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WOMEN PERSONALITIES IN THE ROMANIAN DIASPORA FROM FRANCE

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Abstract*: This article focuses on a clearly established category of personalities belonging to the Romanian diaspora from France, not only before the Second World War, but also in the communist period. The reason for choosing this criterion in selecting the main interest point of our research is the wish to demonstrate that women played a significant role in the Romanian exile, thanks to the numerous voices that earned a considerable reputation in the West and, most notably, in France. As the core of the Romanian diaspora, Paris proved to be a resourceful centre for shaping and spreading ideas germane to the need for modernisation in Romania, although the means by which such messages were delivered varied according to the area of activity of each personality involved. Hence, we have found fruitful contributions by female artists, whose talent enabled them to become spokespersons of an entire generation, benefitting from wide recognition in French cultural and political circles. The most prominent personality we have chosen to include in our paper is, in our view, Monica Lovinescu, whose voice became a landmark in the fight against the oppressive communist regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu, through the indefatigable waves of Radio Free Europe. In spite of difficulties and severe threats, a genuinely pro-European message was shaped thanks to the contribution of the personalities presented below, one that proved to be of paramount importance in Romania's quest for overcoming the Cold War.*

Keywords: diaspora, women, France, anticommunism, modernisation

The role of the numerous and powerful Romanian diaspora that sought refuge in France during the communist period is undeniable in the fight against an oppressive regime which severely altered not only intellectual life, but also the perception of values and human rights in the Romanian society. France and especially Paris proved to be an optimal space for expressing ideas pertaining to freedom and respect for the human being, while fostering the continuation of genuine Romanian artistic and, in more general terms, cultural values, which

were no longer compatible with the official line of a detested totalitarian regime. The purpose of our paper is to outline contributions to anti-communist movements and chiefly to intellectual endeavours meant to raise awareness about the increasingly precarious condition of Romanian elites within the borders of a country shaded by the Cold War. Through document analyses, memoirs and thorough investigations into the relevant national and international literature, we have identified prominent voices that are most certainly worthy of being included into a core of women personalities that proved to be resourceful and influential in the Romanian diaspora from France.

The personalities our study focuses on are part of the common Romanian-French cultural patrimony, whose existence is, in our view, undeniable, given the fact that so many intellectuals shared, during the communist period, values which were and remain to this day common to both cultures.

1. Anna de Noailles

Albeit the timeframe we are mostly interested in so as to attain the purpose of our study is the one surrounding the Second World War, it is useful to turn our attention to a personality that stands out in history even before that, namely the Countess Anna de Noailles. A writer and poet of Romanian descent, originating from the famous old noble Brâncoveanu family, she became, at the beginning of the 20th century, an emblem of the Romanian nobility that had relocated to France. The recognition she benefitted from was noticeable not only in France, but also in Great Britain, as the greatest female poet of the century, according to *The Times* (La Rochefoucauld 1976, p. 38).

The contribution of Anna de Noailles to the activity of literary salons across Paris was exceptional, which is why the opening of her own salon captured the attention of some of the most prominent intellectuals at the time, such as Paul Valéry and André Gide, who belonged to what became known as *La Belle époque* of French literature (Higonnet-Dugua 1989, p. 342). It is our view that it should be deemed important to literally rediscover Anna de Noailles both in Romania and in France, so as to better comprehend the considerable impact her activity and personality had on the cultural life of France during the first decades of the 20th century. In fact, it is the great historian Nicolae Iorga that considered her the best French female poet (Goga 2004, p. 22), whilst George Călinescu regarded her from a radically different angle, as a traitor to her origins (Díaz and Siess 2006, p. 119) - two opinions which are essentially incompatible, although they add weight to the idea that getting to know the

legacy of Anna de Noailles can enable one to better understand the importance of the presence of a Romanian nobility branch in Paris, during the 20th century.

2. Martha Bibescu

As we get closer to the period of time our research mainly focuses on, it becomes important to mention another feminine presence that proved to be an excellent example of the cultural closeness between Romanian elites and the intellectual milieu of France - Martha Bibescu. A cousin of Anna de Noailles and proficient French speaker, like the vast majority of Romanian elites of noble descent at the time, Princess Martha Bibescu was a cosmopolitan personality that often found herself in the presence of the most influential cultural and political figures worldwide. As a writer, Martha Bibescu was frequently seen in the company of prominent names of French literature, especially during her long visits to Paris, such as Paul Valéry (de Diesbach 1998, p. 509), Paul Morand (*Ibidem,* p. 582), Paul Claudel (Bibescu 1992) and Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (de Diesbach 1998, p. 680), but she also befriended numerous other European personalities, like British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Hence, Martha Bibescu's diary indicates that she had the habit of sending books to the family of this politician (Bibescu 2004, p. 35).

What is even more striking for our research is the fact that she eventually fled Romania on September 7th 1945, so as to settle indefinitely in Paris (Williams 1998, p. 135). A clear victim of communist oppression, Martha Bibescu witnessed the nationalisation of her entire fortune as a result of the actions of the new Romanian regime. Her artistic activity continued while in exile, where she became practically assimilated to French elites. Some of the awards she received include the *Légion d'honneur au rang de chevalier*, granted to her by President Charles de Gaulle, a remarkable feat, as the latter openly associated Martha Bibescu to the European ideal. The passing of the great poetess was splendidly described by Michel Tournier, in his book entitled *Des clefs et des serrures*, in 1979 (Dictionnaire des écrivains francophones de l'Europe du Sud-Est).

3. Elena Văcărescu

The list of women who had an exceptional contribution to the creation and perpetuation of a powerful connection between Romanian intellectual life and the French cultural environment before World War Two can be furthered by the addition of the name

Elena Văcărescu (1864-1947). Originating from an ancient Romanian noble family, she stood out throughout her brilliant literary career not only as a writer, but also as a poet and playwright, thanks to her French language creations. Therefore, her contributions were included in both the Romanian and the French cultural patrimony. Settled in France at the end of the 19th century, Elena Văcărescu never forsook her origins and was known for her efforts meant to bring closer two literary worlds, the Romanian and the French. She became a member of the Romanian Academy, but was offered a number of awards in Paris, under the auspices of the French Academy (Firoiu 2002, p. 187).

Moreover, if one is to consider the themes of her works, several of which were inspired by Romanian folklore, such as *Rapsode de la Dâmboviţa*, a veritable *regressus ad uterum*, published in 1889 (Popa 2009, p. 347), it becomes evident that Elena Văcărescu was another important cultural link between the two nations our research focuses on. Her contribution to the dissemination of Romanian literary values among French elites did not stop there, given the fact that she also translated into French poems by Mihai Eminescu, Lucian Blaga, Ion Minulescu, Octavian Goga and others (Ștefan and Firoiu 1975, p. 133).

With regard to her international activity, Elena Văcărescu was also the Romanian Delegate at the League of Nations and the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Paris, as well as a member of the Committee on Arts and Letters within the League of Nations (Turcu 1996, p. 127).

In the case of the aforementioned women personalities, we have encountered a cultural activity marked by the inexistence of language barriers, as valuable literary works were translated and published - one of the keys to ensuring a viable link between Romanian and French elites prior to the Iron Curtain. Once this wall in the way of communication – one that was never considered to be insurmountable by a Latin people already well accustomed to learning French under various circumstances – had been breached, there were no more obstacles on the way to an active integration – not assimilation – of the Romanian exile from France after 1945, when "accessible" means of cooperation had vanished.

4. Magdalena Rădulescu

Moving forward on our timeline, we uncover the name Magdalena Rădulescu (1902-1983), a great cosmopolitan spirit, who completed her studies in Munich and Paris (with de Monvelle and Prinet) and married Italian painter and journalist Massimo Campigli. The careers of the two had a sinuous course, taking them to Italy and Romania, but also to France,

where the Romanian artist met with true success amid her exhibitions, whilst in her native country, the same level of recognition was never attained. Nevertheless, in her creations, put on display in the leading cultural cities across Europe, like Paris, London, Milan and Lausanne, she maintained her interest in traditional Romanian subjects, such as peasants' life, popular dances and customs. With a combination of symbolism and expressionism, Rădulescu' paintings have an air reminiscent of Marc Chagall, but are also marked by a considerable degree of originality. As a member of the Romanian diaspora in France, the artist settled in Nice and would regularly participate in exhibitions where there were Romanians present (Archives of C.N.S.A.S., S.I.E collection, file 167/1, pp. 87-88). She did not portray any significant social aspects in her works, but her 1964 exhibition in Paris, on the topic of circuses, attracted the appreciation of French critics (Cebuc et al. 2003, p. 169). While not being particularly important in perpetuating an anti-communist message, Magdalena Rădulescu has been included in our paper so as to illustrate the fact that all arts were represented within the Romanian diaspora, by successful creators, compatible with western values in their respective areas of interest.

5. Elvira Popescu

In the area of theatre and cinema, the name Elvira Popescu remains emblematic when illustrating the bond amongst Romanian intellectuals in France. For a period of 65 years, the Romanian-born actress astonished the Parisian audience, not only on cellulose, but also – and chiefly – on stage. As of 1923, Elvira Popescu's accent had mesmerised critics in Paris, who did not hesitate to name her *Notre Dame du theatre* (Goga 2001, p. 295) and to open the door to the *Molière* prize, awarded to the best actors in France, along with the *Légion d'honneur*, on two separate occasions (Acteurs/auteurs 1989, p. 5). Without intending to have an overview of her plays or of the films Elvira Popescu starred in, it is to be noted, however, the impact this artist had on public opinion in France (Caler 1986, pp. 89-91). Through her grace and talent, she managed to attract into her salon not only the elites in her line of activity, but also politicians – it is known that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac were among the actress's admirers. As a representative of the Romanian exile, Elvira Popescu succeeded in negotiating the departure of Romanian singer Jean Moscopol for the United States, in 1947, given the total incompatibility between the latter's ideas and the demands of the communist regime in Bucharest regarding the role of such an artist in society (http://www.rezistenta.net/2009/03/jean-moscopol-cantaretul-disident.html).

6. Maria Ventura

To remain in the area of theatre, we shall mention the name Maria Ventura, another successful Romanian actress who, after completing her studies in Paris, played in various shows both in Romania and in France. Having interpreted very important roles in Paris and becoming acquainted with the classics of French drama, Maria Ventura brought to Romania the cultural tendencies of the great Parisian stages, which led to a remarkable development of the Romanian theatre. As leader of her ensemble, she earned a solid reputation among Romanian intellectuals, while benefitting from appreciation on the part of French elites (Arghezi 1962, p. 340). All this determines us to add the name Maria Ventura to the list of artists originating from Romania who brought our culture closer to the one of France, during the Interwar period and afterwards.

7. Monica Lovinescu

While the artistic world in Paris benefitted from significant Romanian contributions such as the ones mentioned above, we have to turn our attention to another category of intellectuals that were particularly active in exile, namely the ones that dedicated their lives to upholding the cause of democracy. In so doing, they became exposed to criticism and even oppression from the communist regime in Romania, whose tentacles spread across the borders of the Iron Curtain and challenged the safety of these intellectuals. Often subjected to harassment and even physical violence, they stood firm on their convictions and went on to gain wide recognition as spokespersons of the intellectual class of Romania.

Monica Lovinescu's contribution to the creation of a pro-European message for communist Romania is undeniable, all the more because in this situation, we are talking about a voice that managed to leave a deep imprint whose traces are visible at present too and whose force is evident in the mentality of the Romanian people. Monica Lovinescu is worthy of the impressive inheritance of her father's work, the great Romanian literary critic Eugen Lovinescu. Thus, without aiming to turn the theoretician of synchronism into the main target of this part of our study, it is necessary to have a brief retrospective of his significant contribution to the pan-European spirit that would not cease to influence the ideas of Monica Lovinescu throughout the period of time that interests us. As in the case of numerous visionary personalities from Romania's pro-Western movement, Eugen Lovinescu found his

main sources of inspiration for his innovative theories in the academic debates of Paris, during his doctoral studies in the area of letters, which he conducted there between 1906 and 1909. His prominent contribution to the development of the European idea in Romania's intellectual debates can be synthesised in the form of the extremely complex notion of *synchronism* (Mamulea 2007, p. 390).

This current quickly turned into a veritable ideological perspective of an entire representative class of Romanian elites in the Interwar Period. Based on the premises of the new sociological approach in France at the time, synchronism promoted a pro-European spirit whose values are undoubtedly encountered even at present in the principles behind European institutional construction and integration. In other words, this is a theory that assessed the precarious state of modernisation of the Romanian state and thus favoured efforts meant to overcome this obstacle, while turning to typically Western values. Not surprisingly, the heated debate triggered by this idea seems to have maintained its validity to date, as it focused on the theory of imitation, belonging to French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, as well as on the idea of mutation of esthetical values (Vrancea 1965, p. 56). After proclaiming the Western and capitalist origins of the modernization of Romanian countries, at the beginning of the 19th century, Eugen Lovinescu militated for a synchronisation with the spirit of an age that guided all Western civilisations, by means of imitation. However, the merit of the literary critic is to have reconciled this theory with the existence of a need to perpetuate the national spirit, which he never denied, throughout his plead for modernisation and Europeanization in Romania (Schifirnet 2007, pp. 162-164).

It is on these bases that the thinking of Monica Lovinescu took shape, even before she formed an impressive career in the world of the international press, thus becoming an outstanding voice in the struggle of the Romanian diaspora from France against the communist scourge. At the age of 24, soon after obtaining a bachelor's degree in Letters from the University of Bucharest, Monica Lovinescu succeeded in finding a way to join the Parisian exile, by means of a scholarship that was granted to her in 1947. As a witness to the abolishment of the monarchy by the communists, at the end of that year, and, consequently, to the suppression of the final major institutional hurdle on the way to removing all traces of democracy, young Monica Lovinescu chose to seek political asylum and was successful in her attempt (Cornis-Pope and Neubauer 2010, p. 222). This proved to be important, all the more because the communists, after obtaining the forceful abdication of King Michael, cancelled the scholarships of young Romanian intellectuals in Paris and made arrangements for their return to Romania. Nevertheless, Monica Lovinescu and other students refused to

take this step back and hoped in vain – according to Sanda Stolojan's personal diary – that the country would be liberated by the Americans (Stolojan 1996, pp. 20-21).

This is the moment that marked the beginning of an emblematic career for what we are entitled to refer to as a genuine European message directed towards a Romania that became lost behind the Iron Curtain. Monica Lovinescu's newly-shaped career met with extremely grave moments, but she genuinely became an evident and much appreciated voice within democratic debates in France and beyond. It thus becomes useful to attempt to list the main endeavours that can be attributed to Monica Lovinescu in the aforementioned context, while taking into account the impact of the message she promoted and the view she constantly upheld during her activities in exile.

The first concrete action pertains to a long series of articles and studies centred on the thorny topic of the communist regime that had invaded her country of origin and the profoundly negative implications of the latter on the Romanian nation, its intellectuals and stance on the international stage. We are discussing those opinions that verbalised the intellectual cause in Romania, whose echo was considerable in the publications that welcomed them, not only in France, but in other Western countries as well. Furthermore, Monica Lovinescu's participation in the forums created by the Romanian intelligentsia exiled in Paris and, more generally, in the West, was major, thanks to her articles which were printed as part of the most significant collections coordinated by these elites. Having never neglected the importance of perpetuating the cultural inheritance of Romania, she translated into French a series of Romanian literary works (Neubauer and Török 2009, p. 285), so as to render them known in relevant circles within her adoptive country.

Given this creative side of Monica Lovinescu's contribution to the shaping of a European message in exile, we have to add the activities that had the greatest impact on the perpetuation of these much needed ideas, by means of radio waves. To this audacious involvement of the writer in Romanian language broadcasts on the topic of Eastern Europe, on Radio France, we may add her welcome appearances on Radio Free Europe, as of 1962, during two weekly shows, which remained for posterity: *L'actualité culturelle roumaine* and *Thèses et antithèses à Paris*. The merit of these broadcasts was not only that of providing a credible framework for pertinent discussions on Romanian culture and the situation of the Romanian people at the time, but also the fact that they gained considerable popularity, both in the West and – what proved to be most important – within Romania itself (*Ibidem*).

In fact, the critical but revered voice of Monica Lovinescu turned into such a threat to Ceauşescu's regime that she became the victim of an outrageous coup orchestrated by the

Bucharest administration in 1977, as a result of the incessant efforts the writer made in order to obtain the liberation of anticommunist militant Paul Goma. In other words, Dictator Ceauşescu turned to the services of two Palestinian spies, as he had repeatedly done in the past, who pursued Monica Lovinescu and inflicted severe bodily harm upon her in front of her Paris residence, on the 18th of November 1977 (*Ibidem*, pp. 276-277). Other key representatives of the Romanian diaspora in Paris, such as Virgil Ierunca and Paul Goma, were being threatened by the same terrorist menace, orchestrated by the Communist Party of Romania (Popescu 1999, p. 32).

Coming back to Lovinescu's case, one that became a veritable obsession for the presidential couple Ceauşescu, we may turn to some information provided by Ion Mihai Pacepa, who revealed details on the attack occurring the day prior to Paul Goma's arrival in Paris, during which the correspondent of Radio Free Europe entered a state of coma. According to Pacepa, former deputy chief of Romanian intelligence services during the communist period, the order issued by the dictator was the following: "Make her shut up. She mustn't be killed. We don't need any American and French investigations that would put us in a difficult position. Finish her. Break her teeth, her jaw, her arms. She mustn't ever be able to speak or write again. Let her become an unforgettable example for others. Beat her at her place, so that she would learn, along with others, that there is no haven for those who badmouth the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Interview that General Ion Mihai Pacepa granted to the journal *Le Matin de Paris*, on the 1st of February 1985. See also: Pacepa 1990, p. 35)

It is to be noted, in order to better understand this paper, the fact that such murderous instruments, directed against Romanian exiled dissidents, and chiefly those who had started to collaborate with Radio Free Europe, were a top priority for the communist regime in Bucharest during the 1970s and 1980s. The despicable series of coups initiated by the attack on Monica Lovinescu continued with a threat addressed to Paul Goma before his departure for Paris, uttered by General Nicolae Pleşiţă. He hinted at the attack on Lovinescu and warned Goma quite frankly that "the arm of the revolution in very long", so he should refrain from engaging in any activity against the communist regime (Lovinescu 2001, pp. 247-256).

An even more serious case refers to the murder of Noël Bernard, a Romanian journalist of Jewish descent, director of the Romanian language service of Radio Free Europe in Munich between 1955 and 1958 and then in the period 1965-1981, apparently under direct orders from Ceauşescu. Let us not forget the bombs in parcels allegedly containing books, addressed to Paul Goma, Nicolae Penescu and Şerban Orescu, the terrorist attack on Radio

Free Europe in Munich, conducted by international spy Carlos *The Jackal*, also at the behest of Ceauşescu, on the 21st of February 1981, as well as the knife assault against Emil Georgescu, another close collaborator of this radio station, on the 28th of July 1981 (Cheptea et al. 2011, pp. 303-305).

8. Conclusions

The cases presented above, focusing on significant women personalities who became well-known during the period of time when they belonged to the Romanian diaspora from France, are merely a selection, based on our assessment of the impact such voices had in the quest for the modernisation of Romania. Whether we are referring to the communist regime or the timeframe preceding this complicated chapter of our history, we have encountered numerous elements of continuity in the involvement of women in the creation of a strong cultural message that can be attributed to the Romanian diaspora from France. Covering a generous range of qualifications, areas of interest and styles of expression, the personalities mentioned in our paper are known for their considerable legacy, whether it is political or artistic, which can be included in both the Romanian and the French cultural patrimonies. They are indicative of a traditional bond existing between two cultures that have constantly shared principles such as freedom and democracy. The moment when such voices as the ones included in our study became most critical is, undoubtedly, the coming to power of the communist regime, which triggered a difficult battle for the preservation of true Romanian cultural values. Thus, personalities like Monica Lovinescu, tireless in their efforts to safeguard the freedom of expression of Romanians, made use of any available means provided by their adoptive country so as to shed light on the dangers intellectual elites were facing under the watchful eye of a totalitarian administration. The efforts made by all the representatives of the Romanian diaspora mentioned in this paper are, in our view, commendable and worthy of further investigations.

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ROMANIAN WOMEN MPES AND THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEANNESS

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Abstract: *This paper investigates the discursive means through which Romanian women MPEs exert power and take on critical standpoints with regards to topics of gender equality, social inclusion, minorities, migration, citizenship, ethnic policies, human rights and conflict, present on the European agenda. Critical Discourse Analysis is employed with the aim to uncover the discursive input of women MPEs to the construction of Europeanness. This approach unveils power enactments and ideological discursive formations that emerge from their public interventions in relation with the mentioned topics.*

Keywords: Europeanness, Critical Discourse Analysis, discursive power, gender equality, social inclusion

European political elites make use of language and discourse as tools for exerting symbolic power, allowing them to take on critical stances with regards to social issues, and to envision a European reference frame for addressing them. In what follows we critically discuss the discursive construction of Europeanness based on topics that concern gender equality, social inclusion, minorities, migration, citizenship, ethnic policies, human rights and conflicts. These are traced in the plenary speeches of Romanian Women European MPs, given during the seventh parliamentary term, which began on July 14th 2009 in Strasbourg, following the 2009 elections, and due to end after the 2014 elections

The employed analysis method is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is "primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues"[1] and traces the relationship between dominance and discourse, and the nature of social power and dominance[2]. By these means, we will reflect on how Romanian women MPEs draw Europeanness in their

[1] Dijk, Teun A. van, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis", in *Discourse Society* 4 (2), 1993: 254.
[2] Ibidem

interventions and on the manner in which they enact power when they discuss inequality topics.

Theoretical Perspectives on Europeanness

In what follows, the theoretical concepts employed in the analysis of four Romanian MEPs interventions on social topics are briefly operationalized. First, the considered idea of Europeanness is that of "a cultural entity substantiated by two concepts which markedly define the development of Western civilization"[3]. These cover the notion of human person and the adjacent idea of liberty "as a regulating ethical norm of life, of its rights and responsibilities, of good and justice, of order and authority"[4]. From this perspective, the European Union is seen as "internationally different because its initial telos (peace through integration), its historical developments and its current institutional and normative framework"[5] – aspects that "make it better suited to spreading universal values. As identified by Creutz-Kämppi and Holley[6] in their study on the rhetoric of Europeanness in the media, Europe is a reality structuring cognitive category that carries a series of implicit definitions such as "democracy", "tolerance and respect", "universal rights", "development", "freedom", "individualism", "humaneness", "industrialization" or "the civilized world".

As Romanian women MEPs plead for a social intervention approach of European institutions with the outcome of Europeanizing vulnerable groups both within and outside the frontiers of the European Union, political language is activated in their interventions and contributes "to reproducing and/or transforming social structures", as suggested by Dirks[7]. Moreover, discourse is considered in relation with power and dominance, from a Foucaldian perspective, as a vehicle for struggles or domination systems[8]. It is the power to be taken over, while its production is "controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures"[9]. In Bourdieu's symbolic power terms[10], this is not an explicit form of

[3] Vergara, Javier, "The History of Europe and Its Constituent Countries: Considerations in Favour of the New Europe", in Journal of Social Science Education 6 (1), 1997: 16.
[4] Ibidem
[5] Ibidem 24
[6] Creutz-Kämppi, Karin, and Peter Holley, "The Rhetoric of Europeanness. Expressions of Collective European Identification in Finland's Swedish Language Press", in *EUROSPHERE International Project Conference*, Osnabrück: University of Osnabrück, 2009.
[7] Dirks, Una, "Critical Discourse Analysis of the Iraq Conflict in the British and German "Quality" Press", in Revista Alicantina De Estudios Ingleses 19, 2006: 103.
[8] Foucault, Michel, "The Order of Discourse", in Young, Robert (ed.), Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, Boston: Routlegde & Kegan Paul, 1981.
[9] Ibidem 52.
[10] Bourdieu, Pierre, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, 1991.

power; it is invisible, exerted also in the political field, as a space that allows agents to operate changes on the world. Here, words become actions and power turns symbolic[11]. Van Dijk[12] endows discourse also with the function of challenging the reproduction of dominance or "the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial, and gender inequality"[13].

CDA: Introducing the Method

Pioneered by Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak, CDA seeks to reveal the manner in which language is shaped by power systems, exploring the interaction between discourses and power relations. As stated by Fairclough and Wodak[14], the principles of CDA stress that social and political aspects are formed and mirrored by discourse. This comprises an institutionalized manner of thinking, rooted in language, expressing individual attitudes and life trajectories. CDA considers aspects of discourse articulation, including argument schema development, local meanings and coherence, lexical, syntactic and rhetoric features. It reflects on aspects such as communication schemata in terms of narration, description or argumentation, on referential and predication strategies, and on contextualization cues, instantiated by speech acts[15]. The critical dimension of this analytic approach is related to its origin from "a radical critique of social relations"[16]. CDA also looks at the relation between language use and the context – social and political – that frames its production and tackles aspects of "gender, ethnicity, cultural difference, ideology and identity and how these are both constructed and reflected in texts"[17].

According to Fairclough[18], social institutions contain the so called "ideological-discursive formations" (IDFs), which correspond to the diverse groups that operate inside these and represent "speech communities", with their discourses, ideological norms, and repertoires of speech events. Institutional subjects are constructed according to the norms of an IDF, on subject positions that have ideological foundations of which they may not be

[11] Ibidem.
[12] Dijk, Teun A. van, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis", in *Discourse Society* 4 (2), 1993: 254.
[13] Ibidem 249-250.
[14] Fairclough, Norman, and Wodak, Ruth, "Critical Discourse Analysis", in Dijk, Teun A. van. (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction*. London, UK: Sage Publications, 1997: 179.
[15] Billig, Michael, "Critical Discourse Analysis and the Rhetoric of Critique" in Weiss, Gilbert and Ruth Wodak (eds.), *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity,* Houndmills, Basignstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
[16] Ibidem 38
[17] Paltridge, Brian, *Discourse Analysis. An Introduction London*, New York: Continuum, 2008: 179.
[18] Fairclough, Norman L., "Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis", Journal of Pragmatics 9, 1985.

aware. Dominant IDFs naturalize ideologies and impose them as non-ideological common sense; therefore discourse analysis approaches with a critical goal denaturalize them, considering the fact that dominant discourses manufacture consensus, stimulate recognition and legitimacy of dominance[19].

According to Gee[20], CDA should begin by considering the social language – a way of employing language for enacting a specific socially situated identity – in the analyzed discourse, the situated meanings of the key-words and phrases, the cultural models activated in that discourse, and the Discourse(s) that encompass the considered piece of discourse. CDA reveals how language influences the message and it relates discourses and the support they give to power relations with broader social practices. Language emerges as action and affiliation; it supports the performing of social identities and activities, it facilitates individual's adhesion to cultures, social groups and institutions[21]. Language in use becomes political, related to what groups regard as a source of power, status and worth.

According to Van Dijk[22], discourse structures influence the arrangement and composition of models; they support dominance and the emergence of opposing representations of 'us' and 'them.' These aspects are disclosed at semantic levels, for instance, in statements that comprise negative evaluations of "them" and positive assessments of "us", since the validation of inequality entails two complementary aspects: "positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the Others"[23]. Such statements are granted credibility through a series of "persuasive moves"[24], noticeable in argumentation (negative evaluations based on facts) or in rhetoric figures (hyperbolically augmenting "their" negative facts in opposition to "our" positive actions by means of euphemisms, denials etc.). Lexical style or the selection of words for making negative or positive evaluations are also relevant, similarly with storytelling, giving accounts of personally lived negative events, and providing details about the other's negative traits. Undesirable actions attributed to "them" are also emphasized at structural levels in the discourse, through headlines, leads, summaries and sentence syntax that situate negative agents on important topical positions. Credible witnesses, sources or experts are quoted or attention is paid to the alleged threat represented by the discredited group to the interests and advantages of the dominant group. Van Dijk recommends beginning CDA by considering

[19] Dijk, Teun A. van, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis", in Discourse Society 4 (2), 1993.
[20] Gee, James Paul, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. Theory and Method*, New York and London: Routledge, 2006.
[21] Ibidem.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Ibidem 263.
[24] Ibidem 264.

features of context, such as access, setting, genre, participant positions and roles, continuing with the characteristics of speech itself. The latter reaches macro-semantics (topics), superstructures (text schemata), local meanings and coherence, and style aspects (variations of syntax, lexicon, and sound).

