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## Table of Contents

Filip TERESZKIEWICZ

EUROSCEPTIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: WHO ARE THE TRENDSETTERS AND FOLLOWERS?.....	4
--	---

Yilmaz BAYAR and Murat GUNDUZ

THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN EU TRANSITION ECONOMIES .....	21
--	----

Caterina PREDA

THE CHILEAN MUSEUM OF SOLIDARITY AND TRANSREGIONAL LINKS WITH ROMANIA DURING THE COLD WAR.....	35
--	----

Elena V. KUCHERYAVAYA, Marta WITKOWSKA, Viktoriya KALINOVSKAYA,  
Pavel SELEZNEV, Svetlana ZUBANOVA and Aleksey FEDYAKIN

THE MULTICULTURALISM POLICY IN EUROPE .....	58
---	----

Vadym ZHELTOVSKYY

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE: IN SEARCH FOR SCENARIOS.....	72
---	----

Vepkhvia GRIGALASHVILI

AN AMBIGUOUS PHENOMENON OF HYBRID WARFARE. THEORY AND POLICY PRACTICE OF GEORGIA.....	93
---	----

Paweł STAWARZ

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN IN THE ENP - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES?.....	111
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## EUROSCEPTIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: WHO ARE THE TRENDSETTERS AND FOLLOWERS?

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**Abstract:** *Since the Hooghe et al.(2002) publication about party positions on European integration, a comparison of radical right and radical left Eurosceptic parties is not often conducted. In literature about Euroscepticism, the image of the horseshoe or “inverted U” illustrates the orientation of Euroscepticism among parties without any deeper analysis. This paper tries fill the research gap by investigating whether these two Eurosceptic groups are distinct from each other in the area of EU trade policy by analyzing the debate surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Using European Parliament debates about this EU-US partnership, the author tries give answers to the following questions: are Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) unified in their attitudes towards the TTIP? Between the far right and far left, which group of MEPs was the trendsetter in the TTIP debate and which was the follower? To answer these questions, a constructivist approach is applied through discourse analysis. In the conclusion, the author concludes that far-left Eurosceptics are trendsetters on the issue, and those on the far-right are the followers. In the contrast to the far-left parties, being opposed to free trade with the US was not consistent with the ideological profile of the far-right parties. Therefore, the latter had to change their attitudes towards this treaty, following the rise of anti-TTIP attitudes in European society.*

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**Keywords:** Euroscepticism, EU trade policy, TTIP, Far-left, Far-right, European Parliament

### Introduction

Political parties and movements with distinct anti-European platforms have gained considerable electoral representation in recent years (Adam, 2017; Rooduijn *et al.*, 2017; Halikiopoulou, 2018). Despite this process, there is still scant research on how and to what extent Eurosceptic activity shapes public policy or public discourse (Leruth, Startin and Usherwood, 2018). Szczerbiak and Taggart confirm this problem, remarking that there is little research that analyses the influence of Euroscepticism on EU politics (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2018). This paper fills the research gap in the area of the Eurosceptic Members' of the European Parliament (MEP) opinion on EU trade policy by analyzing the debate about TTIP that was negotiated during



the EP's 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> terms. For far-left parties and groups, who have historically been opposed to neo-liberalism, opposition to TTIP has understandably played an increasingly important role not only in political campaigns but also in differentiating themselves from mainstream parties. However, if being in the opposition towards TTIP is understandable for far-left Eurosceptics, the debate about the EU-US trade partnership has shown that far-right Eurosceptic politicians were also against this treaty. This observation is interesting because far-right parties mostly support capitalism and free trade, even if it is linked to the EU. The situation begs the question of why far-right Eurosceptics reversed their positions on free trade, and where they differ from far-left competitors in their attitudes toward global trade. Since the publication by Hooghe et al.(2002) about party positions on European integration, the comparison of radical right and radical left Eurosceptic parties is not often conducted. In literature about Euroscepticism, the image of the horseshoe or "inverted U" is widely used to illustrate the orientation of Euroscepticism among parties without any deeper analysis. Therefore, this paper contributes to filling gaps in our knowledge about differences between far-right and far-left Eurosceptics and their respective influences. The second goal of this paper is to scrutinize whether EMEPs are coherent or divided in their attitudes towards EU trade policy by using the ongoing debate surrounding the TTIP. To achieve this goal, two questions are asked: Are EMEPs unified in their attitudes towards the TTIP? Which group of EMEPs was the trendsetter in the TTIP debate, and which was the follower: the radical right or the radical left? To answer these questions, a constructivist approach is applied through discourse analysis.

