europe emerged as a top priority of the I

¹ The views expressed in this article are, naturally, purely personal in nature.

Constitutional Government, which submitted the Portuguese application for European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 1977. Nine years later, Portugal became a member state of the EEC.

Even though academia has, over the years, studied several aspects of the Portuguese membership, including the role of Parliament in European integration (to wit: Ramos, 1995; Magone, 1996, 2006 and 2007; Leston-Bandeira, 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2004; Miranda, 2000; Miranda, 2001; Fraga, 2001; Pinto and Teixeira, 2002; Lobo, 2003; Filipe, 2005; Guedes and Coutinho, 2006; Pardal, 2007; Miranda and Medeiros, 2006; Paulo and Leston-Bandeira, 2006; Fraga and Paulo, 2008; Jančić, 2011; Meyer Resende and Paulo, 2012), it was only in 2013 that a first mapping of the debates held by Members of Parliament (MPs) was made (Paulo and Cunha, 2013).

In contrast, in European Studies broadly speaking there is already a long narrative on national parliaments and the European Union (EU)², but which only truly became a research area no more than two decades ago. Since then, scholars have been researching the link between national parliaments and EU decision-making; the EU democratic deficit or democratic legitimacy; monitoring and scrutinizing EU draft legislation; the early warning system; and case-studies on particular national parliaments³.

² See for instance: O'BRENNAN, J. & RAUNIO, T. (ed.) (2007) *National Parliaments Within the Enlarged European Union: From 'Victims' of Integration to Competitive Actors?*. New York: Routledge; KIIVER, P. (2006) *The National Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution-building*. Leiden: Kluwer Law International; NORTON, P. (ed.) (1996) *National Parliaments and the European Union*. London: Frank Cass; MAURER, A. & WESSELS, W. (eds.) (2001) *National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or Latecomers?*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

³ Respectively: BERGMAN, T. (1997) National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on Empirical Variation and Competing Explanations. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(3), pp. 373-387; BENZ, A. (2004) Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union. *West European Politics*, 27(5), pp. 875-900; RAUNIO, T. (1999) Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union. *Government and Opposition*, 34(2), pp.180-202; NEUNREITHER, K. (1994) The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Towards Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments. *Government and Opposition*, 29(3), pp. 299-

After the “poor discussion” (Franco, 1994, p. 208) on EEC accession held not only at the governmental level, but also by society in general and by the Portuguese Parliament, *Assembleia da República*, in particular, the Parliament slowly started - at its own pace and following the new EEC/EU developments - to engage in a more interested and active participation regarding European affairs.

This path was taken hand-in-hand by the Portuguese Parliament and by the EU, as the steps in the deepening role of the EU were always followed by the strengthening of the role of parliaments in EU affairs. So, following the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice and, finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, there was either a national Constitutional revision that enhanced the role of parliament in this regard or new legal provisions or procedures were approved in the same sense.

This article seeks specifically to address this issue, with the assumption that one way to measure the relationship between national parliaments and European integration is by studying the content of the agendas of the plenary debates. Therefore, by analysing the debates held over eight legislatures (from 1985 to 2011), the authors measured those devoted to European affairs in contrast to the overall number of debates on other issues, in

314; AUDEL, K. (2007), Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs. *European Law Journal*, 13(4), pp. 487-504; RAUNIO, T. (2011) The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National Parliaments in the EU Political System. *Journal of European Integration*, 33(3), pp. 303-321; COOPER, I. (2006) The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(2), pp. 281-304; HANSEN, T. B. and SCHOLL, B. (2002) Europeanization and Domestic Parliamentary Adaptation: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of Commons. *European Integration online Papers*, 6(15); HEGELAND, H. (2002) Parliamentary Participation in EU Affairs in Austria, Finland and Sweden: Newcomers with Different Approaches. *European Integration online Papers*, 6(10); DIMITRAKOPOULOS, D. G. (2001), Incrementalism and Path Dependence: European Integration and Institutional Change in National Parliaments. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), pp. 405-422; FITZMAURICE, J. (1996) National Parliamentary Control of EU Policy in the Three New Member States. *West European Politics*, 19(1), pp. 88-96; BIRKINSHAW, P. (1996) National Participation in Community Affairs: Democracy, the UK Parliament and the EU. *Common Market Law Review*, 3(33), pp. 499-529.

order to assess the relative weight that European affairs have at the Parliament's plenary sessions, a central forum for debate. Finally, this article also intends to make a contribution to literature dedicated to the study of the Europeanization of national parliaments (Börzel and Risse, Radaelli, 2003), by providing new data on the Portuguese case, often neglected in comparative studies.

Therefore, taking the *Assembleia da República* as our case study, the main aim of this article is to analyse the Europeanization of the Portuguese parliament by looking at the plenary debates and the relative importance of the plenary arena in EU affairs. In order to do so, we deal with the following research question: "After accession, did the Portuguese parliament become increasingly Europeanized, namely by addressing a number of key EEC/EU issues?" and concomitantly, "does the Plenary play a limited role in European affairs?" This last question leads us to another related to the committee's work. Further research needs to be conducted on this point. As in other EU member-states' parliaments, the Portuguese MPs also deal with EU affairs at a committee level, especially in the European Affairs Committee. If the authors had included the committee's work in their present research subject, the results would have been different, but since the focus of the article is on the plenary debates, they chose not to include it.

In the end, our analysis contributes to the existing knowledge about the role of national parliaments in European affairs, namely by addressing a poorly researched parliament – *Assembleia da República* – and specially by providing new empirical data, that can be used in the future for comparative studies. It also demonstrates that the Portuguese parliament is on a par with other European national parliaments when it comes to discussing EU affairs in the plenary arena.

The main criterion that guided the selection of plenary debates for analysis in this article was the enrolment of a specific European issue in the plenary agenda⁴, excluding any debate in which the EEC/EU was mentioned in the context of a discussion devoted to

⁴ Data provided by Divisão de Apoio ao Plenário da AR (DAPLEN) and also available online at <http://debates.parlamento.pt/index.aspx?cid=r3.dar>

any sectoral matter, as well as debates held in the scope of the seven constitutional amendments. Although, as Cristina Leston-Bandeira (2002, p. 145) points out, after accession most debates inevitably address some EU matter at some point.

In fact, nowadays “not only a growing number of national issues have a European dimension, discussions on European legislation, as well, can be dominated by national issues”, which coincides with the theory of multilevel governance whereby Europe is characterized by increasing interconnectivities of national and European agendas (Auel and Raunio, 2011).

The article is divided in two parts: the first focuses on the evolution of the legal framework related to the debate of EU affairs by the plenary of the Portuguese *Assembleia da República* from EEC accession to the present time; the second part of the article is more empirical in nature and assesses the number of debates held over 26 years, their evolution (if any), as well as the major issues addressed.

2. The role of the Portuguese Parliament’s Plenary in EU affairs

The Montesquieu definition of legislative power is no longer a sole prerogative of parliaments, notably not of EU Member-States’ Parliaments, precisely due to the transfer of a wide range of legislative powers to the EU supranational level of decision. It is, therefore, widely recognized by literature that the deepening role of the EU led to a radical change in the processes of decision making in the member states and a consequent loss of power by key domestic actors (Maurer and Wessels, 2001), not only in legislative terms, as referred, but also in terms of political influence and, lately, even in terms of budgetary prerogatives, all three renowned for being the core business of parliaments.

As did other parliaments, the Portuguese *Assembleia da República* developed a number of mechanisms in order to try to compensate for this loss/transfer of powers, specifically by reinforcing its political oversight of the behaviour of the executive as a co-legislator in the EU and by exploring the possibilities provided by the EU treaties to enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process. Indeed, it is worth noting that “national parliaments are no longer docile lambs willing to be led to the

European slaughtering block, but exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments in EU affairs” (Auel and Raunio, 2014, p. 13).

Accordingly, among the main competencies of the Portuguese Parliament - elective, legislative and political oversight – the truth is that “European integration directly affects the exercise of the legislative powers of the *Assembleia da República*, termed by many as an 'external evasion' of its primacy regarding legislative competences” leading the Parliament to a “European deficit” (Freire, 2002, p. 41).

However, in order to offset this *deficit*, the majority of the constitutional amendments reinforced the role of the Parliament as far as EU affairs are concerned. Thus, in addition to the generic power to approve treaties (Art. 161(i)), the Portuguese Constitution establishes that the Parliament shall “as laid down by law, monitor and consider Portugal’s participation in the process of constructing the European Union” (Art. 163(f)) and it is competent “to pronounce, as laid down by law, on matters awaiting decision by European Union bodies that are related to the sphere of its exclusive legislative competence” (Art. 161(n))⁵.

In practice, over the nearly three decades of EU membership, Parliament has increasingly aimed at focusing on monitoring the action of the executive, which directly participates in the European decision process as co-legislator in the EU Council of Ministers.

As far as the relationship between the Parliament and the Government is concerned, the Portuguese case is characterized by an informal system of reciprocal influence, based on a systematic parliamentary scrutiny of EU initiatives. This is the system which guaranties the Government the highest level of flexibility towards the definition of a national position to be presented in Brussels. However, it is also “the model which requires the lowest intervention by Parliament” (Paulo and Leston-Bandeira, 2006, p. 7). Even so,

⁵ In addition, it is also within the power of the Portuguese Parliament to legislate on the regime governing the appointment of members of European Union bodies, with the exception of the Commission (Art. 164 (p)) and receive, in due time, the Government’s information concerning the process of constructing the European Union (Art. 197(1)(i)).

over the last 26 years, both in law and practice, Parliament has been performing an enhanced role related to EU affairs, particularly in regard to the placing of EU matters on the agenda of the plenary sessions.

The first reference in law to a plenary debate on EU matters is Law no. 111/88 of December 15, 1988, on the parliamentary monitoring of Portugal's participation in the European Communities (the first *European Scrutiny Law* - ESL), which established that the European Affairs Committee (EAC) should draft a report on the global evaluation of the Portuguese participation in the Communities for assessment by the plenary (Art. 2(3) and (4)). Following the constitutional revision of 1992 and the signing and entry into effect of the Maastricht Treaty, Law no. 20/94 of June 15, 1994, i.e., the second European Scrutiny Law was approved. This law stated that “the *Assembleia da República* shall regularly make an overall assessment of the Portuguese participation in the process of constructing the European Union. For this purpose it shall convene a debate attended by the Government during each Presidency of the European Council” (Art. 3(4)). Although this law did not specify where the aforementioned debate was supposed to be held, it has been convened, ever since, by the plenary.

Furthermore, this law identifies the European Affairs Committee, the plenary and the other permanent committees as the parliament's actors in EU affairs (Art. 1(4)), specifically granting the EAC power to submit draft resolutions to the plenary (Art. 5(5)).

A new European Scrutiny Law was approved in 2006, Law no. 43/2006 of August 25, entitled “Law of monitoring, assessment and pronouncement by the *Assembleia da República* within the scope of the process of constructing the European Union”. This law expressly established plenary debates devoted to EU affairs, with the presence of the Government:

“The Assembly of the Republic shall monitor and assess Portugal's participation in the process of constructing the European Union, particularly by means of: a plenary debate in which the Government shall take part, following the conclusion of the last European Council of each Presidency of the European Union; the debate in the first half of the year may also include

assessment of the European Commission's annual political strategy, and that in the second half of the year assessment of its legislative and working program" (Art. 4(1)(a)).

This, in addition to "an annual plenary debate in which the Government shall take part, for the purpose of discussing and passing the annual report sent by the Government" (idem, (b)).

In fact the "adoption of the ESL, which foresaw the institutionalization of a systematic scrutiny system in the summer of 2006 was a key factor in triggering a change in the parliament's record of scrutiny of European legislation" (Meyer-Resende and Paulo, 2012, p. 88), since it provided a parliamentary procedure for scrutinizing the EU initiatives. This vested the plenary with the jurisdiction for adopting the parliamentary formal written opinions on matters that fall within the sphere of its reserved legislative responsibility and are awaiting a decision from EU bodies, as well as for adopting the parliamentary formal written opinions in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (Art.1 (1) and Art. 2(4)).

Thus, the plenary became an actor in the EU parliamentary scrutiny, by having the possibility to adopt the positions of the Parliament on EU matters also and, mainly, by organizing debates on specific EU agenda topics (Jančić, 2011, p. 99).

Under the terms of this 2006 law, three plenary debates devoted to EU affairs were established: one, at the beginning of the year, for the presentation of the priorities of the Presidency of the EU Council for the first half of the year and for the debate of the European Commission Working Program for the next year; another debate, at the end of the first half of the year, to take stock of the Council Presidency on the first half of the year and for the presentation of the priorities for the next Presidency; and, finally, a debate devoted to the annual report submitted by the Government on the Portuguese participation in the EU.

General practice, however, has shown that, the parliamentary formal written opinions were generally adopted by the EAC and that, despite the obligation to reserve

three debates *per* year to specific EU matters, parliamentary political groups often sought to aggregate a number of themes in the same debate. At the same time, interested MPs often complained about the lack of time available for the debate (usually only 3 minutes, *per* political group, to discuss all the themes).

Thus, even if a group of specialized MPs, specifically members of the EAC, stood for the enhanced debate of EU matters in plenary, practice reflects that the leaders of the parliamentary groups often set the plenary agenda based on the priority given to what is considered as “internal” matters, which rarely included matters in debate or about to be decided at the EU level.

With the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, on December 1, 2009, national parliaments were entitled to a number of new possibilities for enhancing their role related to the EU decision-making process. The Treaty of Lisbon guarantees national parliaments a broader access to information, namely by providing that EU institutions forward to parliaments, directly and opportunely, a number of documents (Art. 12(a)) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocols 1 (Title I) and 2 (Arts. 4 and 9) annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).

Since the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments are also notified on certain procedures, and are able to participate in EU evaluation and control mechanisms (e.g., Europol and Eurojust, as stated in article 12(c) TEU; Arts. 69, 70, 71, 85 and 88 TFEU). Moreover, national parliaments may now express their *reasoned opinion* on whether an EU draft legislative act complies with the principle of subsidiarity, the so-called 8-week *early warning system* (Art. 5(3) TEU; Art. 12(b) TEU, Art. 69 TFEU and annexed Protocols 1 and 2.).

With the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments also became an actor in the process of treaty revision (Art. 12(d) TEU and Art. 48 TFEU), having a veto power regarding the use of the *passerelle clause* (when the Council decides to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting on measures concerning family law with cross-border implications - Art. 48(7) TEU and Art. 81(3) subparagraphs 2 and 3 TFEU), and must be informed regarding other States’ applications to join the Union (Art. 12(e) TEU and Art. 49 TFEU), and on the

use of the *flexibility clause* (when the EU considers that there is a need for an EU initiative in an area where the Treaty does not attribute that competence to the EU - Art. 352(2) TFEU).

As a consequence of the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, these provisions on national parliaments – containing a set of mechanisms that amplify their role in European decision-making – began to be applied. Consequently, one of the effects of these new treaty provisions in Portugal was precisely an enhanced role of the plenary as a parliamentary actor in EU affairs, with the power of making the ultimate decisions regarding the scrutiny of EU initiatives and the prerogative of debating a larger number of the EU agenda items.

According to the above mentioned, the Portuguese Parliament amended the European Scrutiny Law by Law no. 21/2012 of May 17. Among others, this law provides four novelties regarding the role of the Portuguese Parliament's plenary in EU affairs: first of all, it vests the plenary with the power to approve the parliamentary formal written opinions on matters that fall within the sphere of its reserved legislative responsibility that are awaiting a decision from EU bodies (Art. 2(4)); secondly, it also provides the plenary with the power to approve the parliamentary formal written opinions on the principle of subsidiarity, in the framework of the Lisbon Treaty *early warning system* (Art. 3(3)); thirdly, it provides more plenary debates dedicated to specific EU agenda items; and, lastly, it introduces the debates with the presence of the Prime Minister to discuss the agendas of the European Council meetings.

Indeed, this amendment contributed significantly to the Europeanization of the agendas of the Plenary. In fact, since 2012 there are – at least as laid down by law – eight mandatory debates on EU matters, with the presence of the Government, as the following table illustrates:

Table 1: Plenary debates on EU affairs, as established by the European Scrutiny Law, as amended in 2012

When	What	Who
January	Priorities of the Presidency of the Council of the EU and European Commission Work Program ⁶	Government
March	European Council's agenda	Prime-Minister (<i>new</i>)
Second quarter (<i>new</i>)	Instruments of EU economic governance related to the European semester, namely the Stability and Growth Program (<i>new</i>)	Government
June	European Council's agenda	Prime-Minister (<i>new</i>)
July	Priorities of the Presidency of the Council of the EU and Annual Government's Report on Portugal's participation in the process of constructing the European Union	Government
Final quarter of each year, following the debate held by the European Parliament (<i>new</i>)	State of the Union (<i>new</i>)	Government
October	European Council's agenda	Prime-Minister (<i>new</i>)
December	European Council's agenda	Prime-Minister (<i>new</i>)

Source: the authors.

⁶ A debate on the European Commission Work Program is due to be held in the "last quarter of the year", as stated by law (ESL), but, in practice, this debate ends up being held in the first days of the New Year.

In concrete terms, with the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon and with the 2012 amendment to the Portuguese *European Scrutiny Law* – even if it does not represent a significant change and impact on the overall results in terms of the effective enhancement of political engagement or even in a real influence in the final EU decisions – at least, it reinforced the powers of the plenary of the *Assembleia da República* on EU matters. And this is considered by the authors as additional evidence in the context of a trend towards the Europeanization of plenaries throughout EU member states, despite the significant disparities among them.

In fact, the plenary incorporates the major functions of a Parliament: it is the plenary that votes legislation and approves the State Budget and it is in the plenary that the political oversight regarding the Government performance is debated at the highest level, with the participation of all political parties which are represented in Parliament. The plenary also plays an important communication role in regard to the citizens on matters of major political relevance.

3. Debating Europe

This section addresses the debates held in the Portuguese Parliament between November 1985 and June 2011⁷ (from the IV to the XI legislature). This extended period provides a clear view not only of the evolution of the number of debates, but also of the subjects discussed. As it comprises more than 25 years, it may be divided into three distinctive periods, namely *adaptation, integration and implementation* (Paulo and Cunha, 2013, p. 182): whereas the first period (1985-1995) coincides with the early accession years and the approval of the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the first law regarding the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, the second (1995-2005) reveals a more adjusted Parliament, which deals with all kinds of European affairs with ease, and finally, the implementation period (2005-2011), in which Parliament employed a more

⁷ Since the IV Legislature was in office between 1985 and 1987, and the Accession treaty was signed on June 12, 1985, we have decided to include three debates held two months prior to accession.

active posture regarding this subject. This trend would be confirmed after 2011, following the adoption of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and, specially, due to the fact that Portugal was subjected to an IMF-EU financial assistance program until mid-2014, which, of course, inflated the number of plenary debates on EU matters⁸.

As far as the *adaptation period* is concerned, the fact is that, during the EEC accession negotiations, the role of the Portuguese Parliament was almost nil, having discussed the matter only a couple of times, namely before the accession request was delivered, and after the treaty was already negotiated and even signed. Hence, immediately after accession, European affairs was definitely not a common topic on the MPs' agenda, and even if it became more frequent in the years that followed, the first decade after accession is characterized by a modest number of debates on EU subjects.

Throughout this first decade, Parliament addressed issues related to the European Parliament (EP) elections, the Single European Act and focused, for the first time, on the role that it should play regarding European integration (Law no. 28/87 of 29 June). In addition to having held general debates on the broader scope of "European integration" and the monitoring of Portuguese participation in the European Communities on three occasions, Parliament debated the completion of the common market around the year 1992 and also the distribution of European funds.

In the early nineties, Parliament did monitor the developments at the European level and engaged in the debate of the treaty revision (future Maastricht Treaty), at the same time the country held, for the very first time, the Presidency of the European Council, on which only one debate was held, at the end of the presidency⁹. Still during this VI legislature, the remaining discussion focused on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, the ratification of the agreement on the European Economic Area and of the

⁸ Although since 2011, with the Eurozone crisis, there began an especially important period for the EU, in general, and for national parliaments, in particular, the authors chose not to include the debates on this period, as the XII legislature is still ongoing and data would be incomplete.

⁹ Debate held on July 2, 1992.

accession treaties of Austria, Finland and Sweden, which became EU member states on January 1, 1995, completing the fourth round of enlargement.

The low number of debates held until then would, however, increase from mid-1996 onwards, with more frequent discussions on EU affairs being scheduled on the plenary agenda. During this *integration period*, again, plenary debates mainly focused on the role that Parliament should play in monitoring and assessing the Portuguese participation in the EU, but they also dealt with current European affairs such as the Agenda 2000, the revision of the TEU and the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Single European Currency and the second Portuguese European Council's Presidency.

After a significant decrease of EU debates during the VIII legislature (1999-2002) – both due to the lack of substantial EU inputs and to domestic political developments which resulted in the dissolution of the Parliament in 2002 –, the IX legislature (2002-2005) was responsible for the highest score of plenary debates convened to discuss EU matters.

During this legislature, the Convention on the Future of Europe, which took place between 2001 and 2003, constituted an important milestone, not only for national parliaments in general, but also for *Assembleia da República*. The work developed by the Convention included representatives from national parliaments, who, for the first time, were called on to discuss the revision of a European treaty, during which they recalled the need for an *ex-ante* pronouncement by national parliaments regarding the European legislative process. Indeed, the “participation of parliamentarians in this Convention caused a series of debates, both parliamentary (in committees and in plenary) and academic, all over the country, stoking European issues in national policy agenda” (Paulo and Leston-Bandeira, 2006, p. 9).

The European Constitution, EU enlargement, the assessment of the Common Fisheries Policy and the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact were other issues discussed by MPs. A total of 18 debates were held during the IX legislature, which makes it, in both absolute and relative terms, the time period when MPs most discussed European matters in the Portuguese Parliament's plenary. This can be explained partially by the unprecedented fact in the history of European integration related to the parliamentary

involvement in the treaty reform process conducted by the Convention on the Future of Europe.


The involvement of MPs in the debates, at European level, promoted internal debates and prompted a greater interest of parliamentary groups which have so far scheduled more frequent debates on European issues. The 2004's fifth and largest enlargement in the history of the European Union and the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact were also events that lead to the increased political interest in the ongoing developments at the European level.

During the following legislature, however, from 2005 to 2009, the *implementation period*, there were only ten debates out of a grand total of 468, representing merely 2.1% of the discussions. Indeed, despite the reinforced powers provided by Law no. 43/2006, the Portuguese MPs did not debate EU matters in plenary very often, choosing the standing committees as the main *fora* for discussion.


The gridlock subsequent to the negative referenda in France and in the Netherlands on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe may be at the centre of an abrupt political indifference towards European issues. However, and even so, Parliament debated some key issues, such as the EU financial perspectives, enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, the priorities of the third Portuguese EU Council Presidency and the ensuing Treaty of Lisbon.

From 2009 to 2011, the last legislature in analysis, the proportion of debates devoted to European matters was the highest ever (8.7%) and the debates focused mainly on the Stability and Growth Program, which became one of the reasons of the premature demise of this legislature. But other debates focused on the Commission Working Program for that period, the EU Council presidencies' priorities and outcomes, and the assessment of the Portuguese participation in the EU in general.

Overall, during the above mentioned eight parliamentary legislatures, European affairs debates were never lacking. However, there were never more than 18 *per* legislature (four years on average), as shown on graph 1, which means that there were roughly only four debates *per* year.



When comparing the number of plenary debates devoted to EU affairs with the total number of plenary debates held during the 26-year timeframe, the conclusion is that, on average, only 4% of the total number of plenary debates were dedicated to EU matters, as graph 2 shows.



This lack of plenary debates devoted to European affairs is, however, in accordance with a larger trend registered widely among member states' national parliaments. In fact, literature focuses on identifying a certain convergence in relation to the low number of plenary debates regarding European affairs (Raunio 2009) in various UE national parliaments. Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg (2010, p. 175) conclude that “most literature regrets the lack of plenary debates on Europe” and that the existing research clearly demonstrates the limited role that the Plenary plays in European affairs.

Recent data show that only 0.4% of the debates held in the British House of Commons from 1997 to 2010 were devoted to European affairs; whereas in the French *Assemblée Nationale* the number rises from 5 to 7% between 2002 and 2010; on the other hand, in the Deutsche *Bundestag* up to 20% (between 2002 and 2009) and even 33% (in 2009 and 2010) of the debates focused on European affairs (Auel and Raunio, 2014, p. 18). The latter is obviously an exception, since most national parliaments prefer to debate only some major European initiatives in the plenary, while focusing the debate on concrete

matters, such as the legislative and non-legislative EU initiatives, at the committee level (European Affairs Committee and sectoral committees).

An overall assessment of the debates indicates that the topics which are addressed are diversified and centered on issues that were formal (treaty revision, the Parliament's role regarding European integration, etc.), political (EU Council presidencies, European Councils, enlargement, etc.) and economic (sectoral policies, European funds, Single European Currency, Lisbon Strategy, etc.), as presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Main European affairs issues debated in Parliament (1985-2011)

1985-1995	<p>European elections</p> <p>Single European Act</p> <p>Common market</p> <p>European funds</p> <p>European Single Currency</p> <p>Common Agricultural Policy reform</p> <p>Treaty revision – TEU</p> <p>Fourth round of enlargement</p> <p>Parliamentary assessment of Portugal in the EU</p>
1995-2005	<p>European Single Currency</p> <p>Treaty revision – Amsterdam Treaty</p> <p>2000 Agenda</p> <p>2000 Portuguese European Council Presidency</p> <p>Convention on the future of Europe</p> <p>Fifth round of enlargement</p> <p>Common fisheries policy</p> <p>Monitoring and assessing Portuguese participation in the EU</p>

2005-2011	<p>EU financial perspectives</p> <p>Sixth round of enlargement</p> <p>Monitoring and assessing Portuguese participation in the EU</p> <p>European funds</p> <p>2007 Portuguese European Council Presidency</p> <p>Lisbon Treaty</p> <p>Growth and Stability Program</p>
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In general, the most debated issues in *Assembleia da República* were treaty revision¹⁰, enlargement¹¹ and the single European Currency, and the Euro¹². Although slightly higher in number, overall these debates were, in general, highly motivated by formal procedures (parliamentary or even constitutional in nature) and often envisioned a *pro et contra* vision of Europe and European integration¹³.

¹⁰ *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 18, December 10, 1992; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 28, January 20, 1994; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 81, June 14, 1997; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 31, January 7, 1999; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 27, December 7, 2000; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 32, January 10, 2008; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 45, February 8, 2008; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 75, April 24, 2008; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 101, July 3, 2008; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 5, November 19, 2009.

¹¹ *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 23, January 16, 1994; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 73, January 11, 2003; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 8, October 4, 2003; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 83, May 3, 2004; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 98, March 4, 2006.

¹² *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 103, September 27, 1996; *Diário de Assembleia da República*, I Série, N.º 53, March 20, 1997.

¹³ A thorough analysis of these and other debates is currently being made in a book commissioned by the Portuguese Parliament itself to the authors of this article, due in 2015.

4. Main findings

After analysing a period of 26 years, from the early accession years until a status of maturity – characterized by a full capacity to fulfil the duties and obligations inherent in EU membership – mostly after 1992, debates on European affairs held in the Portuguese Parliament were on a pace with the developments within the EEC/EU itself.

Assembleia da República adopted mostly a reactive posture rather than a proactive institutional and political behaviour, which was, in fact, in accordance with the powers provided to national parliaments regarding European integration as a whole, and European legislative powers in particular. This was also in line with the secondary role of the Portuguese Parliament towards the executive regarding the domestic decision-making process on EU affairs.

This article, based on empirical data, clearly demonstrates that between 1985 and 2011 only 91 of a total of 2249 plenary debates specifically addressed European issues (4%). This result may be explained by the consensus existing among the largest Portuguese parliamentary groups towards EU integration and the consequent low controversial nature of the European debate at national level¹⁴, at least, during the first two decades of EU membership. It may also be explained by the technicality and specialization associated with the debates of EU themes and by the generalized idea that EU matters do not call media attention nor contribute to the re-election of MPs.