Excerpts from the interventions of each of the considered Romanian women MEPs are analyzed next, introduced by brief outlines of the discourse production context, in terms of access, setting, roles and positions of participants, all considered from a critical discursive position. The analysis begins with the topics identified in the selected discourse samples, tracing their argumentation schema, features of local meanings and coherence, lexical and syntactic style or rhetorical elements. These are the discursive means through which women MEPs reproduce, challenge or deconstruct specific types of discourses on the ideal equality and social justice order, embedded in discourses on Europeanness.

Table 1.Transcription conventions, adapted after Blommaert (2006)

<=	oppositions
underlined text	parallelisms
bold text	repeated words or phrases
text in italics	euphemisms, hyperbolas, metaphors, enumerations, vague or negative references, rhetorical questions
=	restart or reformulation

Europeanness, Afghan and Pakistani Women

Mrs. Corina Crețu has been a member of the European Parliament since 2007; as an MEP, she had interventions on aspects of gender, social inclusion, minorities, migration and human rights. Extracted from these interventions, Discourse sample 01 (see Appendix) is related with the situation of women in Afghanistan and Pakistan and discloses the discursive construction of Europeanness in its ethical norm dimension, as seeking to safeguard good, justice, order and authority. Part of a debate that took place on December 15, 2011, the discourse is articulated with reference to a non-European reality, critically depicted by a public European actor who takes on the role of the representative of an entire political elite group. Similarly with the discourse samples considered in this paper, the discussed discourse piece is extracted from the European Parliament website, from the individual page[25] of the

[25] [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/33997/seeall.html?type=CRE], February 10th 2013

MEP – specifically the section covering the parliamentary activities unfolded during the seventh parliamentary term. This represents a formalized and normalized setting, open and accessible to the general public by virtue of transparency principles.

The speaker embraces an authority and political elite role, taking the floor also as a representative of a specific political group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (the S&D Group), which is the second largest political group in the Parliament, with 190 Members from all 27 EU countries. Mrs. Crețu discursively operates in the same line with the political group to which she belongs and endorses a perspective that pleads for a European intervention in these areas, alongside international political actors (e.g.: a similar stance emerged during the December 2010 S&D Group conference concerning the new strategy to be developed in Afghanistan[26]).

The discourse sample is a part of a plenary speech, a formal genre that allows key authority positioning and enactments of discursive power, with the speaker assuming the role of Afghan and Pakistani women defender. From this stance, she contests the lack of progress in terms of both local and international political interventions and accordingly pinpoints the failure to address serious human rights violations in the two regions. The countries are thus blamed for upholding serious inequality and social imbalances whose "victims" are women. At a macrosemantic level, the discourse sample first tackles the precarious status of Afghan women, whose condition is discursively acknowledged to have remained as vulnerable as it used to be during the Taliban regimes, because of high rates of birth and infant mortality, of women's marginalization, domestic violence and other forms of abuses that hinder their access to education, health services and justice. Secondly, Mrs. Crețu also reaches the topic concerning the similarly precarious condition of Pakistani women, who are also victims of abuses, as revealed the example she introduces in her intervention. Thirdly, the discourse sample introduces a European human rights protection perspective, calling for a direct appeal to local authorities with the purpose of addressing together these issues.

The discourse sample schema takes on the following form: Afghan women are still the object of abuses and discrimination; violent acts directed against Pakistani women are representative for these women's precarious condition in their country; such human rights violations hinder a partnership of these countries with the European Union. Accordingly, a

[26] "Conference participants welcomed and supported the idea of setting up an international steering committee with the participation of the Afghan government, the European Union, Russia and the United States, as well as other interested donors, to work on guidelines for this plan, which should be implemented by the Afghan government."
http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/gpes/public/detail.htm?id=135889&section=NER&category=NEWS
[Accessed on February 4th 2013]

European model of human rights preservation should be taken on by Afghan and Pakistani authorities, who need to partner with the EU in order to address these issues. Going further with the analysis at the level of meaning and coherence, it is notable that the speaker begins her intervention with a call for common ground, making reference to a previous intervention. She adheres to an already expressed point of view – a persuasive move that strengthens her position. In addition, the MEP's critical standpoint emerges from the parallelism she draws in lines 3, 7 and 21 ("I find it outrageous"/ "I am deeply concerned"/"I too endorse the appeal"). Another parallelism introduces the approached topic in lines 4, 9, 11 and 14, explicitly mentioning the vulnerable group, while the contrasting pairs in lines 2, 12 and 18 highlight the their vulnerable status, opposing improvement and progress to their current precarious situation.

In stylistic terms, the tackled issue is represented through euphemisms and minimizing forms implying that women's status is only apparently improved (lines 2, 4), superlatives expressing the MEP's concern (lines 3, 7, 18) and enumerations depicting Afghan women's real disempowered condition (lines 8, 9, 11, 14, 15). Thus, while making a mimetic positive evaluation of the evolution of Afghan women's situation after the 2001 post-Taliban Bonn Agreement, the speaker expresses her deep concern and describes in detail the poor position of the first group she defends. She then moves further to a second victim group – Pakistani women – and highlights the necessity of a European approach rescuing intervention. Such mediation is required, since a blatant violation of human rights can be discerned in the condition of women referred to in the two mentioned countries. Power is assumed by discursive means by the speaker, who attempts to pass it further to a disempowered group in need of assistance. Mrs. Crețu's speech expresses Europeanness by advocating for a specific type of European mediation, whose outcome should be to safeguard women's rights. This also ought to transfer a European extraction form of social justice and human rights protection to the two discussed countries.

Empowering Single Mothers

Mrs. Daciana Sârbu is also a member of the S&D Group. Even though her area of expertise is not limited to the field of social politics, she shows a great level of interest in what concerns gender inequalities, discrimination and social inclusion. In Discourse sample 2 (see Apendix), she takes on the role of a representative voice of single mothers, by pointing the duality of the matter. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that 5% of women in the

European Union belong to this category and on the other hand, these women are regarded as a neglected demographic group. The insertion of clear data in line 4 is a persuasive move that strengthens the importance of Mrs. Sârbu's cause. Even though she does not imply the argument that she is a mother, the reality and her status not only facilitate her complex understanding of the situation, but also help her to identify the real needs of this group. This enables her to propose accurate solutions and to activate her discursively power endowed voice. It can be therefore argued that she makes use of two types of articulated power. First, the fact that she is a political figure allows her to exert a form of soft power and to be able to make proposals in support for the targeted group. Second, her mother/woman status also supports a form of soft power that allows her to identify with the group she is representing and to endow it with a loud voice.

By proceeding to highlight the most important needs of the targeted category, Mrs. Sârbu draws a clear image of the invoked situation. She mentions the economic events that have cast instability and hardship over this group of women and identifies three of their most important needs: additional unemployment benefits for each child, priority access to affordable housing and flexible employment opportunities. If fulfilled, these needs not only will reestablish the work-life balance, but will also prove that EU is openly concerned with gender discrimination. She pleads for reconciliation policies focused on financial resources (line 11), for quality services and for adequate time arrangements (line 13). Furthermore, her discourse uncovers symbolic power, as she takes on the role of a voice that represents a group who does not have direct access to power

Safeguarding social justice requires comprehensive policy initiatives to correct social inequities and Mrs. Sârbu focuses on a single vulnerable group. She has a clear vision and follows a precise path: she introduces the group, its current situation, its most important needs, and the external circumstances that worsened their status. She then launches a call for help, and finally suggests a series of initiatives.

Informed Perspectives on Injustice

A member of the European People's Party, which is a pro-European centre-right European political party, the largest in the European Parliament, Mrs. Monica Macovei mainly approaches human rights topics in her interventions. Nonetheless, in what follows we discuss Discourse sample 3 (see Appendix), which concerns the topic of violence exerted against women in India, an issue resulting from both discrimination and rape. Mrs. Macovei

uses strong terms ("shocking events") to emphasize the gravity of the situation and mentions a range of violent acts to stress the injustice acts to which the depicted group is subjected. In short, her intro is meant to connect the audience with the described harsh reality, through the repetition of strong terms ("rape", "raped", "brutally gang raped"). This continues in lines 7, 8, 9 and 10, in which Mrs. Macovei makes use of statistics or reliable information sources, in order to offer a broader perspective, complimentary with explicit examples of violent acts and their victims.

Here, political language turns into action: she calls for immediate action, indicating authorities as accountable for the lack of proper measures, for increased insecurity and crime incidence in India. It is through parallelisms and repetitions in lines 14-15 that she briefly presents the measures needed to ameliorate the situation, making use of her powerful voice as a political actor. Her intervention tackles a typical gender security and discrimination topic, with hard statistics and clear bookmarks; this standpoint is also strengthened by her former status of prosecutor, as a professional acquainted with international legislation.

Empowering Women in Politics

Mrs. Elena Băsescu is a member of the European People's Party Group (Christian Democrats), a centre-right political group, and one of the oldest, dating its origin back to September 1952**.** Since she started her mandate, she has approached migration issues, as well as workers' rights, Roma rights and social inclusion, citizenship (including human rights) and gender equality topics. In Discourse sample 4 (See Appendix), she approaches the topic of women and men equality and of women in decision-making. Here, as a woman who is active on the political stage, she takes on a defensive, subjectively laden personal example and an experience based standpoint.

Her adhesion to an allegedly disadvantaged group endows her with symbolic power; her group identification is supported by the use the pronouns "I" and "us". She also refers to a previously expressed authoritarian perspective – that of a colleague, Mrs. Sirpa Pietikäinen, who is an MEP with an intense activity, in organizations such as Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance or European Network for Women in Leadership. The speech is based on two main arguments: the first one lies in the need of women to make a greater effort so they can prove their competence, while the second one refers to "acts of violence inflicted on them". Mrs. Băsescu employs strong constructions to stress the need to develop and implement immediate intervention measures and to stress the wide echo of the revealed

situation: "greater effort", "constantly need to fight", "women are competent", "concrete actions", "must support each other" or "must". Solidarity arises explicitly – in this case, with women's diminished and weakened potential, as a consequence of both symbolic and physical violence (here she makes reference to the Romanian law on domestic violence), complimentary with a determined defense of feminine traits she discursively empowers and endows with legitimacy in the political milieu.

Conclusions

The preceding set of interventions have a role in the articulation of Europeanness as the ideal model of social justice, a perspective the speakers pass further in the form of various IDF. They shape models in their interventions, starting sometimes from their personal experiences as women, mothers, aprofessionals and politicians. They also reinforce commonly encountered representations of the role of the European Union in the world and more specifically, of the legitimacy of EU's international stance as 'legitimate, positive and worth pursuing'[27].

As a political elites representing Romania in the European Parliament, they approach social inequality topics both Europan and non-European contexts and eanact discursive power, critically reflecting on the status of disempowered women's groups they aim to represent on a European political stage and to defend both there and in their original territories.

Appendix

Discourse sample 01[28]

1. Mr President, as my colleagues have just said,
2. there have, *in actual fact*, been *some improvements* in Afghanistan. <=
3. However, I find it *outrageous* that
4. the situation of **women in** Afghanistan is still *almost unchanged*
5. 10 years after the signature of the Bonn Agreement[29]

[27] Lucarelli, Sonia, "European Political Identity, Foreign Policy and the Others' Image. An Underexplored Relationship", in Cerutti, Furio and Sonia Lucarelli (eds.), The Search for a European Identity Values, Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union, London and New York: Routledge, 2008: 23.

[28][http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20111215+ITEM-013-02+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=4-319-000], February 10th, 2013.

6. on creating the transitional government under the presidency of Hamid Karzai
7. I am *deeply concerned*
8. *about the high rates of mortality at birth and of infant mortality,*
9. *the marginalisation of women in society,*
10. *the existence of fundamentalist courts in some regions,*
11. as well as about *the frequent armed attacks against girls and women who go to school or try to take part in public life.*
12. In spite of the progress made <=
13. in terms of their representation in parliament and the administration,
14. Afghan **women** also remain *victims of*
15. *domestic violence, trafficking and forced marriages, the lack of medical care and police and judicial discrimination.*
16. The explosion which took place on Saturday night
17. at **the girls** school in Pakistan
18. *speaks volumes* about the situation of women in this country <=
19. which the European Union is attempting to develop a partnership with, <=
20. but this is at risk of being undermined by the *brutal violation of human rights*.
21. I too endorse the appeal made to the Afghan and Pakistani authorities.
22.

Discourse sample 02[30]

1. Unfortunately,
2. **single mothers** are often *a neglected demographic group*,
3. even though
4. 5% of **women** in the European Union currently belong to this group.
5. These **women** have been particularly hard hit during the current economic crisis.
6. To be able to provide the financial support required to bring up their children,
7. they very often have to go without *rest or medical care*.
8. *We cannot be indifferent*
9. to our citizens who are experiencing hardship.

[29]The initial series of agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

[30][http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20111024+ITEM-021+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=1-243-000], February 10th, 2013.

10. I would like to stress
11. the need to grant not only *additional unemployment benefits for each child*, but also priority access to affordable housing.
12. Furthermore, I believe that
13. **single mothers** should be offered *flexible employment opportunities* at EU, national and local level
14. *to enable them to achieve a work-life balance*.

Discourse sample 03[31]

1. In the last month, several shocking events occurred in India:
2. *a 23 year old student was brutally gang **rape** her in a bus, dying shortly,*
3. *a 16-year-old girl burned after been **raped,***
4. *a young 17 year old victim of a gang **rape,***
5. *committed suicide after a police officer tried to persuade her to withdraw the complaint*
6. *and to marry one of the assailants.*
7. In India, every 21 minutes **a rape** is reported.
8. India statistics show that between 2001 and 2011 in 3 of 4 trials of **rape** judged guilty =
9. *were either acquitted or released for lack of evidence.*
10. **A rape** trial may last up to 15 years.
11. These cases *dramatic and alarming* cases show that
12. the Indian authorities have failed to enforce the law and punishing the victims.<=
13. **And this failure** has led to increased crime.
14. India benefits from **EU funding**, including programs on human rights and protection of victims of torture. <=
15. Request blocking **this financial aid from the Union**, if India fails to take immediate steps
16. leading to investigations and short processes, protection of victims and *severe and dissuasive sanctions.*.

Discourse sample 04[32]

1. Madam President, **I can vouch from personal experience that it is not easy being a woman in politics,**
2. and being **a young woman in politics is even harder**
3. It is primarily down to us to change this situation. =
4. We need to make a **greater effort** and, therefore, always *be one step ahead of men*.
5. At the same time, we must retain our **feminine touch** when we are engaged in politics and *not attempt to be more macho than the men.*
6. I support Ms Pietikäinen's report out of female **solidarity** and as a colleague.
7. However, I must make a few comments. Women **constantly need to fight** for what they want.
8. It does not need to be based exclusively on these representation quotas which we are always debating.
9. Women do not need to take up political positions simply because they are women. <=
10. We need to have a *certain representation quota*, but because the **women are competent** and deserve to be given these positions.
11. When it comes to promoting women to decision-making positions, we need to talk about it less and take **concrete actions**.
12. **We** women **must support each other**, whether young or mature, because *solidarity alone is the key.* The level of success achieved by a woman politician **must** be possible
13. for other women also to achieve later on, who are perhaps *younger and better qualified*.
14. This is why **I** endorse the rapporteur's proposals for supporting women's organisations and promoting mentoring.
15. Finally, **I** would also like to mention another point which affects *women's ability to achieve their full potential*: the **acts of violence inflicted on them**, especially in the family setting.
16. I would like to take this opportunity to applaud that on 8 March, International Women's Day, Romania enacted the amended law on preventing and combating domestic violence

[31][http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20130117+ITEM-017-01+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=4-388-000], February 10th, 2013.

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[32][http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20120312+ITEM-

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017+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=1-096-000], February 10th, 2013.

LE RÔLE DE LA CULTURE POPULAIRE DE LA TRANSYLVANIE DANS LA CONSOLIDATION DE L'UNITÉ NATIONALE

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Résumé: *Les traditions sont des actes porteurs de valeur et de significations pour un group humain. Le paysan devient au début du XX^{ème} siècle l'être national par excellence. Grace à ses traditions il fait la liaison avec les grandes ancêtres. Le paysan est porteur de la spécificité nationale. La paysannerie roumaine montre que la constitution d'un patrimoine culturelle collectif joue un rôle primordial dans la revendication nationale. Les nations sont des entités spirituelles qui existent dans la tête et le cœur des hommes et se reposent sur la conscience nationale. Elles se reconnaissent dans une histoire commune, dans une réputation commune, dans des sacrifices commune. La nation est "une communauté solidaire" qui a besoin de la continuité pour se sentir durable et légitimé ; cette continuité étant assurée par les traditions. En Transylvanie, la culture populaire a joué un rôle très important. Apres "La Grande Unification" apparaissent, ce que l'on appelle, "les exhibitions identitaires" (Anne Marie Thiesse): «Le Musée de la Langue Roumaine » (1919), la fondation du Musée Ethnographique de Transylvanie (1922), (avec les sections: l'agriculture, les métiers artisanaux, les tissus traditionnels, les instruments musicaux, le costume populaire traditionnel etc.) et l'exposition en plein air «Le parc ethnographique Romulus Vuia» (1929). En 1930, commence l'étude scientifique du folklore: Les Archives de Folklore de L'Académie Roumaine, Cluj-Napoca. L'enseignement a soutenu la diffusion des productions populaires (Les curriculums scolaires et les Manuels de Langue Roumaine). L'appel à la culture populaire montre, dans cet espace multiethnique, que les identités nationales ne sont pas des faits de la nature, mais des constructions.*

Mots-clés: *les politiques culturelles***,** *la culture populaire transylvaine, paysan, identité nationale, construction*.

Introduction. Structure.

L'étude focalise sur les politiques culturelles en Transylvanie, qui font appel à la culture populaire, dans le cadre de la consolidation de l'Unité Nationale. La période cible est: 1919 – 1930. On va voir, premièrement la perspective d'approche du thème et quelques

points de repère puis on va parler du nationalisme constructiviste roumain », en général, et après on va voir comment, en Transylvanie, a été créé, consolidé, le sentiment national par appel à la culture populaire: les politiques culturelles transylvaines.

On a choisi seulement deux politiques culturels: *la politique de la propagation de la culture*: dans ce cadre, on va présenter trois cas: les uns qui font appel aux images visuels et les autres qui font appel, plutôt, aux textes écrits. C'est-à-dire: *Le Musée de la Langue Roumaine*, *Les Archives de Folklore de l'Académie Roumaine de Cluj-Napoca, d'une côte et Le Musée Ethnographique Transylvain, d'autre côte.* Une autre politique culturelle est: *La politique culturelle – éducationnelle.* (Dans cet espace je m'arrête aux curriculums scolaires et aux Manuels scolaires de Langue Roumaine). A la fin, quelques conclusions et une courte séquence bibliographique.

Hypothèse de la quelle nous sommes parti est**:** les identités nationales ne sont pas des faits de la nature, mais des constructions. Le sentiment identitaire roumain a été fortifié en faisant appel à la figure du paysan roumain.

La perspective d'approche du thème

On va aborder «le nationalisme » du point de vue constructiviste.[33] Les nations modernes se sont construites/ou ont été construites d'une façon différente que celle mentionnée par les histoires officielles. La liste des éléments de base d'une identité nationale est: des ancêtres fondateurs, une histoire, des héros, une langue, des monuments, des paysages et un folklore. Ce qui crée un sentiment identitaire est le recours à une entière série de souvenirs, une forte connexion avec les ancêtres, une redécouverte des prédécesseurs. Une fois créé, le sentiment national, pour pouvoir être assimilé, doit avant tout être appris. Et pour pouvoir être appris, il avait besoin de piliers de soutien ; un piler de référence étant le folklore. Par de biais de lui on va voir comment en Romanie, spécialement, en Transylvanie, a été inculqué dans la conscience collective le sentiment identitaire. Le culte de la tradition et l'appréciation du patrimoine ancestral représentaient l'axe fondamental qui maintenait la cohésion sociale. « *Donc, le paysan est, si l'on peut dire, le seul historien qui nous reste des*

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[33] Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?" dans *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation ?,* Paris: Agora, 1992 ; Ernest Gellner, *Nations et nationalisme*, Paris: Payot, 1989 ; Benedict Andreson, *L'imaginaire national reflections sur l'origine de l'essor du nationalisme,* Paris: La Découverte poche, 2002 ; Anthony Smith, *Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.

temps antéhistoriques »[34] Les us et les traditions étaient considérés initialement de simple vestiges de la culture nationale. Ultérieurement, ils sont ceux qui fourniront la stabilité à une nation. Plus on assiste à un développement de la construction des nations, plus celles-ci ont besoin de plus d'éléments de référence et de symboles et donc, les us paysans deviennent plus nombreux.[35]

Les méthodes principales de travail sont: l'analyse, la description, l'étude de cas, la synthèse. Nous suivrons l'affirmation de l'identité nationale roumaine, dans l'espace transylvain, commençant, non pas par la négation du passé, mais par sa reconstruction graduelle par l'intermédiaire des traditions.

Points de repère

Le folklore a été « découvert » au XIXème siècle, en relation avec la notion de « peuple »; à l'époque romantique il représente « l'âme du peuple »; en conséquence la collecte du folklore a des enjeux nationaux. Dans le cadre du mouvement de construction nationale, « la tradition » a été celle qui a construit l'objet d'étude de la folkloristique. Un folklore constitué comme prolongation du romantisme militant.

La définition de la « politique culturelle » avec laquelle nous allons opérer dans notre étude est: toute activité de gouvernement qui tend à organiser la culture pour la communauté et les individus: de la culture éducation, de la culture création et de la propagation de la culture. Notre étude va aborder seulement: la politique de la propagation de la culture et la politique culturelle – éducationnelle. Mais, avant de passer aux politiques culturelles, on va faire une courte présentation de la perspective du nationalisme constructiviste.

Le paradigme constructiviste – brève présentation

Le philosophe Ernest Renan (1823-1892) dans une conférence intitulée « *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? »* prononcée à la Sorbonne le 11 mars 1882, passe en revue les implications du concept de « nation ». D'après lui, la nation ne recouvre pas la nation de race, car toutes les nations modernes sont manifestement des mélanges. Toute politique qui forgerait l'unité d'une nation à l'aide d'arguments raciaux se fonderait sur des chimères. La nation n'est identique ni à la langue ni à la religion. En plus, la théorie des « frontières naturelles » d'une

[34] George Sand, Avant-propos des *Légendes rustiques,* dans Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales. Europe XVIIIe-XXe*, Paris: L'Univers Historique SEUIL, 1999, p. 20.
[35] Anne-Marie Thiesse, *op. cit*., p. 20.

nation est considéré arbitraire parce que le passe montre que les espaces vitaux des nations ont constamment varié. La nation, poursuit Renan, ne saurait finalement être définie et fondée en termes matériels. « *Une nation est un âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses, qui en vérité n'en font qu'une, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. L'une ressortit au passe, l'autre au présent. La première est la possession commune d'un riche héritage de souvenirs, l'autre est l'engagement, le souhait de vivre ensemble*. »[36] Plus tard, Benedict Andreson va offrir une définition anthropologique: la nation – « *une communauté politique imaginaire et imaginée comme intrinsèquement limitée et souveraine*. » [37] En conclusion: les nations sont des entités spirituelles qui se sont construites par appel aux éléments de références et le folklore est l'une de ces éléments.

I. Le nationalisme en Balkans

Comme toutes les formes de politiques et culturelles de communauté, la nation est aussi un phénomène de la civilisation européenne, né de l'histoire. Le concept de « nation » est beaucoup plus ancien que celui d' « Etat » mais, dans leurs acception actuelle qui englobe la totalité de la population est peut difficilement définir la nation sans l'Etat.[38]

« La nation », dans cette région du Sud-est de l'Europe, est liée serrée par la notion de « peuple ». Mais, le problème de la définition d'un peuple dans le Balkans est effectivement complexe, d'autant plus que cette notion peut recouvrir des sens différents en fonction des époques et des pays. Les concepts fluctuèrent en fonction de l'histoire, des systèmes politiques et des idéologies. Au XIXe siècle on traduisit le mot « ethnos » par les notions de « race », de « nation », et plus tard, d' « ethnie ».[39] L'ethnisme balkanique contient deux systèmes de références: la langue et le sang. L'« ethnie » n'est pas uniquement un groupe de personnes, une population, unie par une unité de langue, de culture et de religion.[40] Le sang est le symbole par excellence. Ce nationalisme est par conséquent fondé sur l'exaltation de l'histoire des ancêtres. Il s'agit d'un long processus de « légitimer », de légitimer par continuités. Ici entre en scène les mythes historiques fondateurs. « *Les nations développent une mythographie basée sur leurs défenses multiséculaires par rapport aux envahisseurs et aux occupants, sur l'image de la montagne, conservatoire de la culture et de la pureté, de la cellule villageoise fondatrice de la nation, le mythe guerriers ou de forteresses assiégées*,

[36] Ernest Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[37] Benedict Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[38] Oliver Gillet, *Les Balkans religions et nationalisme*, Bruxelles: OUSIA, 2001, p. 64.
[39] Idem.
[40] *Ibidem*., p. 66.

etc. »[41] Ces images finissent par montrer que toutes les étapes historiques furent des signes de la volonté des peuples de créer des Etats indépendants, préfigurant la fondation des Etats modernes.

a. La nation Roumanie – une construction sur la « *cellule villageoise fondatrice* »[42]

« Le culte des ancêtres est de tous le plus légitime ; les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes. Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j'entends de la véritable), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale. »[43]

La nation roumaine commence avec élection de ses grands ancêtres, les Daces, population conquise au IIe siècle par les troupes romanes.[44] Pour connaître, pour affirmer ensuite leur identité et pour défendre leurs droits aussi, les Roumains se sont toujours rapporté à leurs origines.[45] Le premier fond ethnique a été le geto-dace. Sur ce fond s'est greffée la civilisation latine, en tant que second facteur. [46]

Johan Tröster (†1670) étudiait les coutumes des roumains, leurs danses, leurs costumes pour apporter la preuve d'origine latine.[47] Les Chroniqueurs roumains allèrent dans le même sens. Grigore Ureche (1590-1647), dans sa *Cornique Moldavie* écrivait: « *Les Roumains, tant qu'ils sont à habiter le Pays hongrois et la Transylvanie et le Maramurech viennent du même endroit que les Moldaves et tous descendent de Rome* »[48] Miron Costin (1633-1691) reprit ces thèses en traitant les origines du son peuple: « *Le peuple du pays de Moldavie d'où on tire-t-il sa souche ? Du pays d'Italie que tout homme le sache*. »[49]Après Demeter Cantemir (1673-1723), en *Descriptio antiqui et hodicini status Moldavie* (1719) et *Cronique de l'antiquité roumano-moldo-valaque* (1719) posait les pierres de la latinité.[50] Școala Ardeleană, avec ses représentants: Samuel Micu (1745-1806), Gheorghe Sincai

[41] *Ibidem*., p. 70.
[42] L'expression utilisée par Oliver Gilet, idem.
[43] Ernest Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[44] Anne-Marie Thiesse, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[45] Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, [Histoire et myt dans la conscience roumaine], Bucarest: Humanitas, 1997, p. 142.
[46] Mircea Goga, La *Roumanie. Culture et civilisation*, Paris: PUPS, 2007, p. 76.
[47] Johan Tröster, *"Vechea și noua Dacie"* [La vieille et la nouvelle Dacie], Nürnberg, 1666, dans *Magazin istoric* [Revue historique], 11/1978.
[48] Grigore Ureche, *Cornique de Moldavie*, dans Georges Castellan, *Le monde des Balkans*. *Poudrière ou zone de paix ?* Paris: Thématique Histoire, 1994, p. 62.
[49] Idem.
[50] Idem.

(1753-1816), Petru Major (1754-1821) affirmait la descendance directe depuis les colons romains établis au II^{ème} siècle.[51]

Le XIX^{ème} siècle est pour la Roumanie le moment crucial à l'identité nationale. En parlant de la culture roumaine l'essayiste et critique littéraire Garabet Ibraileanu proclamait scandaleusement « *Le Roumains, qui n'ont à peu près rien crée, on a peu près tout emprunté*. »[52] Les élites intellectuelles romaines se sont formées dans l'esprit des méthodes et des livres occidentaux. Elles ont étudié à l'étranger et sont revenues pour se confronter avec la vie et la mentalité roumaines qui étaient bien différentes. En 1868, Titu Maiorescu[53] affirmait « *Messieurs, vous savez que est l'un de maux principaux dans la tête de notre jeunesse, dans la tête peut-être de la majorité d'entre nous ; dans la mienne comme dans d'autre ? C'est que nous avons fait nos études et que nous avons reçu les éléments de notre culture à l'étranger. [...] Nous nous familiarisons avec des formules de culture qui sont essentielles à l'atmosphère ambiante du pays où nous avons étudié, mais qui sont souvent complètement inadaptée à notre situation actuelle et parfois même à la nature du peuple roumain*. »[54] Ces jeunes qui se forment donc en tant qu'intellectuels dans un esprit « moderne », sont appelés à jouer un rôle novateur dans la structure « holiste » du pays. Par conséquent, le discours culturel sera tenté, par sa nature même, de revenir éternellement à ses propres fondements afin d'y chercher une solution à son conflit constitutif.[55]

Le peuple roumain « *le fruit d'un mariage daco-roumain, près de Carpates et Danube […] nourrit par le slaves […] et soumis par le Tartares et les Turcs avant même de devenir adolescent* »[56] a prouvé qu'il détenait le secret miraculeux de survivre dans histoire: l'appel au paysan roumain.