This paper proceeds as follows: the first section provides an analysis of Euroscepticism. The far-right and far-left Euroscepticism typology is chosen for the foundation of this paper, and differences and similarities between the two are described. The second section briefly defines of trendsetters and followers. Third, the paper sheds light on Eurosceptic discourse and behavior within EP activity on TTIP. The fourth and final section reveals which EMEPs are trendsetters and which are followers on the TTIP issue followed by a conclusion.

### **Defining Euroscepticism**

Even though the first notion of Euroscepticism was conceived in 1998 by Taggart (2003), it is still difficult to say that Euroscepticism, as a concrete idea, exists. Taggart and Szczerbiak's

definition states that it is a phenomenon “encompassing a range of critical position on European integration, as well as outright opposition” (2004, pp. 5–6). However, this definition has weaknesses that are common with other definitions of the term because they emphasize its negative and fuzzy character. Further, they do not speculate as to why this negative attitude exists, offer any alternatives to integration, or postulate what end it leads to, creating confusion over what exactly links Eurosceptic movements and groups aside from negative attitudes (Leruth, Startin and Usherwood, 2018).

In analyzing Euroscepticism, many approaches have been used to distinguish them: ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczarbiak, 2004); “Euro-rejects”, “Eurosceptics” and “Euro-pragmatists” (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002); “Rejectionist Euroscepticism”, “Conditional Euroscepticism” and “Compromising Euroscepticism” (Vasilopoulou, 2011); and Far Right Euroscepticism (FRE) and Far Left Euroscepticism (FLE) (Meijers, 2017). The latter typology is chosen for the foundation of this paper. According to Hooghe et al., Euroscepticism is a far-left and far-right phenomenon because the EU expands in competency from liberalization of markets and opening up of domestic economies to competition toward more direct involvement in the functioning of member states’ legal systems and social programmes (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). However, radical right and left parties do not only hold anti-European views, but that their Euroscepticism is a crucial point of their ideological profiles. Both types of parties believe that European integration is a particularly salient policy issue. However, they are in opposition to the EU for very different reasons (Meijers, 2017). Most of all, FREs accuse the EU of eroding national culture, and FLEs criticize the EU as a vehicle of domination and exploitation of the working class (Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou, 2012; Meijers, 2017). While FREs try to combine cultural identity arguments against the EU with utilitarian objections against the pooling of sovereignty, the FLEs’ wariness about the EU is a product of their opposition to the free market economy and their quest for economic and social justice (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). Moreover, as Halikiopoulou et al. write, the electoral rise of the FLEs has been mostly a trend in the European periphery, being the form of protest against the EU in the context of austerity policy forced by EU institutions (2012). In contrast to that, the development of FREs has been ubiquitous across EU member states, “from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean and from the Benelux countries to the post-communist nations” (Startin and Brack, 2017).

Using the FRE/FLE typology, three Eurosceptic factions existed during TTIP negotiations in the EP's 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> terms:

Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE – NGL: radical-left group), Europe of Freedom and Democracy/Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD/EFDD: radical-right group), and Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF: radical-right group). However, it should be noted that some independent MEPs are also Eurosceptics.

### **Definitions of trendsetters and followers**

Although there is no common definitions within political science what *trendsetter* and *follower* mean, terms are used by researchers (Lewis, 1999). For example, Ilbiz and Curtis note that *trendsetters* exert a significant influence, and also shape agendas and norms. Although this definition could be useful for this analysis, their definition of *followers*, which states that “followers are not as strong or influential as trendsetters” and “have comparatively limited influence on setting trends” is inaccurate; according to them, a *follower* exerts some influence on others, which in essence means that *followers* are also *trendsetters* (Ilbiz and Curtis, 2015).