¹⁴ The Portuguese party system may be characterized as being of “limited contestation”, with smaller parties being moderately Eurosceptic and major-ruling parties holding pro-integration views. Despite the recent economic crisis, these positions towards European integration have not changed. On this subject, see for instance: FREIRE, A. (2012) European Integration and Party Attachments: The Portuguese Case as an Example of the New Southern European Democracies. In: TEIXEIRA, N. S. & PINTO, A. C. (ed.) *The Europeanization of Portuguese Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 183-224; GUEDES, N. (2012) Convergência ideológica? Uma análise comparada dos programas eleitorais do PS e do PSD (1991-2009). *Sociologia, problemas e práticas*, 68, pp. 103-125; LOBO, M. C. (2006) Da consolidação democrática à qualidade da democracia: a União Europeia e os partidos políticos portugueses, *IPRI Working Paper*, 20.

This finding sheds light on the role that European affairs have played in parliamentary debates in the country over the last three decades, which, as shown above, are, in any case, in accordance with the figures presented by other member states.

If we had considered the work conducted by committees on this subject, results would have surely been different. Still, for this period, national parliaments, including the Portuguese one, were “amongst the main victims of European integration” (Sá, 1994, p. 403) and would only gain some extra powers with the Lisbon Treaty. In the Portuguese case, this victimization was indeed obvious regarding the monitoring of EU affairs in the first two decades of membership, reflecting in particular the meagre discussion of European issues in the plenary.

Nevertheless, there has been an evolution regarding the number of mandatory plenary debates devoted to EU matters. First, with one mandatory debate, approved by law in 1988, then with two mandatory debates, as provided by the European Scrutiny Law of 1994, followed by three mandatory debates after the approval of a new European Scrutiny Law in 2006, and, following the amendment of that Law in 2012, there are now eight mandatory plenary debates on issues related to the EU agenda.

Of course, besides these mandatory plenary debates on the EU presidencies, on the Government’s report on Portugal’s participation in the process of constructing the European Union, on European Councils and on specific matters related to the annual EU agenda, MPs also debate related EU issues during discussions on national subjects that (more and more) have a European prerogative.

The research made by the authors leads to the conclusion that the number of debates devoted to EU affairs – in addition to those which are legally provided - pretty much depends on the impact that a certain issue has on domestic political life or sectors, on the controversial nature of the subject, on the interest of the EU agenda itself (namely to the mass media) and the involvement of MPs in the agenda.

There seems to be a solid relation between the development and further reach of European affairs and the increase of political interest to debate those matters. In reality, when the MPs got engaged in the treaty reform process, the number of debates on

European affairs also rose. On this matter, Graph 1 clearly demonstrates that it was during the Convention on the Future of Europe, the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty and the discussions on the Stability and Growth Program that the highest number of debates was held. Indeed, whenever the European agenda demanded more national MP participation, or when some decisions had a significant impact at the national level, Parliament had an extra incentive to debate those issues.

Thus, the data now published indicate that every time the EU evolves and/or its action has a significant impact on member states, national parliaments tend to place EU matters on their plenary agendas, highlighting the importance of those matters by debating them with the entire Chamber (and not only with the specialized MP from the EAC). By doing so, Parliament is also communicating the MPs' positions on such EU matters to citizens and raising EU awareness through a plural and democratic approach. In any case, it is easy to conclude that 4% of such debates may not be an impressive result when it comes to demonstrating that EU matters should be more publicly debated by the citizen's representatives at the national level.

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**IS EUROPEANISM A LEGACY OF THE SECOND MIDDLE AGES?
A HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH OF
THE PAN-EUROPEAN IDENTITY
IN THE *LIBER AUGUSTALIS* (1231) AND *PANEUROPA* (1923)**

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Abstract: *This paper brings into focus two major innovations of European identity: the Liber Augustalis (1231) and Paneuropa (1923). It discusses several concepts of modern Europe and their possible medieval origins in the first written constitution of government in the Western tradition. The purpose of the constitutiones was to reign in these regimes and unite them under a single rule of law that defined the rights, powers, and duties of each of the components, purpose that mirrors the labors of the European Union today. We gaze into the ideological and terminological correspondences between the Liber Augustalis and Paneuropa in order to understand the origins of the best example of Pan-Europeanism: the European Union. Introspection on the machinations of the main European power of the thirteenth century that had one language (i.e. Latin) and wanted to create one law, offers a better understanding of the signs manifested by the Pan-European movement, with English serving as main language, slowly heading towards Europeanism. We contest the hypotheses regarding the primacy of the Paneuropa manifesto as the first popular movement for a united Europe, and we bring arguments that Europeanism is an heirloom of medieval origins, and that these constitutiones were not confined to defining the structures, procedures, rights, powers, and duties of government as later constitutions would be.*

Keywords: European Identity, Paneuropa, Liber Augustalis, Europeanism, European Union, legal history.

1. Introduction

What is Europeanism? Briefly, Europeanism¹⁵ can be defined as an attachment or allegiance to the traditions, interests, or ideals of Europeans, and in the second sense as the ideal or advocacy of the political and economic integration of Europe.

What is the idea behind the construct considered to be *Modern Europe*? There are two typical contexts for the use of the word identity in the treaties that regulate the European Union. First, there exists the need for identity at the level of the Union. Such identity has to be perceived as clear and distinct from both inside and outside. Secondly, there is the need to respect existing national identities of the Member States.¹⁶

What is the concept of Pan-Europeanism? A Pan-European Identity does not currently exist, on the contrary identity does not seem to surpass the national level. Article 8 of the draft of the Constitutional Treaty states 'Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the union shall be additional to national citizenship; it shall not replace it'. This provision allows citizens of EU member States rights provided at the European level, which might weaken old communal loyalties, but national citizenship is still not affected (Arizumi, 2011).

Such understanding of defense identity is effective today, as is shown by Mrs. Agnelli's outline of the priorities of Italian Presidency for the first semester of 1996, delivered to the European Parliament on 1/18/96: "External Security. The European Union must assert its external identity by exercising an "irreplaceable" stabilizing influence..."

¹⁵ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/europeanism> (Accessed on 19.10.2015).

¹⁶ What is widely known as the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, published on July 29, 1992) emphasizes the European identity as a goal to achieve in military defense, based on a common defense, being independent and asserting its identity on the international scene. As the Declaration on Western European Union (WEU) reads, one step of critical importance to build such a "genuine European Security and defense identity" is the progressive merger of Western European Union and European Union, by means of which the WEU would become the "defense component" of the Union (today there are members of the European Union which are not members of the WEU).

Article available at: http://sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado_d.html (Accessed on 20.10.2015).

However, the Treaty only links identity to defense. A report on the functioning of the Treaty released on 5/10/95 broadens the meaning to all Union's external dealings "where it will have to bring a genuine European identity to bear". On the other hand, Article F of the Maastricht Treaty reads "Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States". Taken together, these two aspects (European identity and respect for national identities) set up a segmentary-type model of belongings. It is the same model that Shore (1993) reports having seen pictured by European Administration representatives when asked about the issue. As we shall see, the Union is perfectly aware that such a model deals with a problematic integration. In spite of that, the "hierarchical levels of belonging" tell us that the Union is to get a consciousness and a culture of the same kind of the nations. Only national identity is visible: other sources of a plural culture coming from outside the national identity (immigration), or below the national level (regions, ethnonational minorities, social movements) do not appear to make the selection.¹⁷

However European identity can be considered the negative construct of a Europe torn apart by World War. It was a negative outcome of an attempt to end German Europe and to forge a European identity in the Cold War, squeezed, as Europe was, by the rivalry of the USA and USSR.¹⁸

European identity was the negative construct of a Europe torn apart by World War.¹⁹ It was a negative outcome of an attempt to end German Europe and to forge a European identity in the Cold War, squeezed, as Europe was, by the rivalry of the USA and USSR. But negative cultural formation cannot carry the day when the driving forces – the geopolitical threats to Europe – disappear. The questions then arise: who are we

¹⁷ http://sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado_d.html (Accessed on 20.10.2015).

¹⁸ <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-held-kyle-mcnally/europe-eu-and-european-identity> (Accessed on 20.10.2015).

¹⁹ <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-held-kyle-mcnally/europe-eu-and-european-identity> (Accessed on 20.10.2015).

Europeans? What does it mean to be European after the Cold War? Can European identity survive the global financial crisis?

We assumed that Pan-Europeanism, the European identity the European culture are linked by their very founding ideas, the idea of a set of rules, a single and just rule of law, the constitution. The question now arises regarding the medieval origins in the possibly first written constitution of government in Western tradition, the *Liber Augustalis*. The purpose of the *constitutiones* was to reign and unite different regimes under a single rule of law that defined the rights, powers, and duties of each of the components, purpose that mirrors the labors of the European Union today.

We must further gaze into the ideological and terminological correspondences between the *Liber Augustalis* and Paneuropa in order to understand the origins of the best example of Pan-Europeanism: the European Union. Introspection on the machinations of the main European power of the thirteenth century that had one language (i.e. Latin) and wanted to create one law, offers a better understanding of the signs manifested by the Pan-European movement, with English serving as main language, slowly heading towards Europeanism.

“So too the name commonly given to the code, the *Liber Augustalis*, the Augustan book, will be avoided; a name that is the creation of those later commentators who wished to see in these laws an explicit statement of the theory of autocracy” (Abulafia, 1992, p. 203).

2. Constitutions of government in the Western European Tradition

Law-codes often reveal to the reader merely what he wants to find
(Abulafia, 1992, p. 203)

The thirteenth century saw attempts in several European countries to set down the local law in writing and in every case those responsible turned to the civil law to provide organizing categories and organizing principles. The English common law was set out in the Latin treatise on the laws and customs of England, known as Bracton, written in the 1230s. Following the articulated manner of Roman law, the author understood the need for

a coherence approach regarding the laws of the king's court. His treatise equipped the nascent common law with the minimum theoretical structure that it needed to grow in a coherent way (Stein, 2004, p. 64).

At the same time as Bracton was compiling his collection of English law, the Emperor Frederick II in 1231 promulgated a collection of laws for his Sicilian kingdom, known as the *Liber Augstalis* or Constitutions of Melfi. In substantive content these laws are not obviously Roman, but Roman texts were used to justify the law-making power of the Emperor and the procedure to be adopted in the royal courts (Stein, 2004, p. 64).

He established a harsh policy of the containment or repression of local freedoms and local autonomy, and one particular law in the *Liber Constitutionum* of 1231 that he promulgated, the *Constitutio Puritatem*, was to pose great problems of interpretation for later historiography. This constitution established a rigid hierarchy among the normative sources of the Regnum. Judges were to apply the laws of the kingdom first; if the royal law failed to provide a norm corresponding to the case under examination, the judges were directed to turn to the city customary laws, but only if such laws had been expressly held just and admissible (*bonae et approbatae*) by the king. Finally, if the judges found no applicable norm either among the sovereign's dispositions or among the *bonae et approbatae* customary laws, they might avail themselves of the *ius commune*. This, according to an explanation in the text but perhaps added after its publication and placed at the end of the constitution, comprised Lombard and Roman law (Bellomo, 1995, pp. 89-90).

Historians who have grappled with the problems posed by "Puritatem" have not always dealt with both aspects of the problem. The text should be examined from the point of view of the local legal institutions of which the statute was an expression, but also from the point of view of that universal political entity, the empire, of which the *ius commune* was a projection. Furthermore, some historians have considered the local laws and the *ius commune* only within a perspective that reduces them all to simple positive law. After the death of Frederick II in 1250, both during the course of the tumultuous events that ended the Swabian phase of the Regnum and when Charles I, the first Angevin king of Sicily,

came to the throne in 1266, the cities once more began to weave the fabric of their liberty and their self-government (Bellomo, 1995, p. 92).

In his research, of Frederick II, *Frederick II a medieval emperor*, David Abulafia considered that in his kingdom of Sicily, the emperor focused on restoring and enforcing royal control. “In 1231, during the summer, Frederick enunciated a new code of laws for his kingdom, presenting this code to his vassals at Melfi, in the south Italian hinterland. The Constitutions of Melfi, containing over two hundred laws and proclamations, have been hailed by historians as the clearest evidence of Frederick’s wish to make Sicily a ‘model state’, well ordered, centralized, efficient, in which all rights and obligations are subject to the ruler’s whim or will” (Abulafia, 1992, p. 202). He goes on adding that “The practical requirements of reconstruction were wedded to the theoretical requirements of a highly developed concept of absolutist monarchy to create a coherent, consistent body of legislation. “Such an interpretation of the Constitutions of Melfi is, however based on wishful thinking” (Abulafia, 1992, p. 202). He adds that his legislation does not mark the coming of a new Justinian, the laws were not issued on the scale of the Roman codes, and that they did not seek to encompass the whole of human experience, but rather to deal with problems specific to a kingdom in urgent need of reconstruction.

This legislative work (*Liber Augustalis* was probably may have been in large part drawn up by Frederick’s secretary, the cultivated Pier della Vigna) is divided into three books. It is an “open corpus”, however, to which novella constitutions of Frederick’s were added, either as an integral part of the work or separately in an appendix. Not all of Frederick’s later legal enactments found a place in the *Liber Augustalis*, however, a fact that shows selectivity at work and that ultimately gives special value and significance to the legislative texts that were included and demotes the excluded texts to a secondary or occasional status. In short, the *Liber Augustalis* contained the notion (which was to be typical of nineteenth-century “codifications”) that the materials is subjected to unified treatment were to underlie the entire normative system throughout the land. This is, incidentally, an idea that was realized during those very same years, in sharp rivalry with the *Liber Augustalis*, in the *Liber Extra* of Pope Gregory IX, a work that gave the church a

universal normative system, the exclusiveness of which we have already seen. This rivalry created an internal ambiguity in the *Liber Augustalis*, and this ambiguity places the *Liber Augustalis* squarely at the center of the sources of the *ius proprium*, and it attributes a value, a dignity, and a quality to that *ius proprium* lacking in other local normative regimes (Bellomo, 1995, pp. 93-95). His ideas of government stand in a direct line going back to Augustinian ideas of the state as the corrector of man's sinfulness. It is true that Frederick intrudes notions which, at least coincidentally, have an Aristotelian flavor, stressing the function of the created world and the purpose of the ruler as a source of potential perfection or improvement within society (Abulafia, 1992, p. 207).

Consequently, to cite just one example, if we must agree that Charlemagne's universal order fell apart because that first emperor of the Holy Roman Empire had no clear idea of *imperium* and *dominium*, it is just as undisputable that Frederick II had a very clear grasp of those same notions. These were ideas founded on and incorporated into the dispositions and doctrines of the *ius commune*, thanks to the rediscovered importance of the ancient Roman law and Justinian law. They were a part of the European legal tradition of the first half of the thirteenth century, when the glossators' school had reach its height in the works of Azo, Hugolinus, and Accursius. They were the only possible roots from which the project of a "general law" for the exercise of imperium could spring- which was the point on which Frederick II and Gregory IX clashed (Bellomo, 1995, p. 96).

In Spain the legal situation was much affected by the Moorish domination. *The Liber iudiciorum*, a seventh-century collection, based on earlier collections of Visigothic and Roman laws, which had originally been applied to the Visigothic and subject populations but had become territorial, provided some basis for the regional customs. In the middle of the thirteenth century, two remarkable kings, Ferdinand III and Alfonso X, were able to exploit the new learning in order to counter the diversity of laws in their dominions. In the style of Frederick II in Sicily, they sought to introduce a modern system that would act as a unifying force and bring Castile into the main stream of European legal thought. Ferdinand initiated an ambitious set of law books, culminating in the *Siete partidas*, published by Alfonso, known as "the wise". The division into seven parts glowed

with religious significance and may have been modeled on the sevenfold division which Justinian imposed on the Digest for educational purposes. The work they produced was a mixture of traditional customs of Castile and Leon, of civil and canon law and of rules derived from the Old and New Testaments and from patristic writers (Stein, 2004, pp. 65-66).

Peter Stein considers that the European movement and the institutions it has produced resulted, during the last two decades, in a revival of interest in Justinian's law, as the law of an ancient unified Europe, and even more in the medieval *ius commune*, which transcended national boundaries and was everywhere expounded in the same way and in the same language. The institutions of European Community law are frequently described as forming the beginning of a new *ius commune*. The difference, which is sometimes overlooked, is that the medieval *ius commune* was adopted throughout Europe voluntarily, through the recognition of its superiority to any alternative, whereas the new *ius commune*, such as, for example, the rules of product liability, is imposed from above in the interest of uniformity (Stein, 2004, p. 130).

In the Middle Ages, it was assumed that old law was generally good law. Yet the Constitutions of Melfi combine old and new law: the dominating theme is the need to adapt and improve law to fit the urgent need of the Sicilian kingdom (Abulafia, 1992, p. 208). Here lies the political significance of the introduction to the *Constitutions of Melfi*. A theory of government could be propounded in which there was no need to include the saving power of the pope. It was the ruler who had the power to direct mankind to a better end, through the proclamation of good law based on the exercise of righteousness (*justitia*). This optimism must be set against the pessimism of the view that the ruler was a scourge whose power must be reined in by the Vicar of Christ (Abulafia, 1992, p. 207).

3. European and Christian identity towards Pan-Europeanism?

Tough Roman law remains the preponderant influence, the Melfi legislation does not consist of a plagiaristic restatement of Justinian's code.

(Abulafia, 1992, p. 208)

Frederick the II considered himself a vivid example of the old roman Caesar, a legislating Caesar in pursuit of his only love, his realm. His image of a Christian Caesar was following the model of that celebrated by Dante in his image of his first Christian Caesar, the Law-Giver Justinian. There were three Roman Emperors whom he explicitly took as his models: Justinian, Augustus, and Julius Caesar.

The Middle Ages took Justinian- with Scipio perhaps, and Cato and Trajan-as the symbol of Justice, the *minister Domini* who codified Roman Law; Dante treats him as a sacred figure, and he was the inevitable pattern for Frederick the Law-Giver. Immediately after concluding peace with the Pope the Emperor set himself to unify the law of Sicily. In August 1231, at Melfi he published his famous Constitutions- the fruit of strenuous and prolonged activity on the part of the Imperial High Courts (Kantorowicz, 1981, p. 223). This collection, representing a sort of State Law and Constitutional Law, was based first on ancient Norman ordinances, some of which had been collected orally from the lips of aged inhabitants, secondly on earlier legislation of Frederick`s and finally on a large body of new laws (further released at a later date), all blended into one coherent whole by the Emperor and his colleagues (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 223).

“The great codification of a state`s constitutional law- the first of the Middle Ages; indeed, the first since Justinian-was deservedly admired by the world, and annotated by scholars as a work that would be authoritative for centuries” (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 223).

After Justinian, the Emperor of Law, Frederick II`s next hero was Augustus, renowned as Emperor of Peace. The Augustan age was the scriptural fullness of time and the only *aurea aetas* of peace since Paradise. For the Son of God had desired to be born under the rule of Augustus, Prince of Peace, to live as man under his laws, to die under his decree as Roman Emperor. In the days of this great Emperor, the contemporary of Christ, himself celebrated as the Saviour, the Redeemer, the Soter²⁰, the constitution of the world

²⁰ *Soter* is the last word in the early Christian construct of ΙΧΘΥΣ (Ichthus), a backronym/acrostic for "Ιησοῦς Χριστός, Θεοῦ Υἱός, Σωτήρ", (Iēsous Christos, Theou Yios, Sōtēr), which translates into English as "Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour".

had been perfect, because Augustus had rendered to every man his own, and Peace had therefore reigned (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 224). Frederick II conceived it his peculiar mission to bring again this Augustan peace-epoch and the divine organization of the world. If this order could once more be restored his own day would again be the “fullness of time”, in which *pax et justitia*, the only end of earthly rule, would reign over the whole earth as in the days of Augustus. Once, and once only, the Savior himself had recognized the Roman Empire as a rightfully existing, when he said *render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's* (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 235). Justinian, the Emperor of Law, and Augustus, the Emperor of Peace, were Frederick's models; peace and law; two sisters in close embrace; *pax et justitia*, a formula which in endless variation eternally recurs, defining the purpose of a State.

This duality, this Two-in-one-ness permeates the whole Sicilian Book of Laws: after the preliminary introduction the first and weightiest section is divided into two distinct parts, the first concerns internal peace: *Pax*; the second legal jurisdiction: *Justitia*. The law book itself Frederick called the “*Liber Augustalis*” in honor of Augustan majesty; and the book which was published in September 1231, bears on it the date of August (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 226-227).

Law-Order-Humanity typified in the three Caesar-figures, a trinity that embraces every function of a State. The Emperor's Sicilian Law book, the *Liber Augustalis*, teaches what forces, the *virtutes*, are potent to produce these three. True, they are obscured by scholastic-juristic conventions of expression, but they are nevertheless undoubtedly forceful. For these basic influences went to create the first purely secular state, freed from the bonds of the Church. This was the beginning of State-making and its influence, though blunted and obscured, has come down to us to-day through autocracy and bureaucracy (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 227).

All the metaphors of the Book of Laws point in the same direction. The Emperor was the sole source of Justice, and on the throne of Justice he who weaves the web of Justice takes the highest seat. His Justice flows as in a flood; with the scales of Justice he weighs to each his right; he interprets the law and resolves the problems of the jurists and

issues laws to end their differences. He must find new remedies daily for new vices, for amid the changes of time and circumstance the ancient laws do not suffice to pulverize the vicious with untiring hammer blows. From him Justice flows through the kingdom his rivulets and those who distribute his rule throughout the State are the imperial officials who take the helm in the Emperor's stead, and are themselves the Emperor's image, even as he himself is the image of God. These officials were no longer feudal retainers of varying degree, but men selected by the Emperor's favor from every rank, who held their posts not as a *beneficium*, a fief to possess, but as an *officium*, a service to fulfill; in Church phraseology: they discharged the service of God. Since these law-learned officials were appointed by a special act of the Emperor's grace, which only the Emperor could exercise the "co-knowers of our knowledge" he called them the purchase of office in the State was forbidden as simony. The official remains an official, as long as the Emperor considers him worthy and the charisma rests on him, irrespective of his personal worthiness or unworthiness. "It is sacrilege to debate whether that man is worthy whom the Emperor has chosen and appointed" (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 235).

This unmistakable Aristotelian doctrine: the Emperor conceived as the thought-center and power-center of the State was implied in the wording of every law. This penetration of the *civitas terrena* by an independent force immediately of God, demonstrates at once the distinction between "state" and "empire" for the Empire was an inactive abstraction based on an idea, and received its spiritual force through the Church. The State with its finite boundaries is no abstraction based on an idea but a living principle, active and potent to its uttermost boundary. The Justice-God, conceived by the Emperor as a power working in accordance with law, is the characteristic symbol of the Sicilian State. Herein is the answer to a riddle: Kaiser Frederick, in relation to the Empire, where his role like that of his predecessors remained pre-eminently that of the guardian and conservator of *Pax et justitia*, appears "medieval" while in relation to his Sicilian State he is felt to be "modern", because he is a power at work. Caution, however, is necessary here. The true "modern", has nothing in his make-up of the image of God which Frederick II knew himself to be in Sicily. This dual role to be, at one and the same time, the image of God

and a living force this is what makes the whole Sicilian ruler ship of Frederick II unique. This new alertness, this conception of God as a constant force independent of the Church, links the new State with the Renaissance. Here we are again compelled to think of St. Francis at every turn the Emperor's counterpart who in exactly similar fashion, without the Church said, proclaimed God as power. The simple-minded saint saw this power as ever-active Love, a divine *pneuma* which breathed in man and beast and herb; the learned, almost over-intellectual, monarch recognized the divine power in the laws of nature and of science; the one perceiving the earthly manifestations of the Deity by the mind, the other by the soul each after his kind (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 239).

An innovation which Frederick II was the first to introduce into secular law revolutionized the whole legal procedure of the West and shows the active, nay the aggressive nature of the imperial Justice: the Inquisition-prosecution. The general view prevailed in the Middle Ages that a criminal prosecution implied a plaintiff: where none accused, none judged. For certain capital offences Frederick II definitely abolished this principle. Where the crime in question was the gravest one, high treason, an investigation could be set in motion on behalf of the State, without any plaintiff, without delay, without special imperial authorization, simply by the proper authorities on the spot (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 240).

This State was a "work of art", not because of its skillful administrative methods, but because the union of the laws of God, Man, and Nature (Three-in-One of Natural Law, Divine Law, Human Law) made it an approximation to an ideal original (Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 255). Consciously or unconsciously this new monarchy served as a model and a standard for centuries.

4. The Pan-Europa, the idea of a united Europe

Considered to be a milestone in European history, the Pan-Europa, published in

1923 (Vienna), by Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi ²¹ is considered to be the first coherent pro-European manifest. Starting from the necessity to reconcile the European nations into a stable political unit, based on a common goals and interests, the United States of Europe, the author proposes a detailed program meant to bring back the competitive and economic power of Europe, and to grant institutions and alliances as so forth as to prevent a new world war.

Coudenhove's proposal quickly found support among admirers and supporters in the leading circles of European intellectuals, poets and philosophers: Paul Claudel, Paul Valéry, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Stefan Zweig, Gerhart Hauptmann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Franz Werfel, Arthur Schnitzler Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein and the philosophers Ortega y Gasset and Salvador de Madariaga supported the Pan-European idea as well as the composer Richard Strauss. The young mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer who was later to become German Chancellor and the Viennese student and subsequent socialist Federal Chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky were among the first members. Reactions in official political circles were however, lukewarm to negative.²²

In 1926, the first Pan-Europa Congress took place in Vienna with 2000 participants from 24 nations as the public breakthrough for the young movement with the "Pan-European vision" becoming a synonym for the political unification of Europe. Coudenhove was elected the first International President of the Pan-European Union by acclamation. Europe's most respected statesman, the French foreign minister Aristide Briand, became honorary president of the movement in 1927. On 5 September 1929, in a speech before the League of Nations in Geneva, Briand proposed, the creation of a federation of European nations at the insistence of Coudenhove-Kalergi. The initiative of a single man became a

²¹ Son of an Austro-Hungarian count and diplomat and a Japanese lady, the cosmopolite philosopher, writer and politician Count R. Coudenhove-Kalergi became one of the pioneers of European federation and unity by publishing in 1923 the book "Pan-Europa". <http://archives.eui.eu/en/isaar/89> (Accessed on 28.10.2015).

²² http://www.paneuropa.org/gb_int/geschichte.html (Accessed on 13.11.2015).

real political option and the Pan-European movement became an influential organized association on a Pan-European basis.²³

In 1950, the city of Aachen awarded the father of the Pan-Europa idea the first international Charlemagne award (Karlspreis). Shortly thereafter, the European Parliamentary Union merged with the European Movement which was established by Winston Churchill's son-in-law, Duncan Sandys. The European Movement elected Coudenhove-Kalergi as its honorary president, who was the only private citizen alongside politicians such as Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schuman and Henry Spaak.²⁴

Pan Europa was written after the Great War, after a devastating and horrific event that had surpassed even the most terrible of prophecies when Europe was preparing anew for a global conflict. It was a time when the unification projects of Dante and Comenius were silent, the spirit of the Wilsonian Society of Nations was dormant, and the populist communist class hate promulgated by Stalin and Hitler's hate of race, nationalism, revenge and hate was animating the masses of Europe, a Europe torn up by war making the first steps towards a new war.

In his introduction of the Pan-Europa manifest, count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, stated with bitterness that: "Europe is gazing in the past, rather than the future, the market is invaded with memories. The public political debates regarding the past war are greater in number than the ones regarding the prevention of the next. This orientation inwards, to the past is the main reason of the fragmentation and decline of Europe" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1997). With the Youth of Europe lies the mission to change this *status quo*. They are called upon to build, on the ruins of the old Europe, a new Europe, replacing the anarchic Europe

²³ After the failure of the Briand initiative, Coudenhove led the struggle further - no longer in an offensive position, but defensively, against the growing tide of communism and fascism. Through this, the history of European parliamentarism began. http://www.paneuropa.org/gb_int/geschichte.html (Accessed on 13.11.2015).

²⁴ http://www.paneuropa.org/gb_int/geschichte.html (Accessed on 13.11.2015).

with an organized Europe. Despite this message, despite his cry of a unified and peaceful Europe, the movement had no effect.

Two main problems are now facing Europe: first is the social problem followed closely by the European problem, the confrontation between classes and the confrontation between states. The first problem is rightfully dominating public debates and is the reason behind the unification or division of parties. The later on the other hand, is passed into obscurity and ignored. Silencing the European problem, no less important than the first and passing it into the sphere of literature and utopias is an actually closing of the people from the future.

In order to defend its integrity and peace against the great extra-European powers is Europe in need to unite and create, to save its own existence, a federation of states?

The author considers this question to be relevant in itself, posing this question is also giving the answer. He also places this decision into the hands of the citizens, the members, the Europeans.