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[51] Cf. George Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans XIVe-XXe siècle*, édition argumentée, Paris: Fayard, 1991.

[52] Garabet Ibrăileanu, *Spiritul critic în cultura românească*, [L'esprit critique dans la culture roumaine], Iasi: Viața românească, 1922, p. 2.

[53] Titu Maiorescu (1840-1917) est une grande figure intellectuelle roumaine de la deuxième moitié du XIX e siècle, à la fois professeur de philosophie, pédagogue, concepteur de la réforme de l'orthographe roumaine, premier critique littéraire etc. Fondateur de la société "Junimea" (La Jeunesse).

[54] Titu Maiorescu, "Contre la proposition de la révision de la Constitution », Discours du 16 janvier 1883, C. Schifirnet (éd.) Bucarest: Albatros, vol. III, p. 122-123. La traduction a été effectuée par Folschweiller (Cécile), *La philosophie à la rencontre de l'altérité culturelle: Les Roumains et la pensée Occidentale à la fin du XIX e siècle*, dans *Contact des cultures. Perspectives pluridisciplinaires et transversales,* Actes des journées d'étude des jeunes chercheurs en langue littératures et sociétés tenue à l'Inalco, Paris, 21-22 février 2008, p. 38.

[55] Vintilă Mihăilescu, "Nationalité et nationalisme en Roumanie », dans *Terrain*, no. 17, 1991, p. 1, [http://terrain.revues.org/document3015.html], consulté le 3 Avril, 2012.

a. « *À la recherche du paysan perdu …* »

"*La « roumanité », comme identité nationale, s'est forgée à partir d'un mélange stratégique de « ruralité » et de « latinité », selon une recette romantique sui generis.*" [57] « *Chaque culture* – écrivait Noica – *a un archétype*. »[58] Chez nous, l'archétype est « l'image de paysan roumain » qui finisse par construire dans la mentalité collective le sentiment d'appartenance ; le sentiment roumain de l'espace[59] et l'être[60]. Les deux discours de la réception, en 1937, et en 1940, à l'Académie Roumaine, *Elogiu satului românesc* [Eloge du village roumain] par Blaga et *Laudă ţărănului român* [Eloge du paysan roumain] par Liviu Rebreanu, prouvent encore une fois que la culture a été, elle est et elle sera l'univers parfait dans lequel se livre la bataille pour l'affirmation de la modernité d'une nation. « *Le paysan* – disait Liviu Rebreanu – *est le commencement et le fin. Lors de grandes horreurs, des catastrophes sociales, les riches* […] *sont tout de suite prêts à partir. Ils n'ont pas attachement à la terre […] le paysan ne part pas […] il serait condamné de périr comme un arbre déraciné. Aussi, le paysan est, partout, celui qui conserve le territoire national […] la terre c'est la raison même d'exister. Notre terre a une vois que le paysan entend et comprend*. »[61]

L'individu de la société rurale roumaine est solidairement lié à sa communauté ; son individualité est plutôt un « nous » qu'un « moi ».[62] C'est pour cela que Noica affirme que dans le monde villageois roumain « *la catégorie de la personnalité n'existe pas* ». [63] D'autre part, par la structure même de son discours, la culture roumaine "moderne" s'appliqua à donner à la société rurale l'image d'identité nationale.[64]

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[56] Dumitru Drăghicescu, *Din psihologia poporului român* [De la Psychologie du peuple roumain], Bucarest: Albatros, 1995, p. 165.
[57] Vintilă Mihăilescu, *op. cit*., p.1.
[58] Constantin Noica, *Jurnal de idei* [Journal d'idées], Bucarest: Humanitas, 1991, p. 234.
[59] Lucian Blaga, *Opere*, [Oeuvres], vol. XIX, *Trilogia culturii* [La trilogie de la culture], Bucarest: Minerva, p. 194.
[60] Constantin Noica, *op. cit*., p. 234.
[61] Liviu Rebreanu, *Laudă ţărănului român* [Eloge du paysan roumain], apud. Mirgea Goga, *Une île de latinité. Culture, civilisation langue et littérature roumaine*, Paris: PUPS, 2006, p. 43.
[62] Vintilă Mihăilescu, *ibidem*, p. 2.

II. L'étude du cas: Le rôle de la culture populaire en Transylvanie

a. La politique de la propagation de la culture

On va voir la première « exhibition identitaire »[65] transylvaine, si on peut dire comme ça, une exhibition qui concerne, plutôt, les textes écrits: « *Le Musée de la Langue Roumaine* ». Il a été créé à l'initiative de Sextil Puşcariu, le premier Recteur de l'Université "Dacia Superioară" de Cluj, en automne 1919. Son but principal: collecter et étudier le matériel lexicographique de la langue roumaine de toutes les époques et de toutes les régions habitées par les Roumains.[66]

La deuxième "exhibition identitaire" qui concerne plutôt les images visuelles est: Le Musée Ethnographique Transylvain. Il a été fondé en janvier 1923, sous la direction de Romulus Vuia, et a inscrit dans son programme deux buts principaux: « *entreprendre une action de sauvegarde et de conservation de la civilisation populaire roumaine, et devenir un institut de recherches ethnographiques dont le but principal soit l'étude du peuple roumain*. »[67] La question qui se pose est: pourquoi à Cluj ? Parce que, dit Romulus Vuia « *nulle part les problèmes ethniques du pays n'intéresseront autant les étrangers que dans la capitale de la Transylvanie*. »[68] Parce qu'ici, en Transylvanie, « *notre musée ne remplira pas seulement un rôle scientifique, mais aussi celui d'informateur objectif des rapports ethniques du pays*. »[69] (Il y a des objets dans le musée qui montre explicite les rapports ethniques du pays. Par exemple, deux vitrines dans lesquelles se trouve deux types des céramiques: les céramiques transylvaine roumaine du bassin du Beius et dans la seconde, la céramique hongroise.[70] Elles se sont présentées en tandem pour exprimer mieux, parmi la visualisation, le rapport ethnique du pays.)

Les Archives de Folklore de l'Académie Roumaine de Cluj-Napoca, le troisième institut, ont été fondées au printemps 1930, par le chercheur Ioan Muslea, d'après le modèle

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[63] Constantin Noica, *Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes* [Lettres sur la logique d'Hermès], Bucarest: Cartea Românească, 1986 apud., idem.
[64] Idem.
[65] Anne Marie Thiesse, *op. cit*., p. 95.
[66] Sextil Puşcariu, *Muzeul Limbii Române* [Le Musée de la langue roumaine], dans *Dacoromania*, I, 1921, p. 3-4.
[67] La déclaration de Romulus Vuia – directeur du musée, 1928, dans *Muzeul Etnografic al Ardealului* [Le Musée Ethnographique Transylvain], Fundația culturală,,Regele Mihai I"/ La Fondation Culturelle,,Le Roi Michel"/Prefață/ Préface, Romulus Vuia, directeur du musée, București,/ Bucarest, 1928, p. 3.
[68] Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
[69] Idem.
[70] Photo no. IV, dans *idem*. Vitrines du vestibule. Dans la première: céramique transylvaine roumaine du bassin de Beius. Dans la seconde: céramique hongroise.

des archives du Nord de l'Europe (Copenhague, Oslo, Âbo – Finlande. Quelques objectifs des Archives de *Folklore,* qui ont été réalisés*:*

−Collecte de folklore dans toutes les régions du pays (en ce sens, Ioan Muslea a fait appel aux intellectuels: prêtres, enseignants);

−Élaboration de questionnaires qui seront à la base de la recherche scientifique de la culture populaire;

− Création d'une bibliothèque de spécialité;

− Edition de la revue "*Anuarul Arhivei de Folklor* »/ "*Annuaire des Archives de Folklore*" et collaboration avec des institutions similaires de l'étranger etc.

b. Les politiques culturelles – éducationnelles

Dans ce cadre nous avons deux objectifs: on va voir les Curriculums scolaires (formuler les objectifs) et le traitement des contenus des curriculums dans les manuels scolaires de Transylvanie.

On a choisi un exemple: *Programa analitică pentru școalele secundare de băieți din Ardeal, Bănat și Părțile ungurene pe timpul de transiție*. Publicată de Consiliu Dirigent Român, Resortul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice. Tipărită în manuscris, Sibiu, 1919 / *Le curriculum analytique pour l'école secondaire de garçon d'Ardeal, Bănat et Părțile ungurene pendant l'époque de transition.* Publié par le Conseil Dirigeant Roumain, Ressort du Culte et de l'Instruction publique. Imprimé en version manuscrite, Sibiu, 1919.

Les enjeux généraux du curriculum restructuré (la seconde réforme du ministre Spiru Haret 1919-1928) vise trois volets:

- Modéler la personnalité de l'apprenant
- Former ses bases culturelles
- Construire le sentiment national: « *renforcer chez les apprenants la conscience de la vie de notre peuple* »[71]

En ce qui concerne la présence de la culture populaire dans les manuels scolaires, on a choisi deux types des manuels. L'un du Gheorghe Adamescu, Mihail Dragomirescu, *Manual de Limba Română (Cartea de Cetire și Gramatică) clasa a III-a a Liceelor și Gimnaziilor și a Scoalelor secundare de fete*, Aprobat de Ministerul Instrucțiunii 1921, București, Editura

[71] *Programa analitică pentru școalele secundare de băieți din Ardeal, Bănat și Părțile ungurene pe timpul de transiție*. Publicată de Consiliu Dirigent Român, Resortul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice. Tipărită în manuscris, Sibiu, 1919. [*Le curriculum analytique pour l'école secondaire de garçon d'Ardeal, Bănat et Părțile ungurene pendant l'époque de transition.* Publié par le Conseil Dirigeant Roumain, Ressort du Culte et de l'Instruction publique. Imprimé en version manuscrite, Sibiu, 1919.]

SOCEC & Co. S.A., 1923./ *Manuel de Langue Roumaine (Lecture et Grammaire) IIIe année, Lycées, Collèges et Ecoles Secondaires pour les filles*, Approuvé par le Ministère de l'Instruction 1921, Bucarest, Editions SOCEC & Co. S.A., 1923, et l'autre Gheorghe Adamescu, Nicolae Rusu, Mihail Dragomirescu, *Manual de Limba Română pentru clasa a VI-a a Școalelor Secundare de băieți și fete/ Manuel de Langue Roumaine pour le IV ème année, Collèges et Ecoles Secondaires pour les filles,* Aprobat de Ministerul Instrucțiunii 1923, București, Editura Librăriei SOCEC & Co. S.A., 1929.

Dans le premièr le chapitre "littérature du peuple/populaire" comprend: bocete/ des lamentations, strigături/de vers satyriques scandés pendant la danse populaires, colinde/des chansons de Noël, doine/des chansons populaires lyriques.

La littérature populaire, dans la seconde, est divisé en trois parties:

Productions lyriques: chansons populaires lyriques (doine), chansons de ronde (hore), chansons de Noël (colinde), lamentations (bocete).

Productions épiques: poème épique pour Le Jour de l'An (plugușorul), ballades, contes de fée (basme).

Productions dramatiques: anecdotes et satyres, proverbes, incantations, devinettes.

Conclusion

Le folklore tant célébré par les patriotes du XIX^{ème}- XX^{ème} siècle comme terreau du sentiment national a toujours gardé une place majeure dans la conception identitaire roumaine. L'appel à la figure messianique du paysan roumain a la force de construire l'identité nationale. Une image qui est porteuse de spécificité nationale. Le paysan devient, en Transylvanie au début du XX^{ème} siècle, l'être national par excellence.

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CHURCH-STATE RELATION IN TRANSYLVANIA. COMMON EFFORTS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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Abstract: *In this paper I will try to show which was the contribution of the cults, in particular the Orthodox one, in the European Integration process, in conjunction with the State institutions, in Cluj-Napoca. In the process of European integration the churches had and still have an important role due to peculiarities that distinguish them from any other state and non-state structures. In Transylvania, specifically in Cluj-Napoca, there are seven traditional churches and several new protestant denominations, which individually worked hard for our country's integration into European structures. All the religious representatives of the recognized cults in Romania have committed to contribute to this process and they have signed on 27 May 2000 a joint statement pledged to support the integration process. I will illustrate this collaboration Church-State by describing joint projects, partnerships and joint efforts of leading the implementation of the idea of integration itself.*
Research methods used are quantitative and qualitative, descriptions of the projects, analysis and interpretation of existing documents, following the actual results of this common endeavor. We also show the limits of this type of partnership, both in terms of the institution of the Church, which itself is involved in a process of change of the social vision and constraints of an economic, political and administrative governance. The study is limited to present some significant examples of this partnership, and has no claim of being an extensive study, but rather a starting point for further study.

Keywords: European Integration, Church, State, Social Partnership.

1. Definitions and Boundaries

Before discussing the relation between State and Church in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, let me first define the concept of church-state relations and then the meaning of the European Integration, relating to this specific context. "State" may refer to the government or to political activity, while "Church" may refer to a church organization or to a religious faith. Consequently, church-state relations cover four aspects: the relations between government and religion, between government and the church, between religion and politics and between the church and politics[72].

1. 1. The concept of "Church"

Church means a community of believers of the same religion, without excluding non-Christian religions or those that have not a hierarchical structure, such as, for example, the Muslim religion. Believers of the same religion share the same faiths, worships and the discipline established by the hierarchical authorities - where appropriate. The state is the body who founds the legal, institutional and political structure of the national community: the power and its legislation. Each church has its own conception of the relationship with the State to which its believers belong to. But the State is responsible for deciding on relationships with churches[73].

The nature of relations between government in this narrow sense and religion is determined by the nature of the particular political regime. Generally speaking, democratic governments will not impose any laws or policies on religion, whereas, out of a desire to control every facet of society, authoritarian regimes or single-party states will often institute a law on religion or a religious policy as a mean to exercise effective control over the development of religious affairs. Their main concern is to stress that religion must not damage national security, public morality or social order. The differing attitudes towards religion of parties and governments (elimination, attack, control, etc.) are the basis of their

[72] Theoretical Group (1998), 'Separation of church and state: misconception and clarification', in *Hong Kong in Transition: Politics, Economy and Society*, Wide Angle Press, Hong Kong, p.96.
[73] De Naurois, L. (2003), 'Religion et Etat', in *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, Available from: <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/religion-religion-et-etat >, Last accessed 16.02.2013

policies on religion. Consequently, in the relations between government and religion, the form of the political regime plays a decisive role.

The 'church' may be a specific religious body, or certain church organizations or groups of religious believers. By church-state relations we mostly mean the relations between the two organizations of government and church, while the 'separation of church and state' describes the mutual organizational independence between government and church. As stated above, the political regime of a state affects the relations between its government and the church. In democracies, interaction between government and church mainly takes place in the sphere of public affairs outside of religious matters, and does not pertain to the distribution of power. But under authoritarian regimes, because the party-state does not give up its control over social organizations, the development of religious bodies, as a part of the social system, is restricted by the organs of administration over religious matters[74]. In the internal operation of religious bodies, there is still some degree of control and intervention by the party-state.

1.2. European Integration

European integration is the process of industrial, political, legal, economic (and in some cases social and cultural) integration of states[75] wholly or partially in Europe. European integration is undoubtedly the most important process that dominates our part of the world. It was a dreamt project for centuries by a Europe divided religiously and confessional, heir of a 28 century[76] old consciousness and way of thinking. It was believed to be the political, economic and military solution of our continent for the twenty-first century. The Europe's way out of the schizophrenia of totalitarian ideologies, its democratic and unitary reconstruction in the postwar era was the work of the great Christian Democrat politicians and theorists: Alcide de Gasperi (1881-1954), Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), Robert Schumann (1886-1963) Jean Monet (1888-1979), Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985). Significant fact, in their view, the realization of the united Europe, the federalization of Europe, the integration of the European nations and their unity in diversity were nothing else but application of the international principles on which Christian Community personalism undertook reconstruction and democratic domestic politics of Italy and anti-totalitarian

[74] Xunmou, Z. (2002), 'A preliminary investigation of church-state relations and the administrative model for religious affairs', in *A Study of Church-State Relations in Europe and the USA*", Religious Culture Press, Beijing, pp.6-7.
[75] Rosamond, B. (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 21–22.
[76] De Rougemont, D. (1961), *Vingt-huit siecles d'Europe. La conscience europeenne a travers les textes d'Hesiode a nos jours*, Payot, Paris.

postwar Germany[77]. The merit of the Founding Fathers of the united Europe vision is that of having highlighted the vital connection between the personalism, subsidiarity and federalism. The policy of the united Europe can't be other than the "the politics of the Person", the politics of the responsible freedom and the community solidarity. The person is a reality or, rather, a project theological and political, closely linked to the Christianity[78].

The European unification is a frontal challenge to the Christian churches. The conciliating and creative potential of Christianity in a united Europe is seriously affected by the religious groups that are on the continent and are responsible, largely, for the modernity's negative attitude towards Christianity. Believers cannot be a credible unity spiritual factor because they are divided into confessional, national and cultural groups.

2. State-Church Relationship Evolution in Romania until the Cults Law Adoption

"No country can afford to neglect the importance of churches and the balance that the religious life can bring in a society of any kind. Churches have (both in the European Union as a whole, and in each country) a very particular importance because they are the primordial nucleus of the European culture. A Europe which must take into account the constitutional common traditions and cultural phenomena of the Member States, their national identities, as well as the principle of subsidiarity, must respect and protect the equilibrium of the relations between Church and State"[79].

2.1. Romania as a European country by history and culture

The mechanism's structures of European Integration were designed and built in a period when most of the European countries were unable to give their ideological and practical contributions to building the institutional system. At that time, the European Community system was designed by and only for a part of Europe. In terms of cultural affiliation is incontestable the adherence of Romania to Europe. Our modern history is closely tied to this reality. Regarding the political regime, Romania's European orientation is manifested by the democracy and the understanding and application of it, influenced by a

[77] Ica, I Jr., Marani, G. (2002), 'Biserică, societate, gândire în Răsărit, în Occident şi Europa de azi', in *Gandirea sociala a Bisericii*, Deisis, Sibiu, p. 47-48.
[78] *Ibidem*.
[79] Merle, M. (1993), 'Religion, étique et politique en Europe: essai de problématique', in *Religions et transformations de l'Europe*, ed. V Gilbert Vincent and J P Willaime, Presses Universitaires de Strasburg, Strasburg, pp. 58-65.

specific element, in each country: the individual and collective freedoms are subordinated to the respect of the public order and moral conventions. This new redefinition of Europe is not smoothly consumed and it is not yet a final good. After the fall of the Berlin Wall we were holding up to geopolitical theories seeking to justify the broken geography of the continent. Samuel P. Huntington's book[80] makes a difference between the Eastern and Western civilization, more on the basis of religion. It became well known the idea of the existence of a civilized Europe - Catholic and Protestant Europe and a barbaric one - Orthodox and Muslim, and the frontiers of Europe are there where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.

In this respect, Bartolomeu Anania (1921-2011), the late Metropolitan of Cluj, said in 2002: "We have a church that lives within a state, respects the laws of the State headed by the Constitution, but which, by the virtue of his divine dignity, treats the state of the peer. We do not restore the old Byzantine symphony, it is too difficult, but, in any case, the relationships are clear and so far, I think, they are fair"[81].

Towards the Romania's integration in the European Union, the cults had a common attitude by signing on 27 May 2000, by representatives of the religions recognized a joint declaration which supports integration of Romania into the European Union. Signed document was entitled "The Cults Declaration on Romania's Integration into the European Union", also known as "The Snagov Declaration", stating that "the religious cults in Romania are a major component of today's Romanian society and make an important contribution to the spiritual and social life of Romania, being sensitive both to the difficulties and its progress". This statement also says about "the active support for this process. Because we we have always been Europeans, we do inherently efforts to this aim, convinced that this integration serves the interests of our believers and also to the society, in Romania. (...) Given the rich religious life, Romania is ready to contribute to enriching the European cultural and spiritual heritage, reaffirming the respect for life, the human dignity, the right to property, the family and human solidarity, paying particular attention to ensuring freedom of thought, conscience, belief and religion. European unification process, largely aimed at economic unification, can be fully under the conditions in which the European spiritual enrichment. Preserving their own spiritual identity, modeled in history, along with other European

[80] Huntington, S.P. (1997), *Ciocnirea civilizaţiilor şi refacerea ordinii mondiale*, trad. Radu Carp, Antet, Bucuresti.
[81] Pr. Benga, D. (2002), 'Câteva reflecţii asupra raportului dintre misiune şi ecumenism', in *Teologia VI*, nr. 3-4, p. 10-21.

countries, Romania's contribution will increase Europe's cultural and spiritual heritage values"[82].

2.2. Constitutional Regulations regarding the Cults

Under constitutional principles laid down in Art. 7 of the Constitution of Romania[83], the Romanian state must support the Romanians from abroad, to the purchase and fitting of places of worship, in compliance with the states where these communities are located. A project, which the Church is already involved in, is the problem of education, many parochial schools already operating in European countries. In order to hear the voice of the cults more by European institutions in the EU, since there is a body of central government with expertise in cults, the Council of Europe has launched two very important proposals. Thus, they do the efforts in order to establish a religious advisory council, bringing together all religious organizations that are accredited to the European institutions. The Council aims to harmonize positions and join the religions efforts in finding common solutions to the problems raised by the functioning of the European Union. For a better understanding of religious phenomena in order to identify potential issues of conflict and ways to solve them, the Council of Europe is taking steps to establish an Institute for comparative studies of religious phenomena, because there are a wider European concerns on this issue. Thus, the *Recommendation 1720* of 2005[84] of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on education and religion, proposes to establish an institute to train such specialists in religious discipline, considering that the study of religion in school, so far, do not received the attention it deserves. It emphasized the importance of education in European documents to combat ignorance, stereotypes and misunderstanding against religions[85].

Even if from many points of view Romania's situation may be criticized, it seems that the first area in which it respects the European standards, even more than that, it is considered to be an example for other countries, is the constitutional system of the relationship between Church and State. Gerard Gonzales[86], in his paper, *La Convention Européenne des droits de*

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[82] Tătaru-Cazaban, M. (2000), 'Declaraţia Cultelor privind integrarea României în Uniunea Europeană', in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, nr. 4-6, p. 121-122.
[83] *The Constitution of Romania*, Available from: <www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339>, Last Accessed 15.02.2013.
[84] Council of Europe (2005), 'Education and religion', in *Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1720*, Available from <https://wcd.coe.int>, Last accessed :17.02.2013.
[85] Council of Europe (2006), 'Reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 May 2006', in *965th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies*, Available from : <https://wcd.coe.int>, Last accessed: 17.02.2013.
[86] Gonzales, G. (1997), *La Convention Européenne des droits de l'homme et la liberté des religions,* Economica, Paris, p.7.

l'homme et la liberté des religions, states that: "Romania which has ratified the Convention on the 20th of June, 1994, possesses the most complete constitutional device and may be the most protective one".

The article 29 of the Romanian Constitution revised in 2003 guarantees the freedom of religion and the right to choose one's own religion (29.1), the freedom to organize of cults considering their own status (29.3), their autonomy in relation to the State, but also, the state grants its support for religious assistance in the army, hospitals, prisons, homes and orphanages (29.5). It should be pointed out that Article 20 from the *Romanian Constitution*, which states that "the constitutional provisions that regard the rights and liberties of citizens shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is part of" (1.20). Paragraph 2 of this Article states that "if there is a disagreement between the covenants and treaties regarding the fundamental human rights in Romania is a part of the internal laws, the international regulations shall take precedence, excepting the case when the Constitution or national laws contain more favorable provisions". Here's a statement which, besides the fact that it involves a real commitment, we would like to see it more often, because it realizes a perfect communion between a State's commitment at an international level and its conduct in the sphere of its own sovereignty.

The European integration has more and more important consequences on the position and the cults' regime in the Member States. Cults get in contact with the European Union in areas like: labor law, tax law, insurance law, property heritage regime, family law and educational system. In the chapters 13 and 18 of negotiation regarding Romania's accession in the European Union are set the social and employment policies and the education policies and the professional training where the cults can be involved, working with the State for a covering as broad as possible of the population's needs. Romania comes in the EU with its own features in the area of religious life and in the legal regulation of the relations between state and cults.

Regarding the religious life, after 1990 and Romania's exit from the communist regime, the censuses carried out (in 1992 and 2002), included a special section on religion of the Romanian citizens. These two censuses, statistically speaking, present a population of Romania of 99.8% of citizens who declare a religious affiliation, percentage which places it on one of the first places in Europe in this regard, especially in terms of an accelerated secularization at a global level, respectively, a European one.

Religious life in Romania is performed according to the principle of religious belief freedom, principle stated in Article 29 of the *Constitution*, along with freedom of thought and opinions. In Transylvania, through the *Edict of Turda*[87], it was declared the first time in Europe in 1568, the *Declaration concerning religious tolerance*. Although not explicitly defined as a secular state, Romania has no national religion, the public authorities being obliged to be neutral towards associations and religious cults. Citizens are equal before the law and the public authorities, regardless of their religious beliefs or their opinions on the world, life or other similar concepts related to religion.

3. Collaborational opportunities between State and Church highlighted in the Cults Law

3.1. Cults Law Regulations

Until the adoption of cult's law, in 2006, there have been some attempts coming from the Orthodox Church, to regulate, to some extent, the relationship between State and Church. In the complex process of building of a personal democracy, politicians lost credit and their voter's sympathy, and the credibility of the Church grew, attracting sympathy and support of the people.

At the end of 2006, the cults Law was adopted, which became effective in 2007. This law expresses the fundamental realities of the relationship state-cults in Romania, as well as the recognition of the spiritual, educational, social, charitable, cultural role and of social partners and the cults' status, as factors of social peace. The state may enter into recognized partnerships with cults, in areas of common interest, in particular on issues relating to social welfare and education.

The basis of the relations between the Romanian state and the cults are those principles of autonomy, neutrality, fairness and non-discrimination towards them, as well as cooperation in the areas of common interest. The law aims to establish the basic principles of the state's support of cults. Given the public utility of religion, the state provides both direct support for their religious personnel remuneration or for the construction, repair and strengthening of places of worship, as well as indirectly by deduction, under the law, of some amounts of income tax of believers or through providing tax incentives. In what concerns the

[87] 'Declaration concerning religious tolerance', in *Edict of Turda,* Available from: <http://www.ziare.com/cluj-napoca/festival/edictul-din-turda-din-1568-primul-decret-de-libertate-religioasa-din-istoria-moderna-a-europei-741774>, Last accessed 17th of February 2013.

financial aid the State takes account of the number of the believers, but also of the real needs of its subsistence.

Nowadays the religious life unfolds, institutionally, in Romania in two forms: cults and religious associations. In Romania there are currently recognized 17 churches and the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs has recorded more than 1,000 associations with integral or partial religious character.

In Cluj-Napoca the religious life knows old and diverse traditions. Here there are located five dioceses of various cults, a Roman Catholic curacy, several synagogues and neoprotestant denominations. Traditional churches are: the Orthodox Church, the Romanian Church United with Rome, or Greek Catholic, the Reformed Church, the Unitarian Church, the Evangelical-Lutheran Church, the Roman Catholic Church. The Neo-protestant denominations are: Baptists, Pentecostals, and Adventists[88].

As a regulatory regime of the state-cults relationship, Romania fits into the distinct collaboration, different from the radical separation system, specific to France and Holland, and from the state church system specific to the Northern countries or to Greece. The regulatory system in Romania is similar to that in Belgium, Austria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, having also many common points with Germany, Italy and Spain. In what concerns the positions expressed regarding the cults' law, it has been shown that this model is not specific only to Romania, but it fits within the wider European model of state-cults relations regulation. The 11-th statement of the Amsterdam Treaty, repeated in the draft of the European Constitution provides the freedom of the Member States of the European Union to regulate the cults' regime according to their own traditions in their national territory[89].