In this paper, the *trendsetter* is defined as a politician, party, or faction that creates and promotes trends, such as opinions about a particular decision within EU politics, while a *follower* is, in contrast, a similar entity that acts according to the actions of the *trendsetter*. To assess which Eurosceptic politician and group in EP (far-right or far-left) play a *trendsetter* role among EMEPs on the TTIP issue, this paper poses the following questions: Does it set Eurosceptic discourse about a certain topic? Does it present unique arguments during debates? Do other Eurosceptic MEPs echo them?

To distinguish between *trendsetters* and *followers*, two further questions are considered: do they change their attitudes towards TTIP following public debate? Do they start using arguments that have been popular amongst European societies and other politicians?

The investigation of who plays *trendsetter* and *follower* roles in parliamentary TTIP debates is achieved by analyzing speeches through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Since the 1980s, discourse analysis has become a highly-favoured method of empirical analysis, especially among constructivist and critical international relations scholars. However, the terms *discourse* and *discourse analysis* do not have a standard definition, so it follows that there is not a single

method of discourse analysis. Düzgit and Rumelili note that a wide range of scholars use discourse-analytical tools in various ways – some more loosely and illustratively, others more systematically (2018). As such, there are important theoretical differences between scholars employing discourse analysis in terms of whether (and to what extent) individual discursive practices can shape and modify discourse, which shows that notions of discourse are central to the study of interaction practices in institutional settings like the EP. Jaworski and Coupland's research into discourse analysis shows that discourse is "language use relative to social, political and cultural formations – it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals' interaction with society" (1999, 3). Therefore, EP discourse about TTIP can be used to shape an attitude towards this treaty, not only in this EU institution, but also in the EU as a whole.

Additionally, the research is extended on quantitative methods. To show the dynamic of MEP attitudes towards TTIP, voter shifts between pro- and anti-TTIP camps are also presented, demonstrating a change of position in the FRE and FLE camps.

### **Eurosceptic Members of European Parliament attitudes towards TTIP**

EP resolutions are a political instrument that facilitates the EU's governing body to influence negotiations in international trade. Usually the EP approves these acts before formally beginning negotiation, as well as during the negotiation process. The last step is EP approval for an international trade agreement. Therefore, resolutions and preceding debates are used by MEPs to show areas of their disagreement with a specific motion. Sometimes, when an issue is controversial, MEPs postulate a European Commission (EC) or Council statement to resolve their doubts, and debates are also conducted after these statements.

Three debates about TTIP were conducted within the EP. In May 2013, MEPs discussed the resolution on trade and investment agreement negotiations with the US (*EU trade and investment agreement negotiations with the US (debate)*, 2013); in July 2014 they deliberated in the Commission statement on TTIP (*Commission statement: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)*, 2014); and in July 2015 they debated the resolution on negotiations surrounding TTIP (*Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (debate)*, 2015).



Voting on first resolution shows that the overwhelming majority of MEPs supported the resolution (461 for, 105 against, 30 abstentions). Among the pro-TTIP camp were the European People's Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), European Conservatives and Reformists Group (C&R), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), part of Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD). The anti-TTIP camp consisted of the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greene/EFA), Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), part of EFD, and independent MEPs.

This voting shows that FRE MEPs were divided on the TTIP issue. Among members voting for were those from Danish People's Party (DF – *Dansk Folkeparti*), Finns Party (PS – *Perussuomalaiset*), Greater Romania Party (PRM – *Partidul România Mare*), Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik – *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*), Northern League (LN – *Lega Nord*), Party of Order and Justice (PTT – *Partija tvarka ir teisingumas*), Party of Freedom (PV – *Partij voor de Vrijheid*), Solid Poland (SP – *Solidarna Polska*), and UK Independence Party (UKIP). Against the resolution were Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ – *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*), National Front (FN – *Front national*), the Slovak National Party (SNS – *Slovenská národná strana*), Flemish Interest (VB – *Vlaams Belang*), part of Jobbik, and PV. Some members of UKIP abstained.