Regarding the Medieval Europe, Coudenhove makes the following statement:

“During the Middle Ages, when despite the linguistically diversity, the culture of Europe was unitary, it was Christian. The west has understood its national identity and unity much better than today. During the crusades, Europe had one faith, one God, one pope, one knightly ideal, one language shared by scholars. Thus, the Christian faith united against the Muslims and the Jews, was a national fight, the religion being the defining element of unity or division” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1997, p. 122).

In the case of a document as important as the Law book of Melfi, which has even been styled “The Birth Certificate of Modern Bureaucracy” the moment of birth must challenge attention. The function of all secular rules in the Middle Ages was defined in the recurrent formula *Pax et justitia*. If Justice reigned there was Peace; if Peace existed it was the sign that Justice reigned. Governing was directed to the securing of justice; justice was an absolute thing, a gift of God, an end in itself. The earthly State a product of the Fall existed with one task before it: to preserve this gift of God. This vitally distinguishes the medieval from the later commonwealth; justice did not exist to preserve the State, but the

State existed to preserve justice. To quote St. Augustine: *true justice reigns only in that State whose founder and ruler is the Christ*. Such a State, whose *raison d'être* was justice, was now completely transcended. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Hohenstaufen Emperor lived at the end of the millennium which conceived justice to be the sole object of a State an object to which Renaissance statesmen were notoriously somewhat indifferent in the zenith of the “century of jurisprudence” which marked the close of that millennium, and which left its mark on Frederick, as surely as he left his on jurisprudence (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 228-229).

Pan-Europa was intended to be a federative alliance, with all the member states having more to gain than to lose. The essential advantages would be the safety of preventing a new world war, neutrality and protection, disarmament, and the ability to become an economic rival to the United States of America. However, the downside of a continuation of things as they are, in disregard of a Pan-European ideology will lead to a new world war leaving a devastated continent, a Russian invasion, armaments that will lead to the financial collapse of Europe and the failure to rival economically the American or British empires (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1997, pp. 145-146).

The European Union is, at its core, a project of Kantian peace, an attempt to create a peaceful union of European states that had been at war with each other for many centuries, but whose orgy of violence in the first half of the twentieth century left Europe exhausted. The Marshall Plan had reawakened hope for European development and the formation of the European Community in the postwar years created a vision of a European ideal that had been eclipsed by the fire and ashes of war. The EU in its most robust form stands at the pinnacle of this vision – an integrated Europe with a single market subject to common rules and a shared framework of human rights and justice. The plurality of European nations could flourish within an overarching shared commitment to democratic rules and human rights standards. Power and authority could be remolded upwards and downwards: cities, sub-national regions, nation states and the supra-national structure of the EU could all exist together in a cosmopolitan structure defined not by - to my nation

right or wrong - but by a shared political culture of democracy, markets and social justice.²⁵

European identity cannot be based on an integrated European culture. It can only survive as a way of solving problems, united by a common political culture inspired by Kant and embodied in the rule of law, multilevel democracy, and human rights. This remains a Europe worth having.

5. Conclusions

The Constitutions of Melfi, promulgated by the last medieval emperor, Frederick II, was constructed as a set of rules intended to bring order and to assure the “rule of law”, the emperor’s law in a multicultural region as was the Kingdom of Sicily. It was not a modern constitution, it was not a model for a modern constitution, or had the germs of a modern constitutional movement that developed into the later codes of the 19th century. The *Liber Augustalis* was the pinnacle of cultural and legal evolution of the 13th century, one of the greatest legislative works of the Middle Ages and a perfect representative of the canonical idiom of *pax Dei*.

The Pan-Europa manifesto was a modern creation, a desperate cry against a divided and crippled Europe, a hopeless effort towards unity and confederation against a coming tide of hate and revenge. The hope of Europe left in the hands of the young generation, with the goal to create a unite Europe, not only socially and economically but also spiritually and brotherly, in order to stand against the rising empires bordering Europe. It was the swan song of a generation of Europeans, which was supposed to transform a utopic idea into reality.

If we are to compare the two, we can find no direct similarities and/or influences that can validate the premise that the first influenced the latter. However they did both follow a similar pattern in development and both had the ultimate goal of peace (*pax*) and

²⁵<https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-held-kyle-mcnally/europe-eu-and-european-identity> (Accessed on 21.11.2015).

unity, order and stability built upon the concept of love (*caritas*). The identity presented in the Liber Augustalis, is not a European identity, but a Christian Identity. Also the identity presented in Pan-Europa is not the European identity we comprehend today, the utopic Pan-Europeanism never transformed into reality. Today, our Europeanism is an artificial construct, a consequence of the second world war, a forced wall created between two rising global powers.

We can only hope that by future studies of our history and our identity we can (re)discover our “European identity” and move towards a Pan-Europa envisioned by Coudenhove-Kalergi, built upon the ideas of justice and peace intended by Frederick II.

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Section: Contemporary culture

REPRESENTATION OF PORTRAITS IN MURALS OF IMPORTANT WALLACHIA LEADERS FROM THE SEVENTEENTH-EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

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Abstract: *Wallachia represents an interesting environment, not just for the Eastern European history itself, but also defines various expressions in mural art. The leaders are represented most of the times on the walls of churches that they have built. These paintings have many particularities, and, besides the clothing, the „votive” paintings, as we call them, are revealing good knowledge of the art of composition.*

It is like a single genre: „the votive painting”, but no work of this type looks like any other. Matei Basarab (1635-1654), Șerban Cantacuzino (1678-1688), Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714), Constantin Mavrocordat (six times prince of Wallachia), are only a few who have their portraits integrated into the fresco surfaces.

The paintings are hiding problems to resolve in dealing with the space, the light and the chromatic element. There are various representations of the same character, some contemporary, some made years after. It is there a sense of mystery in structure or in the semiotic of forms and even, the semiotic of some decoration. The portraits in murals represent a mirroring of a noble personality on a humble and yet, monumental surface: the wall of a church located in a forest or in an old town. Not just the personalities have their place in history, but also their portraits should have the proper place in the history of art.

Keywords: Votive painting, Mural art, Portrait, Composition.

1. Brief introduction

An original and purely visual testimony of the founders of Romanian churches we can find in images. Those images are often paintings of portraits, usually located on the

walls of the nave and narthex of an Orthodox Church. The votive paintings are taking a role of visual documents, transcending the ephemeral nature of time, therefore their imaginary shape survived of the repainting process until today.

The votive paintings are showing sometimes-big group portraits galleries of royal families. Votive paintings are always having a special regime, unlike the rest of the mural painting in a church. They evade a Byzantine style of the canons of representation. They have a different spatiality, colour and style from the rest of all the religious iconography of the mural painting. This is because each votive painting wants to reveal “real-time” images of the founders in a kind of “photographic” manner.

From a visual standpoint, a votive painting may be sometimes the result of repainting; it can be done during the reign of the founder or even long after he left the princely seat. Votive paintings can incorporate images of different kind of rulers, from princes, boyars, to local priests.

Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Wallachia were constructed many churches and today we have remained in total, 2615 of them. This evidence is based on a research volume of the historian Voica Pușcașu (Pușcașu, 2001). The indexing of all the existing churches across Wallachia and Moldavia, from ancient times until the eighteenth century, mainly composes the volume. Some of the churches are included in the UNESCO heritage. Consequently, they belong to the national cultural and artistic heritage. The styles of paintings are often representing local features. The uniqueness comes from their themes, compositions and types of representation.

2. Votive paintings of Matei Basarab

One of the greatest founders or may be the greatest, it is Matei Basarab (1632-1654). His foundations are over 30 in Romanian Country. Constantin C. Giurescu, as cited

by Nicolae Stoicescu (1988, 94), is recalling Matei Basarab as „the greatest founder of churches of our nation”.²⁶

Besides all those churches constructed inside the Romanian Country – Wallachia, Matei Basarab was an illustrious founder of churches at Vidin, Transilvania or Mount Athos (Stoicescu, 1988, 102).

Other 50 churches were raised in his time, by the boyars.

At some of these churches were preserved images with the figure of Matei Basarab. He is represented with his wife, Elina in the votive painting from Brebu. They are represented side by side, looking at each other, and almost holding hands. They are both wearing the princely crown. In the narthex of Arnota Monastery Church, on the wall of the East, Matei Basarab is represented on the left side, while his wife, Elina, stays on the right side of the wall; **(0.1)** they are looking to each other and are devoting the model of the church to the omnipresent God that is blessing them with a hand gesture. They are wearing crowns and golden costumes with wide black lines outlining their postures. In this representation, we can easily depict parts of an unwritten formula of the votive painting generally: the architectural model of the church is present in the drawing, in an axonometric perspective. The donor's hands are holding this model of the church. Into this

²⁶ The evidence of these foundations is presented by Stoicescu. It's a list with name of monasteries and orthodox christian churches that Matei Basarab founded: „the monasteries Arnota- Vâlcea, before 1638 and Brebu – Prahova 1640-1645; the Royal Court and the Church of Brâncoveni-Olt, 1634 – 1635; Brâncoveni Monastery –Olt, 1640; „Curtea Veche”/”Old Court” Bucharest, rebuilt after 1640; Plumbuita Monastery – Bucharest having also princely homes, before 1647; the Monastery „Holy Apostles” – Bucharest (1647-1648) before 1647; the building and the church of Buzău episcopate, 1649; the princely courts and the church of Caracal, rebuilt after 1640; the Monasteries Căldărușani, 1637-1638 and Negru-Vodă from Câmpulung, 1635-1636; the Church Saint Dumitru – Craiova, 1651; Drăgănești Monastery – Teleorman, founded together with his relatives Diicu Buicescu and Drăgușin Deleanu, 1647; the royal Church from Gheorghia, 1641; „baia” from Giurgiu, 1640; the hermitage (schitul) of Lăculețe – Dâmbovița, 1645-1656, the Monastery Măxineni, Brăila, 1637-1639, the royal Church from the monastery Cornățelul, the Călărași Country (jud.); the Monasteries Negoști, Călărași Country, 1648-1649 and Pinu – Buzău, 1647; the royal Church from Pitești (finished by Constantin Șerban); Plătărești Monastery, Călărași Country, 1640; the Royal Church of Ploiești, about 1637; the Church from Porcești – Sibiu, 1653; the Monasteries Sadova – Dolj, ante 1640, Slobozia _ Ialomița, 1634; Soveja – Vrancea, 1645; Strehaia – Mehedinți, 1645; „Doamnei” Church – Târgoviște, 1653; the Church Saint Emperors - Târgoviște, 1650.”

laic and historical mural painting are inserted religious elements. One is the presence of an angel dressed in red, in the left side of Matei Basarab, and the other religious element recalls a presence: a hand of God goes out of a semicircular sky. The large golden elements and the smaller golden little stars that are spread into the overall background, are dominating almost the entire painting. The chromatic is calm and seated. The tonalities are soft, even on the red from the clothes of the angel and from the clothes of Matei Basarab.

As the historian Nicolae Stoicescu says, Arnota (1644) is one of just three churches where we could still find the entire original painting. The other two are „the church from Dobreni (1646) and the church of the Monastery Plătărești (1649)” (Stoicescu, 1988, 118).

The same author has a remark based also on the writings of the historian Pillat Cornelia regarding the style of eighteenth century painting. In the previous century, the mural painters came mostly from the south of the Danube, while this time, there are mostly Romanians who are willing to renew their art, using both „details who are illustrating the sentimentalism easily accessible to apocryphal stories, and also some elements and scenes inspired by the occidental art” (Stoicescu, 1988, 121).



0.1 Votive painting from Arnota Monastery Church.²⁷

²⁷ Image available from: <http://altmarius.ning.com/profiles/blogs/monumente-din-oltenia-1>. (Accessed: 30/03/2016).

The art historian Vasile Drăguț, writes in his large volume of Romanian art history a paragraph over the portrait representation of Matei Basarab at Arnota: „The votive painting, where are appearing the faces of Matei Basarab and lady Elina, has nothing from the solemnity highlighted of the old votive paintings. Stroe (the painter) made here a real family portrait, where the worthy ruler is portrayed with a guilelessness expression, warm and close.” (Drăguț, 1982)

In her work about the painting of Matei Basarab era, Cornelia Pillat quotes Tania Velmans and makes a parallel between the religious and the laic character of a votive painting. She states: „Tania Velmans formulates – what it’s obvious – that, for being inserted into a religious painting ensemble, the portraits of the donors had to be dematerialized and idealized through the same stylistically procedures like the saints and sometimes, they appeared impersonal and less expressive than those” (Pillat, 1980, 51).

We might assume that these paintings are far from impersonal at all, but the similarity with the religious style is determined by the two-dimensional character and by the rigour of the wall fresco technique itself.

A very rare and mysterious screening of Matei Basarab figure, we can find at „Negru-Vodă Câmpulung” Monastery. **(0.2)** The interior of the church is presenting three distinctive assemblies of votive paintings. Among them, we find the figure of Matei Basarab, and below, the portrait of Petru Movilă.

The legendary “Radu Negru Voievod” himself built the celebrated monument with function of Princely Court of Basarabs from Negru Vodă number 64, located in Câmpulung – Muscel, Argeș” according to the tradition” in 1215. However, Matei Basarab “built” the actual church in the year 1635.



0.2 „Negru-Vodă Câmpulung” Monastery votive painting.²⁸

As the historian Pavel Chihaia says, „The earliest news about the faces from Matei Basarab church has been preserved by the Metropolitan Neofit/Neophyte” (Chihaia, 1974, 243). Neofit, who is visiting the monastery in the year 1764, identifies the following images of the founders: Negru Voevod, his son, Dan Voevod, Nicolae Alexandru Voevod and Matei Basarab with his wife, Iilina. This painting would be dating from the year 1636, when the church was finished. However, this votive painting is counting just four figures. Pavel Chihaia is saying: „We note, however, that in the church of Matei Basarab were at that time two large votive paintings: in one, „Radu Negru”, (having near him the face of „Dan” with the inscription: „Son of Radu Negru” which encourages us to assume that this portrait was improvised) and „Nicolae Alexandru”, having the model on the hands, and in the other votive painting, Matei Basarab with Lady Elina, holding a second model. Neither

²⁸ Image from personal collection.

of the two models was the real representation of Nicolae Alexandru or Matei Basarab church” (Chihaia, 1974, 244).

The work is organised on archway shape and the compositional centre is free. Here are painted on the right and left two groups, each holding an architectural model of a church. The grouping of the characters is much organised. The distances between the figures are almost equals. The distances between the bodies from the right and left size, their shoulders and crowns are projected at the same length from the edges of the painting. Their heights are almost identical; all characters are placed at the same length.

Another votive painting, richer in colour and from a recent date, is located below the old painting, in the narthex, on the surface of the western wall of the church. Here are portrayed Petru Movilă (**0.3**) in the right and the Patriarch Justinian „the founder”. Each is holding the sceptre. The model of the church, however, is painted in the left margin, being held by the Saint Martyr Ioan the New of Suceava, alongside with Saint Nicodim of Tismana. The fresco technique is employed here in a very interesting way. The colours are distributed in a fluid state, the entire work looking as if it was realised just with transparency. Over this colour, the constructive lines of drawing make the most consistent layer.

This painting denotes fully smoothness to which contributed the lack of blacks or browns from the outlining lines. For all this lines, the painter used a soft gray colour. (This resolution is atypical for mural painting in general, not only for the votive painting, which however, is more specific). The use of this gray as a baseline in the construction of each character, gives a particular brightness, unifying the whole space.



0.3 Petru Movilă (left).²⁹

As the historian Vasile Drăguț says, „With relative stability within the country and the love for art of the princes, Matei Basarab, Șerban Cantacuzino and Constantin Brâncoveanu, in Wallachia, the local school of painting developed extensively, obtaining important achievements in most areas” (Drăguț, 1982, 377).

Beside this simple composition of Arnota, in the same era of Matei Basarab was built the Săcuieni Church. Here, the founders are Neagoe Săcuianu and his wife, Zamfira. As Nicolae Stoicescu and Cornelia Pillat are saying, the founder Neagoe Săcuianu was not on the year of the foundation, 1655, a high „*postelnic*”³⁰. He will obtain though, the title of great „*vornic*”³¹, later on, on the year 1672. Cornelia Pillat assumes: „/.../Maybe later, when he is regaining the function of grate “*vornic*”, from 16 May 1672 to 16 March, 1673,

²⁹ Image from personal collection.

³⁰ „*postelnic*”= (in the Middle Ages in Wallachia and Moldova) title given to a great boyar/nobleman, member of the royal council, who was in charge of the bedroom of the prince and later was holding the audiences for the prince; boyar who had this title. „DEX”-„Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române”. Available from: <https://dexonline.ro/> (Accessed: 30/03/2016).

³¹ „*vornic*”= (in the Middle Ages in Romanian Countries) high official in the royal council, tasked with the supervision of the Court, the management of the internal affairs, having also judicial powers. Great „*vornic*”=the first boyar of the Divan, with the task of ruling, royal High Court judge and judge for the entire country.” „DEX”-„Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române”. Available from: <https://dexonline.ro/> (Accessed: 30/03/2016).

was done his interesting portrait, painted in the narthex, having alongside his wife, „Sa(m)fira”, two daughters and two boys. In the votive painting are taking part also the father of Neagoe, Ștefan logofăt and his wife, Stanca, the daughter of Neagoe – Bălașa, and her husband, Radu *biv vel clucer*” ³²(Pillat, 1980, 33).

This is not a royal foundation, but later, we will find some interesting takeovers in the painting of Mamu Monastery, where appears the figure of Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu with his family. The places of the husband and wife are reversing their position. (0.4)

The two compositions are somehow similar. They might be actually very contemporary as period of execution. The year 1672, proposed by Cornelia Pillat is actually, eighteenth years apart from the latest reign of Matei Basarab. The painting dates from Constantin Brâncoveanu era.



0.4 Votive painting from Mamu Monastery Church (left); votive painting from Săcuieni (right).³³

³² „clucer”= (in the Middle Ages in Wallachia and Moldova) governor that was in charge with supplying the Royal Court. „DEX”-„Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române”. Available from: <https://dexonline.ro/> . (Accessed: 30/03/2016).

³³ Right image: PILLAT (1980).

Mamu Monastery is considered to be painted by the prestigious Pârvu Mutu from Câmpulung(1657-1735). He developed a unique personal style especially for large group portrait compositions.

In the footsteps of Pârvu Mutu will follow other artists willing to enrich the monumental art from Wallachia and to preserve the glorious memory of its rulers.

3. The votive painting from Hurezi monastery

Hurezi represents the most important foundation of Prince Brâncoveanu, a foundation that was supposed to compete in splendour with the Monastery of Neagoe, at Argeş. The building process will begin in the year 1690, and the church will be dedicated to saints Constantine and Elena.

In the year 1693, the location, now finished, will be beatified. In short time, will start the process of adorning the monastery church with paintings, and, at September, 30 of 1694, the whole work will be committed under the brush and tools of a team of craftsmen, but under the inspiration and rigour of a selective group of mural painters who are represented inside the monastery church. The Greek painter, Constantinos, following a rich tradition shaped by Pârvu Mutu, represents in paintings the high figures and silhouettes of the families of the Basarabs, Cantacuzino and Brâncoveanu, alongside the other portraits of the master painters or the carpenters who helped at the glorious rise of the monastery beauty, celebrated also in the reputed writings of Charles Diehl.

The votive painting from Hurezi (0.5) has its uniqueness in the Romanian and universal art (the assembly of Hurezi being part of the UNESCO patrimony). A contribution to this prestige is offered also by the large composition that covers the whole surface, the walls of the West, North and South of the monastery church. These walls are hosting a large gallery of portraits, and, among them, are raising the votive painting of the great builder, like an independent composition.

Left image: available from: <http://www.mitropoliaolteniei.ro/?p=11543> .(Accessed: 30/03/2016).

It is noted in the votive painting depicting the Prince family group, a systematic way of composing the elements on the surface. On the right is pictured Mrs. Marica, along with seven daughters. At left, is the prince Brâncoveanu, along with his four sons. Beside this way of composing the groups of people, after their gender (a type of composition that we could met in the mural paintings of the Mamu Monastery), we can notice a particularity: all the people are wearing the crown.

The two groups of characters, the husband with the reigning sons on the right, and the wife with the daughters, on the left, are united into the compositional centre by the architectural model of the Hurezi Monastery. The decorative combined with the figurative treatment are revealing some unique notes. The composition as a whole, it may fit into a rhomb shape. (0.6) This is not so common, we might assume, at least in the case of „group portrait”. The succession of diagonal route from the hands of people represented here, converge towards the bottom of the vertical centre line of the votive painting.



0.5 *Main votive painting from Hurezi Monastery Church.*³⁴

³⁴ Image from personal collection.

The crowns and figures of the right and left side of the composite assembly are rising gradually to the top of central median line. It creates a dynamic rhythm into the static, by the laying on of the hands, one rising/raised, another lowered, and the hands of six of the tallest persons being found near the horizontal centre line of the fresco. In addition of a precise targeting and of a „visual dance” of the hands, another rhythm, this time offered by the vertical lines of force, is marking the place and location of each family member of Brâncoveanu.

Notable for the hidden structure of the painting are the isosceles triangles that emerge from the composition outfits. The historical figures are overly long, the stylistic quality emerging from the finesse retrieved both in the imposing monumental forms and in the small items, decoration, physiognomy and into the refined surface that is gliding with all the tiny stars.



0.6 Votive painting from Hurezi Monastery Church, direction lines of the composition.³⁵

³⁵ Image from personal collection.

Very special for compositional solutions is the presence of a daughter who is hiding behind Mrs. Marica. The daughter couldn't take place in the painting, and it's placed „elsewhere”, disturbing the rhomb framing, but claims offsetting the amount of elements with the opposite visual element, in the left corner, where appears Jesus, the saviour, offering blessings and mercy through the symbolic gesture of the coronation. We can easily remember a similarity with Arnota Monastery.

The spaciousness has a defining role in this work, the constituent elements having an original invoice. There are three horizontal registers separating soil from celestial space, but usually, in mural paintings and votive paintings we could find only two.

The mural painter is lengthening the figures of the Prince and Mrs. Marica, and therefore, had to place excessively far in high the model of the monastery church. Automatically, the line that would separate the soil from the sky should have been raised to the half of the votive painting, which would have disturbed the viewer through too neat symmetry that would result. If this so, the lines of the hands of the tallest figures in this painting, located along and across the horizontal median, would not only double, but would evidence too much the median line.

The entire work would have betrayed itself, by revealing its hidden structure. We have, consequently, too lines of the ground, bounded by distinguishing chromatic complementariness of red and green. Grouping the sons and daughters of the younger age and high is a second reason why there is this second line of the ground/soil. Otherwise, these groups of children were to be painted in a vacuum of agitated red, which would not have helped at all the composition. The median green provides respite to the painting.

If we follow the way in which faces are directed, we see another intrinsic rhythm.

Returning to spatiality, we see a new. Although at first glance, there is the illusion that the characters are sitting on the floor, this is not happening, for example, we can look to the left image, where one of the young girls forming a trio group, is designed in transparency on the feet of the mother's body.

To the right, two of Brâncoveanu sons give the feeling that is floating above the ground surface. Another particularity is given by the rhythmic representation of shoes on the two downward diagonals.

This votive painting has a character of masterpiece. Its particularity comes from the personalities themselves that are captured on the wall surface. Above that, the latent construction of the image, both composite and chromatic, plays an important role into the esthetical language of a precious piece of art and of a reliable piece of history.

4. The votive painting from Bascovele Monastery

Not all the votive paintings of Wallachia are presenting splendour images. Some rulers are portrayed later on; some are portrayed in simple images, colors and composition. It is the case of Șerban Cantacuzino, contemporary with Prince Brâncoveanu.

An interesting not so known later portrait of Șerban Cantacuzino we could find in Bascovele Monastery, in Argeș. **(0.7)** The monastery „Bascovele” is located in Ursoaia-Cotmeana village, in the Argeș Country. It is a complex built by the „vel Comis”³⁶ Șerban Cantacuzino, from the year 1695.

³⁶ „comis”=high official in Moldova and Wallachia in the Middle Ages, which had in care the Princely Court horses and stables, offering also feed supply. „DEX”-„Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române”. Available from: <https://dexonline.ro/> (Accessed: 30/03/2016).



0.7 Votive painting from Bascovele Monastery Church.³⁷

The inscription painted in the narthex tells us that the church was ruined in 1842, due to an earthquake, for which was rebuilt in 1843. P.S. Bishop Nikita Duma of Argeş Monastery, with the help of Reverend Archimandrite Grigorie Uritescu, established the monastery in 1932.

The Bascovele Monastery has two votive paintings in the narthex: an old one, with the family of the first founder, and a more realistic new painting, realised in oil, with three priests and a group of nuns.

The main votive painting is located in the right of the vest wall of the narthex. Here are painted Şerban Cantacuzino, his wife, Maria, the daughter Maria who died at the age of three and a nun. Lady Maria and her daughter occupy the centre of the composition.

³⁷ Image from personal collection.

Given the fact that the church was rebuilt in 1843, the old votive painting may have been realised in this year. The new painting dates most likely, from the re-establishment of the monastery, from 1932.

On the right side of the narthex, the first founder is represented in fresco in a degraded style from an early nineteenth century and before. The four characters are simply grouped. Lady Maria and the daughter are placed on the centre line of the painting. The construction of the figures is dominated by large and energetic strokes of colour.

The chromatic in this work is dominated by warm tones, ochre and orange being used in abundance. The ground is painted in a dark ochre and the earthly background are absorbing in the second plan the dark silhouettes, highlighting in terms of colour, the wife of the founder, a pylon element for creating the brightness of the composition through the opening jacket which reveals a long, white, dress.

5. Valea Monastery votive paintings

Another not so well known portraiture and presence of a Wallachia leader we can see at Valea Monastery. Here is an interesting late representation of Constantin Mavrocordat.

The Valea Monastery is located in the village Țitești, the village „The Monastery Valley” and is a foundation of the sixteenth century (1564) of the prince Radu Paisie (1535 – 1545), son of Radu the Great/ Radu cel Mare (1495 – 1545). The main picture seems to have been painted in 1746, when Abbot (egumenul) Damaschin ordered the beginning of works for the narthex painting.

The historian Victor Brătulescu is studying in detail Valea Monastery, its inscriptions and paintings, in a study published in the „Bulletin of the Historical Monuments Commission”. About the church, Victor Brătulescu states, „In 1846 in the days of Prince Gheorghe Bibescu, were painted the big church, the royal icons and the altar, etc. The hallway represents the painting from 1796, in the narthex, the painting from 1746, the nave and the altar have three layers of paintings: the surface dates back to 1846 and the third layer is painted in the time of Mircea Ciobanul, 1540. This later one is of a

particular significance for the development of our mural art, and making it known it is necessary, because in this era of frequent changes of throne, we have only rare models of paintings, most of the churches keeping just the original architecture” (Brătulescu, 1931).

The votive painting has five characters: in the right are represented the Metropolitan Neophyte/Neofit, followed by „Damaschin ieromonah”, and at left, are represented Radu Paisie and „Constantin Nicolae Voevod” (Victor Brătulescu says that here is the figure of Constantin Mavrocordat – following the inscription), behind which, in penumbra, we find the figure of a monk” (Brătulescu, 1931). (0.8)

Constantin Mavrocordat is painted very similar with Radu Paisie. They are wearing the crown, and are painted in identical golden and black clothes. Here is a way of outlining in the painting that here was more important to reveal the persons who contributed to the rising of the monastery, than their real portrait.



0.8 Radu Paisie, Constantin Nicolae Voevod/Constantin Mavrocordat (left); Radu Paisie, an important monk (right).³⁸

³⁸ Image from personal collection.

The seventeenth-eighteenth centuries in Wallachia offered a rich variety of portraits and ways of matching the presence of historical characters within the structure of a fresco. Painters had to deal with several needs to meet the requirements of a mural laic art inserted into a religious space. Another problem was to paint the present portrait of a contemporary personality, so that this could coexist with the transcendental and timeless religious figures of the saints. Simultaneously, the portrait is a symbol attesting a gift of gratitude to the divinity. The painters possibly borrowed compositional structures from village churches, founded by boyars, to shape monastery churches of a higher recognition. This could mean that no votive painting is of less importance. Overall, the art of placing groups of figures into a large space was a challenge itself, which the mural painters of those times successfully managed to overcome.