The recognized cults in Romania receive salary support for a part of the clergy and non-clergy personnel, for the construction and repair of places of worship, enjoying fiscal facilities like a tax exemption on the land, places of worship, and income of economic activities. These facilities are not a novelty; history gives us examples in the interwar period, both in Romania and in other European countries.

[88] Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală (2002), *Structura Etno-demografică a României,* Available from : <http://www.edrc.ro/recensamant.jsp?regiune_id=2140&judet_id=2295&localitate_id=2367>, Last accessed 16.02.2013.
[89] Romanian Patriarchate (2006), *Legea nr. 489/2006 privind libertatea religioasă şi regimul general al cultelor* Available from: <http://www.patriarhia.ro/ro/documente/489_2006.html>, Last accessed 18.02.2013.

3.2. Debates on Active Implication of the Orthodox Clergy in Politics

The discussion regarding the church's involvement in politics was improved by the statement of the Archbishop Bartolomeu Anania in the spring of 1998. Answering to a question after a lecture at Alba-Iulia, the archbishop said that at the next parliamentary elections, the Romanian Orthodox Church will have to give up the imposed reservation and to enter directly into the civic arena, neither as a party or political faction nor supporting a particular party, but as a major factor of electoral orientation, especially for the undecided citizens category, to whom he will recommend, at the level of the parishes, the persons who are to be promoted in Parliament, regardless of their political affiliation[90]. The echoes of this statement have created confusion and the involvement of the majoritarian church in politics was manipulated, which led the Patriarch Teoctist and Archbishop Andrei of Alba-Iulia to take strong positions in 2000, against extremism of any kind public life. Media speculated much on the alleged links between patriarchy and Cotroceni, the presidential palace, but it is little known the fact that since 1989 no Romanian president was invited to the Patriarchal Palace in Bucharest, where the most important decisions are taken in church affairs. It is an action meant to emphasize that the Church is guided autonomously and does not allow any interference by the part of the State.

In 2000, the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church has taken into account the Archbishop of Cluj proposal, but kept recommendation clergy from 1996, that to refrain from militant politics within the parties. Clerics can, however, run only for as independents, with the Church leaders' approval for a place in local councils. "Not being indifferent to its best interest, freedom, dignity, spiritual and material prosperity of the country and the Romanian people, Romanian Orthodox Church recommended his clergy to advise the believers of diocesan meetings and who knew about the church issues and social and political life in Romania to run for local or for the central legislative or administrative bodies. It was known that the clerics who will stand, despite these recommendations, and will take office in state government or parliamentary seats will be suspended from parish ministry during the term[91].

Then, on March 6th, 2008, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church revised the decision from 12th to 13th February 2004, regarding the issue of the involvement of the priests in politics, urging the leaders of political parties in Romania to prevent the recruitment

[90] Preda R. (2002), 'Biserica în stat. Şansele şi limitele unei dezbateri', în *Gândirea socială a Bisericii,* auth. Ica I Jr., Marani G Deisis, Sibiu, p. 358-383.

of members of the clergy, nor use persons for political purposes, space, jobs and church signs. Holy Synod assured that the Church - keeping the fairness to parties - will continue to be involved in the general policy of the country, contributing "to the defense of democracy, freedom, faith in God, independence and integrity of the motherland, rejecting any form of atheist communist totalitarianism and all forms of extremism"[92].

4. State-Church Partnerships in Cluj-Napoca

After the clergy participation in political life has been clarified by the decision of the Synod in 2008, prohibiting such active involvement in politics, followed collaborative partnerships between national and local public administration and Orthodox Church institutions, especially in areas where the assistance of the State is poor: educational, social and medico-social. In the following lines I will illustrate this collaboration through health and social projects implemented in the county of Cluj.

4.1. Social Projects

Out of the many social projects for children and youngsters, an important project implemented by the Council of Cluj County together with the Orthodox Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac and Cluj is the Psycho-neuro-motor Rehabilitation Centre for disabled children "Saint Irene". The center was opened in 2009, with the object of carrying out recovery and rehabilitation treatments for children with disabilities from Cluj County. The center was established by Resolution of the Cluj County Council and under the direct coordination of General Directorate of Social Assistance and Child Protection. Since opening, the Center received rehabilitation treatment a constant number of children with disabilities.

In Cluj-Napoca, it carries out a Social and Missionary Center "Saint Basil", which has two components: preventing school dropout, respectively, recovery of children out of school. Another partnership is a social kindergarten named "Protection of the Mother of God" in Turda, where children benefit from kindergarten social services and they are enrolled in a program of prevention of child abandonment, keeping so, the children in their natural families.

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[91] Sfântul Sinod al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române (2000), 'Comunicatul Sfântului Sinod al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române', în *Revista Renaşterea*, nr. 3, p.2.
[92] Sfântul Sinod al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române (2008), *Hotărârea nr. 410, privind problema implicării preoţilor în politică* Available from: < www.basilica.ro>, Last accessed 16.02.2013.

The Center for Social Services for Children "Protection of the Mother of God" in Cluj-Napoca had in 2010 a total of 40 beneficiaries. Activities of the program aimed at reducing the rate of child abandonment by their parents and at lowering the number of institutionalized children. Social Services Centre is a form of support for single parent families in difficulty, more complex than the one given in the nurseries.

"Saint Nicholas" Christian Charity Foundation from Gherla unfolds cultural and charitable activities for children in orphanages in Gherla, Cluj by the Community Action Programme. The direct beneficiaries are a total of 300 children. Social activities, spiritual counseling and material support are also offered for elder people, the direct beneficiaries covering a total of 120 rural elders. Besides these social projects for the elderly, there are such permanent institutions in Turda: a center that has provided care and support since 2010 of 53 elderly persons in situation of dependency (among which, 24 elderly persons from the jurisdiction of the City of Turda, 11 elderly persons from the jurisdiction of Campia Turzii, 17 elderly persons from the jurisdiction of Cluj county).

Financial support for these projects comes from local councils in Turda, Câmpia Tuzii and Cluj County. Another center that worth mentioned due to its successful activities is the Care and Support Center in Mociu, Cluj, designed for the elderly and dependency in socio-medical situation. The Centre operates within the Directorate General of Social Assistance and Child Protection and it is further supported by AFMC Christiana - Cluj and Romanian Orthodox Parish of Cluj Romanian Orthodox Deanery Mociu.

4.2. Medical and Social Partnerships

Orthodox Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac and Cluj started in autumn 2009 a unique medical-social project in Transylvania, by whose realization ontological patients will find the space and environment necessary to alleviate the suffering: Palliative Care Center "Saint Nektarios". Free services will be provided by an interdisciplinary team consisting of physicians, clergy, pharmacists, nurses, social workers, and volunteers all contributing, through medical and spiritual support in maintaining the quality and dignity of life of the sufferers and their families.

The Service Center for Ambulatory Neurological Recovery in Turda is the only institution in the outpatient system of its kind in Cluj County which has as objective the recovery and the rehabilitation treatment for all adults with disabilities from Cluj County regardless of ethnicity, religion, educational level and financial situation. The Center has a

team of multidisciplinary specialist consisting of: physical therapists, nurse physiotherapists, social workers and a coordinator.

Other partnerships are known: Free Clinic "Saint Pantelimon" in Cluj-Napoca, the "Saint Dimitrie" Center for information and advice on addiction and the project "Pro Life" to combat the high number of abortions.[93].

4.3. Church Educational projects regarding the European Integration

A Europe which claims to appreciate the values that can bring together all the states and nations, not only has the duty, but is obliged to respect and protect the position that religious institutions occupy in those countries. Churches are in contact with the European Union in so many different areas and so Europe is obliged to take into account Churches and Churches cannot ignore, in turn, socio-political orientation that is built in this period.

Romanian Orthodox Church, unlike the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant churches had no social doctrine, being involved in social projects in partnership with the State, being made after the fall of communism in the face of reality that had to respond. What they did in concrete? Orthodox Theology Faculties created Social and Didactic Theology specializations, where they trained social workers and religion teachers for the state institutions, and in Cluj-Napoca, the Archdiocese has created a social sector missionary, led by a bishop, Vasile Somesanul in person, responsible for all social projects in which the Church was involved in the last 20 years, absolutely new in the context of the Orthodox Church in Romania.

In Cluj also, Babeş-Bolyai University is the unique case in Europe because it has four distinct faculties of theology: Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic and Reformed[94]. The collaboration between these departments has resulted in joint research projects within the university centers: Center for Biblical Studies[95], Centre for Ecumenical Studies and Center for Bioethics[96]. Thus, one can observe a real interest in developing State-Church relationship, supported by both national actors.

[93] Mitropolia Clujului, Albei, Crisanei si Maramuresului, *Misiune sociala*, Available from: <http://www.mitropolia-clujului.ro/Activitatea-misionar-sociala/Policlinica-fara-Plata-Sf-Pantelimon-Cluj-Napoca--eID90.html>, Last accessed: 14.03.2013.
[94] Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, Available from: <www.ubbcluj.ro>, Last accessed: 14.03.2013
[95] Centru de Studii Biblice, Available from <http://cbs.ot.ubbcluj.ro>, Last accessed: 15.03.2013
[96] Revista Română de Bioetică, Available from : <www.bioetica.ro>, Last accessed: 15.03.2013

4.4. Orthodox and Lutheran Projects in Transylvania

The Archdiocese of Cluj has worked since 1995 with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Württemberg, Germany, which, according to the representatives of the Orthodox Church helped the mission rediscovered welfare of the Church and also contributed with logistical and financial support in the establishment of social centers in the Archdiocese of Cluj. In the joint statement of the Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac and Cluj and the Evangelical Church in Württemberg Land is presented first joint opinion obtained between these two churches through mutual visits, correspondence, jobs and theological discussion and then stated how future cooperation between the two churches: "Both parts seek in their abilities to support the life of the other churches. To this purpose they add also, sending and accompanying scholarship, peer counseling and support questions and charitable and social activities; also dedication and participation in spiritual life and worship of other churches[97].

On the 25 of April 1995, they signed a Joint Declaration, where established relations between the two churches and at the feast of the Resurrection in 1996, it was released the communique Steps of Hope, which shows that: "Evangelical Lutheran Church from Württemberg compartment wish to promote the organization and wants to expand philanthropic activity in the Christian Orthodox Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac and Cluj. In turn, the Archdiocese of Cluj brings its own contribution by rich Christian spirituality of the liturgical and monastic life and by the spiritual and philanthropic commitment to build together their lives through inner strength of faith"[98].

4.5. Healing of Memories Project

Another aspect of church involvement in the integration process is the project *Healing of Memories in Europe*. This process was started in many places in Romania, but it has a European dimension, because our continent's history is marked by conflicts and wars between different nations whose repercussions remain until today valid.

A major recommendation of the Second European Ecumenical Assembly in Graz, in 1997, concerned the need to involve churches in these tense situations to overcome their spirit of Christian love. In Northern Ireland, Croatia, Serbia, Cyprus, France, Romania and Hungary is still needed more reconciliation between ethnic groups inhabiting. In Romania it

[97] Arhiepiscopia Ortodoxă Română a Vadului, Feleacului şi Clujului şi a Bisericii Evanghelice Lutherane din Württemberg (2000), *Declaraţia Comună*, Cluj-Napoca, p. 6.

was started that process by Pro Oriente Foundation from Vienna, in collaboration with the Faculty of Orthodox Theology in Alba Iulia, where research aims are the foundation of the Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania.

4.6. Other Events

Another project entitled "Healing the wounds of the past", started in Transylvania as an interdisciplinary and inter-confessional process with the participation of eight Faculties of Theology, two Faculties of History, two Faculties of Psychology and Sociology, all from the universities of Cluj-Napoca and Sibiu. In this project participated indirectly even the Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Cluj, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Alba Iulia, Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Sibiu, Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Cluj-Napoca, Reformed Episcopal Church of Cluj-Napoca, Greek Catholic and Unitarian Church.[99]

In addition to these above mentioned projects, Romanian Orthodox Church with other churches hosted in Transylvania the third *European Ecumenical Assembly*, organized by the Conference of European Churches and the Council of European Episcopal Conferences, in Sibiu, from 4th to 9th of September 2007. This was the most important ecumenical event of the year 2007. The topic debated in Sibiu was "The Light of Christ shines upon all. Hope for renewal and unity in Europe", and it had a particular relevance for the life of the churches and for the Christians living in Europe[100].

5. Conclusions

This study is limited to the identification and the presentation of the elements which constitute the complex report between the State and the Church in the post-communist era. Romania's accession to European structures has brought state and religions in the situation of facing different problems concerning many unknowns, compared to those in the last half century. The State had to meet several requirements from citizens, to rebuild normal relations, domestic and abolished under communism. The cults, on the other hand, were in a position where they had to preserve their traditions and, at the same time, had to answer to

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[98] Mitropolia Clujului, Albei, Crisanei si Maramuresului, *Relatii ecumenice*, Available from: <http://www.mitropolia-clujului.ro/Relatii-ecumenice.html>, Last accessed: 14.03.2013.

[99] Centrul de Cercetare Ecumenica, *Situatia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române si legăturile ei ecumenice în contextul noii Europe (1989-2009), Available from :* <http://www.ecum.ro/infoecum/files/prelegere_rom.pdf >, Last accessed: 15.02.2013.

[100] Mihai Săsăujan,M. (2007), 'A III-a Adunare Ecumenică Europeană de la Sibiu (4-9 septembrie 2007)', în: *Studii Teologice*, Seria a III-a, nr. 3, pp. 181-182.

the questions and the demands of their believers and to the challenges of the time. The concept of European integration is not easily to define, we don't know all its components, so it is a complex concept, still evolving, difficult to understand, to assimilate and to implement, especially in a legal, political, social and undergoing economic construction.

Both the State and the cults were somehow forced to define, first of all, the coordinates and limits of their relationship, fact achieved through the adoption of cult's law in late 2006 and then to try to cooperate in implementing and strengthening European integration projects.

It was necessary to define their position regarding the new situation - the integration of Romania into the European Union. They were trying, at a national level, to create a legislative framework to define this relationship and at a local level, to implement commitments and to answer to the needs of citizens to build a new identity, the European one. The primary role of the cults in these times of change is to be close to their faithful needs, to help them to understand and to assume these changes. Also it is needed to fill gaps and cover the State's deficiency, especially in areas where it is scarce, such as social work and educational area. In addition, they could provide the coordinates for the construction of a new way of life (ethos), a new priority in the promotion and protection of the values and a new vision of the world and person. With a perspective on the future and a serious assumed analysis of the past, the efforts of the state and of the religions could provide solutions and create reference points for the construction of shared values, a common future, and a common consciousness.

I conclude with the words of Alexander Duţu, stating that "Europe cannot be built as a set of free societies, only after overcoming the artificial divisions and deeply rooted in the consciousness. Europe can be built only on a European consciousness. And this consciousness must provide new foundations of the world in which we find ourselves, where we meet the others, heirs of Rome, of Athens, of Jerusalem"[101].

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LA TRANSYLVANIE DANS LES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS PENDANT LA DEUXIEME GUERRE MONDIALE (30 AOÛT 1940 – 9 MARS 1945)*

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Abstract*: This study aims to analyze the problem of Northern Transylvania in the French diplomatic documents from the Vienna Award of August 1940, when this territory was assigned to Hungary, until March 1945, when it was re-assigned to Romania. We propose an analysis of the attitude that French diplomats in position from this region have had towards this problem, to see to what extent the defeat of France from June 1940 has had consequences on the Romanian foreign policy, what was the French interpretation of the Vienna Award, if there were any reactions, what was the French attitude towards the problem of Northern Transylvania during the evolution of the Second World War, to determine if making an analysis of the diplomatic correspondence on this subject can identify the attitude of the Romanian authorities towards this problem, what were the initiatives, the interest and the effort made to re-assign this territory.*

We subsume this issue to the analysis of the Romanian-French diplomatic relations during the Second World War, having the desire to elucidate as many aspects as possible concerning this subject.

Keywords: Transylvania, France, diplomacy, Second Word War, ambassador

« Le désir de reprendre la Transylvanie. La Roumanie abandonnerait volontiers la Bessarabie, mais l'idée d'une reconquête de la Transylvanie est populaire. La Roumanie veut conserver son armée dans ce but[102] ».

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[102]Renseignements fournis par M. Truelle, Ministre de France à Bucarest à la Délégation de la France Combattante en Turquie, 1er juillet 1943, Istanbul, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français (ci-après AMEF), Fonds Guerre 1939-1945, série Londres (Conseil National Français juin 1940-juillet 1943), dossier n° 274, f. 194.

L'extrait ci–dessus d'un rapport rédigé par Jacques Truelle[103], le ministre du Vichy à Bucarest de mars 1941 jusqu'au 19 juin 1943, adressé à la Délégation de la France Combattante en Turquie, le 1er juillet 1943, nous permet de voir le rôle essentiel que la Roumanie accordait à la Transylvanie pendant cette période difficile de son historie.

On se propose à partir des documents fournis par les Archives diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de La Courneuve, Paris, d'analyser et de surprendre l'attitude des autorités roumaines, mais aussi des diplomates français en poste en Roumanie et en Hongrie, sur le problème de la Transylvanie pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

Le sujet concernant ce territoire que la Roumanie a dû laisser à la Hongrie par la sentence arbitrale de Vienne du 30 août 1940, suscite encore des débats et des controverses parmi les historiens et les hommes politiques. Notre but n'est pas de donner une réponse sur cette décision politique, de voir dans quelle mesure les dirigeantes roumains ont bien agit ou non, mais d'analyser comment a pesé la défaite de la France du juin 1940 sur la politique étrangère roumaine.

Est-ce que la défaite a eu ou non un rôle dans les décisions prises par les hommes politiques roumains? Comment a été perçu l'abandon de la Transylvanie aux autorités hongroises d'août 1940, par les diplomates français en poste dans cette région? Quels sujets concernant la Transylvanie dominent la correspondance diplomatique française de cette période? Peut-on à travers les documents envoyés par les diplomates français dresser un bilan sur l'attitude des autorités roumains à propos du problème de la Transylvanie? Comment voulaient-ils agir pour résoudre le problème?

Telles sont les questions auxquelles cette étude essaie de donner une réponse.

L'arbitrage de Vienne du 30 août 1940 dans les documents diplomatiques français

Dans le télégramme du 18 juin 1940, Adrien Thierry[104], l'ambassadeur français à Bucarest, décrit l'entrevue qu'il a eue avec M. Tătărăscu et dans laquelle le premier ministre

[103] **Truelle (Jacques-Marie)** né le 20 septembre 1881 à Paris. Il fait des études de droit et il est diplômé de l'École des Sciences politiques. Le 22 septembre 1940, il est nommé par Vichy «*envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest* » où il reste jusqu'au 19 juin 1943 quand il quitte son poste pour rallier la France Libre. Pour la carrière diplomatique de Jacques-Marie Truelle voir *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République française pour 1947*. Nouvelle série, tome LI, Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1947, p. 359; AMEF, Fonds Personnel, série 3 nominative, dossier personnel Jacques Truelle, dossier n° 277.

[104] **Thierry (Adrien, Joseph, Marie)** né le 4 janvier 1885, licencié en droit, diplômé de l'École des Sciences Politiques; envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest le 30 mai 1936, ambassadeur le 14 avril 1939 : « J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que par décret du 14 avril 1939, vous avez été nommé Ambassadeur et envoyé extraordinaire de la République à Bucarest »; en disponibilité le 22 juillet 1940; Source

roumain, après avoir manifesté « ses douloureuses sympathie pour la situation de la France, a affirmé que le roi […] ne dissimule pas que la défaite de la France serait dans une proportion encore plus grande celle de la Roumanie. Les Russes et les Hongrois qui se sont fait dans cette partie de l'Europe les gendarmes du Reich, ne tarderaient pas à demander leur salaire aux dépenses du Royaume danubien[105] ». Malheureusement, les paroles du premier ministre roumain ont été vraies car une des premières conséquences de la défaite de la France a été le démembrement territorial de la Roumanie.

Dès le 26 juin 1940, un ultimatum de l'U.R.S.S lui réclamait la Bessarabie et la Bucovine du Nord, qu'elle dut céder deux jours après. Le 30 août, par la sentence arbitrale de Vienne, elle restituait à la Hongrie toute la Transylvanie du Nord et le 7 septembre, l'accord de Craiova consacrait l'abandon à la Bulgarie de la Dobroudja méridionale.

Mais en ce qui concerne notre sujet, on analysera les conséquences que la sentence de Vienne a eu sur les rapports franco-roumains. *Comment a-t- elle été interprétée par la partie française? Est-ce que des réactions de part de la France ont existé? Et si oui quelles ont été ces réactions ?*

Donc, notre but n'est pas d'insister sur les détails de cette sentence de Vienne qui sont si bien connus et traités dans l'historiographie roumaine[106], mais d'analyser comment a-t-elle été interprétée par les représentants français à Bucarest et par leurs supérieurs de Vichy. Reste à voir donc, *quelles ont été les réactions ?*

*Dans ses télégrammes n°*1562 jusqu'à 1567 de Bucarest, en date du 30 août 1940, Henry Spitzmuller[107], le chargé d'affaires français à Bucarest qui était à la tête de l'Ambassade après le départ de l'ambassadeur Adrien Thierry, a annoncé Vichy que le Gouvernement roumain s'était résolu à annoncer «qu'il a dû céder à un ultimatum de l'Axe

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Annuaire diplomatique ... p. 574 ; AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, série *cit.*, dossier personnel d'Adrien Thierry, dossier n° 271.

[105] Télégramme d'Adrien Thierry, le 18 juin 1940, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 686, f. 24.

[106] Pour ce sujet voir Tom Gallagher, *Democrație și naționalism în România, 1989-1998,* Bucureşti : Edition All Educațional, 1999, pp. 191-197 ; Cornel Grad, *Al doilea arbitraj de la Viena,* Iași : Institutul European, 1998 ; Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena,* 2ème édition, Bucureşti: Albatros, 1996.

[107] **Spitzmuller (Raymond, Armand, Édouard, Henry)**, né le 17 mars 1900, licencié en lettres et en droit, diplômé de l'École des Sciences Politiques; cité à l'ordre du 23e régiment de dragons, 16 juillet 1918; attaché d'ambassade, 20 novembre 1925; à Bruxelles, 31 décembre 1925; chargé des fonctions de troisième secrétaire, 13 décembre 1926; secrétaire d'ambassade de 3e classe, 14 avril 1928; chargé de fonctions de 2e secrétaire à la Haye, 1er juillet 1930; rédacteur au service français de la Société des Nations, 20 février 1933; membre de la délégation française à la Conférence du désarmement, 3 juillet 1933; chargé de fonctions de 2e secrétaire à Varsovie (non installé) 19 octobre 1935; secrétaire de 2e classe, 16 novembre 1935, chargé de fonctions de consul-adjoint à Genève, 22 janvier 1936; chargé de l'intérim de fonctions de 1er secrétaire à Bucarest, 29 janvier-1er mai 1936; chargé de fonctions de 1er secrétaire à Bucarest; 1er avril 1938, secrétaire d'ambassade de 1e classe, 10 août 1939; conseiller d'ambassade de 2e classe, 26 août 1940; conseiller d'ambassade de 1e classe, 1er avril 1945; ministre plénipotentiaire de 2e classe, 4 mars 1946; officier de la Légion d'honneur 12 avril 1947. Source *Annuaire diplomatique* ..., pp. 569-570.

cherchant par «cette formule à rejeter sur ce dernier l'entière responsabilité du règlement imposé à la Roumanie [108]».

En ce qui concerne les réactions venues de Vichy, étant donné la situation de la France, elles ne pouvaient pas être très encourageantes pour la partie roumaine. Une première réaction de Paul Baudouin[109], le ministre des Affaires étrangères français, a eu lieu le 30 août, quand dans son télégramme envoyé à Henry Spitzmuller il affirmait que : «L'intégrité territoriale de la Roumanie n'ayant pas survécu deux mois à la défaite de la France, l'événement aurait dû faire sentir au Gouvernement roumain ce qu'il y avait d'inconvenant de sa part à prendre envers nous l'attitude d'arrogance et d'animosité qui se traduit par sa presse et par ses actes[110] ». Mais cette réponse doit être placée dans le contexte de l'expulsion des ingénieurs français de Roumanie pendant l'été de 1940[111], incident qui a été déclenché par la partie roumaine, thèse soutenue aussi par l'historien Ana-Maria Stan[112] et qui a créé beaucoup de tensions dans les relations franco-roumaines.

Un jour après, on peut voir, un changement dans le ton du ministre des Affaires étrangères français sur la situation de la Roumanie : «*Notre situation actuelle ne nous permet bien entendu d'autre attitude que celle de spectateurs du démembrement de la Roumanie*[113] *». Sans doute la longue relation d'amitié qui existait entre les deux pays avait laissée des traces malgré la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et la difficile situation dans laquelle les deux pays se trouvaient.*

En ce qui concerne la Roumanie, les Archives françaises ont très bien saisi l'état d'esprit des ces jours-là, car une note affirmait que : « Tous les milieux sont également désemparés […] et l'on voit jusque chez les Gardistes se développer rapidement un courent de rage impuissant et de fureur haineuse contre les puissances de l'Axe ».

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[108] Télégramme d'Henry Spitzmuller, le 30 août 1940, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.*, sous-série *cit.,* dossier n° 686, f. 61.

[109] Paul Baudouin est nommé par Paul Reynaud sous-secrétaire d'État à la présidence du Conseil le 21 mars 1940, puis aux Affaires étrangères le 5 juin 1940. Partisan de l'armistice, il est nommé le 16 juin ministre des Affaires étrangères dans le cabinet Pétain pour en exclure Pierre Laval. Le 28 octobre il est nommé ministre secrétaire à la présidence du Conseil et doit laisser les Affaires étrangères à Pierre Laval. Devenu collaborateur direct de Pierre-Étienne Flandin, il quitte la vie politique française en même temps que Flandin, au début de l'année 1941. Il devient directeur général de la Banque d'Indochine. Arrêté en septembre 1944, il est condamné en mars à cinq ans de travaux forcés par la Haute Cour de justice. Libéré sous conditions en janvier 1948, il reprend le cycle de ses activités financières, voir *Dictionnaire historique de la France sous l'Occupation,* sous la direction de Michèle et Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris : Édition Tallandier, 2000, p. 64 ; Paul Baudouin, *Neuf mois au gouvernement,* Paris : La Table Ronde, 1948.

[110] Télégramme de Paul Baudouin, le 30 août 1940, Vichy, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.*, sous-série *cit.,* dossier n° 686, f. 13.

[111] Pour ce sujet voir AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, séries Commerciales, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 345 et n° 346; AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, série Z- Europe, sous-série Allemagne, dossier n°102.

[112] Ana-Maria Stan, « L'évolution des rapports diplomatiques franco-roumains de juin au septembre 1940 », in *Guerre et société en Europe,* București : Éditions Europa Nova, 2004, p. 196.

Quant à la France, le 31 août 1940, le sujet principal des conversations dans les milieux diplomatiques de Vichy a été la sentence arbitrale de Vienne. On apprend que : « L'avis unanime des diplomates est que cette sentence est très favorable à la Hongrie […]. L'ambassadeur roumain, M. Franassovici, lui-même a reconnu que la sentence de Vienne provoquerait en Roumanie la déception profonde et la consternation, et que la garantie Italo-allemande, qui dans les conditions actuelles a une importance indéniable, ne compose pas tout de même la perte des territoires peuplés par des Roumains. M. Franassovici croit d'ailleurs que le Gouvernement roumain n'avait pas de choix et qu'il voulait mieux de régler les différends territoriaux par voie pacifique que de risquer d'être entraîné dans une guerre[114] *».*

Quelles ont été les conséquences ?