FLE MEPs, in the contrast to their counterparts, were coherent in voting. Against the resolution were Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM – *Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy*), Communist Party of Greece (KKE – *Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*), Croatian Labourists – Labour Party (HL -SR – *Hrvatski laburisti – Stranka rada*), French Communist Party (PCF – *Parti communiste français*), Left Bloc (BdE – *Bloco de Esquerda*), Left Party (V – *Vänsterpartiet*), People's Movement against the EU (FmEU – *Folkebevægelsen mod EU*), Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL – *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laouí*), Sinn Féin (SF), Socialist Party (SPa – *Socialistische Partij*), Socialist Party of Latvia (LSP – *Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija*), Syriza, the German Left (*die Linke*), Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU – *Coligação Democrática Unitária*), and United Left (IU – *Izquierda Unida*).

The overall prevailing opinion among all MEPs was that TTIP is necessary and good for the EU. For FRE MEPs the issue wasn't controversial; they occasionally took part in the debate about resolution. In remarks, they underlined that their support for the partnership depends on

particular regulations, and in large part they didn't attack TTIP. Some of them focused on how small and medium enterprises (SME) could be affected under TTIP rules, others stressed a necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties, doubting the ability of the EC to conduct an effective negotiation (See table no. 1). UKIP's MEPs underlined that Britain has a deep economic relationship with US, therefore the TTIP would make this partnership redundant (*EU trade and investment agreement negotiations with the US (debate)*, 2013).

FLE MEPs during this debate were markedly against TTIP. They emphasized threats that could emerge out of the new EU-US partnership. Concerns that could dominate public opinion in coming years were present in their speeches: anxiety about GMOs, the secrecy of negotiation, anxiety over Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), the decline of labor rights protection, the decline of consumer rights, and degradation of food standards, e.g. chlorinated chickens, meat with hormones (see table no. 1) (*EU trade and investment agreement negotiations with the US (debate)*, 2013).

**Table 1: Number of arguments used during the debate in 2013**

Arguments:	ERL	ERR
anxiety about GMOs	4	-
anxiety of ISDS	3	-
chlorinated chickens	1	-
meat with hormones	1	-
degradation of food standards	2	-
TTIP's effect on SMEs	-	2
a necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties	-	1
the secrecy of negotiation	4	-
decline of labor rights protection	2	-
decline of consumer rights	2	-

The next debate on the Commission statement was conducted in the EP on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2014. No voting was held after this debate, so analysis of distribution is not possible. However, the discussion shows us the arguments used by both sides. The analysis of the FRE MEP arguments during this debate points out that the salience of the TTIP issue increased. Furthermore, they moved to an anti-TTIP position because arguments that were being used by these MEPs were unfavorable for the partnership (see table no. 2). Moreover, they started using arguments that were heard in FLE speeches in the previous EP debate, such as anxiety about GMOs, meat with hormones, and the secrecy of the TTIP negotiations. However, the necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties was the most popular argument being used by FRE MEPs, especially from France and Italy. Only Petr Mach from Party of Free Citizens (SSO – *Strana svobodných občanů*) supported free trade with the US, though he doubted the ability of the EC to conduct effective negotiations (*Commission statement: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)*, 2014).

The FLE' position was stable. A rejection of the partnership was mentioned as one of their most important goals for the new EP term, citing a decline of labor rights protection as the primary reason for opposition. However, agricultural issues, degradation of the environment, and privatization of public services were visible in their arguments as well. A decline in the salience of the GMO argument is notable here because none of the FLEs mentioned it (see table no. 2), especially because they played up this anxiety often during the previous debate (see table no. 1) (*Commission statement: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)*, 2014).