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KEY ELEMENTS PERTAINING TO BAUDRILLARD'S ANALYSIS OF POSTMODERN CULTURE AND SOCIETY

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Abstract: *Jean Baudrillard's postmodern metaphysics proposes a completely new system in its dialectical approach regarding the analysis of postmodern culture and society. Living in the age of speed, the author of famous postmodern philosophy like "America", "Simulacra and Simulation", "The System of Objects" or "The Agony of Power" explains the shortcomings of the secularized postmodern world and finds a comprehensive way of explaining the loss of meaning in the world where contemporary media, financial drive, multinational capitalism and super urbanization contribute to a high extent to the creation of an artificial hyper reality in which the real and the unreal are merged into one. His analysis provides an account for the cultural void, which can be perceived in today's highly computerized and technological systems. He then introduces the concept of simulation of reality to relate it to the human experience, by explaining the fact that, in the postmodern society, symbols and signs have replaced all reality and meaning. Language plays a more important role in delimiting power relations within society and the sign language replaces the real meaning.*

Key words: postmodernism, simulations, triumph of object, hyper reality, utopia

Baudrillard's immense contribution to metaphysical imaginary is precisely the result of his vision, according to which exterior forces control human life and the individual cannot control it; thus, the objects of natural and physical sciences cannot be controlled or influenced by the subject. As a result, the subject is defeated. The objects prove their superiority to the subject by relating them to the uncontrolled growth and replication in all fields. Baudrillard distances himself from all subject-centered

metaphysics and proclaims the superiority of the object in his analysis of contemporary culture and life.

Baudrillard's discourse on hyper reality and its influence on postmodern culture and society have started very early, in the 1960's during a period of time when French academics were influenced by the radical ideas such as revolts and a deconstruction of present values. Baudrillard's philosophic view is the result of three major stages reflected in his books.

The latest stage in the building of his philosophic system is reflected by the appearance of his book "The Singular Objects of Architecture (2000)" which represents the mature reflection in the construction of his philosophical view on postmodernity and culture. His project is embodied in a definition of architecture by means of which he clearly defines his understanding of postmodernism. The book takes the form of a dialogue between Jean Baudrillard and Jean Nouvel and is the result of the initiative initiated by the Writers House and the Paris School of Architecture La Villette. Baudrillard's discourse is opened by the writer's question on whether or not the architecture reflected by the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center is the expression of a society, which belongs to a hyper real time. Baudrillard sees in them the anticipation of present times. To him, the Towers seem to be cloned and they appear to take the form of two perforated bands. They would anticipate the end of modernism and the beginning of a new epoch, namely postmodernity. Baudrillard continues the exposure of his view by introducing different towns, museums and architectural structures which, in his view, have elements of postmodern architecture and then for each one of them adds a concept that defines postmodernity; the examples given justify the beginning of a new trend in architecture, philosophy, and culture, thus having a big impact on society.

New York City is the next stop in Baudrillard's discussion which is used to add a new element to the postmodern view, i.e. utopia. Seen as the center of the end of the world, of an apocalypse, New York represents a utopia that has become reality. New York represents a world that has become reality, that has a body on its own and which cannot be destroyed. The paradox of reality is represented by New York in its whole representation:

“New York provides the kind of stupefaction characterized by a world that is already accomplished, an absolutely apocalyptic world but one that is replete in its verticality- and in this sense, ultimately it engenders a form of deception because it is embodied, because it’s already there, and we can no longer destroy it.” (Baudrillard 2002:14) New York is seen as the city which is indestructible, that has overcome his own destruction, which embodies a deconstruction of space that imposes no limits on heights of the buildings; it is in other words a representation of indefinite determination, of infinity. The next analysis focuses on the metamorphosis of architecture. The shift from the architectural style of the 20th century can be seen in the explosive number of urban establishments. No longer do cities rely on recipes of urban art. A new planning has arisen leading to preconceived cities that no longer need any rules of planning, but rely on models that can be copied or cloned and no longer need the intervention of architecture. Then a comparison is introduced between architecture and philosophy, and the problems they are confronted with. That being said, architecture is being confronted with dimensions which are immeasurable, metaphysical. Because of the impossibility to cope with the infinity, architecture finds itself overwhelmed trying to find solutions to its problems: “Architecture finds itself faced with incommensurable, metaphysical dimensions. A priori it can’t do anything about that. It’s in the same situation as philosophy or science: it’s now an adult. We need to develop other strategies.” (Baudrillard 2002:18)

In the next subchapter, dedicated to the esthetics of modernity, Jean Baudrillard insists on the fact that the age of modernity has reached an end, starting with the moment when everything targeted had as an ultimate goal the idea of progress. Modern art and culture have reached the end when singularity has replaced the concept of multitude. The work of art was an expression of singularity and the disappearance of singularity has led to a cultural void, which needed a new interpretation. “Baudrillard’s narrative concerns the end of modernity dominated by production and industrial capitalism and the advent of a new postmodern era constituted by simulations and new forms of technology, culture, society, and experience. Whereas modernity was distinguished by expansion, differentiation, energy, and movement, as well as by theoretical and artistic projects, which

sought to represent and interpret the real, postmodernity is distinguished by implosion, de-differentiation, reproduction of models of the hyper real and inertia. This new social order is distinguished by the disappearance of all the big signs of modernity – production, meaning, reality, power, the social and so forth – and the appearance of a new type of social order and modes of experience”(Kellner 1989:117).

The idea of the multitudes has replaced the concept of singularity; the idea of the hyper reality has emerged as a way out to the impossibility of coping with the void of culture. Thus architecture has taken a new form of the monster, when objects are simply thrown into towns. Culture has undergone a metamorphosis, has become something else that of course gains value in the realm of the hyper real. In a new subchapter, the concept of the esthetics of disappearance is used to explain the end of modernity. Baudrillard insists that the concept of nihilism, which has replaced abstraction, and the destruction of the sensible, does not mean a disappearance as such, but that there is more to it. It has to do with metamorphosis; a form melts into another, a representation of appearance- disappearance. The art of disappearance is proclaimed as a new particularity of postmodern lifestyle: “The disappearance I’m talking about, which results in the concept of worthlessness or nothingness I mentioned earlier, means that one form disappears into another. It’s a kind of metamorphosis: appearance- disappearance. The mechanism is completely different. It’s not the same as disappearing within a network, where everyone becomes the clone or metastasis of something else; it’s a chain of interlinked forms, into which we disappear, where everything implies its own disappearance.”(Baudrillard 2002:28). Baudrillard’s negativist view on modernity is explained by means of the consequences modernity had on the society. The subjectivity of the group and the subjectivity of the individual led to the ‘death’ of the subject. Baudrillard admits that in the world of duplicates and multitudes we no longer rule the world. The subject has lost its control over the world. He gives as example sciences that admit to no longer ruling over the real. Thus, the modernity has reached the end and a new era is opened to postmodernity. The subject is lost in search for the subject and the modern era is gone when everything searched for becomes ambiguous: “But once everything we are

searching for becomes ambiguous, ambivalent, reversible, random, then modernity is over- and it's just as true for politics." (Baudrillard 2002:39).

In the subchapter "A shelter for culture?" Baudrillard poses the question of whether or not architecture still has a relationship with culture and society. In search for an answer, Baudrillard appeals to the city of Marseille and the remodeling of an industrial building redesigned and given a new utility purpose. Baudrillard thinks that the successive recreation-regeneration process has a value that no one would have thought it would have gained. Baudrillard admits that by exiting dimensional norms, and entering the unprogrammed, unpredictable, the radicalization is made possible. The reconversion of space and big urban spaces built without initial projects like Soho district of New York have been conquered by privileged people in the last decades. This has led to the replacement of the poor by the rich. Previously, cities were the expression of singularity, whereas today they change at high speed, with confusion. Baudrillard insists on the fact that today's cities don't become, they change. Becoming would have been better as it expresses a true architecture. Changing has negative connotations as it offers an excuse for the disappearance of architectural motives.

The city of tomorrow, presented in one of the subchapters, becomes an extension of networks, a virtual world, the infinity of images replace reality, the city becomes the expression of its infinite possibilities: " [...] the city is no longer a form in the process of becoming; it's an extended network. That's fine, you can define it as you have, but that urban life is no longer the life of the city but its infinite possibility: a virtual urban life, like playing on the keyboard of the city as if it were a kind of screen. I saw it as the end of architecture...by pushing the concept to its limit and primarily by using the photograph as a point of departure. This is reflected in the idea that the great majority of images are no longer the expression of a subject, or the reality of an object, but almost exclusively the technical fulfillment of all its intrinsic possibilities. It's the photographic medium that does all the work. People think they're photographing a scene, but they are only technical operators of the device's infinite virtuality."(Baudrillard 2002:48).

According to Baudrillard, we witness a cloning of architectural models; he gives as example a building of offices, which all follow the same model and can be copied disregarding the conception. Thus, in the postmodern world stress is laid on the infinite multiplication of limited models. The question asked by Baudrillard is whether anyone would benefit from this.

Globalization, universality and neutrality represent the biggest danger to culture and to the human being. The absence of quality, conformity with rules and the given would lead to the neutralization of the subject. The subject is defeated, the singularity and ingenuity are replaced by neutrality. In Baudrillard's opinion this is our free choice. The effect on society would be devastating. The society will become dissociated and would lack any conflict. This would lead to two parts of society disconnected from each other. On the one side there will be the privileged, informative society, at the other end the excluded ones. Baudrillard uses the term 'mondialization' to define a globalization that represents a completeness of neutralization and which has as opposite singularity. 'Mondialization' would have no conflicts between antagonistic forces. The result of this movement will produce a virtual hyper society that will grab all facilities, powers, being an absolute minority, becoming more of a minority each day while the rest of the population will lead a life of exclusion. Thus cities will be exposed to two kinds of realities: the space which being the space of the real will be visible, while the virtual space being an abstract will not be seen. Only the privileged ones will have access to it. There will not be a dominant class ruling; there will be the artificial intelligence giving course to "full speculation". A comparison is drawn from it when describing Europe. Euro represents a virtual object coming from a hierarchy. All laws will be made by the few, and will have no connection with public opinion. Everything will function in parallel worlds... According to Baudrillard, the concept of freedom promoted so much by modernism has become a struggle in today's world. The human being is free because it has all the technical means to become free. But this kind of freedom ends in liberalism. Today the human being does not fight anything. The problem of freedom is not being posed, only that of operability.

The second phase in Baudrillard's metaphysical approach is completely detailed by the 1981 philosophical treatise "Simulacra and Simulation" which presents into the greatest details the analysis of postmodern society, the hyper real and the understanding of new concepts like 'simulacra', 'nihilism', the 'apocalypse', the 'hyper market' and 'hyper commodity', territory and metamorphoses, the 'clone story'.

The treatise begins with the definition of the simulacrum which is: "never what hides the truth- it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulacrum is true." (Baudrillard 1994: 10). Baudrillard sees the beginning of a new era affecting abstraction that doesn't reflect anymore the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is regarded as a generation of models of the real that do not belong to the reality but to the hyper reality. Borges's fable in which cartographers of the Empire drew a very detailed map covering the territory exactly, and which is an example of an allegory of simulation is used by Baudrillard to set it in antithesis with the real dangers posed by the generation of models that clone everything, distancing society from reality. The features of the simulation include: genetic modification, cloning, and nuclear operation. In such an instance, the real is formed by models of control in which the human being has no say. This also lacks rationality, because it no longer measures itself against anything that is rational or real. Baudrillard puts it in a very clear way: "the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referential - worse: with their artificial resurrection in the systems of signs, a material more malleable than meaning, in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences to all binary oppositions, to all combinatory algebra." (Baudrillard 1994: 20).

The hyper real can be distinguished by its capacity of being incapable to create the difference between the model or copy of the real and reality itself. It lacks origins and it is driven away from the imaginary. "The distinctions between object and representation, thing and idea are no longer valid. In their place Baudrillard fathoms a strange new world constructed out of models or simulacra, which have no referent or ground in any reality, except their own. Simulations are different from fictions or lies in that the former not only present an absence as a presence, the imaginary as the real. They also undermine any

contrast to the real, absorbing the real within itself” (Poster 2001:6). Then Baudrillard insists on the difference between dissimulation and simulation. In his view the dissimulation accounts for pretending not to have something that you have, in contrast to simulation, which is pretending to have something you don’t have. While dissimulation implies a presence, simulation as seen by Baudrillard implies an absence. He continues the definition of simulation by opposing it to representation and highlighting the fact that simulation appears from utopia, from the disregard to the sign and the representation of the real, i.e. the hyper real distances itself from reality and its representation brings us to the realm of utopia: “Such is simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and the real (even if this equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the Utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every reference.”(Baudrillard 1994: 6).

The major change lies in the fact that signs take a new role in the hyper real world: instead of having signs that dissimulate something, we shift to signs that dissimulate that there is anything. This change determines a new beginning: the beginning of the era of simulacra and simulation, in which “there is no longer a God to recognize his own, no longer a Last Judgment to separate the false from the true, the real from its artificial resurrection, as everything is already dead and resurrected in advance.”(Baudrillard 1994:15) One of the examples chosen by Baudrillard to reflect the concept of the simulacra is Disneyland. Disneyland is created according to Baudrillard so as to stimulate the fiction of the real; its imaginary is neither true nor false, but serves only as a space meant to regenerate the imaginary, it is compared with a waste treatment plant that according to the writer exist everywhere; Disneyland is the place where dreams, phantasms, the historical, the fairylike is recycled, and can be considered on a mental level the product of the hyper real society. Because the real cannot be rediscovered at absolute level in the hyper real, the illusion is also impossible to create. Cultural values are annihilated in advance because of the simulacrum. In order to prove his point, Baudrillard uses the Beaubourg Museum; this

is seen as a perfect illustration of neutralization of signifier and signified, an example of the network system reflected in hyper reality. Beaubourg goes a step further comparing Beaubourg concept with that of the hypermarket. : “Thus for the first time, Beaubourg is at the level of culture what the hypermarket is at the level of commodity: the perfect circulatory operator, the demonstration of anything (commodity, culture, crowd, compressed air) through its own accelerated circulation.”(Kellner 1989: 98). Baudrillard draws a comparison between Beaubourg and the institutions, the state, the power. The nihilistic views are sustained by referring constantly to the implosion of everything sending it all into a mode of disappearance. “Baudrillard uses his analysis of Beaubourg to illustrate in particular his theories of implosion and deterrence. Beaubourg allegedly absorbs and neutralizes all cultural energies, which implode in a deterrence system that mirrors the political and social systems; thus it illustrates in a microcosm the fundamental processes at work in the larger society. [...] Beaubourg thus really contributes to the death of meaning, to the demise of high culture, and can therefore be seen as a monument of cultural deterrence.” (Kellner 1989: 98) Once the hyper real is presented, Baudrillard finds it necessary to explain the defeat of the subject. The subject is lost in its relationship with the object. The subject cannot comprehend the reality of the hyper real object. The objects constitute no longer signs that can be deciphered. An example of hyper real object is the hypermarket. This object is linked to the parking lot, the computers terminal to the city. The hypermarket does not exist outside the present setting and it represents a giant ‘montage factory’. Baudrillard perceives the hypermarket as a model of controlled socialization. But because the model is controlled it signals the end of modernity, the overthrowing of reasonable thinking. “This form hypermarket can thus help us understand what is meant by the end of modernity. The large cities have witnessed the birth, in about a century (1850-1950), of a generation of large, modern stores, but this fundamental modernization did not overthrow the urban structure. [...] (with the hyper market) a new morphogenesis has appeared, which comes from the cybernetic kind (that is to say, reproducing at the level of the territory, of the home, of transit, the scenarios of molecular

control that are those of the genetic code), and whose form is nuclear and satellite.” (Baudrillard 1994: 77).

Baudrillard completes the analysis by introducing the subchapter on the ‘Clone Story’. His approach is very clear; cloning has disastrous effects on society and the human being. Identical individuals are never a representation of the real; they represent a copy, a phantasm. The clone is realized by genetic means and constitutes the disappearance of any imaginary; it is the result of productive technology. He then classifies the simulacra into three types: simulacra that are natural, naturalist and that aim the restitution or the ideal institution of nature made in God’s image; simulacra that aim at continuous globalization and expansion, and last the simulacra of simulation which is founded on the model, the cybernetic game, aiming for total control. After dividing them, the simulacra are attributed to a type of imaginary: “to the first category belongs the imaginary of the Utopia. To the second corresponds science fiction” and to the third “the implosive era of models. The models no longer constitute either transcendence or projection, they no longer constitute the imaginary in relation to the real, and they are themselves an anticipation of the real [...] The field opened is that of simulation in the cybernetic sense, that is, of the manipulation of these models at every level. [...] The imaginary was the alibi of the real, in a world dominated by the reality principle. Today, it is the real that has become the alibi of the model, in a world controlled by the principle of simulation.” (Baudrillard 1994: 119).

Baudrillard’s view is pessimistic; he anticipates that we have become simulators and that we are simulacra in a universe in which one has to fight without hope because all power, all axes of value, are liquefied. In this universe, Baudrillard can see no more hope for meaning.

The book “America”, a perfect example of Baudrillard’s understanding of postmodern society, opens up with the subchapter ‘Vanishing Point’. The ideas presented in this book continue to build on the same structure that the previous ones built. The disappearing landscapes represent the motifs, which make possible Baudrillard’s theme of hyper reality. The introduction to this book presents the esthetics of disappearance by insisting first on the vastness, emptiness of the desert and then, by turning toward the

metropolitan areas of New York. The writer insists that he is in search of 'astral' America, not the social and cultural one: "the America of the empty, absolute freedom of the freeways, not the deep America of mores and mentalities, but the America of desert speed, of motels and mineral surfaces. [...] I sought the finished form of the future catastrophe of the social in geology, in that upturning of depth that can be seen in the striated spaces, the reliefs of salt and stone, the canyons where the fossil river flows down, the immemorial abyss of slowness that shows itself in erosion and geology." (Baudrillard 1986:5) Baudrillard's view insists on the fact that the silence of the desert is a visual thing, a product of the gaze that stares out and finds nothing to be reflected.

The concept of desert is expanded to the desert of meaninglessness as opposed to the profusion of sense. The desert is an expression of metamorphic forms, which Baudrillard sees as magical. His interest lies in the mineralized petrified forms of desert, the perfect geometry of forms and architecture, which hasn't been designed with a purpose. The mineralization of the desert is then compared with the extermination of meaning, drawing back on the ideas expressed in the previous books, i.e. the signs that fail to represent anything. The implosion of meaning is seen as the invention of the Americans. Baudrillard sees in the desert a perfect example of hyper reality, which has begun at the end of modernity. The next subchapter is dedicated to New York which represents an example of anti-architecture: "Anti-architecture, the true sort (not the kind you find in Arcosanti, Arizona, which gathers together all the soft technologies in the heart of the desert), the wild, inhuman type that is beyond the measure of man was made here- made itself here- in New York, without considerations of setting, well-being, or ideal ecology. It opted for hard technologies, exaggerated all dimensions, gambled on heaven and hell...Eco-architecture, eco-society... this is the gentle hell of the Roman Empire in its decline." (Baudrillard 1986:14).

Baudrillard continues by highlighting the differences, which exist between Europe and America. The latter seems to be eroded by wealth, power, indifference, technological futility making it both exciting and disenchanting. Baudrillard sees the disastrous effects on Europe that were created by the end of modernity in America. "Astral America" fights

against the dreams, which it created itself, by materializing them. This is the difference between an American and a European mind. America is the land of the pragmatic dreams, everything one can dream of will become reality.

Thus America is neither dream nor reality. It is a hyper reality, construed as an utopia “which has behaved from the very beginning as though it were already achieved. Everything here is real and pragmatic, and yet is full of stuff of dreams too. It may be that the truth of America can only be seen by a European, since he alone will discover here the perfect simulacrum- that of the immanence and material transcription of all values.” (Baudrillard 1986:24) The Americans have no sense of the simulation because they are simulation by being a part of the model. By being part of the hyper real model, they live on a continent, which is a giant hologram. The motif of the hologram is present again in Baudrillard and this is due to the fact that the hologram stresses the idea of the unreal substance, reviving the world of phantasy. It is the continent in which paradoxically specialized “institutes are set up to make people’s bodies come together and touch, and at the same time, invents pans in which the water does not touch the bottom of the pan [...] this is called interface or interaction. It has replaced face-to-face contact and action.” (Baudrillard 1986:28) In Baudrillard’s view American culture is linked to the concept of the desert, those deserts which are not part of the nature by contrast with the town, in which human institutions are linked to the idea of the emptiness of the desert, not signifying anything. Artificiality is another component the desert is not foreign to. In Baudrillard’s opinion the desert includes everything that is artificial, man-made. He gives as an example Furnace Creek as a synthetic oasis. At the same time, Baudrillard points to a desert, which is signaling the disappearance, the vanishing of humanity. The concept of Eternal Return introduced in the next pages points to the recurrence of micro processes, the unfolding of things in unnecessary ways. Baudrillard sees these symptoms as an end to modernity.

The hyper real is the result of the end of modernity. Baudrillard reminds us that, unlike Nietzsche who saw an end to the spiritual crises in the exaltation of a free will, the hyper reality follows a different pattern resulting in the recurrence of micro processes that

are instantly forgotten. Baudrillard foresees an unbridgeable rift between America and Europe. In his view: “there isn’t just a gap between us, but a whole chasm of modernity. You are born modern, you do not become so. And we have never become so. What strikes you immediately in Paris is that you are in the nineteenth century. Coming from Los Angeles, you land back in the 1800s.” (Baudrillard 1986:68) He continues with the thought that for the European mind the events of 1789 have a lot of importance, them having shaped our minds and leading to a sort of historical predestination. The subchapter “Utopia achieved” highlights the fact that for the European mind America represents a utopia, a phantasy, the exile, a phantasy of immigration.

Baudrillard insists that America is the representation of modernity, it is the only country where modernity is original; and it lives a life of simulation: “In this sense, for us the whole of America is a desert. Culture exists there in a wild state: it sacrifices all intellect, all aesthetics in a process of literal transcription into the real. (Baudrillard 1986: 94). America seems to have lost all its power, of great ideas, converging into a model of the hyper real.

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EUROPEAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: JEAN RENOIR AHEAD OF HIS TIMES

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Renoir is Impressionism multiplied by the cinema. (Bazin, 1973)

Abstract: *This paper examines how Jean Renoir's films sought to initiate a spirit of integration in French and other European societies. Renoir observed that, historically and unfortunately, large sections of the population like women and minorities were deprived of many fundamental rights. Renoir strongly believed in a just and equitable social order. He realized that social justice could only be achieved through a wide and comprehensive integration of all constituent groups forming a social milieu. He thus proposed equal rights for women and the under-privileged common people who formed the majority of the any population. Renoir also appealed for the majority to tolerate and embrace the "foreign migrants" who were usually ostracized in their new environments, in order to foster social diversity. Renoir's aim was to achieve the greater good of all. A forerunner in espousing such a liberal idea, Renoir believed that France and Europe could lead by example.*

Keywords: European social integration, migration, Jean Renoir, social change in European films

Jean Renoir (1894-1979), one of the greatest European filmmakers, has been eulogized for having introduced the “deep focus”, a 360-degree camera movement and for having had been a precursor to néo-realism. In discussing Renoir's works, critics have concentrated on his technical innovations, his fascination with his characters, their gesticulations and their environment(s). In so doing, critical literature has largely overlooked Renoir's attempts to conduct an intellectual debate about existing European

social norms and to propose appropriate reforms. This essay suggests that Renoir's phenomenal foresight sheds invaluable light on a burning social issue that has gripped Europe of today: that of integration of people of various backgrounds and ethnicities into their adoptive European societies. Renoir accomplished this by examining and often redefining European class structures, the status of women and the significance of (the) "outsiders" in European society (at large) in several films. Renoir's films like *Toni* (1934), *La Vie Est A Nous* (1936), *La Grande Illusion* (1937), *La Règle Du Jeu* (1939) and others establish that Renoir's political consciousness promoted European social integration through an unconventional intermixing of races, classes, genders and cultures long before European politicians publicly acknowledged the visible impact(s) of migration, foreign workers and multiculturalism on and in European countries.

The salient features of Renoir's cultural discourse and intended social reforms (broadly) are:

1. Redefining the role of Women for greater social inclusion

First and foremost, Renoir's *Eurovision* includes a thorough assessment of the status of women and seeking a pride of place for them. The feminine imagery in Renoir's films offers deep and complicated ramifications. Women appear in very prominent roles in Renoir's films from the beginning of his career. Many of his films are even named after a woman or involve the life of one: *Catherine*, *La Fille de l'eau* (1924), *Nana*, *La Petite Marchande d'allumettes* (1928), *Madame Bovary*, *Marquitta* (1927), *La Chienne*, *Eléna et les homes* etc. His interviews with the writers of *Cahiers du cinéma*, viz., Godard, Rivette, Truffaut and others, his own accounts in his autobiography and his biography of his father foreground women. Renoir's women present a set of uniquely enigmatic characteristics.

Some of Renoir's women portray the image of a *femme fatale*. In *Eléna et les homes*, Elena, a "Princesse polonaise," tempts Rollan, the proud and victorious general to forsake his political career, authority and fame. Jurieu risks his life and fame as an aviator for the sake of Christine in *La Règle du jeu*. In *La Chienne*, Legrand's wife's aggressive disciplining drives him to succumb to Lulu's seductive appeals, which eventually destroy

his passion for painting, his sanity and render him (Legrand) homeless. In *The River*, Captain John is torn between the stoic Melanie, who refuses to acknowledge his advances and an adolescent Harriet who is determined to captivate him. Beneath the façade of the *femme fatale* is the subtle resolve of an understated but confident woman eager to fight for her place and her ambitions.

Frequently, his women treat serious events in life with striking nonchalance. Eléna, in *Eléna et les hommes*, is very casual about her possible marriage to Martin-Michaud whom she openly ridicules even though marrying him would save her family's prestige and financial status. She is equally unconcerned about her risky relationships with both Rollan and Henri. Her infatuation with Rollan entangles her in national political scandals. Her flirtations with Henri nearly result in a potentially fatal rivalry between the two friends Henri and Rollan. Renoir's women stage their acts deftly to use the men who try to use them.

In an interview, Renoir stated that often women wore masks to conceal their true nature because society demanded them to do so in order to adhere to certain preconceived notions of the "feminine image".

The more I travel through life, the more I am convinced that masks are proliferating. I have difficulty in finding a woman whose face looks as it really is. Our age is the triumph of makeup. And not only for the faces, but, more important, for the mind as well. (Bazin, 1973).

Even though women wear the mask, Renoir never accuses them of wilful duplicity. His women characters respond courageously to the situations they face. They wear the mask to protect themselves from repeated assaults on their dignity and occasionally to get even with their tormentors.

Even though some European countries had begun to establish universal suffrage in the early twentieth century, in many countries they were still considered property. Renoir was uncomfortable with the fact that in many countries (including France), women were still subjugated by the male patriarchs. Hence, Renoir's female characters, instead of following their male partners around, make independent choices, which (predictably) their

male counterparts seldom appreciate. Lulu, in *La Chienne*, unperturbedly dismisses Legrand, her benefactor, much to her pimp Dedé's chagrin. Christine, in *La Règle du Jeu*, flirts with Octave while being cognisant of Jurieu's (her lover's) presence in the house and of his disapproval of this. These women's independent actions result in unpleasant consequences for them but they remain steadfast in their will. Nana, Lulu, Josefa and Elena are important examples of that.

As seen in *La Chienne*, *The Dairy of a Chambermaid*, *Elena et les homes*, they often act in a manner contrary to the society's expectations of them. Renoir's women even indulge in traditionally "male" activities like taking multiple lovers (Elena—*Elena et les hommes*), exploiting men (Lulu—*La Chienne*) and flirting with admirers in the presence of lovers Christine in *La Règle du Jeu* and Mme. Lestingois by openly engaging in a physical relationship with Boudu in *Boudu sauve*.

La Chienne is also notable for Renoir's concerns for a prostitute's personal hardships. This film proposes that it is very difficult for a prostitute like Lulu to escape her dangerous and stigmatized life in the demi-monde other than through death. Renoir believed that even a prostitute merited proper acceptance in society, for she **was** a member of the society.

In Renoir's films, women bear their share of woes at home in the absence of men who fight in the wars or are absent for other reasons. They fend for themselves, earn a living and bring up their children. These, Renoir showcases, are important responsibilities that women can accomplish as efficiently as men if given the right opportunity. His women thus remain very proactive in providing leadership when needed.