La France, malgré la cession de la Transylvanie à la Hongrie a décidé de maintenir un consul français à Cluj. Le 1er septembre, Henry Spitzmuller écrivait à Vichy sur ce sujet : « Bien que la ville de Cluj soit comprise dans cette région cédée à la Hongrie, j'ai prescrit à M. Puech de demeurer à son poste. Si le Département entend supprimer ce consulat, j'aurais intérêt à le savoir aussitôt que possible car l'évacuation de Cluj devra sans doute être effectuée avant le 7 septembre[115] », et la réponse lui a été affirmative *:* « Il y a intérêt à maintenir notre Consulat à Cluj ». Donc, Vichy a décidé que M. Puech, qui avait été admis à faire valoir ses droits à la retraite, devait continuer d'assurer la direction de Consulat jusqu'à l'arrivé de son successeur. *On sait que le chargé d'affaires français a proposé au Département des Affaires étrangères de nommer comme consul à Cluj soit M. Sartini, vice-consul à Galatz, soit M. Seguivand, ancien consul en Bessarabie qui depuis juin 1940 était en disponibilité. Mais Vichy a décidé de nommé M. Charles Claudon*[116] *comme consul à Cluj, le 10 septembre 1940.*

Du point de vue de l'évolution de la politique intérieure, ces pertes territoriales ont eu comme conséquence le changement du régime politique en Roumanie au mois de septembre quand le général Antonescu devient le «Chef de l'État roumain». À partir de ce moment, l'orientation pro-allemande de la Roumanie devient une certitude. L'orientation du régime

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[113] Télégramme de Paul Baudouin, 31 août 1940, Vichy, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.*, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 686, f. 66.
[114] *Note de Vichy, le 1er septembre 1940, Ibidem*, f. 70.
[115] Télégramme d'Henry Spitzmuller envoyé à Vichy, le 1er septembre 1940, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.,* sous-série *cit.*, dossier n°675, f.33.
[116] *Claudon (Charles, Marie) – est né le 31 juillet 1900 ; bachelier de l'enseignement secondaire ; rédacteur-stagiaire au service de la comptabilité, le 10 octobre 1922 ; rédacteur le 16 octobre 1923 ; le 10 août il est promu consul de 2e classe ; le 10 septembre 1940 il est nommé consul à Cluj où il reste jusque au mois du juin 1945 quand il est nommé consul à Vancouver ; le 1er mai 1943 il est promu consul de 1er classe. Source Annuaire diplomatique …*, p. 406.

d'Antonescu vers l'Allemagne, a été très bien saisie par le diplomate français Spitzmuller qui affirmait que : «Sa francophilie (du général Antonescu) paraît malheureusement ébranlée par notre défaite et il est trop conscient des impératifs de l'heure pour essayer de tenir tête à l'Allemagne. Aussi bien, son premier geste a-t-il été de rendre visite à M. Fabricius»[117].

L'évolution de la question de la Transylvanie depuis l'arbitrage de Vienne jusqu'à la fin de 1943

Pendant l'automne de 1940, l'une des plus graves difficultés devant lesquelles se trouvait le régime d'Antonescu était évidemment le problème des relations avec la Hongrie. Nous avons déjà indiqué plus haut que l'arbitrage de Vienne avait été un règlement imposé par l'Allemagne et par l'Italie. Comme toute solution de ce genre, il laissait les deux parties insatisfaites. Les Gouvernements de Bucarest et de Budapest refusent d'accepter la sentence de Vienne comme définitive, ils sont d'accord sur un seul point, c'est-à-dire qu'elle devra être révisée. En Roumanie, la décision de Vienne soulève une grande émotion populaire ; la nation est en deuil et manifeste son mécontentement. Les partis d'opposition ont imputé au Gouvernement de ne pas avoir protesté, ni même indiqué qu'il ne cédait qu'à la force et ils lui reprochent d'avoir compromis l'honneur national.

L'émotion causée par la perte de la Transylvanie a été renforcée par des récits amplifiés, par les cruautés commis par les Magyars à l'égard des intellectuels et les paysans roumains qui ont passé sous leur domination. Henry Spitzmuller parlait dans un télégramme envoyé, le 10 octobre 1940, à Vichy sur les manifestes répandus en Transylvanie pour attirer l'attention aux représentants de Bucarest de ne pas les oublier[118]. Il cite un manifeste qui s'adressait aux Légionnaires, déclarant que pour la Roumanie, un seul problème se pose, celui du recouvrement des territoires perdus. Un autre pamphlet faisait « le procès de l'attitude officielle dans les premiers jours de septembre » d'une manière très violente. Cette réaction nationale n'a pas été sans préoccuper le mouvement légionnaire, et une première satisfaction a été donnée à l'opinion publique par l'autorisation accordée aux journaux de reproduire d'amples comptes rendus des atrocités magyares et de faire paraître des articles violemment hostiles aux Hongrois. Le chargé d'affaires roumain donne même un passage d'un discours prononcé par le Vice-président du Conseil roumain, Horia Sima, dans lequel il cherchait à dissimuler les responsabilités allemandes, en ce qui concerne la cession de la Transylvanie, en chargeant les Anglais. Pour conclure, Henry Spitzmuller affirmait que la

[117] Télégramme d'Henry Spitzmuller, le 31 août 1940, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.,* sous-série *cit.*, dossier n° 686, f. 30.

rhétorique de Horia Sima n'arriverait pas à convaincre « les masses sur la responsabilité de l'Angleterre dans le démembrement du pays comme dans les excès commis par les Hongrois, ni que l'escamotage des véritables motifs de la politique docile et craintive du Gouvernement roumain puisse tromper personne[119] ». Donc, étant donné la situation, pendant le mois d'octobre la Roumanie s'est adressée «à l'Allemagne et à l'Italie pour leur demander de contraindre Budapest d'exécuter avec correction l'arbitrage de Vienne[120] ».

Entre le 21 et le 24 novembre 1940 a lieu la rencontre entre Ion Antonescu et Adolf Hitler dont le but était l'adhésion de la Roumanie au Pacte Tripartite, auquel la Hongrie avait adhérée le 20 novembre. Les sources des Archives et les études historiographiques nous laissent supposer que pendant la rencontre du 22 novembre, le maréchal Antonescu a abordé la question de la Transylvanie. Le communiqué fait par le ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand à M. Fabricius, le ministre du Troisième Reich à Bucarest sur cette entrevue, affirme que Ion Antonescu a essayé à plusieurs reprises d'obtenir de la parte de Hitler la promesse qu'il changera l'arbitrage de Vienne[121]. La réponse est difficile à savoir, mais on sait que pendant toute la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, l'Allemagne a utilisé l'arbitrage de Vienne pour obtenir des ressources militaires et économiques de la parte de la Roumanie et de la Hongrie, en les promettant que le problème serait résolu en leur faveur. *Sur cette visite du général Antonescu en Allemagne au mois de novembre 1940, Henry Spitzmuller affirmait dans un télégramme* adressé à Vichy que *: «la principale question dont le général Antonescu se propose de s'entretenir avec le Führer, comme il l'a fait avec le Duc, est le traitement de la minorité roumaine de la Transylvanie annexée par les Hongrois*[122] *».*

Au mois du juin 1941, l'entrée de la Roumanie dans le conflit apporte un élément nouveau à la question de la Transylvanie. La Roumanie et la Hongrie se trouvent, en fait, sous la direction de l'Allemagne, alliées contre l'U.R.S.S. À première vue, cette situation nouvelle aurait dû entraîner une détente entre les deux pays. Mais les alliés demeurent ennemis. L'évolution des opérations militaires pendant l'été de 1941 a abouti à la libération de la Bessarabie et de la Bucovine du Nord, en août a lieu l'installation de l'administration roumaine en Transnistrie, mais le problème de la Transylvanie n'obtienne aucune résolution. Devant cette situation, le Gouvernement a connu des réactions du part de l'opinion publique

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[118] Télégramme d'Henry Spitzmuller, le 10 octobre 1940, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.,* sous-série *cit.*, sous-série Hongrie, dossier n° 416.
[119] *Ibidem.*
[120] *Télégramme de Spitzmuller, le 12 octobre 1940, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Papiers 1940, série Baudouin, dossier n° 7, f. 330.
[121] Andreas Hillegruber, *op. cit.,* p. 233.
[122] *Télégramme de Spitzmuller, le 21 novembre 1940, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 686, f.140.

qui soutenaient que le but de la Roumanie était la reconquête de la Transylvanie du Nord, mais aussi du part de l'opposition politique qui par la voie de Iuliu Maniu, le chef du parti national-paysan a commenté la guerre que la Roumanie faisait à l'Est, et le fait qu'elle oublie le problème de la Transylvanie.

Devant cette situation, la Roumanie a senti l'obligation de faire connue sa position officielle à Vichy, concernant la guerre qu'elle faisait à l'Est. Donc, au mois de septembre 1941, sur les instructions du Gouvernement roumain, le ministre Dinu Hiott a fait à la Direction Politique une déclaration concernant les buts de guerre de la Roumanie : « Il ne faut pas oublier que du point de vue territorial la question la plus importante pour la Roumanie est celle de la Transylvanie. C'est vers la Transylvanie que restent tournés les regards de tous les Roumains[123] ».

L'intérêt du Gouvernement roumain pour la Transylvanie du Nord est présent pendant toute la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et témoigne aussi par les Archives françaises. Des initiatives roumaines ont eu lieu aussi au mois de septembre 1941. Jean Chauvel[124] affirme dans une note sur la situation de la Transylvanie après l'arbitrage de Vienne, que le 15 septembre 1941, les autorités roumaines ont envoyé à Berlin sous la forme d'une note diplomatique leur mécontentement sur les cases de non-application de l'arbitrage de Vienne, les abus hongrois au détriment des minorités roumaines et leur position sur la nécessité d'une révision de la sentence du 30 août 1940[125]. Mais la réponse de Berlin vis-à-vis de ce mémorandum a été que l'arbitrage de Vienne est définitif.

En 1941, en plein guerre contre la Russie, la paix en Europe Centrale était plus nécessaire que jamais. L'Allemagne était donc hostile à toute idée de révision, tout au moins jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Mais elle laissait parfois entendre que la guerre finie, il pourrait en être autrement. L'arbitrage de Vienne a représenté pour le Gouvernement allemand « un précieux instrument de pression sur Budapest et Bucarest[126] ». À cause de l'attitude que les Allemands ont eu vis-à-vis de ce mémorandum roumain, Mihai Antonescu a renoncé de se rendre à Vienne et à Berlin au mois de novembre 1941, car selon le télégramme envoyé par Truelle à Vichy, le Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres lui avait témoigné que : « La

[123] Note de la Direction Politique, le 8 septembre 1941 Vichy, AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, série *cit.*, sous-série *cit.*, dossier n° 689, f. 85-86.
[124] Jean Chauvel a été diplomate français, fondateur du Bureau d'études clandestin des Affaires étrangères, entre décembre 1942 et mars 1944 ; délégué du Commissaire aux Affaires étrangères du Comité français de la Libération nationale pour toutes questions concernant les affaires étrangères en France, novembre 1943 ; secrétaire général du Commissariat aux Affaires étrangères à Alger, 20 mai 1944. Source *Annuaire diplomatique*...p. 401.
[125] Jean Chauvel, Note sur la situation de la Transylvanie après l'arbitrage de Vienne, AMEF, Fonds Papiers 1940, série Bureau d'Étude Chauvel, dossier n° 120, f. 47.
[126] *Ibidem,* f.47.

Roumanie traversait un moment aigu en politique ; il préférait ne pas partir, s'il n'avait pas obtenu au préalable certaines assurances ; […] il a signalé la note qu'il avait envoyée au Gouvernement de Reich le 15 septembre pour notifier qu'aux yeux du Gouvernement roumain l'arbitrage de Vienne était devenu caduc par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement hongrois, mais il n'a pas parlé sur la réponse de Berlin[127] ».

À la fin de l'année 1941 et au début de l'année 1942, le sujet qui domine la correspondance diplomatique française concernant l'attitude du Gouvernement roumain vis-à-vis de la question de la Transylvanie du Nord et la stratégie qu'il voulait suivre pour récupérer ce territoire est la participation hongroises à la guerre. Selon Ion Antonescu, le fait que la Roumanie et la Hongrie avaient une participation inégale à la guerre représentait un désavantage pour la Roumanie, dans la situation dans laquelle les deux pays à un moment donné devaient se battre pour la Transylvanie du Nord. Ces préoccupations roumaines sont dévoilées à Jacques Truelle, le 18 septembre 1941, pendant une entrevue qu'il a eue avec le Secrétaire général aux Affaires étrangères, Alexandru Cretzianu qui lui a parlé que: «D'après ses informations, le Gouvernement hongrois aurait opposé un refus aux demandes allemandes de fournir des effectifs plus nombreux[128] ».

Des tensions sur ce sujet ont eu lieu au début de l'année 1942, quand à l'occasion d'une visite de M. von Ribbentrop à Budapest, il aurait prononcé que la frontière entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie avait été résolue par l'arbitrage de Vienne. Le 27 janvier 1942, le ministre français déclarait sur le sujet de cette visite que: «D'après mes informations (le Ministre de Roumanie) […] le Gouvernement hongrois subordonnerait une participation beaucoup plus large à la guerre contre les Soviets à l'octroi des garanties pour l'annexion de territoires comprenant la Transylvanie encore roumaine et le Banat serbe[129] ».

Les soucis des autorités roumaines sur ce sujet ont été très bien saisis par Jacques Truelle car à la fin de janvier il envoie une longue note à Vichy pour présenter la situation : « M. Antonescu marque depuis quelques temps une vive résistance et qui l'amène à poser ses conditions à une participation renouvelée de l'armée roumaine à la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S, répondant en cela aux vœux de tous ses compatriotes. Il cherche non seulement à obtenir des garanties concernant le sort futur de la Transylvanie mais allant plus loin et ne voulant pas que les Hongrois continuent à tirer leur épingle du jeu et à garder leurs forces intactes pour l'heure des règlements de compte, il dénonce à l'Allemagne leur inactivité. C'est pourquoi on a suivi ici avec une profonde anxiété la visite de M. de Ribbentrop à Budapest et bien que

[127] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 14 novembre 1941, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 689, f. 130.
[128] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 18 septembre 1941, Bucarest, Ibidem*, f. 91.

visiblement on soit mal informé de son résultat, on a une impression assez pessimiste parce qu'on craint qu'une fois de plus M. de Bardassy ait réussi à céder le minimum. Or, le maréchal Antonescu demande, s'il accorde les 500.000 hommes qu'on lui réclame que les troupes hongroises participent aux opérations d'une manière identique, c'est-à-dire la majeure partie en première ligne et qu'elles ne se bornent pas à occuper des territoires conquis. Jusqu'à présent le Conducteur ne s'est pas départi de cette ligne de conduite. Il étonne certains de ses collaborateurs par cette fermeté […] Les Allemands ne le persuaderont-ils pas que le Gouvernement hongrois ne se dérobe plus, et fort de ces promesses, ne forcera-t-il pas le pays à poursuivre un combat au-dessus de ses forces? L'histoire de ces derniers mois inclinerait à la croire, d'autant plus que la présence d'instructeurs allemands dans les camps, les appels individuels, la conviction des classes 1942-1943 sont autant de mesures signes d'une préparation militaire[130] […] ».

Comme une conséquence directe de discours du Ministre des Affaires étrangères allemands prononcé le 8 janvier à Budapest et pour parler sur la participation de la Hongrie à la guerre, le maréchal Antonescu est allé voir Hitler, le 11 février 1942. Bien que tant Hitler que von Ribbentrop aient essayé de convaincre le Conducteur roumain que le discours de Budapest avait été « un pénible événement[131] », et que l'Allemagne attendait une attitude loyale du part de la Hongrie, Ion Antonescu n'a pas été satisfait par cette réponse et il a affirmé que la Roumanie ne renoncerait jamais à la Transylvanie du Nord, mais elle laisserait résoudre ce problème à la fin de la guerre[132]. On peut donc supposer que le maréchal Antonescu pensait qu'une fois la guerre à l'Est finie, il était décidé d'imposer le désir de la Roumanie de reprendre la Transylvanie du Nord même avec les armes si les négociations diplomatiques échouaient, et pour ça la Hongrie devait participer de même façon à la guerre à côté de l'Allemagne pour que les chances soient égales. Cette hypothèse est confirmée aussi par les Archives car on a une note diplomatique datée le même jour que le Conducteur Antonescu rendait visité à Hitler, dans son Quartier Général à Wolfsschanze, c'est-à-dire le 11 février 1942, qui affirmait qu': « On ne le dit pas hautement, mais on pense sérieusement que la guerre avec la Russie finie il y aura un compte à régler avec la Hongrie au sujet de la Transylvanie et qu'il faut se préparer à ce règlement. Or, si la Hongrie garde son armée intacte, elle a plus de chances de s'emparer du reste de la Transylvanie que la Roumanie[133] ».

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[129] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 27 janvier 1942, Bucarest, Ibidem*, f. 162.
[130] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle à Darlan, le 21 janvier 1942, Bucarest, Ibidem,* f. 164-167.
[131] Andreas Hillgruber, *op. cit.,* p. 296.
[132] *Ibidem.*
[133] Note sur la situation de la Roumanie, le 11 février 1942, AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, série *cit.*, sous-série *cit.*, dossier n° 689, f. 181-183.

Pendant l'année 1942, l'Allemagne a profité de l'aide militaire et économique de la Roumanie et de la Hongrie dont elle avait tant de besoin pour la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique sans donner une résolution au problème de la Transylvanie du Nord.

À l'automne de 1942, le problème de la Transylvanie du Nord avait été discuté dans une entrevue entre le ministre roumain à Vichy et le maréchal Pétain. Dinu Hiott dans son rapport envoyé à Bucarest sur ce sujet, affirmait que le chef de l'État français lui avait dit qu'en ce qui concerne la Transylvanie du Nord, il est disposé que dans le cas où «il aurait un mot à dire à la table verte, il soutiendra la rétrocession de ce territoire à la Roumanie[134] ». Bien que les affirmations du maréchal Pétain aient représenté l'expression d'une sympathie pour notre pays qui dans ces moments vivait une situation pareille à la France, l'accomplissement d'un tel engagement était évidemment problématique dans le contexte de l'évolution de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, comme l'affirme aussi Ana-Maria Stan[135].

La situation ne change pas à la fin de l'année 1942 car : « Le maréchal reconnait qu'il n'a pas obtenu du Gouvernement du Reich aucune promesse écrite concernant la restitution de la Transylvanie, mais il affirme néanmoins son espoir de reconquérir un jour cette province au besoin par les armes[136] ».

Au mois de janvier 1943 a eu lieu une autre entrevue entre le Chancelier Hitler et le maréchal Antonescu où le problème de la Transylvanie du Nord a été discuté de nouveau. On disait que: «Certains milieux toujours prêts à tirer des conclusions rapides prétendaient déjà que le maréchal aurait obtenu du Führer une promesse formelle en ce qui concerne la Transylvanie du Nord mais s'inquiétaient en même temps des concessions qui ont pu être consenties en contre-partie. Rien ne permet d'ailleurs jusqu'à présent de vérifier le fond de ces rumeurs[137] ». Sur cette visite faite en Allemagne, le Vice-président du Conseil des Ministres faisait le suivant témoignage: «En ce qui concerne les questions économiques et militaires il n'avait pas été mécontent de sa visite. Mais il ne m'a pas caché qu'il n'en était pas de même au point de vue politique, c'est-à-dire au sujet de la Transylvanie et des assurances que la Roumanie cherchait à obtenir. Il m'a dit être heurté des réponses complètement évasives[138] ».

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[134] Rapport envoyé par la Légation roumaine de Vichy à Bucarest, signé Dinu Hiott, le 29 octobre 1942, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères roumain (ci-après AMER), Fonds 71/1920-1940, série France relations avec la Roumanie, dossier n° 73, f. 421-422.
[135] Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.,* p. 143.
[136] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle à Pierre Laval, le 21 décembre 1942, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 689, f. 268-269.
[137] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 15 janvier 1943, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 690, f. 3.
[138] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 21 janvier 1943, Bucarest, Ibidem*, f. 7.

Dans le contexte des succès soviétiques et la destruction de l'armée roumaine, la question de Transylvanie et les relations avec la Hongrie qui depuis le dictat de Vienne ont hanté les esprits, sont passées pour le moment au second plan[139].

La question de la Transylvanie du Nord à la fin de la Guerre

Au début de janvier 1944, parlant de la Transylvanie, M. Mihai Antonescu avait dit au nouveau ministre français à Bucarest, Paul Morand: «Non seulement nous devons l'arbitrage de Vienne aux Allemands et aux Italiennes mais ils ont tenu à aggraver plus tard leurs gestes en venant nous dire que cette cession était considérée par eux comme définitive[140] *».*

Il est certain que les dirigeants allemands ont été inquiets par les répercussions que les événements de Finlande auraient pu avoir sur l'opinion roumaine et c'est pour tirer les choses au clair que le Chancelier Hitler a convoqué le 27 février le maréchal Antonescu à son Quartier Général. Le Conducteur qui s'attendait à entendre le Führer lui réclamer la participation massive de l'armée roumaine à la défense du front méridional de Russie, a été agréablement surpris de constater que le Chancelier Hitler n'exigeait de lui que des apaisements au sujet de la loyauté roumaine […] d'autre part, Hitler n'a pas caché au Conducteur les déconvenues qu'il éprouvait du côté de la Hongrie, sans aller toutefois jusqu'à se lancer dans ses promesses précises au sujet d'une abrogation éventuelle de l'arbitrage de Vienne. C'est ce qui explique qu'à son retour à Bucarest, Antonescu se soit empressé d'exploiter les récents incidents qui se sont déroulés à Cluj et au cours desquels quelques Roumains ont été molestés. Il a voulu, de la sorte, resserrer autour du Gouvernement une opinion qui s'enflamme facilement contre la Hongrie, mais qui est de plus en plus inquiète de la tournure prise par les opérations militaires sur le front de l'Est[141] ».

Le Gouvernement soviétique a proposé le 12 avril 1944 au Gouvernement Antonescu, les 6 conditions d'armistice. L'article 6 prévoyait: «L'annulation de l'acte de Vienne au sujet de la Transylvanie et la contribution de l'U.R.S.S pour rattacher ce territoire à la Roumanie[142] ».

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[139] *Télégramme de Jacques Truelle, le 9 mars 1943, Bucarest, Ibidem,* f. 20.
[140] *Télégramme de Paul Morand, le 17 janvier 1944,* AMEF, Fonds *cit.*, série *cit.,* sous-série *cit.*, dossier n° 686, f. 220.
[141] *Télégramme d'Henry Spitzmuller, le 13 mars 1944, Bucarest,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 690, f. 134.
[142] Note de la Légation de France à Bucarest sur la situation en Roumanie*, Ibidem,* f. 208.

Les événements qui ont eu lieu en Roumanie, le 23 août 1944, n'ont pas représenté seulement la fin du régime Antonescu mais aussi l'entrée de la Roumanie sous l'influence russe. *Reste à voir quel a été le sort de la Transylvanie du Nord après ce changement ?*

Du point de vue des opérations militaires, après le discours du roi Mihai I qui a été prononcé le soir du 23 août, l'armée roumaine est devenue l'alliée des troupes soviétiques. Le 7 septembre 1944, le ministre des Affaires étrangères roumains a annoncé que la Roumanie se considérait à partir de ce jour en état de guerre avec la Hongrie. Dans sa déclaration, M. Niculescu-Buzești soulignait que le Gouvernement roumain ne reconnaissait pas l'arbitrage de Vienne: «Ce territoire appartenant de droit à la Roumanie, le Gouvernement roumain n'avait pas jugé nécessaire jusqu'ici de déclarer la guerre à la Hongrie en espérant que la Gouvernement de Budapest reconnaîtrait de lui-même que le point de vue roumain était juste. Toutefois, le Gouvernement hongrois a manifesté par ses actes qu'il entendait conserver la proie obtenue à Vienne et qu'il entendait rester solidaire de la politique allemande d'agression et d'oppression. Bien plus, les troupes hongroises avaient attaqué les troupes roumaines. Dans ces conditions la Roumanie se considère en état de guerre avec la Hongrie[143] ».

Donc, pendant les mois du septembre et d'octobre, le but a été, la libération de la Transylvanie du Nord. Du point de vue politique, le nouveau premier ministre, le général Constantin Sănătescu a eu comme principal objectif la résolution de statut juridique international de la Transylvanie du Nord. Bien qu'une délégation gouvernementale roumaine ait été envoyée à Moscou pour négocier le projet de la Convention d'armistice, le 10 septembre 1944, elle a reçu le texte final qu'elle a dû accepter et signer deux jours après. Ce texte affirmait que l'arbitrage de Vienne du 30 août 1940 devenait nul: «Les Gouvernements alliés considéreront les décisions de l'accorde de Vienne comme nulles et non avenues. Ils décrètent que la Transylvanie, soit en totalité, soit dans sa plus grande partie, retournera à la Roumanie dont la frontière sera celle fixée le 28 juin 1940[144] ».

Le 10 octobre le roi a promulgué la loi n° 487 qui donnait naissance au Commissariat roumain pour l'administration des territoires libérés de la Transylvanie, qui avait comme but de représenter l'autorité du Gouvernement roumain dans ce territoire. Un comité avec rôle consultative a pris naissance aussi[145]. Mais les Soviétiques ont refusé d'accorder à la

[143] Note de Jean Basdevant, le 31 octobre 1944 Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds Europe 1944-1970, série Roumanie, dossier n°8, f. 76.
[144] Note de la Légation de France à Bucarest sur les conditions d'armistice imposées à la Roumanie, *le 14 septembre 1944,* AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 690, f. 211.
[145] Pour ce sujet voir Marcela Sălăgean, *Administrația sovietică în Nordul Transilvaniei (noiembrie 1944-martie 1945)*, Cluj-Napoca : Fundația Culturală Română, 2002, pp. 42-43.

Roumanie *la souveraineté* de ce territoire. Au mois du novembre 1944 la situation de la Transylvanie change beaucoup, pour la partie roumaine dévient évident que ce territoire n'appartiendrait à la Roumanie qu'à condition que le roi accepte un Gouvernement communiste. Donc, au mois du novembre Staline a instauré dans la Transylvanie du Nord une administration militaire soviétique.

En ce qui concerne la représentation de la France dans la Transylvanie du Nord pendant cette période, les Archives nous témoignent qu'après l'entrée des autorités militaires russes à Cluj, M. Claudon a été mis en résidence forcée. Dans le télégramme envoyé au général de Gaulle à ce sujet, on lui fait au consul français la suivante description: «M. Claudon avait soutenu les intérêts de la France Combattante très efficacement […] En vue de les soustraire aux Allemands, il a fait passer la frontière à de nombreux évadés. Le général Veress, commandant de 2ème armée hongroise lui ayant imposé l'ordre écrit de se rendre à l'ouest de la Tizsa, il a refusé. Enfin, il a attendu les troupes russes avec confiance[146] ». À la demande des autorités française, Roger Sarret, le représentant du Gouvernement provisoire de la République française en Roumanie, a entrepris plusieurs démarches pour qu'il soit libéré, mais les autorités russes de Bucarest lui ont répondu qu'elles «se déclarent incompétentes pour ce qui concerne l'ex-Transylvanie hongroise[147] ». Donc, les autorités françaises ont dû intervenir à Moscou pour demander sa libération et son rapatriement. Après plusieurs interventions de M. Garreau, l'ambassadeur français à Moscou, M. Claudon a été libéré et il est arrivé le 10 décembre 1944 à Bucarest.

Dans les mois qui ont suivis jusqu'à la formation du Gouvernement Petru Groza au mois de mars 1945, les deux premiers ministres roumains, Constantin Sănătescu et Nicolae Rădescu ont essayé à plusieurs reprises de discuter le problème de la Transylvanie du Nord avec les Soviétiques mais sans aucun résultat[148]. La situation change au mois de mars 1945. Staline accepte donc l'installation de l'administration roumaine dans la Transylvanie du Nord comme une « récompense » pour la formation du Gouvernement Petru Groza. Le 13 mars 1945, dans la présence du roi Mihai I er et du Gouvernement, des fêtes ont été organisées à Cluj pour marquer le retour de la Transylvanie du Nord à la Roumanie. Bien que la France y ait été représentée par le délégué du Gouvernement provisoire de la République française à Bucarest, M. Roger Sarret, aucune délégation et aucun journaliste Anglais ou Américain n'y ont pas participé, car les missions américaine et anglaise de Bucarest ont voulu ainsi manifester leur mécontentement contre la formation de cabinet Petru Groza.

[146]Télégramme Demarque, P.O. Le Lt-Colonel Semeidei-Servais Directeur Du Cabinet à M. le général de Gaulle, le 10 novembre 1944, AMEF, Fonds Europe 1944-1970, série Roumanie, dossier n° 1, f. 31.
[147] Télégramme de Saint-Hardouin, le 18 novembre 1944 Istanbul, *Ibidem*, f. 39.