**Table 2: Number of arguments used during the debate in 2014**

<b>Arguments:</b>	<b>ERL</b>	<b>ERR</b>
anxiety over GMOs	-	3
anxiety over ISDS	3	2
meat with hormones	-	3
degradation of food standards	3	1
TTIP's effect on agriculture	5	1

a necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties	-	4
the secrecy of negotiations	3	3
decline of labor rights protection	8	1
decline of consumer rights	2	-
degradation of the environment	5	1
privatization of public services	5	
personal data protection	2	1
doubt about the ability of the EC to conduct effective negotiations	-	2
undemocratic character of procedures	2	1

As was mentioned before, the second resolution was adopted on 8<sup>th</sup> July 2015, two years after the first. As shown in the EP debate in July 2014, the political situation around TTIP changed dramatically, as anti-TTIP movements became more popular and encouraged societies to oppose this partnership (Eliasson and Huet, 2018). Voting on the resolution in the EP exposed a shift in the opinion about TTIP; though the pro-TTIP camp (consisting of EPP, the majority of S&D, ALDE, and C&R) was victorious with 436 votes, the anti-TTIP bloc grew (consisting not only of GUE/NGL and Greene/ALE, but also EFDD, EFN, and independent MEPs), garnering 241 votes against it in the process.

MEP voter shift to the anti-TTIP camp was observed among FREs. Against the resolution were Congress of the New Right (KNP – *Kongres Nowej Prawicy*), Five Star Movement (M5S – *Movimento 5 Stelle*), FPÖ, Golden Dawn (LS-CA – *Laikós Síndesmos – Chrysí Avgí*), Jobbik, Liberty (*Wolność*), LN, National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD – *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), NF, part of UKIP, SSO, and VB. However, members of four parties broke ranks, as some MEPs from UKIP, as well as the entirety of SD and VB abstained. Furthermore, the majority of VP didn't take part in the voting, though they were present in the hall.

FLE MEPs were still coherent in their attitudes toward TTIP. Against the resolution were AKEL, BdE, die Linke, FmEU, Galician Alternative of the Left (AGE – *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda*), IU, KKE, KSCM, Left Alliance (VAS – *Vasemmistoliitto*), Left Front (FG – *Front de Gauche*), Party for the Animals (PvdD – *Partij voor de Dieren*), Podemos, Popular Unity (LAE – *Laíki Enótita*), Portuguese Communist Party (PCP – *Partido Comunista Português*), SF, Syriza, SPa, The Other Europe with Tsipras (AET – *L'Altra Europa con Tsipras*), and V.

The discussion about the second resolution shows that there was still a majority in the EP that supported TTIP. However, the topic became salient because the number of MEPs taking part in discussions increased. Furthermore, the voting and debate confirmed that the majority of FRE MEPs moved from “pro” or “abstain” positions to “against”, although SD, VB, VP and part of UKIP remained neutral. Scrutiny of the debate shows that among the “against” camp of the FRE MEPs are two groups. The first maintains an absolute opposition that consisted of FPÖ, Jobbik, LN, M5S, and NF. These MEPs rejected this treaty stressing hazards such as a decrease in food security, anxiety over ISDS, growth of unemployment rate in the EU, and unfair competition for European SMEs and agricultural firms from US companies. The second group is less resolute in their opposition, emphasizing support for global free trade. TTIP has, according to them, too many regulations. Their main concerns were ISDS, and privatization of public services (LS-CA SSO, UKIP) (*Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (debate)*, 2015). Interestingly, there is an absence of the necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties argument, which was popular among FREs in later debates (see table no. 2 and no. 3).

The FLE MEPs’ argument held firm from previous debates, with the most popular touchpoints being the decline of labor rights protection, anxiety over ISDS, and the privatization of public services (*Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (debate)*, 2015). The consistency among FLE MEPs was observed in the voting as well as the reasoning, although the view of the voting process as undemocratic became more prevalent. (see table no. 3).