Ahead of his times, Renoir emerges as an early advocate of women's rights.

2. Initiating social change through a critical examination of class structure

By depicting a pampered, helpless, slovenly monarch in *La Marseillaise* (1938) with a gluttonous appetite but without any craving for "governing" Renoir questioned: a) the necessity of not only the French monarchy (and by extrapolation other European monarchies) in particular, but also of the ruling social "elite" in general; b) the *real*

motivation for the monarch's courtiers and aides to pay lip service to the monarch's authority, while executing their own secretive and vested acts including launching wars; and c) the continuing dominance of the lower classes by the (European) social elites (upper classes).

Renoir's films like *Boudu Sauvé des eaux*, *Le Crime de Monsieur Lange*, *La Bête Humaine* (1938), also explore the status of various classes in society and their often complicated and confrontational relations from an informal perspective. Monsieur Lestingois (in *Boudu Sauvé*) gallivants with the housemaid secretly to deceive his wife of his infidelity and to maintain his pretentious dignity. By contrast, Madame Lestingois submits to Boudu's (a homeless vagabond whom Monsieur Lestingois helps with food and shelter) openly aggressive sexual advances disregarding aristocratic social rituals and prudence. The protagonists' disjunctive behaviour offers a sarcastic rejection of vain upper class social conventions (particularly in the act of adultery) and a "review" of the exploitative and often combative relations between the upper and lower classes. *La Grande Illusion* revisits the class divisions as noted in the following commentary:

The opening scenes of *La Grande Illusion* provide a subtle reflection of the old European social order during the First World War, as Captain de Boieldieu (Pierre Fresnay) studies aerial surveillance maps from the safe distance of his office in order to plot out military strategy. There is an aberration in the photographs, and de Boieldieu decides to investigate the area, accompanied by a rugged, enlisted pilot named Marechal (Jean Gabin). Their plane is shot down by a stern and rigid German officer, Captain von Rauffenstein (Eric von Stroheim), who orders the soldiers to determine the ranks of the captured prisoners, and to invite them to lunch...but only if they are found to be military *officers*. Despite their opposing allegiances, de Boieldieu finds greater commonality with his captor, von Rauffenstein, than with his own fellow countrymen, who find him distant and inaccessible: reminiscing about dinner parties at Maxim's, speaking in the foreign language of English, moving in the same [elite] social circles. As aristocratic, career officers, both men are witnessing the gradual erosion of their inherited

privileges and the resulting power shift to the working class. However, while de Boieldieu accepts the reality of modern times as a consequence of the French Revolution, von Rauffenstein resists its inevitable tide, and believes that observing the rules of privileged society are paramount to the rules of war. Soon, the disparity between the two social classes emerge: the aloof and regimented "old order" of de Boieldieu and von Rauffenstein who are riding out their obsolescence with the illusion of fighting a *gentleman's war*, and the vital and motivated "new order" of Marechal and Rosenthal (Marcel Dalio) who will risk their lives to fight in the Great War in their own mistaken illusion that, one day, they will return to their civilian lives and reap the benefits of a lasting peace (Durgnat, 1974, p. 347).

Renoir quite sagaciously sensed that Europe's wars and the rise of the leftist political forces around Europe were the catalysts for not only a change of the balance of military power but also for the creation of a new social order. The objectives of this new order were to: a) to replace the ancient practice of hereditary power and (hereditary) public offices with elected ones; b) to create opportunities for *all* to ascend the political power bases and c) to assimilate the largely invisible but majority ordinary people into the decision-making process.

3. Advocating compassion for the plight of the ordinary people

By scrutinizing the plight of the under classes in various settings, Renoir expressed his strong support for replacing the status quo of the upper classes. Faulkner (1986, p.17) explains how *La Chienne* examines property as the infrastructure of inter-personal relations among Legrand, Dédé, Lulu, Adèle and Godard

Renoir's introducing the narrative of (La Chienne) Legrand, Dédé and Lulu as a story of "Vous et moi" (You and me), invites the audience to consider the events to be from their own and their close acquaintances' lives. By using the iconic guignols as the commentators of the plot and by having one guignol beat the others before the mystery begins, this film suggests that ordinary human beings were often reduced to puppets. Here, under the surface of the triangular relationship among Lulu, Legrand and Dédé resulting in

Lulu's murder, Legrand's ruin and Dédé's wrongful conviction are several complications. Lulu (a prostitute) is romantically infatuated with her pimp Dédé, who *sells* her body. Legrand, a middle class clerk, unwittingly gets attracted to Lulu and eventually murders her. As is witnessed in Dédé's trial, society and especially the justice system often turn a blind eye to the facts of a murder case (or other crimes) involving the ordinary people and impose their biases (and flawed judgments) on unsuspecting individuals, innocent of the crimes they are accused of, particularly, in the absence of a robust legal defence.

Likewise, *Boudu sauvé* and *Le Crime de Monsieur Lange* accentuate the ordinary people's struggle to be noticed or to be given any respect.

4. Proposing improved race relations and racial integration

Sur un air de Charleston narrates the story of:

A man in blackface lands in a spaceship and meets a girl who lives in a shack with a monkey in the year 2028. He hooks her up with a telephone, and she teaches him how to Charleston. Then they fly off in the spaceship, leaving the monkey behind (Edwardtell, 2000).

Examining this film is significant because:

- a) it is one of the earliest European films to examine black and white characters' and by inference the two races' romance on the large screen;
- b) sarcasm and seriousness simultaneously shroud the young blonde's decision to live with an ape;
- c) Renoir's use of role reversals where the white Parisienne woman with black lips leads a primitive life, while the African with his black skin, black attire but white lips plays the role of a learned and thus modern, intellectually advanced individual; and
- d) since the world around them would not have accepted their liaison, they fly into outer space.

Through this on-screen romance of an African and a Parisienne, Renoir not only dreamt of the union of Africans with the French people in particular, but also of a future proactive union (process) of the colonizers with the colonized in general.

5. Urging assimilation of migrants to end parochialism and cultural isolation

Renoir's investigation of races was not confined only to the differences among people in different continents. He probed the fissures that divided the various peoples of Europe along ethnic lines. *Toni* explores the plight of immigrant workers in a foreign country through a very circuitous inter-ethnic romantic affair as noted here:

Even the brutish, mean Albert is not wholly vicious (and certainly less despicable than Gaby who leaves Josefa in the lurch after persuading her to do his dirty work): forced to marry Josefa [who is the daughter of an immigrant to France], inescapably aware of her preference for Toni, Albert has never been allowed to forget that, as a Belgian among meridionals, he is an interloper (Milne, 1980).

The importance accorded to the gypsies in resolving the crisis in *Elena et les hommes* (1955-56) shows Renoir's sympathy for the plight of the long marginalized, hated and discriminated group of people in Europe and appeal for their social inclusion. Renoir believed that European societies could only benefit culturally by welcoming people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds, by learning from their differences and by teaching them the nuances of their host societies.

It follows that long before the European Union was formed Renoir tried to draw the attention of politicians to the need to foster a pan-European social environment where people accepted each other and made an effort to live in harmony. By investigating the questions of race, migration of foreign workers and their cultural isolation, Renoir pleaded for an amicable integration of these (very) people.

6. Encouraging anti-war, anti-fascist and pro-pacifist sentiments

Renoir's own military service-related injury during World War I shaped his political convictions. While his passion for fighting against the enemy did not diminish, the

sufferings wars caused its victims appalled him. Renoir acknowledged his anti-war sentiments in this statement:

Before the war my way of participating in this universal concert was to try to bring a voice of protest... Today, the new being that I am realises that it is no longer the time for sarcasm and that the only thing that I can bring to the illogical, irresponsible and cruel universe is my 'love' (Jean Renoir quoted in Armes, 1970).

After the World War I, he devoted his attention to producing films that decried war, to find the roots of social friction and to search for ways of resolving disputes peacefully. Renoir was so concerned about the ill effects of the war lurking in the late 1930s that he forewarned his audience about it through *La Grande Illusion* set during the war of 1914. Renoir rejected the parochial ethnic perceptions and prejudices that divided people and resulted in wars.

La Grande Illusion is a sublimely poignant and lucidly insightful commentary on the social legacy of the Great War in Europe. Filmed in 1937 under the looming threat of World War II, *La Grande Illusion* serves as a haunting elegy for the tragedy of the First World War and a relevant cautionary tale on the immeasurable toll of war. Using mundane events and conversations to depict life in a prisoner of war camp, Jean Renoir compassionately captures the tumultuous climate of profound social and political change: the changing role of women, the demise of aristocratic rule, the creation of new wealth (and new social order) in a free market economy. Stylistically, Renoir employs mesmerizing, long, rapid tracking shots and introduces sound to reflect the chaos and uncertainty. Note the reassuring melody of Maréchal's harmonica after an emotional breakdown, and the arranged diversion of the German guards using flutes. Inevitably, the officers' path of glory proves to be inextricably bound to the idealistic belief that there is an underlying, redemptive purpose in war. However, like the idea of a *war to end all wars*, it is an elusive and unattainable grand illusion (Acquarello, 2001).

By contrasting the elitist conversations of the senior officers from opposing sides with that of the ordinary soldiers, Renoir highlighted how the ordinary people fought the

elites' wars but were ignored and scorned upon during and after the wars. Further the romance of the kind German woman and the (French) Maréchal (whom she shelters), clearly illuminates how despite the fractious and destructive wars, ordinary people forged their own (interpersonal and frequently romantic) relationships irrespective of their ethnic, linguistic or cultural differentiations.

Renoir's *La Règle du Jeu*, is an anti-fascist film in the guise of a story about a game party. The Fascist intrusion can be interpreted in various ways. One could argue that the poacher or even the aviator represents the German encroachment.

The prevalent anti-Semitic sentiments are reminded by the Jewish origin of the Marquis, whom the servants criticize for his lack of class, because they believe a Jew cannot have aristocratic status. The actor Dalio (who plays the Marquis) ironically is a Jew. The Heroine, Christine, an Austrian, played by Nora Grégor, an Austrian refugee drew strong criticism from the chauvinist press (Gilliat, 1975).

Renoir encouraged the rational French citizens to protect the immigrant Jews and other vulnerable Europeans. The German controlled Vichy government banned *La Règle du Jeu* (Wikipedia, 2015).

Renoir emphasized his opposition to war and fascism by his personal actions as well. Hitler, who made German cinema an integral part of the then German government, summoned Renoir to meet with him after the German incursion into France. A diplomat, Renoir agreed to consider Hitler's offer (to him) to become the director of the Franco-German Film Corporation. Within hours of his cordial meeting with the *Fuhrer*, however, Renoir engineered his dramatic escape to the USA. Renoir rekindled his political interests in Europe on arrival in the USA.

This Land Is Mine (1943) is a melodramatic tale of Occupation and Resistance in which a location "Somewhere in Europe" is a thin screen for collaborationist France. The film does inveigh against a number of policies and practices synonymous with Vichy, such as anti-Semitism, the break-up of unions, and the suppression of women's rights (Faulkner, 2001, p. 11).

Later in 1955, *Elena et les hommes* returns to the complex problems of European politics and ethnic disdain that led certain leaders' irrational national and international political actions in the name of national pride.

7. Germinating a grass roots' movement through personal political involvement

Renoir's concern for the plight of the ordinary people further propelled him to advance his cause through public involvement. This led him to produce the film *La Vie est à nous*. The significance of the title aside, *La Vie* was the first fully publicly financed film. The ordinary workers, having financed the film, not only had the opportunity to own the film, but also to dream of publicly airing their voice of *protest against social injustices* and of seizing political power to shape the political future of France (or the country of their domicile- suggesting a pan European approach) if the situation so demanded. This being a documentary film, it honours the financial contribution of the ordinary people to create a social history in film for future generations. *La Vie*, some believe, is "A propaganda film of the communist party of France, showing how the comrades help the proletarian people against the capitalists"(Eichenberg, IMDb).

Although France never embraced Communism as the dominant political ideology, Renoir certainly succeeded in encouraging the ordinary people to aspire for great things in life. Renoir's social philosophy was rooted in the optimism that where government failed to help them, ordinary people could survive through the worst of experiences if they took control of their lives.

In *La Vie* Renoir also appealed to the ruling elite to offer more social benefits to the greater numbers through a more equitable distribution of resources. Renoir's political motivations attracted the attention of the entire nation.

Faulkner notes,

In the 1930s, in France, Renoir's name was synonymous with the popular causes of the decade, with workers' rights and anti-fascism. At the time of the Popular Front he was French cinema's most celebrated man of the left. He directed the anarcho-

syndicalist political comedy, *Le Crime de M. Lange* in 1935, made a film for the French Communist Party in 1936, *La Vie est à nous*, and wrote regularly and widely for Party papers and journals in the latter half of the decade. (He even stood as godfather to the son of Maurice Thorez, the Party's Secretary-General). At the end of the decade, at the time of the release of *La Grande illusion* (1937), *La Bête humaine* (1938), and *La Règle du jeu* (1939), Renoir was consistently excoriated by his enemies on the right as "politically of the same persuasion as the Judeo-democratic lineage of Zola" (Vinneuil, 1988, p. 256 cited in Faulkner, 2001, p. 2).

The *Dairy of a Chambermaid* (1946) reiterates this message when the protagonist refuses to be exploited by the powerful men who try to suppress her and leads her life independently, undaunted by criticism.

Conclusions

Renoir's films raise the political awareness about the *la condition humaine* in France and around Europe. The most important aspects of Renoir's vision for a new Europe are:

- The human condition represented a deprivation of the common masses, women and the foreigners (regarded as aliens) of their fundamental human rights to be included in the decision-making about their own social plight. Renoir's films thus echo the voice of the disenfranchised (women, common people and foreigners).
- **Integration** implied repairing the cracks that adversely affected the French society in particular and other European societies in general and assimilating all factions of society into one inclusive social unit. Only through a just **integration** of these underprivileged people could society function in a reasonable manner.
- Two kinds of wars were occurring in society that caused a constant state of stress in people's lives. The first kind was the wars, between (European) countries, that created divisions, espoused fascist ideologies and denigrated people along racio-ethnic lines. The second kind was the warfare among the various factions of people within one society that

provided certain segments of that society with some special privileges while depriving others of some fundamental rights.

- Renoir was not content to only raise the issues he saw as detrimental to society but he also proposed solutions for the same. Among his solutions were:

1. Moderation of one's behaviour, embracing tolerance and acceptance of so-called *alien* peoples, their cultures and religions and adaptability to unavoidable demographical changes. Recognizing and upholding the *diversity* that migrants offered enriched their adoptive society culturally.
2. Inclusion and involvement of the common people or the *silent majority* in the decision making process to achieve the greater good of the entire community.
3. According women their legitimate right(s) for freedom, a greater role in shaping and resolving social issues and *due respect*, in order for Europe to promote a more equitable and stable social order and lead the way for social change around the world.

Having never sought political office, Renoir avoided the influence of vested interests as he attempted to arouse public sentiment for political reforms. Renoir's proactive critique of European society promoted and encouraged (and does so still today) changes to the status quo. With Europe currently (in the second decade of the third millennium) undergoing unprecedented social changes on account of the increasing migrants' crisis, Renoir's films prove that he was a pragmatic visionary about European geo-political and social issues long before Europe and the world recognized them as urgent.

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Section: Communication

A CONCEPT OF ETHICAL COMMUNICATION FOR EUROPE

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Abstract: *In contemporary societies, communication plays a paramount role and is an indispensable form of social and political mediation. The function of communication is enhanced in the context of the European Union, since the large territorial dimension, the different countries involved, and the relatively new political institutions with respect to the nation states require an intensive communicative exchange in order to strengthen the process of cooperation, development, and integration. The reference to the principles of communication, as highlighted by the theories of Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, offers a concrete possibility to shape communication from an ethical standpoint, and allows for conceiving a pluralistic, democratic process. With the integration of some aspects of the communitarian thinking, the idea of an ethics of communication provides some concrete chances of reflecting on the relation between people and institutions, and of conceiving of a communication which be more attentive to the present challenges and which secure a more effective and respectful interweaving among the different subjects and instances concerned.*

Keywords: communication, Europe, ethics of communication, integration theory, communitarianism.

1. Communication as a Central Issue

Because of the large dimensions and the multilayered organizational system which characterizes the EU, communication has a paramount role in Europe and constitutes an indispensable issue of European life. Already with the formation of the large national states in the modern era, it was clear that face-to-face encounters could not exhaust the possibilities of social and political life, and that new mediation instances have become necessary in order to support not only socio-political, but also cultural activity. The concept of representation embodies the peculiar solution to meet the need of summing up

and transposing common issues on a general level. On the other hand, the press and other forms of written communication undertake the task of informing the people and of hosting the expressions of public opinion. In the present time, the worldwide affirmation of the technological revolution, the global interconnectedness, and the overriding spreading of the social media ascribe to communication a pivotal function and increasingly convert it into the privileged arena in which ideas and programmes are discussed and evaluated as successful or inadequate. In consideration of this, it can be reasonably affirmed that a successful system of communication codetermines the creation of a community as well as its degree of legitimacy and recognition by the people. A common identity is surely supported by tradition, cultural patrimony, and efficient institutions; nevertheless, it is also based on a lively and engaged public opinion and, nowadays, on the space and attention which it is able to gain in the multimedia virtual reality. Thus, a basic condition of the successful development of a European identity in the long run essentially depends on the capacity of constructing communication as a constant and effective interaction process on different levels, and of letting it efficaciously interweave with institutions. Moreover, the way communication is realized and concretely performed contributes to determining the sentiment that the people have of being adequately considered as *worthy subjects and citizens*. In this respect, communication should be seen as a complex web structure which surely entails horizontal as well as vertical processes, and notwithstanding guarantees in each constellation a respectful and worthy consideration of the subjects involved, in which equality is ensured at least by their role of fully acknowledged interlocutors.

2. Communication as a compensative function

The function of communication additionally acquires a particular relevance, since there is a disparity between the common sentiment of being European, which is present at least in a vague and unelaborated form, and a declaration of allegiance to the institutional European setting, which is a very recent issue (Walkenhorst 1999, 220f). In my opinion, this primarily depends on the fact that a European cultural interweaving (and therefore a form of communication on that level) roots on a centuries-old *permeability* of the cultural

(literary, philosophical, artistic, and scientific) discourses. They allowed for the formation of trans- or supranational movements and currents (for instance the Enlightenment or Romanticism) as well as for political transformation (one needs only to think of the enormous impact of the French Revolution on the other European countries, but also of the expanding process of democratization at the beginning of the 20th century). By contrast, the European politico-institutional setting is very recent and therefore has not been completely assimilated. The question of sovereignty (with the consequent distribution of power) still represents a constant and often tense object of discussion, on which a really common understanding has not yet been attained.

This also mostly explains the difficulty to regulate the relationship between the EU and the member states as well as the relations among states, while scientific and cultural projects appear much more successful and easy to be performed. As a matter of fact, the European Union did not originate from a scarcely organized territorial and institutional setting, nor did it present itself as the more powerful alternative, as happened with the national states at the beginning of the modern era. On the contrary, it was, so to say, a *non-original and supra-levelled organizational instance*. Indeed, the EU had to refer from the beginning onwards to strongly structured political unities (the national states), which had constitutively claimed that absolute sovereignty and control over their territory were a fundamental condition of their existence. Moreover, these states already rested on a large popular consensus and on a long-standing tradition, and possessed a public sphere and an arena of political debate which were essentially organized on a national level and for a national public. Indisputably, it is much more complicated to organize transnational or supranational contexts, when the existing national structures are already firmly established (Peters 2007, 293ff).

In recent years, this deeply-rooted national arrangement has strongly determined the premises themselves of the debate on Europe, by rendering it mainly concerned with questions of principle such as the conditions of adhesion and participation in the EU. Furthermore, the prevailing of the national component has contributed to shifting the decisional power towards the European Council, which is formed by the Premiers or the

national Ministers respectively concerned, and this shifting has not been without consequences. Three main factors can be observed, which have contributed to increasing national feelings:

- 1) National representatives of the Government tend to act by referring to the interests of their nation, to which they are directly accountable, and to stress their national belonging as the privileged reference point (Brunmayr 2000, 21). As a matter of fact, they have been appointed in a national context and their primary pragmatic-political target is to obtain consensus and good electoral results in national polls.
- 2) When conflicts or divergences arise, they are immediately perceived as contrasts among nations. In doing so, national distinctions (and sometimes their separating traits) are emphasized and made the object of polemics, so that they lead to further distance and incomprehension.
- 3) Insofar as national states are perceived as the effectively empowered subjects, this increases the sentiment of dissatisfaction by other subjects (for example minorities and regions) which feel progressively excluded from the fundamental decisions. This reflects on the national politics and brings on further conflicts also within the states.

For all these aspects, already the context of communication concerned and the subjects directly involved contribute to creating a frame of communication which focuses on the national states and additionally emphasizes differences and contrasts instead of similarities.³⁹ In effect, the subjects directly involved in communication or bargaining are the ones that establish the rules of the game and define the paramount level at which communication takes place. Thus, the fact that European politics and policies are established by national members of the Governments, and appear as an expression of the different relations of power among nations, makes for increasing nationalism and forms of national resentment. It provokes, so to say, a *performative self-enhancement of national legitimization and consciousness*.

³⁹ Gehrke has remarked: "He who wants to build a European identity must stress rather the European than the national aspect" (Gehrke 1998, 74).

However, this also suggests the hypothesis that a modified organization of the communication, which create more possibilities of convergence and involve more subjects in a different form, could at least improve the possibility of reciprocal understanding and accustom to more empathy and solidarity. Thus, a strengthening of the European cohesion cannot refrain from thinking over the conditions of communication and looking for its *qualitative intensification*, which implies interrogating on the basis conditions in which communication takes place and is shaped.

3. The significance of the integration theory

This statement can be enhanced, if the quest for European Union is not thought of as a static issue, but as a work in progress, subject to adjustment and improvement. A German political thinker and expert in constitutional law, Rudolf Smend (1888-1975), wrote in his work *Constitution and Constitutional Law (Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht)* of 1928 that a political unity is not a static entity based on values and traditions which already exist, but something dynamic and fluid which can be continuously strengthened through lively energies and commitment (Lhotta 2005, 40). In doing so, Smend did not radically separate between the sphere of civil society and institutions or between the individual on the one hand and the social on the other, but understood these components as dynamic elements which were able to support and strengthen one another through their constructive interweaving, creating a form of reciprocal interdependency and cohesion (Waechter 1994, 92). His *theory of integration*, still stressing the importance of unconscious, but continual cooperating agency (Hurrelmann 2005, 172), underlined at the same time the meaning of a voluntarily supported and enhanced integration process, since the risk of a failed or regressing integration was always a possible alternative to reckon with (Llanque 2009, 323). From this standpoint, integration was not only a descriptive analysis of a socio-political phenomenon, but an agenda to be systematically pursued and implemented (Morlok-Schindler 2005, 19).

According to Smend's theory, three different aspects have to be chiefly taken into account as concrete levels of a political integrative process: 1) personal integration; 2) functional integration, and 3) substantial integration (Smend 1968, 136ff).

- 1) *Personal integration* regards the role of persons in promoting political unity. In a more immediate and perceivable form, it concerns the function of political leaders and other public or institutional personalities, who should exert a symbolic, charismatic, but also competent public function, and represent through their presence and activity the unity and consistency of the political organization. On the other hand, personal integration is also implemented from below by the direct and active involvement of the citizens, who are called to participate in political life and express their consent and dissent (Morlok-Schindler 2005, 21). This demands not necessarily action, but at any rate attentive observation, since the attentive observer is the one who is more critical and can suggest reforms and corrections to be accomplished.
- 2) *Functional integration* refers to the performance of specific political acts which are considered as meaningful and symbolically relevant for the formation of a common will and a common sentiment. Smend mentions to this respect elections, parliamentary debate, the formation of majorities and of the government, provided that the moment stressed is not the prevailing of a determinate position, but the procedures actuated. In fact, they emphasize the importance of participation and commitment as well as the necessity of arguments underpinning the different views and being capable to gain consent. By acting together and by perceiving it as a common undertaking albeit the plurality of positions, the sense of unity performatively increases and demonstrates its consistence.
- 3) *Substantial integration* concerns the tasks and the targets which are pursued and which have to be intended as the search for attaining common goals. For Smend, tasks and targets are not only formal categories, since they relate to values and conceive forms of coherent action in order to achieve them. In this context, fundamental rights are included as a package of guarantees which have to be always maintained, and which should nevertheless be interpreted not as the safeguard of individualistic interests, but as

basic conditions protecting citizens and their indispensable civic and political freedom (Morlok-Schindler 2005, 21f). Yet, substantial integration is also understood as a projective dimension, including ideas and programmes to be fulfilled in the long run.

In effect, the conception of a dynamic political unity which can be performed through a constant effort both concerning the institutions and the individuals handling in society gives way to gradual shaping. Additionally, Smend's theory is also applicable to a supranational dimension,⁴⁰ since it includes the perspective of a multilayered organization in which the single states are perceived as promoters and contributors of the political union, enriching it by their specific input and energy. It equally entails the chance of the development of a sentiment of belonging, which has some roots in the past and nevertheless is open to change in relation to the future. Smend insisted on the value of symbolic elements (flag, anthem, and the like) and public acts (elections, etc.), since they stress an immediate unity which in his opinion is less sensitive to divergences of arguments and controversial contents (Notthof 2008, 123). Nevertheless, it is indisputable that all these processes also (and meanwhile primarily) require an intensive process of communication, which becomes even more demanding because of the large dimensions and the manifold of the subjects at stake, who lay the claim to be informed and actively involved in the political undertaking.

4. The ethical implications of communication

As a matter of fact, integration needs communication at least as a fundamental form of intermediation. Nevertheless, communication has not only an instrumental value, since the conditions themselves which allow for and enact communication lay normative claims to the ways of performing interaction. This distinction has been stressed in particular by Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, who remark that *instrumental agency* uses now and again

⁴⁰ Hurrelmann (2005) confirms the possibility of transferring Smend's theory on a European level, although he remarks that not all necessary aspects can be evinced from that theory, so that also other sources are needed.

communication to bargain, but is nevertheless primarily motivated by the attaining of its aims, and uses therefore the others as means. By contrast, *communicative agency* implies, at least in its original function, an innate tendency to a cooperative undertaking between subjects considered as equal (and therefore partners in the communicative process) (Habermas 1981, 127ff). Following this issue, Apel and Habermas have elaborated a theory of communication which at the same time entails ethical, regulative principles. They deduce four principles which are implied in communication in its primary function⁴¹ and which grant for its correct use: *intelligibility*, *truthfulness*, *sincerity*, and *rightness* (Habermas 1983, 68ff). Intelligibility refers to the effort to be understood and to express oneself in a comprehensible way; truthfulness means the attempt to adhere to reality (in its everyday understanding); sincerity implies a correct attitude of the subject in relation to the partners of the communication; finally, rightness implies the social use of rules (respect of the other, equality of the possibility of participation in the communicative process, etc.). These principles already enable a form of communication which is ethical in the sense that it refrains from forms of deliberate misunderstanding, false representation, lie, and of imposing oneself on the others. Even more than the four internal principles of communication, however, the modality itself of conceiving the *subject enacting communication* furnishes precious indications about the way of performing an authentically plural and democratic subject.

First of all, the subject enacting communication is a multiplicity, performed by a “*We speak*” or “*We communicate*”, which opposes the “*I think*” of modern philosophical tradition (Apel 1999, 15). Concretely, this means that the subject concerned is constitutively plural. In fact, communication entails an interaction among two or more people including active participation and intervention. Monologues, issuing an order, and the like, are not fully appropriate examples of communication, because they represent one-

⁴¹ As communication is here considered in its primary, but not exclusive and absolutely necessary function, the principles are not subject to a “must”, but to an “ought to” which requires an engagement from the subject and entails a duty which has to be performed by the single individuals. This is the reason why they open up to the intrinsic possibility of an ethics. To this proposal, see also: Landenne 2015, 42ff.

way actions and mostly express hierarchically structured utterances. An authentic (or ideal) form of communication implies true involvement and interweaving of two or more persons, and presupposes at least reciprocity and an equal distribution of chances about implementing speaking. From a political perspective, this entails that the subjects concerned are entitled to partake in the communicative process, to express their opinion, to underpin it with arguments, and to look for consent. Finally, they are enabled to participate in the decision making from an equal position and to look together for a solution which can gain the consent of all subjects concerned (Apel 1973, 426).