Parmi les documents diplomatiques français qui concernent la Transylvanie du Nord pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale on a trouvé deux[149] qui parlent sur les injustices faites contre les Juifs dans cette région qui était sous occupation hongroise, après l'arbitrage de Vienne. Il s'agit d'une lettre envoyée par M. Claudon, au ministre de France à Budapest, M. Dampierre[150], le 4 décembre 1941. Dans cette lettre, le consul Claudon parle sur la manifestation antijuive qui a eu lieu dans la capitale de la Transylvanie à la fin du mois de novembre 1941, en la décrivant comme « la plus importante manifestation antijuive depuis les violences de 1926[151] ». La seconde lettre a été rédigée par Charmasse, le chargé d'affaires de France à Budapest, le 1er juillet 1944, et envoyée à Pierre Laval. Il s'agit d'un document qui a comme source notamment le témoignage du consul français à Cluj et qui « peint le calvaire des Juifs de Hongrie – parmi eux ceux de Transylvanie du Nord, depuis l'intervention allemande du 19 mars 1944[152] ». Toujours sur les mesures anti-juives prises en Hongrie parle Paul Morand dans un télégramme d'avril 1944 dans lequel il mentionne le discours d'Eden à ce sujet qui disait : « Par bonheur certains satellites de l'Allemagne se sont montrés plus humaines. Afin d'encourage cette attitude, le Gouvernement britannique est heureux de promettre que les Alliés tiendront compte de cette attitude au moment de la paix. Ce passage qui vise la Roumanie a été fortement commenté (mot passé)[153] ».

Conclusions

En dépit des efforts du Gouvernement roumain, au lendemain de la défaite française, pour se rapprocher de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie, ces deux pays ont résolu, le 30 août 1940, la question de la Transylvanie au profit presque exclusif de la Hongrie et ont imposé leur solution à la Roumanie.

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[148] Pour ce sujet voir D.C. Giurescu, *Guvernarea Nicolae Rădescu,* Bucureşti : Edition All, 1996.
[149]Voir aussi Carol Iancu, *Le Shoah en Roumanie. Les juifs sous le régime d'Antonescu (1940-1944). Documents diplomatiques français inédits,* Montpellier : Université Paul-Valéry Montpellier III, 1998, pp. 45-46, pp. 165-167, pp. 187-188.
[150] Dampierre (Robert, Gaston, Marie, Aymar de) né le 4 décembre 1888; licencié en ès lettres et droit, diplômé de l'Ecole des Sciences Politiques; il entre dans la diplomatie en mai 1912 comme attaché d'ambassade à Vienne; le 31 juillet 1940 il est nommé ambassadeur à Budapest où il reste jusqu'au 24 novembre 1942 quand il quitte son poste pour rejoindre la France libre; le 5 mai 1943 il est révoqué par Vichy. Source *Annuaire diplomatique* ... p. 415.
[151] Lettre de M. Claudon à M. Dampierre, le 4 décembre 1941 Kolozsvar, AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Hongrie, dossier n° 412, f. 39.
[152] Carol Iancu, *op. cit.,* pp. 45-46.
[153] Télégramme de Paul Morand, le 1er avril 1944, AMEF, Fonds Personnel, série 3 nominative, dossier n° 193 - dossier personnel de Paul Morand.

Une première conséquence de cette sentence de Vienne, l'a représentée la détérioration des conditions de vie des Roumains qui sont restés dans la Transylvanie du Nord, à cause des atrocités et des massacrés commis contre eux par les autorités hongroises.

On ajoute les relations très tendues entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie, la possibilité d'une confrontation militaire entre les deux pays a été présentée pendant toute la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. En ce qui concerne l'Allemagne et l'Italie, les deux pays ont suivi leur but, c'est-à-dire, ils ont utilisé l'arbitrage de Vienne pour obtenir l'aide militaire et économique de la part de la Roumanie et de la Hongrie dans la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique.

Quant aux diplomates français en poste à Bucarest pendant cette période ils ont très bien entendu que la Transylvanie était : « une question qu'aucun Gouvernement roumain ne saurait laisser prescrit. Le malheur veut qu'il en soit de même pour la Hongrie. Ainsi le statut de l'Europe du sud-est quelle que soit l'issue de la guerre, reste essentiellement précaire et sujet à discussion[154]».

Bien que la France n'ait pas pu avoir une position plus ferme concernant la perte de ce territoire par la Roumaine, car elle vivait sa « défaite », on peut affirmer qu'au moins les représentants français à Bucarest et les autorités de Vichy ont entendu le drame que la Roumanie vivait, et par cette non-participation à ce que « les Roumains tiennent pour une injustice » les rapports diplomatiques entre les deux pays ont continué pendant toute la période de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et ont connu des moments des réussites.

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AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.,* dossier n° 681.

[154] Note sur la politique roumaine depuis l'arbitrage de Vienne (30 août 1940), 10 octobre 1941, Bucarest, AMEF, Fonds Vichy Guerre 1939-1945, série Z-Europe, sous-série Roumanie, dossier n° 686, f. 12-13.

AMEF, Fonds *cit.,* série *cit.,* dossier n° 686.

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THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY IN THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS CASE OF UKRAINE

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Abstract: *Dans la présente recherche nous tournons notre attention sur le concept d'européanisation, que nous considérons un vraiment thème de controverse. Ainsi, nous commencerons par présenter aux lecteurs le processus d'européanisation des voisins de l'UE. Puisque nous voulons analyser l'influence d'une politique européenne dans le processus mentionné ci-dessus, nous allons discuter du rôle de la politique européenne de voisinage et si elle favorise ou non l'Européanisation de sorte que, finalement, de présenter l'exemple de l'Ukraine.*
Mots-clés: *Integration, Les voisins de l'est, Les Politiques Européenne, Évolution, Région.*

1. Introduction

1.1. Europeanization - a contradictory topic. Premise and main objectives

The Europeanization process was initiated in some people's opinion, in 1990s[155] and has become a rather fashionably research tool amongst scholars from European Studies and International Relations[156]. Some other researchers on the other hand, consider that this process has its roots before that date, the two world wars being considered "the parents" of Europeanization and that it usually refers to changes that take place in practices and national politics coming from European integration[157]. Different definitions of this process, elaborated based on different premises and research interest, found in time, their way to reach the public and we wonder which one in closer to the real meaning of this term.

[155] U. Sedelmeier, The European Neighbourhood Policy. A comment on Theory and Policy, Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: partners or periphery?, 2007, p 168-174.
[156] H. Axt, A. Milososki, O. Schwarz, „ Europäisierung - ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen" in Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48(1), 2007,p. 136-149.
[157] K. Featherstone, C.M. Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),p.82.

Before elaborating our article, we would not like to come-up with a new definition for this concept, but we would like, however, to express our own opinion on what Europeanization mean. This will also help the reader to better understand our research's methodology, and finally why the conclusions of this study.

Europeanization represents, in ours believes, one of the parties that express the concept of Globalization, and a concept that should have a strong approach to the people, before the approach to the institutions. Also, we consider that there is not a precise year, but maybe a period of time, when this process found its beginnings and that it started at the moment when Europeans realized that they belong to the same continent and that all together, by their history, culture, religion, behavior or even politics or economics compound Europe. In our opinion this might have happened in the 18th century, better that in the 20th one because we see its presence at the time, among the European countries that look forward to identifying themselves with already created European "rules"[158]. See for instance the beginning of "The declaration of Human Rights from 1789" and its later adoption by the European states. It might have happened during the Roma Imperium as well, when the Romans spread their culture through the expansion they initiated, or it might have happened even before this period of time. But at that time, we cannot talk about Europe, with the same meaning as today. However, placing Europeanization in time is strongly connected to how one person perceives Europe and its "birth". On the other hand, the 20th century, with its progress and historic events lead to a better understanding of this process and it also helped it to evolve and to gain importance among the European citizens.

But is Europeanization all about people? Or it is also about economics, politics or institutions? The answer seems to be positive if we rely on Abraham Lincoln's phrase "of the people, by the people, for the people," because people are de center of humans' universe, the creators of politics and economics. However, nowadays we can easier observe this concept to be mainly focused on the EU and on the domestic changes of the states that find themselves into this process, but again we maintain ours believes and we advocate that it is more than that and that this process goes beyond the EU.

Another question is related to the borders of this process. Where can we talk about Europeanization and where does it end? Nowadays, it is commonly considered that Europeanization reflects only the European Union[159]. However, we believe that

[158] Although in the text, the term is presented very similar to the concept of European integration, we would like to have a clear differentiation between the two of them.
[159] A. Gawrich, I. Melnykovska, R. Schweickert, Neighborhood Europeanization trough ENP, 2009, [http://www.polso.z.fu-

Europeanization goes beyond European Union and that it also affects the European Neighborhoods. We are talking here not only about the neighbors that are parts of Europe as continent, but also the ones that geographically speaking, are located on other continents, present different kind of relationships with European countries and which in order to maintain their relationships, adapt to European common values, standards, policies, or start an entire process of European Integration.

Bearing in mind all the above-mentioned aspects and mainly the fact that nowadays, Europeanization is more and more linked to the EU area and that it is considered that this area represents the cradle of this process, the premise of the article states that although, in our beliefs, Europeanization represents a process that was initiated before and that should have led to the European Integration and European Union, finally it is developed mainly according to the EU "regulations", not only inside, but also at the periphery of this area, where ENP interfere. An additional premise is linked to the study case of the article and it states that Ukraine is a Europeanized country.

At the end of the research we will be able to conclude if the premises were correct and if we managed to achieve the main objectives we have set:

- to observe how a European policy interfere in the Europeanization process;
- to analyze the effects of Europeanization in the Neighborhood countries of the EU;
- to better understand the Europeanization process in Ukraine.

Our objectives outlined our work and named the study and the analyses terms.

1.2. Methodology

The present study that presents three main chapters, intends to achieve its above-mentioned objectives that wouldn't have been achieved without a precise study on the definition and different acceptances of the term of Europeanization. For that, many online and physical archives that exposed the terminology of Europeanization have been studied.

Further on we focused our attention on Europeanization process among neighbor states of the UE. At this point, we will focus mainly on an East-European state, Ukraine, mainly because this is the region/state that interests us, especially because of its historic past. So, the first restriction of the study is geographical, and refers to the Eastern periphery of the EU. The second restriction is thematic and focuses on the European Neighborhood Policy and how this policy affects the Europeanization of neighbor states.

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berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_03_August_Melnykovska_Gawrich_Schweickert.pdf], Accessed 23 July 2012.

This research wouldn't have been possible without several paper-works that we will present in a formal way, in the Bibliography of the study, and informal, based to the knowledge that we have gained by reading them.

In our lectures and studies we appeal to European publication, Ukrainian included. Further on, the above-mentioned methodology can be observed in all the chapters of the paper.

2. The Europeanization of the EU neighbors and the ENP role in the process

Before starting analyzing the role of the ENP in the Europeanization process of the Eastern European neighbors, we would like to present a short distinction of this process inside the EU and within the neighbors' areas:

a. In the EU context, member states, who are in the process of EU integration, initiate and shape the Europeanization.

b. In the EU periphery, the Europeanization process presents a different structure, mainly because the states of these areas have different types of institutional links with the EU. Their contacts are determined especially by geopolitical and geographical factors, factors that are linked with constraints and choices decided by the EU with regard to its external involvement. In this area, states do not have the institutional means to influence the decisions made by the EU and that through the Europeanization process, affects them. In this area, this process can only be seen by EU, as a foreign policy instrument[160].

If we go back to what we have stated in the chapter before, regarding the birth period of the Europeanization, we could compare the EU with the Roman Empire. This seek to "conquer" more states, to include them into its borders[161] so its power to increase. Otherwise, if this comes to be somehow difficult, compared to the Roma Empire, the EU Empire establishes agendas or policies that involve the neighboring countries so that it doesn't miss the chance to link and to trade with the last ones. This main difference between the two determined the success of the EU in what concerns connections with other states.

Due to its dimensions, the EU has become during the years an important actor[162] that attracts from different point of views many other states. However, because the EU have established different plans of interaction with other countries through Foreign Policy or ENP,

[160] B. Copieters, M. Emerson, M. Huysseune, T. Kovziridze, G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci, M. Vahl, Europeanization and conflict resolution- case studies from the European periphery, Gent: Academia Press, 2004, p 20-27.
[161] We are not talking here of the geographical borders only. Metaphorically speaking, we address at this moment the cultural, religious, economic, etc. borders.
[162] N. Wright, The European Union: what kind of International actor?, 2011, [http://eastanglia.academia.edu/NickWright/Papers/474497/The_European_Union_What_Kind_of_International_Actor], Accessed 02 August 2012.

the states in questions must somehow submit to the EU decisions in order to create links with it. In this case, they might encounter an advantage by presenting some common values, rights, economies with the EU or find themselves under the conditionality of implementing domestic changes. In this case, Europeanization without conditionality talks about long-term embedding of European values and norms and internalization. Such a process is based more on lesson and learning. The EU has to focus more on promoting 'linkage', mainly because it is dealing with non-candidate neighbors[163].

As we already argued above, ENP as an EU tool, the last one being considered by us a Europeanization effect, represents nowadays one of the developers of the Europeanization, that aim the EU neighbors, and that provides to them a conditionality layout to link with the EU.

Under these conditions, three dimensions of ENP policies are important not only for the quality of Europeanization of these neighbor countries (Justice and Home Affairs and Democracy Promotion), but also for the EU's strategic interest (Economic Cooperation)[164].

Economic Cooperation

According to Vincentz (2007), the EU has offered to the ENP states "economic cooperation in exchange for political reforms". However, the subject of economic cooperation remains rather vague. Compared with EU enlargement, ENP presents a development component and is also strictly bilateral, which fore-goes the chance of creating a unified economic region.

The EU however, presents appropriate models with ENP members of future economic integration. Depending on interest of either the ENP states or the EU, the economic integration remains a bilateral instrument with specific cooperation schemes and a basic trade component.

Democracy Promotion

In some people's case, the ENP represents for the EU a democratization tool[165]. On the other hand, the EU's democracy promotion strategies are seen by others as being badly coordinated[166].

Non-state actors and similar institutions should be supported by bottom-up and not belonging to high-level politics strategies in the field of civil society, education system, and

[163] S. Levitsky, A. Way, „Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International dimension of Regime Change" in Comparative Politics, 38 (4), 2006, pp.379-400.
[164] D. Mahncke, S. Gstöhl, Europe's Near Abroad – Promises and Prospects of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 2008, p. 214-239.
[165] W, B. Ferrero, Remarks on democracy promotion, Brussels: European Commission, 2006, p.35.
[166] G. Crawford, European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy. Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democracy, 2000.

media. In what concerns the education system and the civil society, ENP offers different financial support through TEMPUS and TACIS/EIDHR respectively. While TEMPUS is intended for higher education modernization or people-to-people-contacts among European students, especially between East and West, TACIS refers to infrastructural help and EIDHR to bottom-up democracy promotion. Finally, in neighboring countries, the freedom of media represents an essential part of helping democracy. Although the EU is a young player in supporting the media as we already argued above, the EU sees the instrument of media support as a tool of democracy promotion[167].

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)

JHA has been from the start within ENP, an element of the Action Plans, which demonstrates that there is an increasing importance of security aspects. The main fields of cooperation and demand in JHA are the border policy and the migration, judicial and police training and cooperation and organized crime and drug trafficking[168].

Policy regulations in the field of JHA have several characteristics. First, some aspects are very important for the EU's interests on internal security (illegal migration, EU's Schengen regime, organized crime, asylum policy). Second, JHA is both a long-term initiative for democracy, good governance and socio-economic transformation and a short-term security strategy. The EU had to offer rewards, like visa facilitation for asylum seekers, due to its interest in the JHA. Third, core state functions like police cooperation or border policy are affected by demands concerning policy. Finally, demands in JHA are closely linked with the acceptance of democratic values, and this can be seen in areas like independent judiciary[169].

The above-argued subjects are characteristic for each ENP states. However, depending on the geographical area of the state, it can present some different aspects, but this doesn't astonish us because we already know that each country has its own history and this applies also to an entire region as well.

Bearing this in mind we are wondering if for instance, the Eastern European countries found themselves for the first time in the situation of Europeanization, or if they have encountered forms of Europeanization before EU. If we are looking to the soviet age, we see a cultural, politics and even economic approach among these countries and based on that, we

[167] Friederike Von Franqué, Medienhilfe als Instrument der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Ziele, Motive und Implementierungswege internationaler Akteure in Bosnien-Herzegowina und Kosovo, Berlin, 2008, p 39.
[168] Michael Smith, Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, Katjia Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun (Ed.), 2007.
[169] W. Knelangen, „A Neighbourhood of Freedom, Security and Justice?" in European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours, 2007, pp. 78-101.

could bend to state that Eastern European countries encountered Europeanization even before. But did the soviet countries represent Europe at the time, as EU does today? The answer is very simple: they did not, in the context of a continent that found itself especially between Soviet and Nazi ideology and this without considering the other ideologies of the time. But what happens if we take a closer look to the Eastern neighbors and if we take their case in particular. For example, what is the case of the Republic of Moldavia? Is this a relevant country to observe Europeanization before EU era, so we can assert our premise that Europeanization led to the EU birth, and that Europeanization development should not depend on the EU decisions, but the EU should relay on the Europeanization process? Not exactly, and we base our affirmation on historic data. Moldova represents a state that gains its independence not long before and which during the time, was attached to different states or ideological country Unions by its own will or under the historic circumstances of the moment[170]. In this case, we will not direct our attention to this case and we will look forward to Ukraine, which is another state that gained its independence not long before, but which history was different that Moldova's.

Considering all the argued subjects, in the following chapter, we will analyze the Europeanization process in Ukraine, how ENP influence it and if we can talk related to this state, about Europeanization before the EU. Otherwise, we could consider that either Europeanization did not exist before EU, or that for the East European neighbors Europeanization exist only under the context of the EU.

3. The Europeanization of Ukraine

In 1991, Ukraine's parliament adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. At this moment, after 70 years of Soviet-style modernization, Ukraine started to show an interest in joining the EU, but it failed in becoming a member state because she didn't manage to transform itself into "a fully European country, measured by stability and prosperity"[171]. Under these conditions, Ukraine had to reconsider its actions and to achieve a better integration if she still intends to become a member state. All these would also help Ukraine to start, or to continue, a Europeanization process that will bring her closer to EU and to the other European countries that share the same values, policies or economics. Later on, the EU came up with a solution, to create a linkage with the European neighbors, so EU can achieve its interests under the promise of the integration. Thus, in 2003, the EU brought a

[170] Republica Moldova, Istorie, 2012, [http://www.moldova.md/md/istorie/], Accessed 02 August 2012.
[171] John Tedstrom, The EU and Ukraine: a transatlantic veiw. The EU and Ukraine: Neighbors, Friends, Partners?, London, 2001,

new initiative that by 2004 became a new policy, the European Neighborhood Policy. Ukraine became soon one of the ENP member states. Further on we will focus our attention on the three topics that we argued above: the economic cooperation, democracy promotion and justice and home affairs.

For the new participant states to the ENP, European Commission centers proposed to offer a place on the internal market, through a detailed integration. So, the barriers with the neighbors' states would have been lowered. Also, they will enter into accepting the EU conditionality, without affecting the member states' integration. But the economic benefits of integration, under ENP do not stimulate enough the reforms in Ukraine, because first of all, Ukraine should become more European in political terms and the economic aspects do not influence and led to big political reforms, second because for Ukraine the balance of cost-benefits is less attractive than for the states with a membership perspective. For that, Ukraine must adopt the acquis to gain access to the market. Third of all, the countries without a perspective of membership may not find it interesting to adapt and to accept the conditions of the EU and the ENP doesn't justify the exposing of an ENP member to the EU's rule-setting agenda, especially because these countries cannot influence the rule-setting, as the member states can do[172].

On the other hand, before 1991, Ukraine did not know the economic system of democratic western countries, the capitalist one, but the communist system. However, in the period of 1991-2004, Ukraine adapted relatively well the new system, but it still has some lacks in term of "EU economic system" or on other words, EU's regulations on this field.

On the other hand, in the field of democracy promotion, the EU put very clear demands on Ukraine compliance with democratic standards, especially on the field of politics and elections. Also, the new agreement partnership offered by the ENP, put a bigger emphasis on democracy promotion than the PCA document before. However, the in-existent reward form behalf of the EU, discourage the leaders of Ukraine in promoting the democracy. Besides, the EU demands are however, related to the need in civil education regarding the human rights, minorities and so on. Luckily, the absence of the political rewards at this level, are compensated by direct European support, especially financial one. We consider that if EU would support and reward more the leaders of Ukraine, they would fill responsible to reward by their own the population, and so, the democracy promotion will meet higher levels.

[172] Kataryna Wolczuk, Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its Policy towads European Union, EUI Working Papers, 2004,p 72-112.

Still, we believe that Ukraine meet the feeling of democracy before the ENP. For that, will remember the Orange Revolution, which happen in 2004, one year before Ukraine become a ENP member, when citizens were aware of democracy and expressed in public their opinion on election fraud.

In the field of justice however, if before ENP there was a linkage focused on cross border collaboration, within ENP, the EU priorities are the governance –related matters. Compared to the time before ENP, within this policy, many financial supports are given for the justice aspect, as for the other two above-mentioned[173], and these serves to civil education, which will maintain the principles that Europeanization promotes as well, when the country leaders will fail to do so.

All the above-mentioned subjects make us state that Ukraine finds itself in the process of Europeanization and that this country begun this process before the ENP. However, this process started not long ago or at least the institutional Europeanization process[174], because the citizens seemed to be aware even before of some "European values". On the other hand, ENP presents some lacks in leading Ukraine to Europeanization, mainly because this policy cannot be influenced by Ukraine, a country without a membership perspective yet.

4. Conclusion and further research

From the beginning of the article we were able to better understand that the Europeanization goes far before the EU and that it should have led, in time, to the creation of the EU. Nowadays however, Europeanization is understood as being a result of the EU and in order to be considers Europeanized you must present the EU values and even more, you must adapt, accept and work under EU regulations. We were wondering if this is correct and if the EU is the one that should offer the perspective of Europeanization. We believe not, but as we already show in our research, in practice this is exactly how it happens.

In order to better understand our subject of study on how does a European policy affect the Europeanization, we had to adapt in parts to the idea that EU is the one that offers the terms. We did, however, try to bring proves that Europeanization should not gravitate only around the EU and we din encounter some arguments to state this idea. First we came-up with our own believes related to the meaning of Europeanization and the research made us understand that this goes beyond the economic or political aspects that EU promotes and that

[173] A. Gawrich, I. Melnykovska, R. Schweickert, Neighborhood Europeanization trough ENP, 2009, [http://www.polso.z.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_03_August_Melnykovska_Gawrich_Schweickert.pdf], Accessed 23 July 2012.
[174] We believe this is a result of the soviet period.

it also talks about values or about people. But then, the EU represents also common values or actions that aim the people. So again we were wondering if we are not wrong and if Europeanization should not be all about the EU. Second, we observed that elements of Europeanization where found in other centuries as well, for e.g. the 18th century's reforms. Finally, we consider that the truth is somewhere in between because on one hand, the EU represent the majority of European countries, it might be considered the one that should set the rules, according to common aspects of the member states. However, on the other hand, in some domains, the EU could try to achieve its own interest and not only to fail to Europeanize the countries that reform their regulations because of the Integration and Europeanization dream, but to have a negative impact on them as well, to cause divergence and so to lead them into "the arms" of other actors that seek to influence them.

Our research become a restrictive one, in the last chapter, where we studied the ENP impact on neighboring countries of the EU, members of the ENP and if this policy supports the Europeanization process with a particular focus on Ukraine. Regarding this subject, our conclusion is that ENP sustain only in parts the Europeanization process. Also, for the European neighbors, to adapt to the European rules in terms of cost-benefits is not so profitable or is more difficult than for the member states or for the states with a membership perspective. Otherwise, the ENP created some links between EU and Ukraine but it encounters some as well. Without common aspects, or without interest from the leaders or even form the population in promoting European values or policies, the Europeanization process knows a slow evolution in this country. Luckily, different European instruments exists in order to support at least one part (leaders or citizens) when the other fails in achieving its responsibilities. Also, we observed that especially from the moment when this country is considered a whole, as Ukraine, some Europeanization actions came forward. Nowadays however, through European initiatives and support, particularly financial, this could change and the process of Europeanization can be accelerated, but it is a must for all this actions to look not to create divergence.

At the end of the study, we considered that an interesting subject for a future research could be to analyze the Europeanization process before the EU era or to analyze the impact on Europeanization of European financial support in Ukraine.

To conclude, our research made us understand that the premises we have set are only partially true. It is true that the Europeanization exists before the EU, it is also true that nowadays the EU regulations tend to influence in different ways, the countries on the continent and not only. On the other hand, it is only partially true that a policy, such as ENP

can fulfill Europeanization in the European neighbor countries, because it also creates some rejection feelings. Under these circumstances, Ukraine, for example, can be redirected towards Russia. Also, we can state that Ukraine is a Europeanized country, but we must bear in mind that this country finds itself only at the beginning of this process.

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LE ROLE ASSIGNE PAR LA FRANCE ET PAR L'ITALIE A UNE CONFEDERATION DANUBIENNE DANS LE SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL, DE 1919 A 1945

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Résumé: *Les projets de confédération danubienne qui surgirent entre 1919 et 1932 montrent les liens étroits qui existent entre une construction régionaliste et le système international dans lequel elle se déploie. Celui de l'entre-deux-guerres ne fut pas favorable au régionalisme danubien, pour des raisons qui tinrent à la rivalité franco-italienne et au caractère encore indéterminé des avantages et des dangers de l'intégration pour les grandes puissances européennes. Une fois cet obstacle et ces inconnues levés, à partir de 1945, des réflexions plus lucides se heurtèrent aux réalités de la guerre froide.*

Mots-clés : entre-deux-guerres, confédération danubienne, politique étrangère française, politique étrangère italienne, ententes commerciales régionales.

La fin de la Grande Guerre vit l'effondrement de l'empire austro-hongrois, qui avait structuré l'espace géopolitique centre-européen depuis plus de quatre siècles. Très rapidement la France nourrit l'espoir de rassembler les cinq Etats dits successeurs (Autriche, Hongrie, Tchécoslovaquie, Roumanie, Yougoslavie), auxquels se seraient éventuellement adjoint la Pologne et la Bulgarie, contre l'Allemagne afin de constituer un rempart contre cette dernière.

Ce qu'il est d'usage de nommer confédération danubienne est un objet historique étrange. Le peu de succès que rencontra ce projet et l'absence de réalisations concrètes le font considérer *a posteriori* comme une chimère, comme le produit de réflexions abstraites et irréalisables à cause des conflits qui existaient entre les différents États concernés. Zara Steiner écarte ainsi la possibilité pratique d'une fédération danubienne telle que Tomas Masaryk ou Oskar Jászi pouvaient la rêver[175]. Les auteurs de la série 1920-1932 des *Documents diplomatiques français* écartent de même l'existence de tout projet français en ce

[175] Zara S. Steiner, *The Lights That Failed : European International History, 1919-1933*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005, XV + 938 p.

sens[176]. D'un autre côté, la fréquence de ses occurrences dans les discours d'un certain nombre de décideurs, les débats parlementaires et les écrits de publicistes, par exemple le député français Ernest Pezet, l'économiste hongrois Elemér Hantos ou encore l'homme politique slovaque Milan Hodža[177], plaident pour un examen plus approfondi de la signification qu'elle put revêtir dans l'entre-deux-guerres. Vito Platania écrivait de son côté dans un opuscule publié après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale : « *Après 1919, l'idée de Confédération danubienne devient un vaste courant, tous en parlent et en discutent la possibilité. Plus de projets isolés, mais une infinité de plans et de conseils* »[178]. Le projet resta certes imprécis et incertain dans son contenu mais l'expression même de « confédération danubienne » fut assez unanimement employée. Elle ne devait pas cesser d'occuper une place importante dans les perspectives des diplomates français, place que le manque de réalisations concrètes auxquelles elle donna lieu a eu tendance à faire négliger. De son côté, l'Italie ne pouvait pas rester indifférente à une idée qui pouvait servir ou desservir son ambition de remplacer l'Autriche, et pourquoi pas l'Allemagne et la Russie en pleine déliquescence, comme puissance régionale dans le bassin du Danube.

L'étude des projets de confédération danubienne doit donc se situer au croisement de logiques régionales et de logiques qui relèvent d'une appréhension par les puissances des contraintes du système international. Quel lien peut-on établir entre un projet de construction régionaliste au sein de l'Europe et le système international de l'entre-deux-guerres ? Quelles tensions peut-on identifier dans ce lien entre les tendances à l'intégration et celles à la désintégration ?