**Table 3: Number of arguments used during the debate in 2015**

<b>Arguments:</b>	<b>ERL</b>	<b>ERR</b>
anxiety over GMOs	-	3
anxiety over ISDS	7	11
chlorinated chickens	-	3
meat with hormones	-	4
degradation of food standards	4	6
TTIP's effect on SMEs	2	5
TTIP's effect on agriculture	4	3
the secrecy of negotiations	-	2
decline of labor rights protection	7	2
decline of consumer rights	1	2
degradation of the environment	1	1
privatization of public services	5	4
personal data protection	-	1
doubt about the ability of the EC to conduct effective negotiations	-	1
undemocratic character of procedures	6	-

### **Which Eurosceptic MEPs are trendsetters and which are followers?**

FLE MEPs were *trendsetters* on the TTIP issue, especially among Eurosceptic MEPs. Their influence on European societies in several EU member states was recognized by academics (Fabry, 2015; Bluth, 2016; Eliasson and Huet, 2018). FLE parties and movements profoundly affected opinions of European societies on TTIP, having had the ability to channel anxieties into

the STOP TTIP, and increased the salience of this topic during the EP elections in 2014 (Keith, 2017). In the EP, GUE/NGL (and also Greene/ALE) were against TTIP from the beginning, and therefore had a consistent narrative regarding the treaty, presented in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> terms of the EP. The TTIP issue was important for FLEs because of their ideological profile. As mentioned above, far-left parties are against the EU mainly because of its neoliberal direction in the European integration process. The new partnership with the US was for them the quintessence of global capitalism and evidence that international corporations are steering the Union in the direction that is against popular interest. This narrative steadily gained traction in European societies, and is evidence that FLE MEPs initially used arguments that have become popular in the public discourse. Furthermore, many of those arguments were taken up by the FRE in the next debates, confirming that FLE MEPs were trendsetters among Eurosceptic MEPs.

As a result, FRE MEPs were *followers*. In 2013, this topic was not on their agenda, so they debated their position rarely. The lack of interest in this issue came from the ideological profile of FREs. TTIP, as an economic issue, didn't draw their attention because it had no direct influence of national identities and values, and was not linked with immigration. There was no reason for them to take part in debates about the new partnership with the US. Furthermore, because differences in attitudes toward trade liberalization, they were divided in the voting even as a majority of them were pro-TTIP. If FRE MEPs had objections to the partnership, they were focused on the weakening of SMEs and the necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties. However, in 2014 and 2015, they became increasingly radicalized. FRE MEPs started using the same arguments as their FLE counterparts, attributing them to public opinion. They followed the public anxiety about TTIP influence on the European economy, not to mention standards created by FLE MEPs during the 2014 elections and the FLE-established STOP TTIP (Keith, 2017). Only two arguments were typical for the FREs: during the first and second debates they mentioned the necessity to preserve protected geographical indications and traditional specialties, and they voiced concern about SMEs under TTIP rules, indicating that FREs are concerned more about economic sovereignty, especially compared to FLE.

In trying to understand FLE progress and FRE failure to control the debate surrounding TTIP, the spotlight has to be placed on specific issues that were used debates, such as food-safety

and ISDS. These issues help raise the salience of TTIP generally, which in turn allows lobbying, protests, and campaigns on technical details and other specifics. At the beginning, GMOs and the American process of chlorinated microbial wash of poultry was a natural choice of focus as it connected an appealing food with chemicals. FLE MEPs presented American standards as ‘weak’ and ‘less safe’ in public statements. In large part, the European public has increasingly agreed (Eliasson and Huet, 2018, 104-105). According to Garcia-Duran and Eliasson, these controversial issues were strategically chosen by FLEs in order to maximize the perceived threat to consumer interests and safety posed by TTIP, which helped them convince other MEPs and the European public opinion that TTIP would harm product safety and public health, and therefore helped them to increase the salience of this topic (2017, 26). All in all, TTIP has been presented as a trade-off between neo-liberalism (or ‘wild-west capitalism’) and ‘popular sovereignty’, which is consistent with FLE sources of EU critique.