Furthermore, as an authentic communication can be performed through a form of speaking which requires reciprocity and intelligibility, the plural subject expresses a commonality which nevertheless maintains individual distinction and autonomy. Therefore, communication constitutively entails, secondly, a readiness and willingness to open up to the other, to actively include the other in the communicative process, to listen to him or her, and to answer the possible questions or objections. This makes for reciprocity in the process of communication, but also implies a concern for the needs and the interests of the others. In doing so, the others are included on principle as equally worthy subjects and everyone is really interested in the point of view expressed by others and in the opinions they have or in the proposals they make. In the context of a political debate, the consequence to be expected is that the subjects involved and their views be considered as worthy and relevant for decision making, and this is to be applied also to representative organs, governments, and their exponents. In the relation between citizens and institutions, communication inevitably affects different levels,⁴² but it can be implemented through forums, public debates, and, on the part of the institutions, through feedback and willingness to pay attention to the needs of the citizens. Especially the *feedback* for the demands and the initiatives of the people ensures the implementing of a true

⁴² With respect to this, Dupeyrix has underlined that Habermas presents an articulated theory of the different phases of communication in which different subjects, functions, and institutions are involved (Dupeyrix 2012, 252ff), and in which also new media result to play an incisive role.

communication also on an inter-level dimension, and conveys them the confidence that they are taken seriously by the institutions. As a general issue, feedback promotes the reduction of distances and the increasing of direct approach to the citizens through a really communicative and interactive procedure.

Besides, from the perspective of communication, the attitude of appreciating the others and being concerned with their demands includes not only the activity of speaking as such, but also the habituation to deal with problems and to look for commonly acceptable solutions. The passage into activity is already entailed in the *performative nature of communication*, which is implemented *de facto* through speech acts, and not only through sentences. Speech acts are constituted by two parts: a propositional component, referring to the content, and a performative one, which is implemented through an action (which in general implicates an aim). Orientation toward a problem-solving attitude derives from the fact that utterances and arguments presented in the communicative process are not only talkative performances, but they intend to contribute to its development in a cooperative context (Chennoufi 2013, 112f). Thus, they make the basis for a common search for solutions, striving for consent and compromise, and correspondingly implementing actions. In doing so, the communicative process opens the way to deliberation and actuation of concrete policies, attained by a continuous process of discussion based on grounds, mediation, and reaching of consent among the concerned subjects.⁴³

Finally, the cooperative attitude created by the procedures entailed in the communication process, and the effective experience of collectively being affected by the same questions with the necessity of a jointed problem-solving, produce the arising of a sentiment of *solidarity*. Solidarity, as already John Dewey had remarked, derives in general from the progressive accustoming to act together in a cooperative form (Dewey 1981ff,

⁴³ To this respect, Habermas introduces the principle D of the ethics of discourse, which requires the consent of all subjects concerned and, by considering them as effective participants in a practical discourse, implies a transformation of the Kantian (or of Rawls') imperative into a fundamentally intersubjective claim (Habermas 1983, 76).

328ff). The ethics of communication, from the perspective substantiated in particular by Apel, is able to deduce from its premises *solidarity* and further issues, such as *justice* and *co-responsibility* (*Mitverantwortung*) (Apel 1992, 7ff), whereby co-responsibility does not mean a diminishing of responsibility, but rather its increasing through the cooperative agency and the concern for the others, and justice is deduced from considering the others as equally worthy subjects for whom it becomes unobjectionable to care for. Nevertheless, solidarity can also be seen, from a more immediate perspective, as a habit already deriving from constant debate and the exchange of views, and even more from the necessity of a concerted deliberation and consequent implementation. By proposing a pragmatic vision of solidarity with regard to Europe, Habermas maintains that it is possible to make reference to the idea of a *thin identity* and at the same time to create an enhanced and self-enhancing custom of cooperation and concerted agency, so that everyone increasingly feels responsible for the others and their well-being.

5. The project dimension

This understanding of the ethics of communication provides a democratic vision of the “we-subject”, where each individual is and remains autonomous and is not dissolved into a merely collective subject and nevertheless acts in a cooperative way, comprehends the points of view of the others, and can also take into consideration their needs and problems. It has the advantage of developing in a processual and functional form a sort of “we”-feeling, without confronting with a substantive vision of contents and perspectives (Habermas 2011, 76f). On the other hand, it is not sure that this can be sufficient to guarantee a continuity of solidarity and cooperation in case of very critical situations, in which the different subjects concerned have conflictive interests and they suppose that they could independently find for themselves better solutions. To include the teleological dimension of the aims, Apel introduces a distinction between an *ideal community of communication*, which serves as a regulative principle, and the *real community of communication*, which is rooted in the concrete historical context and can perfect itself by orienting its agency towards reducing distance to the ideal one (Apel 1988, 141ff). This

procedure allows for a systematic implementation of fundamental rights which are recognized on principle as untouchable, and it also enables to let agency be inspired by crucial values which are to be considered as non-negotiable, such as tolerance, equal respect and right to participation, freedom of opinion, and recognition of the others (Mandry 2009, 224). Yet, the purposive dimension remains indefinite and entails more the perpetuation (or improvement) of the basic conditions of communication or the accustoming to act together, than a coherent pursuing of a constructive project. For that reason, the idea of a *project dimension*, as suggested by the communitarian thought (Senigaglia 2005, 271ff), proves itself to be a complementary, but equally indispensable issue, since it allows for giving (or trying to do it) a congruent direction to the concerted efforts. In fact, the idea of a common project is a component to be emphasized, if the political organization is to be conceived of as an articulated vision to be developed in the future. This is all the more important in view of the fact that the problem-solving perspective could go short in relation to the cultural, educational, and also social aspects which can be connected with the idea of Europe. From this perspective, the pragmatic growing together should be integrated also by the ideal and cultural components entailed in the project dimension (Taylor 1993, 51ff), which alimnts an enhanced interweaving, but also the shaping of a common space where cultural, educational, and social initiatives can be actuated (Barber 1998, 38, 44).

How could this space be realized? First, it should be premised that it is not indispensable (and perhaps also not useful) to imagine a closed space with rigidly definite borders and principles of inclusion and exclusion. Rather, attention should be concentrated to the positive featuring of the common space in a way which progressively strengthens the *chances* of cooperation, interplay, and common undertaking, by endeavouring to reduce disparities and to increase well-being also in less advantaged territories. Furthermore, the emphasis should be put less on a compact, vertical, and united structure, and more on a *network of initiatives and projects* which indeed are already at work, but should be multiplied and made effectively known. By depicting Europe as a *common space*, Ortega y Gasset remarked that in the past European states had always looked one at another and

oriented their development and their efforts to the achievements of the others, but they had done so by considering them as rivals. According to Ortega, an authentic European perspective for the future implies transforming this kind of reciprocal attention and competition into a plurality of coordinated and reciprocally empowering efforts (Ortega y Gasset 2001, 218f). Accordingly, the European space should be conceived of as the place where this enhancement of activity and laboratory of ideas is made possible.

6. Communication in a European context

Notwithstanding the possibility of communitarian integrations, it is indisputable that communication remains a fundamental and irreplaceable issue with an essentially connecting and intermediating function. This becomes immediately clear, if the point is made that also cultural, social, and scientific interweaving necessitates exchanges of view and forms of communication which support its developmental targets. Additionally, also these aspects have to be conceived of as projects which maintain an ethical equal relation among the subjects involved, are sensitive to their feedback, and willing to take account of their suggestions. Thus, the fact that the political union should be considered as a dynamic process which can be performed through continuous and multi-thematic as well as multilayered activities (Wessela 2014), stresses the central function of communication and the importance of its ethical achieving. The question is: how could the normative conditions included in communication be implemented from a present standpoint, and with the aim of strengthening a common-shared, but plural, European we-dimension?

First of all, the tendency has to be avoided that the “we” component be divided into an “I and the others” or alternatively into a “we” entailing “the better” and opposed to the others. It is clear and to be expected that the subjects concerned have also specific interests and needs to defend. Yet, this should neither flow into the mere consideration of the egoistic perspective, nor give origin to forms of ranking. If it is unavoidable that there are differences of potential and performance, the perspective of the “we” entailed in communication rather requires considering the problems of specific peoples, territories, regions, or nations as a common concern which should be gradually solved with an

articulated and cooperative effort (Falkowski 2011, 88f). This does not preclude, on the other hand, that the subjects concerned having specific difficulties should demonstrate a sense of responsibility and a commitment not only in relation to the people specifically affected, but also to all European interlocutors. In other words: reciprocal understanding and help should not be negated, but they who ask for it have to be aware of the difficulties they create to the others and be also willing to understand their point of view as well as to responsibly act before them.

Moreover, how should the “we” who arise through the communicative space be conceived of? Because of the complex and extended dimensions of the European Union, the idea of a *web* entailing a *multilevel communication* can be the only conceivable structure. Within it, each individual can experience a *plurality of identities* and *forms of belonging*, which are supposed to vary in intensity and commitment according to the different allegiances expressed by each one, and are also modifiable in relation to time and situation (Walzer 1997, 86ff). From this standpoint, the commonly supported idea of a double level in the European setting, that of the citizens who democratically vote and participate or are represented in the public debate, and that of the states and their national governments representing Europeans citizens as members of a particular nation, could be in some sense reductive. In fact, this polarization risks to augment conflicts and to push citizens into a merely national framing. On the level of identity, it can also compel to the uncomfortable choice between the national and the European self-characterization, producing therefore an unwanted emphasis of nationalisms. This dualism could be loosened and made fluid through an increasing of the participation, at least in the consultative phase, of the *representatives of the regions*, and this could be performed on a preliminary national level as well as on a general European level, in particular when important general issues are at stake. Thus, regions could find some communicative platforms and political arenas where their voices are present and can be effectively listened to.

The complementary, indispensable effort should concern an intensification of the *communicative relationship between citizens and EU institutions*, which takes more into

account the reactions of the citizens, and provides them with a satisfactory feedback.⁴⁴ In doing so, it could be conveyed to the citizens that institutions are more eager to stress the initiatives and decisions which truly concern Europeans citizens and their well-being, than to over-regulate every aspect of their life. The public stressing of issues which implement citizens' rights more effectively, improve their quality of life, and meet their concrete needs, would surely provoke a positive impact on the population. Also the chances for citizens of feeling listened and taken seriously could be enhanced, if the European institutions could give particular attention and a more rapid answer to concerns which arise from different states and which can be classified as supranational and commonly shared.

Additionally, communication should be intensified *at different levels*, which concern first the supranational dimension with the enduring striving for creating an authentic European space (Zarka 2012, 35f), but then also involve the national, regional, and even local dimension in the form of a lively interest for European or supranational themes and people. In this respect, the idea of a *transnational communication* has been emphasized (Habermas 2008, 97, 107f), which should entail for instance on the national level the participation of foreign interlocutors (Conrad 2014, 31)⁴⁵, and which could besides perform a constructive activity of comparison consisting in discussing the problems under study with a constant reference to and a report of parallel situations and

⁴⁴ This aspect has been defined as *responsiveness* (Hahn 2008, 67ff), concerns politicians as well as institutions, and conditions in a relevant manner the way a political organization is perceived and the degree of its legitimization.

⁴⁵ Conrad imagines an interesting thought experiment with three groups of people that initially are kept separated, and then the members of the groups are allowed "to move from room to room to form their own understanding of how the given problem is perceived in the other two groups, and possibly to return to their own groups and report about what they have learned from the other discussions" (Conrad 2014, 36). A further level of interweaving would be reached, according to Conrad, if the persons joining one of the other two groups are admitted not only as observers, but also as speakers (Conrad 2014, 37).

possible solutions experimented with in other European countries and regions.⁴⁶ However, also a *trans-regional communication* is worthy of being promoted, which includes partnership with regions in other countries and interregional cooperation and debates especially in zones across national borders. If it is true that solidarity increases through constant interweaving and cooperation, an intensification of communication and debate on transnational and trans-regional level with European background and implications could underpin the habit of common initiative and concern.

Nevertheless, also an *embracing debate on the European project* should not fade into the background. Especially one aspect handicaps this kind of debate: the fact that the discussion is often dominated by the question *if* the European project is worthy, and not *how* the European project could and should be brought forward. Properly speaking, two levels have to be distinguished in the debate: a level concerning the formation of a political organization, and the further shaping of its institutions and politics. Too often, the question about accepting Europe or not, or, more moderately, about more or less Europe, is privileged in disfavour of a serious and intensive political debate on the question, how an embracing European project has to be developed and implemented, and which could be the appropriate policies and institutional improvements. A political entity, whose legitimacy is steadily questioned, undermines its chances of development and amelioration. This should be taken into account, when the contents of communication are at stake.

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⁴⁶ This should entail, as has been defined, “horizontal dimensions” of discursive convergence and integration (Hepp 2012, 26), which could be performed at different levels and with a multiplicity of diffuse practices and micro-processes.

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SUBCULTURE AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY

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Abstract: *Our paper aims to analyze the subculture concept and phenomenon in the context of a knowledge-based society, considering various manifestations at the level of society and of the community, and implicitly the issue of their consequences. In this regard we have taken into account the potential factors that trigger or prevent the formation of subcultures, be they ethnical or conflictual, deviant or criminal.*

Our research also considers the current situation at European level, taking into account the demographics' dynamics (the aging population and the strong influx of immigrants), seeking to explain the occurring trends linked to the multiplication of subcultures in the European area, especially in the EU, as a structure of the new Europe. The increase of the EU's strength goes hand in hand with the increase of the different regions' force, some of them hoping to become independent given the weakening of the national sovereignty (the post-sovereign era). The cultural, geographical and historical differences among historical region are obvious and important especially for the inhabitants, involving trends of subcultures' manifestations (in Germany – the Länder have different cultures, and Belgium can be divided into the French and the Walloon areas).

Keywords: culture, subculture, knowledge-based society, European integration

1. Introduction

Our paper had as starting point the finding of an explanation for the different behaviors occurring at societal level, at community level, given the imminent trends of globalization, the trend pursuing uniformity, triggering an obvious reaction of the local

communities, visible through the emergent behaviors. The issue is even more interesting due to the fact that globalization, which can be perceived more and more severely, does not bring about a new culture, but rather generalizes one, characterized by the manipulation of the masses through the media, this way setting and fostering the phenomenon of subcultures. In its turn, the European structure, the manifestation of globalization, only considered from the perspective of culture clearly represents a twofold cultural movement. On one hand there is the movement from East towards West materialized in the so-called process of re-entry of the European nations in Europe, which more than half a century thereafter became part of another structure considered to be “non-European” (!), on the other hand there is the movement from West towards East in the form of expansion (enlargement) of the European structure set off in the West part of the continent through the process of integration pursuing actually the unification of the continent.

The analyzed subject is even more intriguing as the two cultural parts of Europe (East and West) stem from the same sources – the Greco-Roman and the Christian religion, although along the history each of them came to acknowledge their own characteristics and elements. The notion of “Europe” represents a complex comprising the largest "united diversity" but without mixing the “associated opposites”.

Europe represents the knot where so many political, economic, social, cultural, religious and anti-religious histories were intertwined and intra-built in a way which was both conflictual and solidary; Edgar Morin argued that:” Europe dissolves when you want to see it clearly and distinctly. It goes to pieces if you want to surprise its unity”.

“Europe equally represents the right and the force, democracy and oppression, spirituality and materiality, measuring and hybris” i.e. the lack of measure, reason, and also the myth, inclusively regarding the idea of reason” (E. Morin, 2002: 39) so that to study it taken into account should be of its uncertain, vague, conflicting aspects, implicitly determining its complex identity generated exactly by culture.

On these grounds, the first part of the work aims to highlight a succinct literature review, searching various theories and explanations in the multidisciplinary direction; the second part considering the cultural dynamics and the formation of subcultures in a Europe

that is desired to be unified, the discussions leading subsequently to considering the possibility of transforming the national cultures into subcultures if we consider the phenomenon of the European integration and implicitly the idea to forge a distinct “European culture”.

2. Considerations on the concept of culture and subculture

Culture is the one the expression of a society is based on through both material and spiritual matters, including here language, ideological values, gender roles, social conventions, religion and artistic expression. We make reference, of course, to individuals interacting in a certain given territory and who share a culture. Within it, however, there can also be defined groups whose values and norms are distinct from those shared by the majority, groups that constitute what we call subcultures – sharing either constructive or destructive features – characterized by a distinct identity, commitment, distinctness and a certain level of autonomy. Traced back to the 18th century, the concept has undergone changes, from being considered the mere process of improvement up to the differentiation between the material and nonmaterial culture, so that by mid 20th century the term acquires a degree of importance, receiving different meanings borrowed from other subjects such as cultural studies, organizational psychology, sociology of culture and management studies. Culture is considered as *“all socially transmitted patterns of behavior, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought characteristic of a community or population”* (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1982) considered to include knowledge, beliefs, values and rules that exist at society level – all of them determining and influencing human behavior. It is worth noting that in most Western languages culture has a general meaning – of “civilization” or “refinement of the mind”, namely a particular meaning – the results of this refinement, reflected in education, art, literature.

Culture comprises knowledge, beliefs and human behavior which is both the result and a component of human capacity to study and transmit knowledge to future generations (*Enciclopedia Concisa Britanica*)

Culture also displays different levels – at the highest level there is the “culture of a national or regional society” (indicating here a common set of attitudes, values, goals, and practices shared by members of a community; it is about data culturally “inscribed” and transmitted from one generation to the next); it is the way in which attitudes are expressed in a given organization thus reflected into a “corporate or organizational culture” (set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a particular area, activity, or societal feature); finally, we can consider also the culture of certain specific functions within organizations: marketing, research and development, personnel.

Culture is the context in which things happen; every culture can be distinguished from another by the specific solutions chosen in order to solve certain problems that have emerged as dilemmas. These issues must be considered from three different directions: those arising from our relations with other individuals; those arising from the passing of time, and those which are related to the environment. “If we refer to functions of cultures and civilization, we must consider that the main fundamental need which culture meets is individual and group identity. We are who we are by the language we speak, the historical heritage, values, customs and traditions we share through the literary, artistic and philosophical creation in which we were formed. The idea of education, training and becoming of the person is coming here closer to the alternative meaning given to crops - fruit, agriculture, etc (Malita, 1998: 37)., suggesting subsequently that “Culture meets the need of belonging, opposite to loneliness. When running dry and not feeding, alienation will definitely occur. It is therefore about a vital function. Culture is the guarantor of the human life, i.e. the discarding the purely biological (or animal) sphere. It occurs in layers, it is gradual. One can enjoy more or less culture, while remaining within the same culture”(Malita, 1998: 37).

“Culture has strong emotional resonance, it gives rise to feelings of social solidarity, it develops an aesthetic sense, it allows emotions, encourages creativity, spontaneity, originality” (Malita, 1998: 37).

Culture is below the level of awareness, but it influence and supports actions; it is set up by people, confirmed by others, stylized, and transferred to the young (or

newcomers) for learning, culture thus being the means by which people “communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge on dealing with life”. Culture is an “intertwining of senses of how individuals interpret their experience and guide their actions”(Geertz, 1973). Hofstede (2010) follows the same idea, considering culture as a common system of meanings, dictating where to direct our attention, how to act and what to cherish, the culture organizing such values in what the author calls “mental programs” (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede (2010), Trompenaars (2012) and Parekh (2000) indicate the value system as representing the essence of a culture, including rules and norms that determine the core activities and social relations.

The rules represent the common meaning that a group would give to what would be considered “right” and “wrong”. These rules may formally develop in the form of written laws, as well as informally in the form of social control. Values, on the other hand, determine the definition of what is considered to be “good” and “bad” and therefore are closely related to the ideals shared by a group. A culture is relatively stable if the rules reflect the values of the group; when this is not the case, tension is likely to occur. In Eastern Europe, for example, the rules of Communism did not fit the values of society, thus disintegration was a logical consequence.

Culture represents the bundle of analytical models (Eggertson, 1998) that members of a community share. This “software of the mind” groups together the mental models that determine possible and probable actions, taking into account the context in which decisions are taken. So once again it is emphasized the collective character of culture, the “collective programming of thinking that distinguishes the members of one group from another” (Hofstede, 1980). The strength of these mental programs in determining human behavior can be seen in the difficulty to abandon old habits of thought and action.

Currently, while small companies tend to reflect cultural uniformity, large industrial companies, not only in Europe but worldwide, reflect cultural diversity and imply the existence of numerous subcultures. Subcultures are represented by the values and the norms that are distinct from the ones held by the majority, and which are held by a group within a wider society. The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian language (editions of

1998 and 2009) and the Grand Dictionary of Neologisms are the only dictionaries for language which document on the meaning of the term subculture with its sociological meaning – “the culture of a social subgroup” “The term”, argues Alexandru Ciolan in *Ziarul Financiar* of 14 October 2010 “fell within the scope of scientific debate and is circulated in the cultural press in articles of encyclopedic character”. " The term was borrowed from English (subculture) not only by our language but also the French language (sous-culture), Spanish, Italian, Portuguese (subculture), German (Subkultur) etc., as at its origins the concept of subculture [.....] was put forward by the Chicago School in the 30s/40s in the last century (R. Lit..24xii-2003). Besides this term of Anglo American origin, the Romanian language has, however, a relatively widely used term, consisting of the word sub “inferior” and culture to denote ignorance and bad taste. These waves of vulgarity, of teribilism even, which can be found quite aggressively in music represent some kind of reflex - subculture of a notable part of young and adolescent individuals (EV.31VII 03) or do not get mixed in the bran of subculture (R.Lit.16 / 01p.17). The word with this meaning is much, much older than this first certification. When subculture certification as a means of expression of a community (regarding age, ethnicity, gender issues, etc.) opposes the culture of the majority, it becomes counter-culture. Unlike subculture, which is built in order to affirm values, tastes, and customs, counterculture is established at the outset and openly in opposition to the rules of society. Therefore, subculture can have negative connotations, but counterculture, because of its deliberate character basically politically, can only have positive connotations. (Alexandru Ciolan – *Ziarul Financiar* dated 15/10/2010).

The beginnings of the subculture theory were marked by the perceptions of some researchers who have joined in what got known as the Chicago School, which became known due to its theory of subculture as defining a deviant group. Most researchers who have studied the phenomenon of subcultures, especially for the situation of last century US (Downes and Rock, 1988; Merton, 1938; Cohen, 1994; Agnew 1997, 1992; Sampson et al, 1993; Simons et al, 2003) considered as being deviant a reaction, a normal response, as a sociological matter, explaining various options in a cultural / social setting - as a kind of

analysis of the problems that surrounds individuality – as a result of the standing disjunction between culture and the structure of a modern society. Most of the studies mentioned above are considering subculture rather in the form of “islands” with negative connotations that reflect disorganized and criminal behavior, stressing that the effectiveness of culture is less likely to flourish in environments where poverty and social disorganization flourish, indicating the connection between these variable and the high rates of crime and delinquency. Of course, the researchers based their findings on the analysis of data collected in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The dynamics in time of this phenomenon highlighted the idea according to which the concept of subculture should be understood in a complex way, including its positive connotation. There are subcultures of ethnic groups which are recognized as such in the institutional structures of the Member States (ex. the national minorities as was outlined above), there are also subcultures that are constituted or are set by groups that are not the expression of ethnicities, but of rather nonconformist groups. The question is which is the dynamics of these subcultures? Under what conditions can culture become subculture, or subculture reach the level of the dominant culture? The process of developing subcultures and transforming them into a dominant culture is itself complex and lengthy and involves considering the dynamics and the consequences in terms of outlining cultural identities and of political, social and economic consequences

3. Cultural identity and subculture. Dynamics. Consequences

It is required a more profound understanding of cultures and subcultures, of the reason for which people of different training and background behave or reach conflictual situations. Understanding one's own culture is essential to understanding other cultures or other individuals, the reactions stemming from both own conceptions and values and the ones the others' behavior is based on.

The groups of individuals are organized so as to increase the efficiency of processes for resolving their problems. And because different groups have developed in different geographical areas, they have also developed different sets of logical

assumptions. Every culture must resolve a limited number of issues which are general, universal and common to all individuals. A culture can be differentiated from another according to the specific directions chosen for addressing these issues. The anthropologists F. Kluckhohn and F. L. Strodtbeck (1961) identify five categories of problems, arguing that all communities accomplish all the possible types of solutions but show their preference in a different order. Therefore, in every culture there is a set of value orientation, which will be “dominant” and preferred. According to this system, the five basic categories of problems individuals usually face are – the relations established among individuals, the way they relate to the time factor, the way they relate to the work that has to be performed, the relationship man-nature, or, respectively, the human nature. In short, the authors argue that individuals face common universal problems emerging from the relationships established with their peers, with time, with activities and with (human) nature. “Cultural identity has a special place in every study on culture. Identity is ensured by the difference of specificity. Cultural idiosyncrasy has been acknowledged. They were formed and continue to develop based on the delimitation from other cultures and even on the refusal, on separation and on confrontation” (Malita, 1998: 37).

The changes that can be recorded by a culture arise because people realize that certain ways of doing things no longer work; it is not difficult to change culture, especially when people acknowledge the fact that the very survival of the community is at stake, in case survival is considered desirable (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012: 32). Regarding survival, the mental patterns of strategies are continuously changing, they are improved and adapted, another side of the continuity being the unity - assuming a single and continuous identity - and based on language, culture, religion, followed by the three characteristics of civilization – the institutions, the laws and the technologies, different from culture, but still integrative part of it, civilization being also a unifying factor). Although these are constants in the equation of unity and solidarity, they also record changes over time, relying on strategies embedded in the collective memory. Culture’s key is her style developed in the subconscious, being the product of a stylistic matrix, that influence individual behavior creating identity; this matrix being formed by centuries of

experience that maintain a collective memory. Culture hoards the essential experiences of the collective life, starting with those linked to the supreme imperative of survival. “Cultures are usually conservative in their mission to keep their heritage and defend identities even when they are considered prejudices” (Malita, 1998: 37).

Cultures change. In Europe there is a tendency towards a homogenous culture influenced by the information technology, the international competition, the online education, the economic instability and the influence of international organizations.

The fundamental differences in business matters are based on cultural differences, either of European influence or from elsewhere, considered from the perspectives of managers who face such issues in the transnational companies. Behavior, values and beliefs (even religious) influence most relationships in the workplace, as well as business relationships. The idea of individualism has different meanings in national contexts (in the UK it means nonconformity, in the US confidence, in Latin countries it gets a connotation of egocentrism, and in Germany it acquires a meaning of autonomy). Individualism represents an explanation for the necessary authority so that people can become more committed to stay in their place, or to trigger mechanisms for cooperation in the case of independent individuals. The persons belonging to cultures of individualistic leadership may consider collectivist cultures as being conformist, while those cultures with a leadership of a collectivist type may consider subservient the leadership of an individualist type.

The media culture is a subculture; the media phenomenon takes up most of people's time and binds us to the relationships with the power. We do not all live in the same era. The disparities in the era of globalization are flagrant. In the same time the “global market” becomes a “joint homeland”.

Fragmentation, atomization, localism, stand the flattened pressure of an unprecedented expansion. Can there be talk of a model culture with a civilizing mission in the era of globalization? Can culture be a homogeneous block, an object of domination? Could we overlook micro-cultures and subcultures, cultural phenomena, identifying culture strictly with the elitist production?

The media society changed the details of cultures' issues; in its turn, the knowledge based society will change the situation.

It is an incentive for multinational corporations to transform national companies into groups led by multinational teams, considering that their effectiveness will depend on how managers will work, as well as workers, belonging to different cultures.

4. Culture, subculture and the knowledge-based society

“Knowledge means power” (Francis Bacon)

The concept of knowledge society is used worldwide today. This name is a contraction of the term “knowledge-based society”. “The social order that is emerging on the horizon is based on knowledge” The human factor will be central in the process of producing knowledge. The knowledge society will highlight the most important factor of production – the competitiveness' key will be the ability of individuals and groups to produce knowledge and use it efficiently. The central role will be given to the social actor (individual or corporate) in the creation of knowledge, altering the perceptions about the productive wealth of the nation. This new reality will determine a different treatment of human capital as a factor of production compared to all the other factors involved in producing wealth.