Le gouvernement français, désireux de reconstruire l'Europe centre-orientale après l'effondrement des empires, soutint précocement une confédération danubienne rejetée par l'Italie, libérale comme fasciste. Le personnel politique italien garda cependant une attitude ambiguë, entre méfiance et conscience de l'opportunité que l'idée danubienne représentait pour une puissance qui s'était toujours inscrite dans une perspective européenne. La forme de la confédération danubienne fut ainsi à géométrie variable, car les attentes des deux puissances à l'égard d'une confédération danubienne étaient contradictoires. La méthode et

[176] *Documents diplomatiques français* (*DDF*), 1920-1932, 1920, tome II, introduction, p. XII.
[177] Sur ces deux hommes, voir Lubor Jílek, "Projets d'union économique dans l'espace danubien jusqu'en 1938 : les espoirs d'Elemér Hantos et de Milan Hodža", contribution au séminaire international « Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle », organisé en 2001-2002 à l'Institut de la Gestion Publique et du Développement Economique (IGPDE), par les professeurs Eric Bussière, Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Sylvain Schirmann, Université de Metz, et Michel Dumoulin, Institut d'Etudes Européennes de Louvain : http://www.comite-histoire.minefi.gouv.fr/seminaires/les_seminaires/premiere_annee__2001, consulté le 18/05/2011.
[178] Vito Platania, *Piani e progetti per una confederazione danubiana*, Marl : Amerikai Magyar Kiadó, 1954, 15 p., note de bas de page de l'auteur, p. 1.

les processus de construction envisagés révélèrent, outre les enjeux de puissance à l'œuvre, des questionnements et des expérimentations propres à l'entre-deux-guerres : hésitations entre primat de l'économique et primat du politique, rôle des institutions internationales. Après les échecs des années 1930, les considérations de l'immédiat après-guerre, qui voulurent faire d'un groupement régional danubien le premier test d'une construction régionale fédéraliste en Europe, manifestèrent la force qu'eut cette idée de « confédération danubienne ».

1. Les premiers projets de confédération danubienne : à la recherche d'un nouvel équilibre en Europe

Dès 1919, le principal obstacle auquel se heurta tout projet de confédération danubienne fut l'héritage encombrant de l'empire austro-hongrois, spectre à ne pas ressusciter. Jules Laroche, alors sous-directeur pour l'Europe, écarta dès le mois de mars 1919 toute possibilité d'un quelconque lien danubien à créer entre les Etats successeurs[179]. Le diplomate reconnaissait cependant que les Etats successeurs avaient « *intérêt à rester unis entre eux* » : il s'agissait d'attendre des circonstances favorables à leur réunion autour d'objectifs stratégiques communs. Les parlementaires français déplorèrent l'absence d'une politique plus ambitieuse qui aurait créé ces circonstances et assuré la sécurité de la France. A l'instar du sénateur Imbart de la Tour ou des députés Margaine, Lorin, Marcel Sembat, le député Bellet regrettait ainsi que les peuples d'Autriche-Hongrie, après avoir été libérés de la domination habsbourgeoise, n'aient pas conservé « *des rapports étroits pouvant aller peut-être jusqu'à la fédération* », et défendait une thèse proche de celle de Jacques Bainville, qui déplorait le maintien de l'unité de l'Allemagne associé au morcellement de l'Autriche-Hongrie[180]. Sénateurs et députés se rejoignaient sur l'intérêt qu'avait la France à la prospérité économique en Europe centrale et au maintien d'une Autriche et d'une Hongrie fortes face à une Allemagne qu'il fallait équilibrer[181].

L'Italie de son côté ne voulait en aucun cas de la reconstitution d'une puissance danubienne, même polycentrique. Très rapidement les diplomaties des deux puissances

[179] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français (MAEF), Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série A – Paix, volume n°111, f°58 à 69, note de Jules Laroche « Question de l'Autriche allemande. Troisième note », 5 mars 1919.
[180] Cette thèse, défendue par Bainville dans *Les Conséquences politiques de la paix* publié en 1920, avait déjà été formulée dans des articles parus l'année précédente dans *L'Action française* : voir notamment « Une paix trop douce pour ce qu'elle a de dur », 8 mai 1919, et « La paix à l'Est », 18 juin 1919.

vainqueurs de la Grande Guerre en vinrent à formuler un accord tacite, qui transparaît dans les instructions envoyées aux diplomates et qui reposait sur une double renonciation : renonciation de Rome à son attitude ambivalente à l'égard de l'*Anschluss* et renonciation de Paris à appuyer un rapprochement politique des Etats successeurs. Ce que François Charles-Roux nomma la « garantie mutuelle »[182] semble être devenu une réalité au début de 1921, lorsque Carlo Sforza et Eduard Beneš, qui en tint informé le gouvernement français, constatèrent leur accord sur les deux points cruciaux cités ci-dessus[183]. Cependant, le gouvernement français poursuivit l'objectif de rapprocher les Etats successeurs.

La première piste explorée en ce sens fut économique et pragmatique et se manifesta par l'implication de la France dans la conférence tenue dans la ville italienne de Porto Rose du 24 octobre au 23 novembre 1921. Celle-ci avait pour but d'améliorer les relations douanières et commerciales entre les Etats successeurs, sous les auspices des grandes puissances et notamment de la France et de l'Italie. C'est à l'occasion de la préparation de cette conférence que le délégué français, le contre-amiral Faou, envoya à Briand une dépêche où se dessinent les lignes d'une politique danubienne de la France[184]. Il plaidait en faveur d'une politique qui ne se résumât pas au redressement de l'Autriche ni n'abandonnât les Etats danubiens à des influences contraires et à leurs tendances antagonistes. Il proposait pour cela une politique de « petits pas » économiques : « *Donc pas de confédération, pas d'inféodation à un système extra-danubien, pas de solidarité permanente ; mais des échanges de vues, des conversations sanctionnées par des accords particuliers. Il semble que parmi les moyens à envisager pour atteindre ce but l'un des plus pratiques consisterait dans l'institution de conférences économiques périodiques.* »

Briand de son côté concevait le rétablissement de l'harmonie économique et politique entre les Etats successeurs comme un processus lent et les tentatives de rapprochement, même mineures, comme autant de tests pour l'avenir[185]. L'échec de la politique hongroise de la France en 1920 avait montré les difficultés d'une stratégie trop pressée[186]. Il restait

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[181] MAEF, Papiers d'Agents, Alexandre Millerand, volume n°56, fascicule « Autriche », f°43 à 47, sans date. Et *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés, 1881-1940*, 12ème législature, session ordinaire, 73ème séance, 26 mai 1920, p. 1625-1641.

[182] MAEF, Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série Z, Italie, volume n°79, f°89 à 97, dépêche très confidentielle n°237 de Charles-Roux à Millerand, Rome, 13 septembre 1920.

[183] MAEF, Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série Z, Tchécoslovaquie, n°65, f°201 et 202, copie de l'échange de lettres Beneš-Sforza du 8 février 1921.

[184] MAEF, Série B – Relations commerciales, B54, volume n°62, f°77 à 98, lettre confidentielle du contre-amiral Fatou à Aristide Briand, reçue par le Département le 11 mars 1921.

[185] *DDF*, 1920-1932, 1921, tome 1, document n°100, instructions (sans numéro) de Briand à Fatou, Paris, 10 février 1921.

[186] Jacques Bariéty, "L' "accord révisionniste" franco-hongrois de 1920. Histoire d'un mythe", *in* AYÇOBERRY, Pierre, BLED, Jean-Paul, et HUNYADI, Istvàn (ed.), *Les Conséquences des traités de paix de*

cependant entendu que la politique danubienne de la France avait avant tout pour but d'intégrer l'Autriche à son espace historique et d'éviter l'*Anschluss* : la solution danubienne n'était qu'une des tactiques possibles pour y parvenir. Or, la conférence de Porto Rose fut un échec, en partie à cause du refus des délégations roumaine et tchécoslovaque de conclure une convention nécessitant une ratification parlementaire, donc l'engagement des Etats, au profit d'un simple protocole qui formulait des recommandations[187]. De plus, face à la menace allemande, l'appui sur la Petite Entente avait la préférence des gouvernements français[188]. La volonté politique d'inciter à la formation d'un lien danubien fut alors refrénée et la signification et la définition d'une confédération danubienne peu questionnées.

L'Italie de son côté, quoique hostile à toute résurrection d'une entité qui ressemblerait de près ou de loin à l'ex-Autriche-Hongrie, n'était pas opposée à un regroupement danubien sous son égide. Cela aurait parachevé la politique de rapprochement avec le royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes menée par Carlo Sforza[189] ainsi que le réchauffement des relations entre l'Italie et la Tchécoslovaquie initié par le traité de commerce et de navigation signé le 23 mars 1921[190]. L'Italie accepta donc de soutenir la conférence de Porto Rose et d'y participer, mais avec un objectif très différent de celui de la France puisqu'il s'agissait, non pas de relever l'Autriche en renouant ses liens économiques avec ses voisins, mais d'empêcher le rétablissement d'une puissance autrichienne tout en assurant à l'Italie le rôle de guide des Etats successeurs[191]. La divergence croissante entre les programmes danubiens de Paris et de Rome joua un rôle important dans l'échec de la conférence : le contre-amiral Fatou fit en sorte que l'Italie se vît refuser le double statut d'Etat successeur et de grande puissance ; la délégation italienne s'employa alors à ce que la conférence ne dérivât pas vers un embryon d'entente économique réelle. La plupart des questions importantes pour une reconstruction de l'Europe centre-orientale par une esquisse d'intégration économique furent laissées de côté afin de maintenir un équilibre par défaut entre la France et l'Italie[192].

1919-1920 en Europe centrale et sud-orientale, Strasbourg : Association des publications près les universités de Strasbourg, 1987, 400 p., p. 75-83.

[187] MAEF, Série B Relations commerciales, B54, volume n°65, f°105 à 118, dépêche de Fatou à Briand, adressée à la personne, Portorose, 15 novembre 1921.

[188] Sur les relations de la France avec la Petite Entente, voir : Isabelle Davion, *Mon Voisin, cet ennemi : la politique de sécurité française face aux relations polono-tchécoslovaques entre 1919 et 1939*, Bruxelles : Peter Lang, 2009, 472 p.

[189] Le 12 novembre 1920, les deux Etats avaient signé le traité de Rapallo, qui ouvrait la porte à la résolution de leurs contentieux territoriaux.

[190] Donatella Bolech Cecchi, *Alle origini di un'inimicizia. Italia-Cecoslovacchia 1918-1922*, Soveria Mannelli : Rubbettino, 2008, 218 p., p. 121-123.

[191] Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Rappresentenze diplomatiche, Vienna, busta n°273, fasc. 1, dépêche n°30 de Salvago-Raggi, Paris, 10 janvier 1921.

[192] ASMAE, Rappresentanze diplomatiche, Vienna, busta 273, fasc. 1, rapport secret de Romano Avezzana, sans date ; MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, B54, volume n°65, f°198, dépêche n°133 de Lefèvre-Pontalis à Briand, Vienne, 28 novembre 1921.

2. Les ambiguïtés d'un projet, entre logique d'intégration et logique d'équilibre

Après cet échec, il fallut attendre 1925 et la résurgence du mouvement pour l'*Anschluss* pour que les projets de confédération danubienne ressurgissent. Les radicaux-socialistes français alors au pouvoir considéraient la question autrichienne comme un problème économique. Plus largement, sans qu'il fût question d'établir une entité politique, ils voulaient croire au pouvoir apaisant de la prospérité et de la coopération économiques sur les nationalismes. Mais, derrière l'apparente modestie d'un programme sectoriel, ce projet était surinvesti d'enjeux politiques. Plusieurs diplomates s'étaient convaincu que les pays d'Europe danubienne avaient besoin d'une organisation orchestrée de l'extérieur, d'une « *direction sage et puissante* »[193], à l'image de ceux d'Europe balkanique avec lesquels ils tendaient à les confondre dans un espace marqué par le morcellement politique. Dans ses mémoires, Bertrand de Jouvenel donna un témoignage rétrospectif de cette conviction en y décrivant Vienne comme « *la maîtresse et l'organisatrice de toute l'Europe danubienne* », l'Allemagne des années 1930 comme l'« *ordonnatrice de l'Europe danubienne* » et l'Italie comme le pays qui avait laissé passer sa chance de « *se faire l'organisatrice du bassin danubien* »[194]. La nécessité d'une puissance qui aurait donné l'impulsion d'un ordonnancement économique puis politique commun à toute la région était communément admise.

Or, dans les années 1920, seules la France et l'Italie apparaissaient à la fois capables et désireuses de promouvoir une forme d'intégration centre-européenne. L'Allemagne était disqualifiée par sa défaite et le traité de Versailles ; le Royaume-Uni n'était guère enclin à s'impliquer dans une telle initiative. Le problème est que les intérêts et les conceptions des deux puissances latines divergeaient profondément. Depuis le gouvernement Millerand (18 février – 23 septembre 1920), une forme de consensus s'était établie sur le fait que la réorganisation de l'Europe centre-orientale devait obéir à deux impératifs, antigermanique et antibolchévique. Deux plans de confédération existaient, l'un minimal, qui aurait rassemblé la Pologne, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, autrement dit les trois pays destinés à s'associer en une barrière stratégique dans une perspective antibolchévique, l'autre maximal, rassemblant soit les cinq États danubiens (Autriche, Hongrie, Tchécoslovaquie, Yougoslavie, Roumanie), soit les trois États de la barrière précédemment évoquée auxquels seraient venues s'adjoindre

[193] MAEF, Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série Z, Grande-Bretagne, volume n°40, f°20 et 21, dépêche n°100 de Doulcet à Poincaré, Budapest, 25 juin 1923.
[194] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *D'Une Guerre à l'autre*, tome I, Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1940, 416 p., p. 127 et p. 164.

la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie, l'Autriche ne devant y être associée qu'ensuite[195]. Le projet concernait donc véritablement l'Europe centre-orientale et était en partie disjoint de la question du devenir de l'Autriche.

Quant à l'Italie, l'arrivée au pouvoir du fascisme ne modifia pas son désir de jouer un rôle d'arbitre européen que la signification qu'elle lui donna. A l'idée classique d'une Italie qui servirait de pont entre l'Orient et l'Occident[196], Mussolini donna une tonalité beaucoup plus nettement antislave, dirigée contre le royaume des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes et contre la Tchécoslovaquie. Il ne rejetait pas *a priori* tout projet de confédération danubienne, ainsi que le montrent plusieurs propos explicites : « *On ne pourra peut-être pas empêcher une confédération des peuples danubiens* »[197] ; « *On pourrait dire qu'une confédération danubienne est en train de se construire laborieusement. Mais c'est un fantasme d'affirmer qu'elle sera nécessairement dirigée contre l'Italie* »[198]. En revanche, ce projet devait devenir un instrument de contrôle de l'Italie sur l'Europe centre-orientale.

A la politique de Millerand Aristide Briand apporta une méthode qui s'approchait de l'intégration économique mais qui était en réalité dominée par une finalité politique précise, l'équilibre européen, beaucoup plus que l'intégration danubienne. Par ailleurs, Briand fit de la résolution de la question d'Autriche une priorité. En marge des négociations des pactes de Locarno et avec l'aide de la sous-direction aux Relations commerciales et de son directeur, Jacques Seydoux, le ministre lança l'idée d'un régime commercial préférentiel entre les Etats successeurs[199], auquel une association de l'Italie était envisagée. L'idée de Briand était en fait d'amener Rome et Prague à collaborer au relèvement économique et politique de l'Europe centre-orientale afin de satisfaire toutes les orientations de la diplomatie française, aussi bien le soutien à la Petite Entente que la recherche d'alliés qui fussent des puissances militaires plus importantes[200]. Dans le contexte de l'enquête Layton-Rist diligentée par la SDN pour

[195] Magda Adam, "Confédération danubienne ou Petite Entente ?", in *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, volume 25, 1979, p. 61-113. Vojislav Pavlović, "Une conception traditionaliste de la politique orientale de la France. Le vicomte Joseph de Fontenay, envoyé plénipotentiaire auprès du roi Pierre I[er] Karageorgevitch (1917-1921)", in *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, volume 49, n°193, 1999, p. 69-82.

[196] Benito Mussolini, *Scritti politici di Benito Mussolini*, Milan : Feltrinelli, 1979, 357 p., discours prononcé par Mussolini à Pola le 20 septembre 1920.

[197] *Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini*, volume XVI, Florence, La Fenice, 1955, 499 p., article « Contre le retour des rois » publié dans le *Popolo d'Italia*, n°5, 6 janvier 1921, p. 98-100.

[198] *Idem*, interview de Della Torretta par Mussolini à Cannes, publiée dans le *Popolo d'Italia*, n°6, 7 janvier 1922, p. 381-385.

[199] Toute cette affaire est largement documentée dans les cartons des archives du MAEF, au sein de la série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, sous-série B54.

[200] MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, B54, volume n°38, f°50 à 59, note de Seydoux, 5 juin 1925.

évaluer la situation économique de l'Autriche[201], un régime de tarifs douaniers préférentiels apparaissait comme une solution valable à l'atonie économique de la zone centre-européenne. Mais, dans un contexte dominé par des logiques de puissance, l'Italie n'était pas encline à partager son influence avec la Tchécoslovaquie.

Entre 1925 et 1933 les négociations furent relancées au gré des opportunités offertes par les événements internationaux. Les réactions des diplomates aux réveils sporadiques du mouvement pour l'*Anschluss* montrent les liens étroits entretenus entre la question de l'indépendance de l'Autriche face à l'Allemagne et les projets de confédération danubienne. En effet, le primat accordé dans ces derniers à une dimension immédiatement politique ou à une dimension d'abord économique dépendait de l'analyse du mouvement pour l'*Anschluss*. Louis Mathieu de Vienne, ambassadeur de la République française à Vienne de février 1927 à octobre 1934, estimait que les raisons d'ordre politique de la crise autrichienne, notamment la disparition de la maison des Habsbourg et la libération consécutive des tendances favorables à une union avec les États allemands catholiques, passeraient avec le temps, mais que les données les plus importantes du problème étaient économiques[202]. Jules Laroche avançait qu'on ne développerait le patriotisme autrichien qu'« *en donnant à l'Autriche des raisons de vivre* »[203], ce qui passait par la construction d'une communauté d'intérêts, d'abord économiques, avec ses voisins. En revanche, François Charles-Roux, en poste à Prague, avait une analyse d'abord stratégique de la situation et mettait l'accent sur le danger de fragiliser la Petite Entente par les projets de confédération danubienne[204]. En ce qui concerne l'Italie, diplomates et dirigeants ne descendaient pas dans les subtilités de l'argumentation sur le caractère plutôt économique ou plutôt politique du mouvement pour l'*Anschluss*. Guariglia affirma dans ses mémoires : « *Il est superflu de dire que, déjà [en 1928], cette question se vidait de plus en plus de son contenu économique pour démontrer son caractère essentiellement politique. En réalité, les préoccupations sur l'impossibilité de la survie économique de la république autrichienne, sur lesquelles se fondaient les arguments pour l'union austro-allemande, commençaient à paraître très exagérées. [La question] figurait en permanence à l'horizon politique […].* »[205]

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[201] Walter Layton et Charles Rist, *La Situation économique de l'Autriche. Rapport présenté au Conseil de la SDN*, Genève : Société des Nations, 1925, 221 p.

[202] MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, B 54, volume n°45, f°100 à 103, dépêche confidentielle n°190 de Louis de Vienne à Briand, Budapest, 9 septembre 1927.

[203] MAEF, Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série Z, Autriche, volume n°78, f°65 à 67, dépêche secrète n°156 de Laroche à Briand, Varsovie, 13 avril 1927. Elle fut réexpédiée par les soins du Département aux autres ambassadeurs en Europe..

[204] MAEF, Correspondance politique et commerciale 1918-1940, Série Z, Tchécoslovaquie, volume n°70, f°130 à 132, dépêche très confidentielle n°273 de Charles-Roux à Briand, Budapest, 1er juillet 1927.

[205] Raffaele Guariglia, *Ricordi 1922-1946,* Naples : Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1950, 783 p., p. 76-77.

Le débat français apparaissait donc plus aux Italiens comme une façon de convaincre du bien-fondé d'un système économique danubien que comme une interrogation susceptible de faire vraiment avancer le problème de l'*Anschluss*. Dans le cadre de la préparation de la Conférence économique mondiale, Scialoja s'opposa à toute restriction des champs de compréhension du problème autrichien pour prôner une vision générale. Il fallait selon lui donner priorité à l'établissement du diagnostic sur celui du remède, remarque qu'il assortit de ces mots : « *Quant aux remèdes, ils sont presque toujours de nature politique* », sans préciser par ailleurs lesquels il faudrait apporter[206]. Cette position correspondait au désir italien de faire obstacle à toute confédération danubienne et aux capacités économiques de l'Italie, réduites du fait des difficultés financières et du déficit de la balance commerciale[207] : l'influence politique constituait pour elle un levier plus puissant et plus efficace.

Les premiers effets de la crise économique se firent sentir en Europe centre-orientale dès 1930, autour du problème crucial de l'agriculture, soumise à des problèmes structurels non résolus et à l'effondrement des prix du blé[208]. Pour y remédier, des projets de crédit agricole international furent envisagés[209], qui eurent des liens directs avec ce qui avait été envisagé les années précédentes et échouèrent pour les mêmes raisons de logiques de puissance. Un premier projet français, désigné comme le « projet Loucheur », avait pour enjeu « *l'établissement d'un système douanier préférentiel entre États successeurs de la grande unité économique qu'avait été l'Empire austro-hongrois* »[210]. En janvier 1931 l'étude du problème fut renvoyée au Comité financier de la SDN, qui dès son premier rapport mit l'accent sur les aspects politiques du problème et sur l'aiguillon régionaliste que le crédit agricole devait constituer[211]. Le 21 mai 1931, le Conseil de la SDN approuva une convention instituant un Institut de crédit agricole international, qui devait avoir son siège à Genève. Mais la convention ne fut pas ratifiée : beaucoup d'États s'abstinrent, soit parce qu'ils ne souhaitaient pas prêter d'argent pour une entreprise hasardeuse étant donné le défaut de paiement récurrent des États danubiens, soit parce que le projet ne leur convenait pas pour des raisons de politique générale, comme c'était le cas de l'Italie.

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[206] G. Bruccoleri, *L'Opera dei delegati italiani nella Società delle nazioni*, volume II, 1925-1929, Rome : Anonima Romana Editoriale, 1936, 395 p. : intervention de Scialoja au comité du Conseil de la SDN chargé de la préparation de la Conférence économique internationale, 8 juin 1926.

[207] György Ranki, *Economy and Foreign Policy: The Struggle of the Great Powers for Hegemony in the Danube Valley, 1919-1939*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1983, 224 p., p. 25.

[208] Charles Hilliard Feinstein, Peter Temin, Gianni Toniolo, *The European Economy Between the Wars*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1997, XI + 233 p., p. 71-76.

[209] Nous nous permettons de renvoyer à la communication dans ce colloque du Professeur Sylvain Schirmann, « Régionalisme agraire en Europe centrale et crédit agricole européen autour de 1930 ».

[210] Pierre-Etienne Flandin, *Politique française 1919-1940*, Paris : Les Editions Nouvelles, 1947, 466 p., p. 97-98.

Igino Brocchi, un haut fonctionnaire triestin qui travailla aussi bien au ministère des Affaires Etrangères qu'au ministère des Finances, fut ainsi chargé d'élaborer une contre-offensive au projet français. S'il existait des similitudes entre les deux projets, il y avait aussi des différences de taille, à la fois techniques et politiques. Dans un premier temps le projet italien comprenait l'Italie, l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Yougoslavie : il était donc restreint à une aire infrarégionale, concentrée autour des débouchés sur l'Adriatique, et accordait à l'Italie une place privilégiée. Brocchi était par ailleurs d'avis qu'un recours supplémentaire au crédit serait trop dangereux pour des Etats danubiens déjà endettés et qu'il valait mieux assurer les conditions de l'achat des surplus agricoles par des accords régionaux. Sur ce point, l'intérêt italien rencontrait celui des États danubiens, car Brocchi entendait bien faire jouer un rôle de premier plan aux entreprises et aux institutions dans lesquelles l'Italie avait une place importante : au lieu de créer de nouveaux instituts, il fallait « *profiter des institutions existantes, comme les Magasins généraux [de Trieste], comme les entreprises ferroviaires en contact direct avec les exportateurs et les importateurs, et comme la Banque des règlements internationaux, qui ont précisément cette fonction spécifique et une relative disponibilité de capitaux* »[212]. Le projet italien fut cependant lui aussi acculé à l'échec par l'accroissement rapide des difficultés financières des États danubiens et par l'absence de coopération internationale. Là où la France fit jouer son poids à la SDN, l'Italie chercha à faire jouer son influence à la Banque des Règlements Internationaux, notamment par l'intermédiaire d'Alberto Beneduce, vice-président du comité de direction[213]. Bien qu'il fût nécessaire de relever économiquement l'Europe centre-orientale et évident qu'aucune puissance n'y parviendrait sans la coopération des autres, les projets danubiens ne furent jamais l'instrument dépolitisé de coopération internationale que leurs concepteurs mettaient en avant.

La préparation du célèbre plan Tardieu de mars 1932 vit ressurgir les débats autour de trois questions principales, le nombre d'États à inclure dans l'entente, le degré d'intégration régionale et la procédure à suivre. Là où Louis Mathieu de Vienne préconisait une entente économique à trois entre la Tchécoslovaquie, l'Autriche et la Hongrie pour rétablir une

[211] MAEF, Série SDN, Secrétariat, sous-série 1J, volume n°1167, f°207 à 211, Rapport du Comité financier sur le crédit agricole, Genève, 20 janvier 1931.
[212] Archivio Storico di Trieste (AST), Archivio Brocchi, busta 34, fasc. 341, note de Brocchi « Parere sulla via da seguirsi per coordinare le discussioni a Ginevra su gli accordi economici con gli stati danubiani in preparazione », sans date, mais d'après les documents avec lesquels cette note a été classée, elle date probablement des premiers jours de mars 1931.
[213] Archivio Storico della Banca d'Italia (ASBI), Carte Beneduce, n°121, fasc. 1, sf. 3, lettre de Brocchi à Beneduce, 14 mars 1931.

« *économie du moyen Danube* » entre trois pays qui lui paraissaient complémentaires[214], Charles-Roux plaida en faveur d'une entente des cinq Etats successeurs qui n'aurait pas démantelé la Petite Entente[215]. Si Robert Coulondre, le sous-directeur aux Relations commerciales, se rangea aux vues de Louis de Vienne en avançant que, plus le groupement danubien serait étendu, plus l'Allemagne et l'Italie pourraient réclamer d'y être incluses[216], René Massigli, alors directeur du Service français de la SDN, prôna une entente à cinq[217]. André Tardieu, qui forma son gouvernement le 20 février, arbitra en faveur de l'entente danubienne à cinq, privilégiant ainsi les arguments politiques sur les considérations économiques. Il y fut encouragé par l'attitude des parlementaires : le 17 novembre 1931, le député Ernest Pezet déposa une demande d'interpellation sur la nécessité d'une « *union économique régionale de l'Europe centrale et orientale* ». A ses yeux l'union des cinq Etats successeurs auxquels serait adjointe la Bulgarie donnerait un contenu concret à l'arbitrage, à l'assistance mutuelle, à la sécurité, au désarmement et constituait à ce titre le nœud de tous les problèmes de la politique étrangère française[218]. L'échec rapide du plan Tardieu puis, l'année suivante, la mort de la coopération économique internationale lors de la conférence de Londres devaient remiser durablement tout projet d'intégration économique danubienne.

3. Quel avenir pour un groupement régional en Europe centre-orientale après les échecs des années 1930 ?

En 1954, Vito Platania, qui évoluait dans le secteur privé comme dans les bureaux du ministère des Affaires Etrangères italien, publia un opuscule intitulé *Piani e progetti per una confederazione danubiana*, dans lequel il passait en revue les projets danubiens depuis 1919. Il y plaidait pour l'établissement d'ententes régionales en Europe et donnait à l'entente danubienne une nette orientation antibolchévique[219]. Malgré son caractère relativement

[214] Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Rome-Quirinal, volume n°776, fasc. « Projet d'accord économique Tchécoslovaquie-Autriche-Hongrie, 1930-1932 », copie de la dépêche n°210 de Louis de Vienne à Briand, Budapest, 23 septembre 1931

[215] CADN, Rome-Quirinal, volume n°776, fasc. « Projet d'accord économique Tchécoslovaquie-Autriche-Hongrie, 1930-1932 », copie de la dépêche n°297 de Charles-Roux, Prague, 1er novembre 1931

[216] Pour le télégramme de Massigli annoté par Coulondre : MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, sous-série Dossiers géographiques, Autriche, volume n°31, duplicata du télégramme en clair par courrier n°167 de Massigli, Genève, 17 février 1932. Pour la réponse qui lui fut adressée par le Département : MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, sous-série Dossiers géographiques, Autriche, volume n°31, télégrammes au départ à chiffrer n°264 à 277, Paris, 20 février 1932.