### **Conclusions**

The above-conducted analysis shows that Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament were divided in their attitudes toward TTIP. Far Left Eurosceptic MEPs were against the partnership from the beginning because they are against neoliberal capitalism and free trade. They were also coherent in their attitudes towards TTIP as an example of global capitalism because of their ideological profile. In contrast, Far Right Eurosceptic MEPs are not coherent in their attitude towards EU trade policy and therefore not coherent in their attitude towards TTIP. These attitudes also had roots in their ideological profile. Because of the division of FLEs in their attitude towards economic issues (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014), two groups can be distinguished: “neo-liberals” who support global free trade, and “anti-liberals” who are against globalization, especially in the economic dimension. However, after anti-TTIP attitudes were promoted in European societies by FLEs, most FLEs have changed their opinion about this treaty. These observations may be important for EU trade policy. Cooperation between FLEs and some FRES on EU trade policy is possible in the EP and member states. The TTIP issue has shown that this cooperation can change opinion on a European level about some aspects of EU trade policy and therefore change a society’s attitude toward it. For that reason, the European Commission should think about bringing FRES into the pro-free trade camp if it wants to increase economic

cooperation between the EU and the rest of the world. It is possible, as some studies show, that FRE MEPs are not resolutely against EU activity in external trade policy (Tereszkiewicz, 2018).

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## THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN EU TRANSITION ECONOMIES

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**Abstract:** *The globalization process gained acceleration as of 1980s and the barriers over flows of goods, services, and capital were reduced gradually by many countries. The aforementioned developments caused the considerable increases in foreign direct investments which became a significant external financing instrument especially for developing and emerging economies. In this context, the economic and non-economic effects of both foreign direct investments and trade liberalization have been researched extensively in the related literature. Given the related literature, the study explores the effect of foreign direct investment inflows and trade liberalization, two featured characteristics of the globalized world, on human capital development in 11 EU transition countries for the period of 1995-2018 through panel regression analysis. The regression analysis revealed that the impact of FDI inflows on human capital development was negative, while trade liberalization positively affected the human capital development. However, the magnitude of the both variables' impact was found to be very weak.*

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**Keywords:** Foreign direct investment inflows, trade liberalization, human capital development, panel regression analysis.

### Introduction

The liberalization and globalization processes led the countries to loosen the barriers over flows of goods, services, and capital and in turn international capital flows in terms of direct investments and portfolio investments raised significantly as of mid-1980s. The foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) peaked USD 3.136 trillion in 2017 from USD 12.558 billion in 1970,

but then decreased USD 1.195 trillion in 2018 with fluctuations due to the recent economic crises (World Bank, 2020a). In this context, FDI has become a significant external financing alternative especially for developing and emerging economies with the insufficient saving rates. Furthermore, the host countries can benefit from positive externalities of FDI such as know-how and technological spillover (Hunya, 1998). However, the negative effects of FDI such as deteriorations in financial stability and inequality and environmental degradation may emerge (Cao et al., 2017). The countries generally implement policies such as fiscal incentives, legal privileges in income transfer, and free land allocation to attract FDI given the positive effects.

The considerable increases in FDI flows and the countries' tendency towards FDI attraction motivated the scholars to investigate the economic and social impact of FDI flows especially as of 1990s. In the related literature, FDI-growth has been the most studied topic (see Lasbrey et al. (2018) and Dinh et al. (2019)). However, the effect of FDI inflows on unemployment, human capital development, competitiveness, financial development, tax revenues, environment, inequality, poverty (e.g. see Magombeyi and Odhiambo, 2017; Bayar and Sasmaz, 2017; Bayar and Ozturk, 2018; Kaulihowa and Adjasi, 2018; Bayar and Gavriletea, 2018; Demena and Afesorgbor, 2020).

The paper investigates the effect of FDI and trade liberalization on human capital development. Theoretically, a two-way interaction between FDI inflows and human capital development is expected. On the one hand human capital is an important criterion for foreign investors, because higher human capital development also is a direct sign of higher level of qualified workforce and an indirect sign of better socio-economic development outlook. On the other hand FDI inflows make a contribution to the development of human capital through on-the-job training or learning or know-how and technological spillover effects (Majeed and Ahmad, 2008; Baranwal, 2019).