It is generally estimated that: the knowledge society will bring national subcultures and especially the professional and ethical ones closer together. “The knowledge society – argues Draganescu – is preceding the Consciousness Society where moral values will have the priority they deserve”. The knowledge Society will represent a new stage in the culture, “the knowledge culture” that involves all forms of knowledge including artistic, literary, or other type of knowledge. It will set the ground for what we have appointed “the consciousness" society” of truth, morality and of the spirit”. The knowledge society is estimated to have a global character and will be a factor of intensified globalization. The 21st century will be remembered not by military conflicts or political events, but by humanity entering a new phase of globalization- the “flattening” of the Earth. Without commercial or political frontiers, under the double effect of globalization and of the digital

revolution, knowledge reserves and resources are connected to each other wherever they are on the globe, leveling the “play field” like never before. Friedman brilliantly removes the veil of mystery that covers the exciting and often thrilling global stage, displaying it before the readers’ eyes – a “flat world” that one can feel, but one barely understands it” (Joseph Stieglitz about T.L. Friedman)

It is estimated that in the Knowledge Society very important will be for the progress of a nation its level of preparedness, of training, the level of information and the participation to the social life. In this (cultural) society – the intellectual and creative horizon and ability will have a decisive role. The culture of information will be predominant. Knowledge society will be followed by the Consciousness Society. There will be reached a combination between the elements of the Knowledge society and of the Consciousness Society. In fact the great era of information will include the era of the information society, of the knowledge society and of the consciousness society. As can be concluded, both consciousness and knowledge are information. Of course, before joining together the consciousness society and the knowledge society there will be a grouping of the information society and the knowledge society. The knowledge society will meet new organizational forms both in society and in the economy.

In the transition towards a Europe of Knowledge the policies of knowledge, research, innovation, education and training are of an exceptional importance for the future of the European Union. The knowledge society is where information means power in the most general meaning, be it about politics, the economy, or finances. Obtaining, controlling and superior valuing of information will be the cornerstone of this society. The knowledge society is the pinnacle of the development of human society, in which knowledge is the ultimate and utmost fundamental source of social power. “Knowledge means power of a higher quality” (A. Tofler). Being very versatile, knowledge increases strength and wealth. Knowledge makes power and wealth depend on it. As society of the future the social and cultural environment will focus on knowledge, on its capitalization.

Conclusions. Knowledge as a factor of unity

Motto: “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder”

Due to the compressing of distances and time, thanks to technology knowledge society acts more and more like a factor of globalization. In its turn, the European structure, a form of globalization, but also in terms of culture, represents a cultural movement in two directions. On one hand there is the movement from East towards West materialized in the so-called process of re-entry of the European nations in Europe, which more than half a century thereafter became part of another structure considered to be “non-European” (!), on the other hand there is the movement from West towards East in the form of expansion (enlargement) of the European structure set off in the West part of the continent through the process of integration pursuing actually the unification of the continent. The analyzed subject is even more intriguing as the two cultural European parts (East and West) started based on the same sources – the Greco-Roman and the Christian religion, although throughout history they came to discover their own defining elements. The legend says: “When the Modern European world was born there came three fairies and gave their offerings: the first one brought Freedom, the second brought Equality, and the third brought forth Prosperity. That evening came the evil fairy and said: “You can only fulfill two of the three promises: Choose!” So the Western Modern Europe chose Freedom and Prosperity and never got to know equality; Modern Eastern Europe chose Equality and Prosperity and never got to know Freedom. Philosophers and theologians have chosen Freedom and Equality and they have never known prosperity.

It is true that there is a unity of cultures in the core of the European culture, but what most characterizes this culture is also the very strong diversity. Diversity exists in parallel with the community. These two essential elements – unity and diversity – are the foundations of the envisaged European federalism. In this context it must be stressed that it is necessary a minimum of unity yet to be developed diversity. With globalization it can be seen that the most diverse identities begin to emerge, they can be perceived as a reaction to certain uniformity. The terms of homogeneity, uniformity cannot be used to define or understand European culture. In the context of the European Union there can even be

indicated an opposition between the Europe of the States as national cultures and the Europe of regions as the manifestations of subcultures. There are in Europe regions that develop within states; they develop parallel to the states sharing sovereignty within the European Union.

The notion of “Europe” is a complex comprising the largest “united diversity” but without being mixed some of the “associated opposites”. Culture must constitute the base of the European Union. Only then will European citizens perceive the Union as holding fundamental values.

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THE IDEOLOGY OF GRUPPE 47, BETWEEN LITERARY POLITICS AND POLITICS OF LITERATURE. A TRANSATLANTIC STORY.

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Abstract: *In the aftermath of World War II, the informal association of intellectuals known as Gruppe 47 found itself in a troublesome position in its attempt to rebuild a new political culture in postwar Germany. My analytical approach to the ideological controversies, paradoxes and inconsistencies of the group's orientation will provide some relevant tools for explanation and put forward confrontational dilemmas for assessing the overall activities of Gruppe 47 members. This type of approach is risky and difficult for two main reasons: i) first, because the membership of the Group was non-permanent and circumstantial and ii) second, because the overall activity of the Group seemed to move indecisively between two main coordinates (i.e., an aesthetic and literary programme on the one hand, and a politics of culture / literature, on the other). Intuitively, I think that the study of literary culture in post-war Germany could function as a strong indicator of the status and transformations of political culture in this country and may be more successful than conventional historiography, political science or institutional theories in explaining what really happened in Germany in the period in question.*

Keywords: Group 47, intellectuals, literary politics, politics of culture, de-Nazification, Der Ruf, American connections

Preliminaries

Any investigation dedicated to the overall activity of Group 47 inevitably faces an insurmountable paradox: even though Group 47 was and still is appreciated as the most important literary orientation in postwar Germany, the Group's activity as such still remains filled with lot of ambiguities. The paradox as such can be explained as follows:

first, the membership of Group 47 was rather circumstantial, depending on the momentous initiative of Hans Werner Richter (the leader of Group 47) to summon the literary personalities of the day to the various Group meetings, which testifies to a certain inconsistency of the Group; then, the remarkable literary activities of some of the Group's members (Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Martin Walser, Ingeborg Bachmann, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, etc.) do not necessarily explain (i.e., through their themes, topics and aesthetic orientations) their belonging to the Group, but rather a kind of personal 'Bildung'; finally, the Group's meetings were not subordinated to an explicit aesthetic agenda, its formal character primarily deriving from the participation rules which will be discussed later. The difficulties of investigating the ideological activity of Group 47 increase if we are to consider the general ideological confusion that characterized German political life in the first years after war capitulation until 1949, when West Germany was established.

Based on these general considerations, a series of rather contextual appreciations were made in the bibliographical references concerning Group 47's activity; with few exceptions (a book written by Siegfried Mandel and another one edited by Stuart Parkes and John White), the exclusive investigation of Group 47 lacks any sort of perspective. The most important part of reflections dedicated to Group 47's activities is placed within the context of modern German literature or German literary culture, as well as in the context of intellectual life in the two Germanys, in a sometimes comparative perspective or within the framework of relations between German intellectuals and the four zones of postwar occupation in Germany. In addition, there is a widespread tendency of assessing the activity of German cultural and intellectual milieus within the context of the ideological policies during the Cold War (see attached bibliography).

Therefore, three perspectives might be salient for assessing the ideology of Group 47: i) first, the activity of Group 47 as an ideological entity might result from the common traits of the ideological commitments of the group members, the informal discussions and letters among themselves, and their particular aesthetic representations; ii) second, I think it is possible to construct a narrative of both the Group's literary politics and politics of

literature, not necessarily following the traditional approaches of literary histories and criticism. Accordingly, a new methodological investigation equating literary politics and, respectively, politics of literature with political aesthetics (i.e., an ideological commitment to a certain aesthetic view on politics in general) might be instructive and explanatory; iii) third, and probably the most challenging and innovative part – on which I found, at best, minimal references – will be to find relevant information on the relationship and connections between American institutions and individuals, on the one hand, and the most prominent German intellectuals who belonged to Group 47 by studying complementary bibliographic sources (biographies, autobiographies, letters, monographs, etc.). If successful, this methodology of research might stand for a sociological and cultural diplomacy investigation of Group 47's activities. In a sense, this study aims at i) deepening my research in the area of connections between American institutions and people and European public intellectuals and ii) questioning the troublesome relationship between the aesthetic programmes of intellectuals and their political positioning in the real world.

This paper will put forward some general considerations regarding the historical premises and contexts influencing the group's overall orientations, a brief analysis of the cultural and intellectual context in which Group 47 emerged, and two analytical and explanatory elements of the ideological commitment of Group 47 members (i.e., internal dilemmas within the Group and the Group 47 members' connections with various American institutions and individuals).

General historical premises

In 1945, at the end of World War II, Germany experienced devastation and damage on multiple levels: politically, the German state was divided by the victorious Allies into four distinct zones of occupation; economically, Germany experienced the most devastating period in modern history, probably unparalleled since the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648: the most important cities were destroyed, businesses were affected by the crippling war reparations, and the overall economic planning in Germany during the Third Reich had been oriented according to military goals and necessities, etc. Culturally,

German intelligentsia was facing a series of inconsistencies and uncertainties stemming from a double crisis: i) the disintegration of the German political culture during the Weimar Republic in the inter-war period and ii) the disastrous outcome of the totalitarian political culture during Nazi nationalism at the end of World War II. Socially, Germany was also disintegrated by massive political emigration of diverse social classes and outstanding intellectuals; after 1945, the social crisis would be best visible within the conflict between the exiles and internal emigrants, especially among intellectuals (Beutin et al., 2005, p. 430).

Under the circumstances, Group 47 found itself in a difficult position in its attempt to rebuild a new political culture in post-war Germany. My analytical approach to the ideological controversies, paradoxes and inconsistencies of the Group's orientation will constitute both tools for explanation and confrontational dilemmas for assessing the overall activities of the Group 47 members. Intuitively, I think that the study of literary culture in post-war Germany could function as a strong indicator of the status and transformations of political culture in this country and may be more successful than conventional historiography, political science or institutional theories in explaining what really happened in Germany in the period in question.

The intellectual context

The interwar period, and especially the Nazi regime, created the premises for the turbulences and the general disorientation that characterised the political and cultural life in Germany after 1945. Some critics argue that everything started with Thomas Mann's 1918 programmatic text, *Unpolitical Meditations*, in which the famous German novelist separated the predominant cultural ethos in Germany from the countries that emphasised primarily the concept of civilisation, such as France and Great Britain (Boyle, 2008, p. 120); this ideological manifesto would have contributed, according to some commentators, to augmenting German intellectual superiority, which created additional difficulties in appreciating the ideological and aesthetic visions of some of the most prominent representatives of Group 47. Hans Werner Richter, for example, in his work *Beyond Defeat*

(1949), rejected the idea that he was subordinated to the American ideology and, as prisoner of war, still remained very much loyal to Germany (Robin, 1995, pp. 63-64); moreover, following the founding of *Der Ruf* publication in the United States, Richter continued to edit it in Germany and repeatedly insisted for the independence of the journal (Trommler, 2004, pp. 374-375).

But this is one minor part of the story; the ideological controversies proper were shaped by two different intellectual oppositions in interwar Germany. First, there was the conflict between the humanist-bourgeois intelligentsia and Marxist intellectuals. The ideological orientation to follow was rather imprecise, and this fact is clearly visible in the adoption of *Programm zur Verteidigung der Kultur* (the Agenda for the Defence of Culture) by German intellectuals at the 1935 Paris Congress of Literature (Beutin et al., 2005, p. 435). Some West German intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, perhaps in order to defend their dignity and cultural autonomy, opted for a leftist orientation; in this respect, the support that some of the prominent members of Group 47 (Walser, Richter, Grass) showed in the 1960s for the Social Democratic Party is relevant (Boyle, 2008, p. 154). The most interesting case is that of Gunther Grass, who sympathised with the Social Democratic Party's political agenda even after the disappearance of Group 47, but his support was conditioned by certain expectations concerning the abandoning of the ideology of revolutionary politics to the detriment of adopting a new political orientation grounded in slow progress and gradual transformations agendas; this would mean that Gunther Grass was a sympathiser of left-wing politics committed to the ideological views of a conservative in disguise. This paradox explains the ideological imprecision resulting from the impossibility of evacuating the reminiscent humanist and conservative values in the context of adhering to the ideological left.

Second, there was the aesthetic debate: the controversies between expressionists and realists (e.g., the debate between Georg Lukacs and Bertolt Brecht) in post-war Germany were refuelled by the polemic surrounding the aesthetics of expressionism, which was to blame for representing the ideological basis of the fascist culture in the recent past. This was but one particular occurrence of what has been assimilated to "fascist

modernism" (Betts, 2003, p. 291) and might stand as one of the explanations why the meetings of Group 47 took place under the ideological and political constrictions of realism, even though, aesthetically, the literary works admitted during these meetings fell outside the program of literary realism. Essentially, however, the ideological and/or aesthetic disputes in post-war Germany were reducible to a principled opposition between a nascent democratically-minded intelligentsia and the detraction of the fascist culture. In the new post-war political context, the questions still remained: first, what was the most efficient way to oppose and discard cultural fascism? And second, was it possible in terms of explicit political action, rather than by means of poetic and critical words? A new generation of German intellectuals had to dismiss the model of authoritarian democracy which was the political foil to the aesthetics of fascism. These were precisely the challenges the members of Group 47 had to confront.

Analytical elements for assessing the ideology of Group 47

1. Internal dilemmas. For the majority of post-war West German intellectuals, the chief issue was that of accepting the ideological meanings and implications of what the Allies called the process of de-Nazification. The dimensions of the de-Nazification process went far beyond the political and ideological spheres, if we are to consider the famous "Liberation Law" which divided the German supporters of Nazism into five distinct categories (Rauh-Kühne, 2004, pp. 68-70). As far as the German intellectuals of Group 47 are concerned, I mentioned earlier Richter's case, who shared, even during the war, a feeling of loyalty and belonging to Germany; however, this was not the case of Alfred Andersch, who acknowledged and divulged his option for deserting the war (in his 1952 *The Cherries of Freedom*), exposing himself, accordingly, to possible accusations for his lack of patriotism (Robin, 1995, p. 65). But what the new generation of young intellectuals in West Germany rejected was the cultural meaning of de-Nazification as re-education which was aimed at altering the very German national character. This kind of political and cultural rehabilitation is worthy of closer investigation.

What the Allies and especially the American occupiers intended to inculcate as a substantial form of re-education was the idea of “collective culpability”, which some members of Group 47 simply denied. What they proposed instead was the idea of “collective trauma” (Kapczynski, 2008, pp. 1-25) and this ideological stand was promoted in *Der Ruf* journal even before the emergence of Group 47. Moreover, some other metaphors were favourite expressions in the *Der Ruf* publication: after the war, according to German intellectuals, the German nation experienced “illness” and “quarantine”, alluding to the fact that the Allies treated the German people as subjects to be cured. Evidently, this attitude meant rejecting this version of the concept of re-education by the majority of intellectuals belonging to Group 47, this being apparently one of the reasons why the German military authorities removed Richter and Andersch from their positions as editors of *Der Ruf*. Actually, after their return to Germany at the end of the war, both Richter and Andersch (who had been prisoners of war at Fort Kearney, Rhode Island) militated for the repudiation of the coordination and control policies (Gleichschaltung) (Boehling, 2004, pp. 388-393).

Another question that stirred the intellectual life in post-war Germany was connected to some reflections about the impact of literary aesthetics on politics; in other words, could literary productions function as political tools, or as means for escapism? Although the regulations of the Group 47 initial meetings formally evacuated political issues, the intellectuals joining the meetings had to confront this pressing challenges of post-war German political culture. Even the Allies were not in complete agreement regarding the direction of German culture after the war: for instance, some American government officials insisted that Germany should be steered towards capitalism, while Henry Morgenthau had the vision of a strong agrarian Germany (Junker, 2004, pp. 1-28). According to Hans Werner Richter, there was either the possibility of democratising socialism (i.e., anti-statism) or socialising democracy (i.e., welfarism), even if, whatever the case, the American occupation in Germany aimed at supervising the overall democratisation processes of the country (Fait, 2004, pp. 57-64). Excepting these two possible options for the future of political culture in Germany, the German intellectuals

criticised the American alternative for supervising democratisation in West Germany. Additionally, the American ideological commitment towards westernisation/Europeanisation of West Germany contrasted with the politics of massive nationalisation in Eastern Germany after 1945; the hidden agenda of American occupation in West Germany was intimately connected with diminishing the nationalist impetuses. The intellectuals' response to the American strategy was that of reformulating nationalism in terms of pleas for reunification.

Under the circumstances, probably the most pressing aesthetic issue had to do with an innovative concept of representation. The German intellectuals of Group 47 were caught between defending an apolitical concept of literary and cultural representation tantamount to an apolitical existentialist aesthetics and the representation of politics according to an aesthetic program, which would have meant the re-politicisation of intellectuals. Beyond this principled distinction within the nature of representation, there was a controversy concerning the tone of representations deriving from the very mood of intellectual expression. That is why I would formulate a distinction between two versions of "representational moods", consistent with the meanings of *Trummerliteratur* (i.e., literature of despair, of ruins, of hopelessness, of defeat and disintegration) as opposed to the connotations of Zero-hour literature (i.e., spiritual rebirth, redemption) (Brockmann, 2004, pp. 191-197; Brockmann and Trommler, 1996). By and large, the members of Group 47 adopted quite a pessimistic view on the overall state of affairs in post-war Germany, rather in the spirit of *Trummerliteratur* than in the spirit of Zero-hour literature, but this assertion needs further clarifications, beyond the scope of the present paper.

2. *American connections.* Probably the most obscure and equivocal side of the overall activity of Group 47 refers to the multiple instances of formal and informal connections with American officials, institutions and ordinary people. The vast majority of literature dedicated to Group 47 is rather silent on the topic, due to its second-rate importance and, probably, for reasons of irrelevance in the context of primordial literary analysis and criticism. But, contrary to this orientation, I see the issue as illuminating, for

the complex ways in which the ideological and aesthetic views of Group 47 were shaped, influenced, and further developed. For instance, one should reconsider the major role that the American agency OMGUS (Office of Military Government for Germany) played in the process of what I would term “negative de-Nazification” through prohibitive actions, restrictions and ideological control. The actions of OMGUS, doubled by the constant supervision of cultural activities in West Germany by ICD (Information Control Division), had to do with granting publication licenses, paper allocation and, in most cases, censorship of Nazi-type cultural events (Basker, 2003, pp. 97). Even if the situation changed in 1949, when the military authority was replaced by civilian high commissions (Schumacher, 2004, p. 90), the influence of these institutions on the cultural and political actions carried out by the members of Group 47 should not be dismissed. It is one thing to oppose positive re-education, either as de-Nazification or anti-communism, and quite another to resist the more compelling circumstances that would have resulted from restricting publications or censorship: that is why I think that a re-examination of the formal and informal contacts between the German intellectuals of Group 47 and American officials and institutions is necessary for a realist assessment of the Group’s ideological orientation.

The very case in point is Richter’s and Andersch’s decision to form an independent intellectual organisation after being replaced as editors of *Der Ruf*; their decision lies at the foundation of Group 47. Even though Group 47 was not instituted as an explicit reaction on the part of some German intellectuals towards American politics in Western Germany, its genesis was closely linked with the German intellectuals’ will for independence and freedom of expression. The literary histories that discuss the context in which Group 47 was founded do not seem to pay enough attention to the connections between the Group’s activities and American officials, primarily because of the fact that the Group’s meetings were exclusively dedicated to literary matters. During these meetings, literary productions in the form of manuscripts were read before an audience, and afterwards criticised without the lecturer being granted the right to reply; the political and ideological debates were informal at best and outside the Group’s explicit meetings. Nevertheless, Group 47’s

meetings were, for the most part, partially or totally sponsored, and the most talented young writers were awarded prizes (the first two awards were sponsored by an American publishing house from New York). Some publications and translations were also subsidised. Among others, there were two kinds of practices associated with the American support for cultural manifestations in West Germany: financing the publication of books and propaganda materials (e.g., *Der Monat* was founded in 1948 with CIA funds and *Die Wandlung* hosted large-scale anti-communist propaganda in the US zone) and implementing American public relations programmes which encouraged friendly and cooperative relations between American institutions and individuals and German citizens, respectively (Beutin et al., 2005, pp. 462, 469-470).

Intuitively, I believe it is important to investigate more thoroughly not only the ways in which the German intellectuals belonging to Group 47 responded to the American policies, institutions and individuals with whom they came in contact, but also the amount of satisfaction and agreement of the United States political circles with the literary aesthetics and ideology in post-war Germany. It is also interesting to deepen the research on the forms of commitment of American officials to changing political and cultural conditions in Germany and the ways in which Americans guided their actions in order to gain the Germans' approval and trust. One special case of intellectual response on the German side was the "Declaration on the War in Vietnam", issued by Group 47 in November 1965, which generated the left-wing anti-Americanism in Germany (Gassert, 2004, pp. 632-633).

The penultimate meeting of Group 47 took place at Princeton University in 1966, following an invitation of the German Department at Princeton, where one of the group's occasional members, Victor Lange, had been an active professor between 1957 and 1977. The complete recordings of the sessions of the Princeton meeting are available, and it would be relevant to investigate how the more divided opinions of the Group members contributed to its final dissolution one year later. In 1968, the meeting was supposed to be held in Prague, but Richter suspended it on account of the student protests and the promises made to Czech writers to pay a silent tribute to dissenting voices. By that time,

the political dimension of Group 47's activity had increased significantly, so that one of its prominent members, Martin Walser, had come to reject the dichotomy between literature and politics (Parkes, 2003, pp. 55-56). This meant that Group 47's meetings were now increasingly dominated by the spirit that would animate the 1968 revolts: anti-capitalism, grassroots democracy, pessimism (Jarausch, 1998, pp. 470-477). This is the reason why political conversions of some relevant literary productions written by Group 47 intellectuals could also function as illustrations for the fusion between politics and aesthetics (e.g., Boll's *Billiards at Half Past Nine* and Grass's *The Tin Drum*). Moreover, Peter Handke's appearance and his speech during the Princeton meeting generated instability, confusions and even indignation within the Group: using his drama *Offending the Audience* as a pretext for criticism, Handke characterised the orientations of the Group as "descriptive impotence" and incriminated the pre-eminence of personal interests and the exhibition of egos (Moralic, 2007). In light of such considerations, the Princeton meeting can stand both as the epitome of Group 47's American connections and the root of its swan song.

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Section: Education

CHALLENGES FOR AN EFFECTIVE EDUCATIONAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECEC SERVICES IN ROMANIAN CONTEXT

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Abstract: *Parents are the primary agents of socialization and hold the great influence on child behaviour in early childhood, considered to be a crucial period of socialization. The family type and the parenting styles have significant influence on socialization process. Although the notion of socialization became less central to sociological debates, the idea of families having a major role in primary socialization process is still quite central (Gillies, 2011). The present paper analyses the factors affecting socialization of children in Romanian families. The first part of the paper will be dedicated to a review of literature regarding the influence of the family in the socialization process of children. In the second part the author will present the results of a study case conducted in Bucharest in 2015 using a research methodology based on PAPI questionnaire with parents having children between 0 and 6 years enrolled in ECEC services. The analysis*

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will focus on manner of exercising parenting styles in Romanian family. The factors affecting socialization of children will be also highlighted according to the data form the field survey. The results have implications for researchers, policy makers and practitioners from the family policy area.

Keywords: ECEC services, childhood, child development, family, work life balance policies.

1. ECEC Services, Parenting Styles and Socialization of Children

The concept of educational partnership between family and ECEC (early childhood education and care) services system aims to become a central one for social policy, flexible and open to educational problems. Building an effective educational partnership between family and ECEC services should take into account the variety of parenting styles. Researchers have found a strong positive relationship between parent - initiated involvement practices and children outcomes (Epstein et al., 2009; Hess and Holloway, 1984).

Parents are the primary agents of socialization and hold the great influence on child behaviour in early childhood, considered to be a crucial period of socialization. The family type and the parenting styles have significant influence on socialization process. Although the notion of socialization became less central to sociological debates, the idea of families having a major role in primary socialization process is still quite central (Gillies, 2011). The way parents take care of their children impacts on the latter's personality development and their ways of interacting with social and close relations.

The parental style is very influential in children's development. Researchers have developed the concept of parenting styles to describe the interaction between parents and their children during the socialization process. Baumrind's model of parenting styles is the most influential framework that has been proposed for classifying styles of parenting. In the 1960s, Diana Baumrind was interested in the different ways that parents attempted to control or socialize their kids. She identified three patterns of parenting styles based upon two aspects of parenting behaviour: *control* and *warmth*. Parental control refers to the degree to which parents manage their children's behaviour—from being very controlling to

setting few rules and demands. Parental warmth refers to the degree to which parents are accepting and responsive of their children's behaviour as opposed to being unresponsive and rejecting. When the two aspects of parenting behaviour are combined in different ways, three primary parenting styles emerge:

Authoritarian parenting	<i>Emphasizes blind obedience, stern discipline, and controlling children through punishments--which may include the withdrawal of parental affection.</i>
Permissive parenting	<i>Is characterized by emotional warmth and a reluctance to enforce rules.</i>
Authoritative parenting	<i>A more balanced approach in which parents expect kids to meet certain behavioural standards, but also encourage their children to think for themselves and to develop a sense of autonomy.</i>

1. Table Parenting Styles (Baumrind, 1971)

Baumrind's studies established that elementary-aged children of authoritative parents display adaptive levels of self-reliance and self-esteem, and socially responsible, independent, and achievement-oriented behaviour; children with authoritarian parents display relatively less independent behaviour and lower levels of self-reliance and self-esteem; and children with permissive parents display less positive behaviour and self-reliance but high levels of self-esteem.

Later, researchers added a fourth parenting style, uninvolved parenting. Maccoby and Martin (1983) analysed adolescents aged 14-18 in four areas: psychosocial development, school achievement, internalized distress, and problem behaviour. The study found that those with neglectful parents scored the lowest on these tests, while those with authoritative parents scored the highest. The uninvolved parenting style is low in parental responsiveness (the nurturing aspect of the child) and low in parental demandingness (control over the child). Routinely these parents are too busy or self-involved to support

their child in school functions, teach life skills and encourage socially acceptable behaviour.

A growing number of research has proven repeatedly that parenting styles have a direct correlation with the children development. Ensuring the best possible outcome for children requires parents to face the challenge of creating a best partnership with ECEC services. It is important for family policy-makers to help new parents in adopting appropriate parenting techniques and strategies to ensure that children receive guidance that will best allow them to succeed in later life.

2. Development of ECEC Services in Romania

After a very long period of being a predominantly private (family issue), the care of very young children is now becoming, in significant degree, an out-of-home activity in which governments are increasingly involved.

Since 2006, a series of European policy documents and events have highlighted the importance of quality ECEC provision. In the *Communication on equity and efficiency in European education and training systems* (2006) the European Commission highlighted that “*pre-primary education has the highest rates of return of the whole lifelong learning continuum, especially for the most disadvantaged, and the results of this investment build up over time.*” The European Commission acknowledged that the investment in ECEC is not a sufficient condition: in order to offset disadvantage throughout the education system, pre-primary programmes need to be followed up with subsequent interventions, such as support for language learning and social adjustment, otherwise their beneficial effects tend to decay.

The European Commission has set out the priorities for early childhood education and care with the aim of improving access to and the quality of services from birth to the start of compulsory schooling. Work on this started in 2012 in cooperation with international organisations and stakeholders. A number of priorities have been set: promoting the most effective use of European funding, developing policy guidance, developing more European data and research. By 2020 at least 95% of pre-school children

of 4 years or older should participate in early childhood education. Countries' improvements in relation to the target are monitored on a yearly basis. EU countries are currently developing methods to monitor the quality of early childhood schooling and care. These efforts are coordinated by the Thematic Working Groups for Schools policy.

Within the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training (ET 2020), the Member States agreed that high quality early childhood education is one of the ways to address the educational disadvantage. Furthermore, it was perceived as a foundation for later educational success, especially in the case of children from disadvantaged backgrounds.

The provision of formal childcare services is an important indicator of work family balance. Due to the increased participation of women with children in paid work, demand for regulated childcare services has been increasing in all over the Europe.

What has Romania managed to accomplish so far regarding ECEC system development? The most profound change in Romania, like in other new Member States, has been the transition from communist regime to market economy. Formally, childcare for children from birth to school age was highly subsidized. In the process of transition to the market economy many of these services were closed down. Thereby a lack of childcare places has emerged and those that still exist are often expensive for parents, especially childcare from the private sector (Matei, 2014).