[217] MAEF, Série Relations commerciales 1919-1940, sous-série Dossiers géographiques, Autriche, volume n°31, duplicata du télégramme à l'arrivée en clair n°222 de Massigli, Genève, 27 février 1932.

[218] *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés, 1881-1940*, 14e législature, session extraordinaire de 1931, 2e séance du 17 novembre 1931, p. 3895-3914.

[219] Vito Platania, *Piani e progetti per una confederazione danubiana*, Marl : Amerikai Magyar Kiadó, 1954, 15 p.

anecdotique, la brochure montre la persistance de l'idée de confédération danubienne après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale en même temps qu'elle révèle son effacement derrière les préoccupations plus pressantes liées à la division de l'Europe en deux blocs. En outre, dans une Italie disqualifiée par sa défaite et l'effondrement du fascisme, l'heure était davantage au choix atlantiste et européen qu'à la reprise des échafaudages de l'entre-deux-guerres qui aurait pu compromettre l'équilibre entre les deux blocs[220].

Dans l'immédiat après-guerre, la France se trouvait dans une position un peu plus favorable pour développer une diplomatie qu'elle voulait autonome. Une dépêche de Maurice Dejean suggère la permanence d'une idée d'intégration danubienne[221]. Le diplomate commençait par reprocher à la politique française en Europe centrale entre 1919 et 1938 d'avoir été entièrement dominée par les liens qui l'unissaient aux pays de la Petite Entente et d'avoir négligé le rôle de médiateur. Paris devait œuvrer pour une Autriche indépendante, y compris vis-à-vis de Prague – et il faut ici souligner que c'est Dejean qui fut nommé ambassadeur à Prague en novembre 1945. Il ajoutait : « *C'est la condition préalable à toute coopération politique et économique entre l'Autriche et les petits Etats limitrophes, dont il est inutile de souligner l'importance. […] En dehors de la Bohême et de l'Autriche, le seul intérêt proprement français en Europe centrale réside dans l'établissement d'un compromis durable entre les nations du bassin danubien. Indépendamment de toute question de fédération, il est en effet très important que celles-ci présentent un front uni contre un réveil éventuel du pangermanisme et qu'aucune d'elles ne soit tentée à l'avenir de favoriser les intrigues de Berlin et de Rome* ». La grande inconnue restait bien sûr l'attitude de l'URSS qui, tant que le problème allemand ne serait pas réglé, pouvait se laisser tenter par le maintien de divisions chroniques ou le panslavisme. Constituer un obstacle à l'Allemagne par des nations uniquement slaves ferait donc le jeu de Moscou.

Ernest Pezet, ce parlementaire qui avait œuvré pour une politique danubienne de la France dans l'entre-deux-guerres, poursuivit lui aussi ses réflexions tout en les subordonnant à l'attitude de Moscou. Ses archives recèlent deux notes[222] où apparaissent deux idées importantes : tout d'abord la nécessité de récuser la logique d'équilibre des forces pour une logique d'intégration, économique certes, mais aussi politique, à travers le règlement du

[220] Frédéric Attal, *Histoire de l'Italie de 1943 à nos jours,* Paris : Armand Colin, 2004, 415 p., p. 71-72.
[221] *DDF*, Quatrième série 1944-1953, 1945, tome I, document n°8, dépêche n°A/1836 de Maurice Dejean, ministre de France auprès des gouvernements alliés réfugiés à Londres, à Georges Bidault, Londres, 6 janvier 1945.
[222] Archives de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP), Papiers Ernest Pezet, volume n°8, dossier n°3 « L'Europe centrale et le plan Tardieu, mon rôle dans sa préparation, 1931-1932 », note « L'Europe centrale et orientale », post-1945 ; volume n°11, dossier n°2 « Plans et notes de conférences 1944-1947 », conférence du 29 novembre 1944 « Problèmes actuels d'Europe centrale » devant le Centre d'études des cadres.

problème des nationalités par une médiation internationale et non plus par les rapports de force entre Etats souverains ; ensuite « *l'articulation organique* » du groupement régional danubien à « *l'Europe déjà unie ou en voie de s'unir* ».

Quelques leçons avaient donc été tirées des événements de l'entre-deux-guerres, en même temps que la nouvelle menace soviétique rendait nécessaire l'arrimage de l'Europe centre-orientale à un ensemble plus vaste. Mais les mois suivants rendirent toute spéculation danubienne inopérante : dès le mois de mars 1945 un congrès panslave se tint à Sofia à l'initiative de Moscou.

Conclusion

Au-delà de l'affrontement de logiques de puissance, celles de la France et de l'Italie aussi bien que celles des Etats successeurs, les projets de confédération danubienne dans l'entre-deux-guerres montrent la difficulté qu'il y eut à changer de paradigme une fois les traités de paix en application. Certes, aucune intégration politique des Etats danubiens ne fut jamais évoquée que comme une chimère et l'intégration économique rejetée à un horizon lointain, par l'Italie mais également, quoique d'une façon différente, par la France, pour laquelle toute fédération danubienne devait avant tout servir sa sécurité. Mais la simple coopération commerciale était immédiatement perçue comme annonciatrice de cette intégration refusée, vouant ainsi à l'échec des projets même modestes. Or, l'absence de coopération signifiait la crise aussi bien politique qu'économique pour toute la région.

Après 1989 l'idée d'une fédération danubienne ressurgit timidement en France, en restant centrée sur des thématiques évoquées ci-dessus, la particularité de l'espace danubien, le rôle dominant de l'Autriche autour de laquelle se seraient groupées les ex-démocraties populaires, l'étroitesse des liens à maintenir entre ce groupement, perçu comme transitoire, et l'ouest de l'Europe engagé dans le processus de construction européenne[223]. On retrouvait là les idées d'Ernest Pezet en 1944, elles-mêmes nourries du substrat des projets danubiens de l'entre-deux-guerres.

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EEAS'S ONE OF A KIND MOMENTS-2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE

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Abstract: *Starting from the institutional changes that the Lisbon Treaty brings, the following lines aim to analyze the situation EEAS, in particular the support to Haiti after the earthquake, by analyzing allocations for humanitarian aid and comparisons to other actions EEAS and their disproportion. Also, this paper will analyze the relationships fostered between the EEAS and Haiti, which are visions between the two entities and foreign policy approach for joint cooperation. EEAS today has an interesting position that is worth analyzing and can be classified as an institution of lobbying but at the same time it can be considered as a specialized EU Foreign Ministry. It location can be anywhere as long as it is subsidized unconditionally.*

Keywords: EEAS, Haiti's Earthquake, EU Commission, Humanitarian aid, Lisbon Treaty

I. Background

It enjoys autonomous status that operates under a management responsibility over capacity crisis in the EU, strengthen its external position. It also has an outside service say in the political and strategic aspects of development cooperation instruments by promoting constant presence outside the EU with delegations and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Other words can be likened to a lobbying body in terms of nature of HR[224] activity, but can be identified and counter-lobbying activities for strengthening the external position, in situations of interest (e.g. crisis management in Libya and Tunisia).

A close presentation of the internal structure of the EEAS is categorically required, in terms of its objectives. The EEAS has approximately 3417 members divided between the Headquarter (1457 members) and EU Delegations (1960 members) and an administrative

[224] See : http://eeas.europa.eu/background/index_ro.htm

budget of € 524,915,791 for the year 2014[225] of which € 747 918 581.64 represent the 2012 financial execution. Out of the amount allocated for 2014, € 154,631,407 represents staff expenses at headquarter and € 312,923,884 is allocated to the 139 EU Delegations which have been serving EU citizens for nearly 60 years and are present in 163 countries and international organizations. The claim that EEAS has an unlimited budget remains on the grounds that in the last three years of activity no budget proposal was rejected.

Comparing these figures with the diplomatic service of the 27 Member States which has a total staff close to 94 000 and budgetary costs of some € 7.529 million, it can be argued that the EEAS is a small player in many EU external policies, considering its low staff count. In addition, in the EEAS, the EU Special Representatives are left (EUSRs) with an unclear status after the adoption of Treaty of Lisbon. This specialized organ was originally created by the Council to manage crisis situations or to act as a substitute in those places where the EEAS is not represented. Haiti is among the countries kept under surveillance by it.

In 2012 the total budget of the EUSRs, was € 28 million, including 200 political observers and administrative staff[226]. Today EUSRs is fully integrated into the EEAS, the budget is shared and the staff wage rates are established by the EEAS.

Moreover, one needs to expose and analyze the source of the functioning of the EEAS, starting with the deliberate will of mystical pawns in the service of EU's external lobbying[227] and continuing with the implementation of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU's foreign policy, which were scattered throughout the body of the treaty. The general provisions on the Union's external actions are embedded together in Title V of the TEU, but specific terms of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) are separate from those provisions referring to the External Service, with the latter as part of a separate document (Title V TFEU). It is on these grounds that the Lisbon Treaty may be interpreted as hiding, instead of repealing, the three pillars structure and facilitating for CFSP to delimit non-CFSP external actions[228].

The European External Action Service has experienced a difficult road to entrance into service as provided in the text of the Convention on the future of Europe (2003), some officials agreed with the creation and promotion of a specialized service in this respect, while others were reluctant and considered such a measure ineffective. Finally, both Patten and

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[225] EU Report: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB2014/RO/SEC10.pdf

[226] EEAS Review, July 2013.

[227] For example, Poland, which circulated a paper calling for the EEAS to be " *a sui generis* institution similar to an executive agency".

[228] Elsuweg, P. (2010) Eu External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: in search of new balance between delimitation and consistency, *Common Market Law Review*, 47(4), pp. 992-995

Solana promoted arguments against the existence of a dual mandate because they considered it as an impossible task to be achieved by anyone[229]. Subsequently, these trends have been incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty, which has been ratified by all member states, and then one year after the entry into force entered the year with the first mission EEAS his intention to involve economic and political in Haiti after the earthquake of 2010.

Despite the fact that the EU has created the largest diplomatic service in the world that can handle actions involving the EU and any third State through which the EU exercises its CFSP, defining the contours of the EEAS mandate is difficult to achieve.

The Lisbon Treaty describes the EEAS as:

Article 27 (3) TEU:

"In fulfilling His mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in Cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise Officials from relevant Departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service Shall be ESTABLISHED by a decision of the Council. The council shall act on the Proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission. "

This section focuses on the procedural and organizational aspects rather than on the role and powers of the service, making it inevitably vague and imprecise[230]. According to the statement no. 15 annexed to the Treaty, *"The Conference declares that, as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon is Signed, the Secretary-General of the Council, the High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Commission and the Member States SHOULD begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service "*[231].

The EEAS training activities take priority, some activities that could occur in its service could have been predicted, starting a foreign campaign for recognition in different areas deprived[232] others such as the example analyzed in the present work, no. One item worth noting is that in the exercise of external policy other institutions represented by key

[229] European Foreign Affairs Review, 2009, 14(3), pp. 431-450.

[230] Merket H. (2011) The European External Action Service : An opportunity to reconcile development and security policies or a new battleground for inter-institutional turf wars? in: *Proceeding JMCE Research Student Workshop*, *King's College London, September 2011.*

[231] Declaration No. 15 on Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union annexed to the final act of the intergovernamental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon. Retrieved from : http://eur-lex.europa.eu

[232] Opening the new diplomatic missions, after EEAS operating, in South Sudan, Libia and Myanmar.

people are involved. Some authors concluded that the architectural changes in the EU foreign policy, starting with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, promotes this idea and the implementation of the new Treaty give the Union a new leadership role on the world stage[233].

At a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, in 26 April 2010, the question of whether the EEAS could handle consular services by creating a specific department for EU citizens present in a third country. The UK supported this idea, but other member states were reluctant on the grounds that the Maastricht Treaty already requires Member States to undertake the duty of providing consular services to all EU citizens. Currently, the EU Commission has neither the resources nor competence to manage foreign affairs, however, this possibility deserves another look in the future.

Promoting a specialized external service, mustering a certain number of people to perform specialized work on specific areas of interest, is a factor that involves additional resources and the fulfillment of preset responsibilities that can give rise to internal feuds and professional competition. **Can the EEAS be designated as a training body?**

By December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European Union already had a quasi-diplomatic service. Supported by the European Commission, it had 136 delegations accredited to more than 190 countries and international organizations[234]. In addition, many EU investors lobby for the establishment of such a Service through ad-hoc diplomacy involving the representatives of major industrial companies (such as Daimler AG, Nokia, etc.)

II. The Decision to Help Haitians

The choice of this topic, which is still smoldering, as the response to the 2010 disaster in Haiti is the first action of the EEAS and leverages the efficiency and the interaction thereof. Furthermore, little has been written about this subject except for some newspaper articles[235] more or less biased, which is why a scientific analysis from the point of view of international relations is required. Amid the implementation of the external representation program, the fate of this service has experienced unprecedented ascendancy although it was often marked by opposing interests on foreign policy[236]. Forming a diplomatic service with

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[235] Walden, G. (2010) Scandal, waste and waffle on Eu diplomacy. *The Times*, **16th March**. Retrieved from: http://www.thetimes.co.uk

[236] Foreign policy promoted by EU founding states Italy, France, Germany, etc. bringing immeasurable contribution parallel to the tasks performed by the EEAS.

responsibilities alike those of an EU Foreign Ministry was an idea that emerged because of the professional contribution of the Member States.

When taking into account the primary financial aspects, the Haiti aid, consolidating the EU's position as the main donor, can this mean exerting **a certain influence** on the policy?

Not long after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, Catherine Ashton was appointed High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. She dealt with prioritizing and establishing the EEAS structure. Subsequently, when the earthquake in Haiti happened Ashton called a meeting of all political actors at EU level to render a common EU position on the involvement in the disaster in Haiti.

Thus the EEAS had a promising start. By Decision 2010/427 / EC of July 26/2010, the provisions on organization and functioning of the EEAS entered into force approximately 6 months after the earthquake in Haiti, which struck on 12 January 2010. On the eve of the earthquake the EEAS did not have a clearly defined status regarding the functioning of the organization, although the composition and role of service had been already provided by the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on 1 December 2009. This situation justified the initial reaction of HR Catherine Ashton[237] to convene the Council and the Commission to take a decision by mutual agreement to supplant the lack of a legal status for the EEAS.

Where the means employed to manage the disaster in Haiti used in optimal conditions? This is why there was criticism about the first management action / task of the European External Action Service. Ashton behaved under stress to achieve such coordination among the key EU institutions, at the time did not produce a single run in the institution crisis in Haiti. Although at that time she was close to resign, she is deemed as having a formidable character, traits that have helped her election as HR.

III. EEAS economic development in Haiti

On 12 January 2010 the earthquake in Haiti struck with a magnitude of around 7 on the Richter scale. Around 3 million people were affected by the earthquake and 220,570 citizens were declared dead, 300,572 were injured and 2.3 million people were left without shelter[238]. EEAS clearly acted to help and improve damage, but all this help from humanitarian aid position closely related to the exercise of foreign policy as a global actor. The EEAS has provided € 122 million in 2010, of which 100 million were allocated directly

[237] The term "Foreign Minister" was used in the constitutional treaty (2004) prior to the HR/VP adage of the Lisbon treaty.

to the humanitarian needs caused by the earthquake, such as water, food, shelter, hygiene products for nearly 5 million people. Out of the rest that remains available, € 22 million were allocated to treatments for diseases, epidemics, ensuring sanitary conditions and proper environments for making required vaccines which were distributed to about 3 million people. It should be remembered that in addition to the amounts granted by the EU Commission aid was also granted from 25 Member States forming the Civil Protection Mechanism of the European Union.

The following year, in 2011, funds were granted amounting to € 38.5 million to assist 5 million people. However, funds allocated for 2011 were aimed not only at people in the refugee camps where they were provided food and shelter, but at all people seeking shelter and help after the earthquake. The structure of the funding was proportionate to the situation in Haiti and was based on three pillars: malnutrition (€ 7 million); earthquakes and cholera prevention (€ 26 million) and pillar III - disaster risk reduction. This tripartite form is in favor of disadvantaged citizens in this way can share financial skills and the funds can be allocated more easily.

Subsequently, the risks have been reduced, interfering with the establishment of order and social integration corroborating survival, although the contribution was a priceless, 2012 allocations were less than in previous years, 2010 and 2011. Approximately 1.3 million citizens of the island have received the entire amount allocated[239]. The earthquake in Haiti has attracted the attention of many global players, both states and international organizations that prove their power and influence through promptly, e.g USA, UNICEF, Red Cross and the European Union.

According to a speech by Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, the main problem is represented by the fight against cholera. Due to few water sources, the disease has spread among Haitian communities almost a year after the disaster, i.e. from November 18 2010 to November 23 2010, the number of deaths from cholera have rapidly increased, reaching 50 deaths per day[240]. Thus, after this date may find relief and even reduce the number of fatalities from cholera, between November 23/ 2010 – December 4/ 2010, reaching 22 deaths per day.

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[238] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Haiti earthquake 2010- Three years report, p.5 Retrieved from: http://www.ifrc.org
[239] European Commission, Department of Press and Communication (2013) *Haiti earthquake three years on: EU gives an additional €30.5 million in humanitarian aid*, Brussels: DOPAC.
[240] "Cholera in Haiti", Kristalina Georgieva, Press Statement in Berlaymont, Brusseles, 13 Decembrie 2010. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu

These figures are due to contribution of the international community, through social assistance, providing the necessary resources of daily living. Although in those critical moments mutual support from the international community was important, projects have continued to unfold, and the spread of different pandemics stopped. Some examples signify vaccinating over 1 million people against cholera, distributing 1.3 million hygiene tools to the population as well as access to clean water to over 500,000 people. All these activities are due to the aid provided by international organizations and states[241].

Among the main objectives set by Kristalina Georgieva, since 2010[242], towards combating the spread of epidemics and providing shelter for the population, one can mention the optimal coordination of the distribution of humanitarian aid, the large number of donors, the presence of military contingents to maintain public order and grant aid to those in need by continuing humanitarian assistance providing health, sanitary conditions and proper shelters.

Crisis management at that time represented a morbid moment for the European Union's foreign policy in terms of the promptitude with which various decisions were taken at the time, but the degree of their effectiveness differed according to the needs of the Haitian people. In 2008, the EU concluded a strategic cooperation with Haiti on infrastructure, public health and social security. In this way a decision was made to help Haiti to evolve towards a new assertiveness. During all this period the financial lobby was made by the Commission.

Following the visit to Haiti with the advent of the New York Conference, on "*A shared vision for Haiti-The next ten years*", HR Catherine Ashton supported the Haitian government's plan to channel resources to the public. Approximately $ 1.6 billion, of which € 265 million from EU taxpayers in the form of humanitarian aid, € 650 million in financial aid from the governments of the Member States, and the rest up to € 3 billion through the contribution of the citizens of the Member States. During the visit, Ashton also promised the involvement of EU social workers, law enforcement agencies and the Police.

The European Union has supported Haiti in the development of its infrastructure, economic development through the establishment and contribution to the aid budget. In the first three years, after the earthquake, effective aid was given to ensure proper shelter for about 1.5 million people who were left homeless. Support for education, social inclusion and the justice system were undeniable among the EEAS objectives. 7,000 teachers were trained nationwide and more than 120,000 children benefited from the support given to them, not

[241] Kristalina Georgieva, was a key pawn in the action deployed by EU, also led voluntary activities undertaken by member states with people around the world, under EU.
[242] "Humanitarian challenges in Haiti", Kristalina Georgieva Statement, Brussels, April 2/ 2010.

only in the last three years but also though previous programs conducted successively up to the present.

Year 2013 brought another tranche of financial aid to Haiti, amounting to € 30.5 million. In addition, in 2013 the Strategic Country Plan on the cooperation agreement between the European Commission and the Haitian government for financial support through the European Development Fund No. 10 will expire. This agreement was concluded with Haiti in order to support infrastructure development and good governance, and although is an essential lever for the growth of Haitian economy, this process represents penetration and implementation of a common policy.

In the period spanning 2008-2013 the contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) for Haiti totaled EUR 291 million[243], but increased considerably after the disaster struck. The Tenth EDF stipulates a maximum amount of €22.682 billion for the ACP[244] countries, as follows: €17.766 billion for the national and regional indicative programs, €2.7 billion to finance intra-ACP and inter-regional cooperation, and €1.5 billion to finance the Investment Facility. Of course, it should be noted that the financial resources available to the EDF are formed by the contribution of the Member States.

The countries contributing more than half of the amount allocated to the Tenth EDF were Germany (20.50%), France (19.55%) and the UK (14.82%).

Although the seriousness of the situation in Haiti in the last three years (2010-2013) affected the entire country, the substratum of the problem it's obvious when compared to the status-quo in Haiti during the IMF involvement. Reports often underlined the precarious situation in the country and impoverishment of the population. The IMF had entered into an agreement with Haiti in November 2006 on Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in Haiti.

The Plan was considered in part ineffective due to the destruction left by the earthquake. At the time public institutions were vulnerable, but since, democracy has been consolidated by the will of the people and the establishment of law and order[245].

Macroeconomic goals have been achieved through the first program developed, although growth was a bit slower[246].

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[243] République d'Haïti- Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu

[244] ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

[245] International Monetary Fund (2008) *Haiti: Third Review Under the-Three Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Requests for Augmentation of Access and Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, and Request for Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries- Staff Report; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Haiti*, IMF Country Report No. 08/223, Corrected August 2008.

IV. Haiti – a fulcrum for modelling the image of the EEAS

Why has **EEAS involved** itself in the earthquake in Haiti with a highly disproportionate contribution from other cases, such as that in the Sahen area (Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad)?

For the Sahen area, a 200 million Euro aid was given to 16 million inhabitants, while in Haiti for about 8 million inhabitants the costs were ten times as high, 85% of the 522 million were given exclusively by the EEAS (443.7 million Euros), this amount not including the personal financial aid from the Union citizens, all of these adding up to 3 billion Euros.

Another example comparable with Haiti is the situation of the development program adopted by the EEAS to for the development of the southern Mediterranean countries, where, in 2011-2013. € 3.5 billion were allocated. Forming an international task force was required. For example, Tunisia, where the official language is French, and the labour market has been exported to France for several decades, is of major importance for the EEAS, it benefiting from a financial support, in 2011-2013, of € 4 billion.

This amount can be used as comparison to Haiti, but other points of identification: population, infrastructure, economy and labour market are completely disproportionate, making it hard to provide a relevant comparison.

In the case of Haiti, it is important to bring into discussion the amount allocated by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), namely € 34.25 million for Haiti relief in 2012, particularly for cholera and other diseases. This amount later included, in 2013, the pretext of the damage caused by Isaac Tropical Storms and Sandy Tornado, although these two major events took place in August and October 2012, respectively, therefore virtually unpredictable[247] when the ECHO allocated the funds.

This assistance, regardless of its nature, reinforces the external position. The tactics used by the service are bargaining tools which strengthen its global image by climbing on top as the main donor for the earthquake, outpacing the U.S., a serious competitor for both policy enforcement and power modelling on the international scene.

By comparison, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, acted promptly from a social point of view, by accelerating the adoption of orphans from Haiti, through this

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[246] One of the most important issues that the IMF is able to revitalize is welfare program carried out by the World Bank on November 30/ 2007, noted on the occasion of the second review. These programs brought Haiti into the sphere of democracy operating within normal cohabitation parameters. All these factors which in terms of economic evolution used to financial aids from EU, by making financial reports, have become virtually ineffective after the disaster in 2010.

[247] EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, Commissioners Kristalyna Georgieva and Andris Piebalgs (2013) Joint Statement on the third anniversary of Haiti earthquake, Brussels, 12 January 2013, A 12/13.

granting an immeasurable humanitarian aid, after about a year after the disaster. The EEAS introduced its relief package, which did not expressly facilitate adoptions and promote social inclusion by raising and education by the source states.

Here, discussions can be raised whether the financial support given by the EEAS is more beneficial than the U.S. adoption process of regeneration the Haitian race in a new environment, a **teleological colonization?** This discussion revolves around the outcome, if the social mechanism is paramount in such times when the population and society is fragmented by invariable loss of life, which has caused the formation of monogamous families.

I believe that the social approach by the U.S. has a beneficial effect, both in terms of short-term results and long-term, while the EEAS has tried to keep the number one position through humanitarian aid donor financial and monetised.

The historic president has a huge variation in foreign policy, which is why there were sufficient evidence, though some unsolved, which can sustain the conquest of the territory through political involvement. Economic support is the antechamber of policy decisions, each measure has an effect, in this sense, the EEAS exercises historical, ideological and political fulcrums. Taking them one by one, the historical element is the main precedent, for several hundred years Haiti was run by the Europeans (Spanish and French[248]), on the other hand a consequence of island's colonization by Europeans, slowed down culture, tradition and values, an example in this sense is the official language: French and local traditions.

Of important interest is the early 2010 and the origin of the decision to help Haiti in a special way, disproportionate to the other similar actions, maybe because it was the **first action by the EEAS?**

Arguments can be diverse, but as any situation it has two hypotheses: first, disaster management in a relaxed manner, without major implications, the second hypothesis was engaging in a particular way because it was the first large-scale action carried out by the EEAS and the it could consolidate its position in a bipartite manner: EU external policy and EU's position towards the U.S.. I take the opinion of the second hypothesis, listing the following points of convergence towards supporting the hypothesis: **identity, tradition and history.**

[248] The discovery by Christopher Columbus, the movement of the capital from Santo Domingo, the conquest by French and Spanish, struggle with Dutch, has affected Haitians settlements. History repeats? The Columbus acted as well, in 1492 when he establish his settlements in this territory, moved the capital city, not soon, the French came (1625-1711). The US occupation in Haiti is not significant in time, but is important because it is the current-value (1915-1934). Effect of quality outweighs quantity!

Although at first glance they seem simple random concepts or keywords, they represent the fulcrums used to enhance the image together with the aid given to Haiti. The premises of the aid given to Haitians are strictly related to language, political system, poverty and geo-strategic position.

In addition, which are the presumed interests subsisting the **EU's political position in Haiti?** From the first day of its activity the EEAS has imposed a foreign campaign to enhance the image, although legal and operational foundation of this service has some weaknesses.

The EU bilateral agreements on trade and investments don't mention or remind about Haiti having concluded any specific agreement, yet Haiti is part of ACP countries, therefore has free access to products from the EU market, trade and investments exchange[249]. Policy makers have matured through the intervention of the EEAS in Haiti, the first time in 2008 with the implementation of the development program, encompassing the governance and political support in establishing radical measures of gradual recovery.

V. Conclusion

The position of the EEAS and the High Representative is to achieve more coherence in the external relations, by bringing closed together foreign policy areas. However, it is difficult to see such a mechanism operating as long as the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU is subject to national veto and the EEAS is a stand-alone service seen internationally as an independent sphere of activities of the Commission.

It still acts as a Commission service, through the actions it undertakes by consultation and cooperation between services. If Member States would have wanted, they could have long "modelled" the Maastricht Treaty and not create artificial divisions from different fields of international relations.

According to Graham Avery, a former senior EU official mentioned that the "*duplication and rivalry between the Commission and Council Secretariat will be replaced by duplication and rivalry between the EEAS and the Commission*"[250].

Thus, the conflict of jurisdiction and rivalry devolves from the external missions of both institutional entities[251]. The relationship with Haiti is very close, not only from the

[249] Memo 13/ 734 din 01/08/2013 European Commission-*The EU's bilateral trades and investment agreements-where are we?,* Brussels, 1 august 2013, it is stipulated the actually status of ACP countries and the reasons for helping all states. Haiti is not expressly listed as the recipient of these offers.

[250] Graham A. (2009) Europe's Foreign Service: From Design to Delivery. Brusseles: EPC Policy Brief.

position of the EU as the largest donor, but also from the view of foreign policy, which promotes relief (financial and humanitarian aid). The program launched by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the constant support given to Haitians for ten years is a bold project, but has many criteria to be met, however this position can be confident, as long as during 2010-2013 all the goals set have been achieved, beginning 2010 in a rate of 85%, and there still being a possibility that within 10 years, the situation in Haiti to be one of prosperity and not one of survival.

The most important thing that should remain consistently positive is the morale[252] of Haitians and determination and focus on prosperous future developments must be the premise of a normal island population, while foreign interests should be stalled and any external interference must be punished.

Will Haiti return to a **complete state** in a decade? This question has not answered yet, but a clear answer is that the European Union plays an important role in the development and prosperity of the Haitian island and sustainable development of the capital Port-au-Prince.

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