The main childcare facilities in Romania for children between 0-6(7) years are nurseries (day-care centres for children between the ages of three months and three years), kindergartens, and day care centres. These facilities remain dominated by public financing and provision. Official records reveal that the number of children aged three months to three years in public crèches declined from 47,239 in 1990 to 18,551 by 2013 (INS, 2013). Assessment made in 2010 on Barcelona target regarding access to childcare services showed that Romania did not achieve the Barcelona objectives: in 2010 the gross enrolment rate of children in nurseries was 2.7 (well below the target of 33%) and the gross enrolment rate for children in kindergartens was 81.8%.

3. Challenges for an Effective Educational Partnership between Family and ECEC Services: Results from Empirical Research

3.1. Methodological issues

In order to set up the main challenges for an effective educational partnership between family and ECEC services, a survey was conducted in Bucharest during May-June 2015. The objective of the survey was to identify different parenting styles and strategies for an effective educational partnership between family and ECEC services. The null hypothesis tested was: *H0: Parenting styles influence the relationship between families and ECEC services.*

A stratified random sample was used to collect data from 1021 parents with children between 0-6 years that had children enrolled in ECEC system (nurseries and kindergartens). Because of the difficulty of data collection process (mainly caused by reduced availability of parents to respond to the questionnaire) three techniques were used for data collection: PAPI (paper and pencil interviewing), CATI (computer-assisted personal interviewing), and CAWI (computer-assisted web interviewing).

Data collection technique	Total number /% of applied questionnaires		Questionnaires applied to parents who had children enrolled in nursery (%)	Questionnaires applied to parents who had children enrolled in kindergartens (%)
PAPI	447	44%	43%	44%
CATI	452	44%	42%	45%
CAWI	122	12%	15%	11%
Total	1021	100%	100%	100%

2. Table Sample structure (Survey INCSMPS, 2015)

3.2. Results

The families in contemporary societies have undergone profound changes in recent decades. The changes that have occurred within the family are so significant that the term

family has become increasingly ambiguous, tending to cover different realities today. How the today's parents exercise parental roles within the family? Data collected through field survey conducted in Bucharest show that most parents share the duties of caring and educating children, the percentage increasing with the age of child.




Figure 1. *The person responsible for caring and educating children within the family* (Survey INCSMPS, 2015)

However, over a half of the respondents expressed *strongly agreement* and *agreement* with the statement “Within the family, the mother is the main person responsible for raising and educating children” this issue reflecting in a great extent the real behaviour in managing parental roles within the family in Romania.




Figure 2. The degree of agreement with the statement *Within the family, the mother is the main person responsible for raising and educating children* (Survey INCSMPS, 2015)

30.3 % from the interviewed persons expressed *strongly agreement* and *agreement* with the statement "Father should be more authoritative towards children in the family compared to mother", the percentage reflecting the authoritarian father's role in the family.




Figure 3. The degree of agreement with the statement *Father should be more authoritative towards children in the family compared to mother* (Survey INCSMPS, 2015)

The main parenting styles practiced by the respondents participating in the quantitative research in Bucharest were the *authoritative style* (52.1%), followed by the *authoritarian style* (18.9%). The *permissive parenting style* was practiced by only 7% from the total population investigated, but if we consider the high percentage obtained for the category “undefined parenting style⁴⁹” associated in extremis with the reduced involvement of the parent in the education of his child, the percentage of parents practicing the permissive parenting style could be higher.

Parenting style identified ⁵⁰	Response percent (of total sample) N: 1021 respondents
AUTHORITATIVE PARENTING STYLE Characteristics: <i>Combines systematic monitoring with a high level of parental support. Parents formulate rules and control the compliance with those rules. They do not impose these rules and are open to verbal exchanges with children explaining them the reasons why the rule must be respected and where the rule applies, and stimulating, at the same time, their independence of thought.</i>	52.1
AUTHORITARIAN PARENTING STYLE Characteristics: <i>A high level of control associated with poor support of child activity. Inviolable principles and rules of conduct are imposed to the children.</i>	18.9

⁴⁹ Although an authoritative parenting style is related to positive developmental outcomes, many parents likely use a mixture of different parenting styles when parenting children. Parents may modify their individual parenting style to fit particular circumstances.

⁵⁰ The parenting style questions are embedded in the questionnaire in a random order. The measure consists of items for each of the different styles of parenting in a five point Likert format ranging from strongly agree to disagree.

PERMISSIVE PARENTING STYLE Characteristics: <i>Low level of control, associated with the identification of the parent with the child's emotional states. Few rules of conduct and few responsibilities are impose to the children. Parents struggling to understand and to meet the needs of the child.</i>	7.0
COMPOSITUM PARENTING STYLE Characteristics: <i>It is characterized by elements specific for the three parenting styles (authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive).</i>	4.0
UNDEFINED PARENTING STYLE Characteristics: <i>No specific elements for the three parenting styles (authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive).</i>	18.0

Table 2. Parenting styles, Survey INCSMPS, 2015

Strategies aimed to streamline the educational partnership between family and ECEC systems (nurseries/ kindergartens) must take as starting point the quality of services offered within the institutions concerned, particularly those services directly related to the child's family.

Collected data show that, in Bucharest, both *the quality of collaboration services with the child's family* and *the quality of psychological counselling services offered to parents* are higher in the case of kindergartens as compared with nurseries, aspects validated by the focus groups also (conducted with personnel working in nurseries and kindergartens from the public and private sector).

In the case of nurseries the quality of collaboration services with the child's family was “*very good*” and “*good*” in 84.2% of the cases. But the quality of psychological counselling services offered to parents was “*very good*” and “*good*” only in 36.8% of the cases. For kindergartens the quality of collaboration services with the child's family was “*very good*” and “*good*” in 89.9% of the cases. The percentage for the quality of

psychological counselling services offered to parents was perceived as “*very good*” and “*good*” only in 39.6% of the cases, but the percentage is higher than in the case of nurseries.

A greater openness towards parents from the staff working in education and care institutions (nurseries/ kindergartens) is another aspect that needs to be taken into account so that the educational partnership between family and ECEC services become more efficient. 30.8% of parents having children enrolled in nurseries feel the need for more frequent discussions with the nursery staff. 93.2% of them certified that the teaching staff is opened for discussions with the parents and 85.7% certified that the medical personnel is also opened for such discussions. When we consider kindergartens 20.4% of parents having children enrolled in these institutions feel the need for more frequent discussions with the kindergarten staff. 94.7% of them certified that the teaching staff is opened for discussions with the parents and 80.2% certified that the medical personnel is also opened for such discussions.

4. Conclusions

Results indicate the importance of positive relationships and open communication as components of an effective educational partnership between family and ECEC services. The ECEC system should be designed to ensure that parents can access early childhood care and education every time they need as they balance the care of their children with their decisions to participate on the labour market.

The findings from the field research have implications for policy makers and practitioners from the ECEC area. Building an effective educational partnership between family and ECEC services should take into account the variety of parenting styles. It is important for family policy-makers to support new parents in adopting appropriate parenting techniques and strategies to ensure that children receive guidance that will best allow them to succeed in later life.

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BETWEEN PERCEPTION

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Research interests: The Multidisciplinary Research Group in Cultural Studies (GIMEC) was created under the aegis of CDCS (European Centre for the Dissemination of Social Sciences). Our aims are to investigate with multidisciplinary framework the complexity of concepts as culture, perception, etc.

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Abstract: *Perception is a subjective exercise determined by the context where it is generated, being the cultural processes the main determinant to construct what it is perceived. In this sense, the culture is considered as an ambient factor that is performed in a collective but not universal way, through which individuals are constituted. This suppose an amalgam of different productions that depend on the environment, yet built by subjects whose movements generate new or not contextualized paradigms in terms of the ways and areas they are in contact with.*

Keywords: Perception, affordance, experience attention, multidisciplinary, representation

1. Introduction

We started some years ago developing our academical activity, from humility and multidisciplinary approach, as the platform to analyze the realities and those aspects that are direct and indirect related with culture.

Our motivation to deal with perception concept lies in the deep and accurate connection that maintains with culture. In human cases, it is evident that physiological mechanics of perception are similar; nevertheless, the interpretative mechanics of perception produce bias that we found very interesting.

Perception, in global, is under our interest (at individual and collective level), principally because it is an essential tool to understand ours surroundings, it is different between beings and the cultural trace affects, critically, in how and what we perceive. Even so, we will not deal with a detailed analysis of perception, looking for quintessence, but we will deal with the aspects of perception in which we are more interested.

2. Discerning the *Reality Empire*

Sloterdijk said (2000): *"Humanism as word and as a movement always has a goal, a purpose, a rationale: it is a commitment to save men from Barbarism"*. In various seminaries, lectures and papers, we have already approached savagery-barbarism/civilization-humanity, we believe it essential in shaping otherness, and we understand it as a projection of the first binomial confronted: animal / human.

Generally speaking, from the western point of view, when we think of ourselves, in humanity as a whole, appear the characteristic values of civilization: The Civilized Humanity... What we will finish to define as "*Reality Empire*"; because indeed we will mention aspects in this text, partially related to what we were studying until now: Forms-of-life. We say, therefore, how from humanism, as supremacist philosophy, it displays over discourse, what we would denominate the "*Reality Empire*".

The "*Reality Empire*" finally breaks down like "*Imperative of Reality*" in our life, and even being a category that shows essence, we have catalogued it always as state. In our conception of what Heidegger understood as *being-there*, doesn't include the valuation of a preconceived existence and faithful to essence, but responds to how is (*state*, non *essence*) the world around us (*what-perceived*).

We can see in an etymological approach to the concept of *Reality* three morphemes: *res* (thing), *-alis* (relative to) and *-ity* (quality); then, *Realitas* means 'the quality what is true, what is real (*realis*)'. We could understand, thus, the *Reality*, the *realität*, like a operative-operating, namely, a dispositive that resolves what pretends, and that works, that facilitates the understanding of *what-perceived*. *What-perceived* we follow seeing it like what goes beyond of understanding or translating as *realität*; we could say that *realität* is an interpretation of *what-perceived*, in the rough, that is defined, or it goes to defining depending of the perceptive mold (in all aspects) to which we have come, through interpretative mechanisms "subjugated", and "juxtaposes", to the subjectivity and previous accumulation of experiences of life and dreams. For example if we analyze the different contemporary worldviews, clearer in their differences, between a maasái member or an executive of New York; or between an executive of New York and an Afro-American guy of West Baltimore; or in the different historical worldviews, if we compare a sans-culotte with an olmeca.

In this sense, we can evaluate the zoom according to how we tune up in the study's context, because no one composes their *Realitas* of the same way that a cultural analogous. A father than a son or daughter, a neighbor than other, a friend than other friend, and so on. Equivalence or metaphors that result in identification of coequal similarities may occur,

but certainly the particular interpretation of the world, although with "similar" cultural background, responds to a singular subjective milestone. We could say that probably coincide mostly those categories decoding the world or the environment, depending on how we appoint or analyze the situation or context in which we bring up; while there will be nuances significant enough to make a difference in the interpretation of *what-perceived*.

We say that *what-perceived* is (*state*) perceived, but not that is (*essence*) perceived, because we don't perceive the essences of the *res*; but rather the situation or state in which they are, or rather they are found.

We extend this "*Reality Empire*" as imperative-of-reality, considering the meaning of *Imperium*, concept with we worked before in another seminaries, conferences and papers.

Thus, we have to approach later, introduce us into the factors or concepts like the *Imaginatio* as possibility condition; the potentiality of arts or what artistic as engine change and its relationship with creativity, imaginative and dreamy capacity. The quality and attribute of discourses, as well as building concepts that categorize our thinking and the specific keys to discern the world.

However, the keys, the mechanisms of thought's articulation, as containers of ideology, throw specifics' worlds. Like Nietzsche said, citing by Foucault (1989) "[...] *Western Metaphysics is linked not only to its grammar, but to those who, speaking monopolize the right to speak [...]*", adding, and the ability to shape it.

3. Urban perception

3.1. Affordance in the cities

James J. Gibson, from ecological perception approach, developed the concept *affordance*: "affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal" (Gibson, 1977). In a certain way, affordances are similar to the idea of "meaning" of one object, without the mentalist dimension; affordance means the potentiality of actions that the object offer (Aivar et al, 2002).

Affordance concept suppose a new approach in the cities researches considering that give: 1) a new conceptual framework to understand the relations between individuals and the surroundings built over the time; 2) a theoretical base to improve the designs, giving a common code; and 3) an evaluation tool to explore the relation between the intention and the real use of the design (Maier et al, 2009).

The city is an "open place" of affordances. Thus, the city is not a *tabula rasa*; otherwise it's a force system, lights, shadows, sounds, silences, obstacles that structure possibilities of several actions. Affordance permits to think that the relations among neighbourhood residents and their places sketched are not closed; they are produced in the merge, transforming potentially, between the places and the residents interceded by the action developed between each others.

3.2. City as dispositive

In agreement to Deleuze (1989), a *dispositive* is a type of ball, a multilineal combination. It is composed by different natural lines, and, these lines of the dispositive not cover the system, each ones would be similar by their own, otherwise they follow different directions. These lines always build disequilibres processes; these lines as bring closed as go away each others.

This concept, contemplated by Foucault in the 70's, suggests "the net that could be develop in a diverse elements group that includes discourses, institutions, regulations, laws, administrative rules, science declarations, moralist and philosophical proposals" (Moro, 2003). If we analyse the city as dispositive, we will understand the control mechanisms that exist, upset the individual perception and affect the intra and interpersonal relations. On the other hand, it is possible to analyze the subjetivize processes that decide the life of the residents.

Beside of these concepts, it is interesting to remember the theories provide by different authors about the poverty. It is known that the poverty theories since XVIII, and that feed a good chance of XX works, are developed to justify the growing social inequality that run with the develop of capitalism. In the last decade of XX, it's provide one

new concept: social exclusion. This concept is deeply normative and marks who is inside the normality previously defined, who has the proper behaviour and ideas, who is correctly connected to the strategical place means, with the proper social relation and who performance as has to be (Pilar Monreal, 1996, 2014).

3.3. City hacked

Since the medium XX century, the cities started to grow up and showed big urban places re-organized among that a character and necessities of "standard" citizen model, and the diverse reality were made uniform and simplify. The cities were segregated by functional areas: work places, education, entertainment, neighbourhood...

As a capitalism reflection in the territory, cities have been transformed in objects that are used unfairly, thanks to the collaboration between the political and economical establishment. Signs of this are the *gentrification process* (lower-income families and small business are pushed to migrate out of their neighbourhoods while middle-class people arrive to drive an elite urban place; Glass, 1964) or the *business improvement districts* (local business associated signed agreements with the local government to improve the urban services, but they decided which are the priorities in these neighbourhoods; Kreutz, 2009). As Tiqqun collective explained, the objective is to maintain the model in base of the "presence management": residents have to be out of the streets, out of the places (Deleuze-Tiqqun, 2012). Streets become in new object to consume, whole cities support the economical model prevailing as perfect dispositives.

Among the History, it was showed how individuals reacted against dispositives and over tacked the limits; they produced new relation with the places and increased the affordances pre-established. In this last decade, Occupy Wall Street in EEUU or 15-M in Spain, social street markets or the Social International Forum, these examples show the possibilities of hack the cities, jump across the dispositives in the neighbourhoods and get new affordance of spaces, exploring and recovering the human relationships as support for the new urban process.

4. Review of “five aristotelian senses”

Perception is a process from the collection of stimuli by the body receptors, their decoding using neural structures, and finally the interpretation, which also involved such neural structures, but strongly influenced by the culture and previous experience. From the point of view of biology, we will focus on the body receivers or "the sense organs".

The current idea of "sense organs" comes from the texts of Aristotle, who ranked them in the 5 senses that even today we still use: sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell (Pineda, 1998).

However, in recent decades, the boom in biomedical disciplines has revolutionized both technical and conceptual level. Theories like Darwinian revolution have been relieved by neo-Darwinism, thanks to advances in molecular biology, paleontology and genetics. Similarly, there have been great advances in the study of the sense organs and different receptors associated to each of them. Therefore we consider that we must review the classical concept of the "5 senses" to adapt to recent studies.

If nowadays we know the existence of nociceptors, thermoreceptors and tactile receptors (Talagas & Misery, 2015), why should we keep talking about the sense of touch, when at least 3 receptors are associated with 3 completely different functions? Therefore we should talk about nociception (pain sense) (Julius & Basbaum, 2001), thermoception (temperature) (Green, 2004) and pressure.

Similarly, for decades or even centuries it has been known the existence of different receptors on the taste (bitter, sweet, sour, salty). Currently the research argue that there is a fifth taste, called umami, and also deny the popular belief that every tongue area has specific receptors for a particular taste, as it has been shown that different tongue areas converge giving each part different taste receptors (Li et al, 2002). In turn, smell, despite having completely different receivers, is an essential element for the culinary process. Current research claims that we can distinguish millions of different scents, which fall into 10 different categories.

On the other hand, hearing is in charge of the auditory processing and it is also responsible for sense of equilibrium (equilibrioception) (Barnett-Cowan, 2013).

As to the sense of sight, we know it is due to the action of two different types of photoreceptors, the rods and cones. Functionally, the rods are more sensitive to light than the cones, and they are found throughout the retina and are important for visual perception when the light is low intensity, as in the twilight and dawn. They are receptors of low frequency (380-600 nm wavelength). Cones are less sensitive to light than rods, and are functionally more important when the light intensity is high, such as during the day (high-frequency receptors 450 at 780 nm) (Vicario, 1999).

Finally, the research points to the existence of new meanings, as the perception of the relative position of our own body, or kinaesthetic (McCloskey, 1978), and the perception of time or cronoeption (Prieto-González et al, 2014). The kinesthetic sense can be understood relatively easily as an integrated process of neural structures, and touch receptors and responsible of balance. However, it is much harder to understand the cronoeption. We know that there are physiological elements, as the epiphysis, that are involved in body changes associated with the cyclical and seasonal changes. But, can we really say that there are body receptors capable of perceive time?

Therefore we propose a future line of research that covers a genealogy of the concept of time, to help us understand and integrate it into studies on perception, in order to develop a theory that allow us understand variations in the perception of time in different animal species.

5. Perception and audiovisual representation: What is the link?

The words "perception" and "cinematography" are loaded with multiple meanings and are subject to considerable similar theoretical developments, with definite shared characteristics. Therefore, the study of film and audiovisuals is a study on the perception itself. Cinema, as well as art, has a strong relationship with religion, science and philosophy, that is, audiovisual representation has been developed as a way to understand, to explain the mystery of the world of things, of the human being (corporeality and soul (emotion), to catalog the diverse, to take and objectify the heterogeneous and changing reality. Mitry suggest (Mitry, 1997) that film allows man to organize and give sense to nature's events. This

object dominates time and space in a frame. In this sense, there are several studies focusing on the analysis of time and space representation, we stand out Deleuze and his "Movement-Image and Time-Image" (Deleuze 1986).

The link between cinema and reality creates a space of representation of that reality in key-realism. The concept of reality from the point of view of their form of representation is accepted as a fact, as something pre-existing to this representation, something finished. From this standpoint, we can only be witnesses. As José Enrique Monteverde explains:

“(…) We suggest as “reality” in very general terms, a framework which covers the empirical, sensitive and habitable world, but involves the territories of the conceptual, symbolic, sentimental, imaginary, etc; that is, everything that can affect (or be affected by) physical or mental action of man in his individual and social dimensions” (Monteverde, 2001, pp. 15-16) (translated from Spanish by me).

In this sense, José Antonio Marina (1993) says that reality is "all the meanings that a person sees". From the vantage point of semiotic theory, the perception would be "assimilate stimuli to give meanings", similar to the well-known proposal of Heisenberg cited in the same text "We should not forget that what we observe is not nature itself, but nature determined by our questions". The story of perception represents the subject who feels and acts in the world. Representation is an appearance of our feelings, imaginations and our form of being in the world (Monteverde, 2001) (translated from Spanish by me).

Representation, then, is composed of shots, signs, codes, words that make up a language...a cluster of meanings. Important, too, is constructivist notion of perception. On this view, representation is a construction itself that continuously reproduces the results of the interaction between two factors (social and emotional). Thus, knowledge, as well as representation, is not a copy of reality but a reconstruction by the individual. The act to perceive is representing. This means looking closely at how experimentation, empowerment and recognition are interesting to understand this process. Films translates feelings, emotions and provides a reflection of the world. According Mitry (2002, p. 10) exists in this process "(...) a time, a social phenomenon, a psychic need and aesthetic reality” (translated from Spanish by me). Also, representation mediates between man and the world. Projection and

reproduction (on live) are "a momentary psychic ideal", a mediator value between the real and the ideal. In the words of Malraux, the cinema therefore "No imitates life, but reveals it" (Malraux, 1959) (translated from Spanish by me).

In sum, the audiovisual image have the following features:

1. Language and expression. It has been necessary to create a language and codes, and an object. A representation.
2. Objective and subjective. Moving-image, projection and reproduction intercede between man and the world.
3. Analogon-experience. Build a sense, it simulates a continuum that serves as analogon (Sartre) between reality and film.
4. Movement-construction-existential space. Representation includes experimentation, re-power and knowledge processes.

There are several theories and interpretations that analyze the link between film and reality. This helps us to understand the complexity of their definition and values. In other words, it will help us to understand ways of perceiving reality in film, brief genealogy:

1. Constructivist. The reality is the result of a construction, the result of the work of many vectors. Constructions of reality are based on what we know about her (including pictures and sound). In this sense, we need to bear in mind the media coverage that we suffer, the social and historical context, hence the conditions under which we construct reality (Soviet school).
2. Phenomenological-existential. Experiential phenomenological consciousness, Heidegger, Pouny and Sartre.
3. Positivist-spectacular. The age of information and Hollywood (Palao, 2004).

Given these characteristics and theoretical currents we can find common ground between diverse intellectual traditions and cinematic impulses that tell us about ways to "see the world on the screen". These models or modes represent a reflection on the perception. This is yet another example of how the film reflects on the act of perceiving and, above all, their way of seeing and perceiving the world. An example of this would be: Griffith and the "Institutional Model of Representation" (IMR), Hollywood and the "paradigm of the show",

or film-hegemonic culture. Kuleshov and the soviet filmmakers as Sergei Eisenstein. Vertov and the “kino-eye” theory. Without neglecting the vanguards currents and pure cinema, that is Nouvelle Vague, Italian neorealism, Dogma 95...among them we can emphasize Epstein, Fernand Léger, Dulac, Gance or Richter, among others.

Faced with this scenario, our work focuses on developing a line of research linked to the analysis of perception and cinema. The results of this analysis will be presented soon.

6. Miscellaneous perceptions

6.1. Introduction

Perception is the mechanism by which human and nonhuman animals are linked to the world. It mediates among stimuli of external world and mental individual functions of organization and categorization. Perception generates the “image” we have of environment, a worldview. This complex function is ranging from active pursuit of the source of stimuli (Gibson 1969), late selection of relevant stimuli (Deutsch y Deutsh 1963), stimuli categorization and conceptualization, to the feedback of the individual’s action.

Perception has been a recurring topic in philosophy, and it has been studied in depth in humans by psychologist. Gestalt psychologists studied deeply this issue at the beginnings of 20th century. They proposed several universal principles that always work in the presence of the combination of specific stimuli (Oviedo 2004). Some of these principles are: 1) tend to differentiate between figure and ground, 2) tend to lump stimuli which are closed together, that are perceived as a single structure, 3) tend to close open shapes and 4) perceptual constancy, the perception of the same stimulus from different perspectives, different illuminations or from different positions. This universal approach of perception has had many followers in psychology, and it has strengthened the view that perception could be explained from the knowledge of the structure of the nervous system.

6.2. The effect of the environment

State the opposite view Faced with this view, other scientists gave more importance to environment: empiricists (Pérez 2005). They thought that the physical and cultural environment change perception individually. This current of thought was nurtured of

researches which were conducted at the beginnings of 20th century: cross-cultural studies. Many of them were based on compare: different effects of optical illusions, colour perception or pictorial depth perception among cultures. A cultural psychologist, Rivers (1901, 1926), studied the perceptual differences between New Guinea tribes and the Indian population. In his researches he concluded that “primitives” had more effectiveness in labours related with visual perception. But not by having greater capacity, but by attends more to the details of the environment. It was not due to have greater capacity, it was on account of attend more to the details of the environment. Rivers said that this was due to the strong environmental pressures that tribes faced when they were finding food or were defending of potential dangers of a natural environment.

Segall, Campbell and Herskovitz (1963, 1966) conducted a research about the effect of three different optical illusions among twelve different cultures. They chose a well-balance sample as to age, sex and other variables as schooling. Their results showed that optical illusions had more effect in early ages than in adults in every culture. Moreover, they observed that western subjects were more susceptible to Müller-Lyer illusion (Figure 1) than non-western subjects. In contrast, non-western people were more susceptible to horizontal-vertical illusion (Figure 2) than western people. The origin of these differences could be due to the different development environments of these populations. In the first case it could be explained by western environment dominated by right angles against non-western environment dominated by curved lines and open spaces. These geometric differences in the environment could be facilitated visual adaptations in western people to understand closed angles in an arrow as lines that move away, so that they interpreted it as bigger lines; and open angles as approaching lines, so that they interpreted it as smaller lines. Comparing angle lines with centre lines of arrows changes the perception of the length of centre lines of each arrow. In the second case, it could be explained by the differences of openness in each environment: non-western environment had more open spaces than western environment. Because of non-western people were habituated to this environment they understood vertical lines as lines that move away, so they interpreted it as bigger lines against horizontal lines. These explanations give ecological sense to the effect of these optical illusions among

cultures, redefining optical illusions as the consequences of successful optical adaptations to the environment.

6.3. The role of attention

Attention is an important factor in perception at different moments. In this work we highlight role as first step of the process. It selects the source of stimuli, anticipating information in base on past experiences and other factors, sifting the stimuli which will be processed afterwards. As in perception studies, some scientist have proposed several principles of attention (García-sevilla 1997; Añaños 1999). Attention is focused in bigger, more colourful, more intense, moving, more complex and novel stimuli. Each of these principles is strictly dependent on the environment.

However, not everything is universal in attention: motivation, emotion and personal interest are highly variables among individuals and they are important modulation factors in preference stimuli (Easterbrook, 1959; Garcia-sevilla 1997).

6.4. Comparative psychology – Human and non-human animals

In addition to cultural psychology, another branch in psychology that explores the perceptual diversity is comparative psychology. These highly influential studies have as main objective understand general mental processes in animals, focusing in humans through the study of other animals (Dewsbury 1984). Because of its phylogenetic proximity, primates have been much studied, especially from cognitive psychology. The view among researchers is diverse about animal capacities. On one hand, some scientists think that between human and non-humans animals there are significant differences in mental capacities. On the other hand, other scientists think that these differences exist, but they could be explained by a greater quantitative development in some specific mental functions (Henríquez 2014).

In perception these differences are minimums. In other animal species there are “universal principles” too, as in humans, but they are different in some cases. For example, in baboons (*Papio papio*) has been observed that the human perceptual principle which humans focus first of all in global contour and then in details (Navon 1997), the opposite occurs. In

the first place baboons focus his attention in the components and then in the global shape (Fagot, Tomonaga & Deruelle 2001). In the case of chimpanzees (*Pan troglodytes*) have no preference in this respect. They focus the global shape and the components in the same way.

However, as in humans, experience is an important modulation factor in non-human perception. Tanaka (2007) conducted a research about the capacity of interpret pictorial representations in chimpanzees. He observed that not all subjects could understand the drawings, but it does the photographs. All chimpanzees that passed the test were juveniles, except one. It was the only one involved in a similar research with other pictorial representations when it was an infant. Tanaka concluded that the experience during chimpanzee infancy is critical for development of this ability. Other scientists think that it could occur in a similar way in humans (DeLoache et al. 1998).

Experience and learning seem to have a great impact in high-level capacities of perception, as self-recognition. Self-directed mirror-induced behaviours are described in great apes, except in gorillas, and in humans from two years. Other primates, as rhesus macaque (*Macaca mulatta*), systematically fail this test. Chang et al. (2015) questioned whether after visual-somatosensory training macaques would be able to perform self-directed mirror-induced behaviours. The results were satisfactory: the macaques began to perform behaviours just as great apes and adult humans.

6.5. The diversity of perception

As we could observe above, perception is a complex phenomenon that joins in a wide range of mental processes in human and non-human animals. It is far from being a uniform phenomenon between individuals and species. Emotions, personal interests, learning and past experiences are great modulation factors which individualized perception. Just as the cultural psychology extended the conception of the diversity of perception and the important role of experience in humans, comparative psychology is opening up new lines of thought for understand the real diversity of perception.

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