Trade liberalization is the process of reducing the trade barriers mainly used to protect the domestic produces. One of the widely discussed issues in the relevant literature has been the benefits and costs of trade liberalization. The propositions in favor of free trade went back to the absolute advantage of Smith (1776) and see the free trade as an important component of economic growth through raising the productivity (e.g. see Sachs and Warner (1995), Panagariya (2004)). On the other side, some economists (e.g. see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and Stiglitz (2003)) criticized the trade liberalization based on unrealistic assumptions such as perfect competition and

constant return to scale and existence of externalities and asymmetric information (Talukder, 2013). In this context, trade liberalization may positively affect the human development through increasing the productivity via transfer of knowledge and technology and (Jadoon et al., 2015).

The article investigates the influence of FDI inflows and trade liberalization on human capital development in 11 EU transition economies during the 1995-2018 period through regression analysis. The EU post-communist countries economies underwent a process of economic and institutional transformation as of late 1980s to integrate with global economy. Furthermore, the transformation process accelerated with the contribution of the countries' carrying out the requirements of EU membership in 1990s. The EU transition economies attracted significant FDI inflows for the period of 2003-2007 and reached about USD 153.4 billion in 2007, but then considerable contractions in FDI inflows have seen due to the recent economic crises and was about USD 27.4 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2020a). The paper will be one of the early studies investigating the influence of FDI and trade liberalization on human capital development for a sample of transition economies. The next section presents the relevant literature summary. The study dataset and method are explained in Section 3, and the applied section is carried out in Section 4. The article ends up with Conclusion.

### **Literature Review**

The economic effects and determinants of FDI flows have been one of the extensively studied issues in the globalized world. In this paper, we explore the effect of FDI on human capital development which is relatively untouched topic in FDI related literature. The empirical literature on the nexus between FDI inflows and human capital development differs from the research subject, because a mutual interaction between two variables is theoretically expected. In the study, we explore the effect of FDI inflows on human capital development which is a significant determinant of economic growth. However, human capital may become a significant determinant of location selections for foreign investors.

The empirical literature on the influence of FDI on human capital development generally reached a positive influence (e.g. see Sharma and Gani, 2004; Arcelus et al., 2005; Reiter and Steensma, 2010; Muhammad et al., 2010; Lehnert et al., 2013; Agusty and Damayanti, 2015; Gökmenoğlu et al., 2018). But a limited number of studies reached an insignificant or negative



influence of FDI on human capital development (Nembot Ndeffo, 2010; Cao et al., 2017; Zhuang, 2017; Baranwal, 2019).

In this context, Sharma and Gani (2004) analyzed the influence of FDI inflows on human capital development in 34 countries from low and middle income countries for the period of 1975-1999 through regression analysis and discovered that FDI inflows had a positive influence on human capital development in both groups of countries. On the other side, Arcelus et al. (2005) explored the impact of FDI on the main components of human development index through DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) method and revealed that the countries were more efficient in use of FDI gained more improvement in human capital development.

Reiter and Steensma (2010) explored the effect of FDI on human development under FDI policy and corruption in 49 developing countries for the period 1980-2005 through regression analysis and disclosed that FDI contributed to the human development in case the host countries restrict foreign investors to enter some sectors and the impact of FDI on human development was negatively affected by higher corruption levels. On the other side, Muhammad et al. (2010) analyzed the influence of FDI on human capital development in Pakistan for the period of 1975-2008 through regression analysis and revealed that FDI positively affected human capital development.

Lehnert et al. (2013) analyzed the effect of FDI on human development in 175 countries for the period of 1997-2007 and discovered that FDI inflows had a positive effect on human development. On the other side, Agusty and Damayanti (2015) explored the influence of FDI inflows on human capital development in 124 developing countries through regression analysis and discovered that FDI inflows positively affected human development. Gökmenoğlu et al. (2018) also analyzed the effect of FDI on human development in Nigeria during 1972-2013 period through Johansen cointegration test and Toda-Yamamoto test and revealed that FDI positively affected human capital development in the long run and also a two-way interaction between two variables.

Nembot Ndeffo (2010), Cao et al. (2017), Zhuang (2017), and Baranwal (2019) reached an insignificant or negative influence of FDI on human capital development. In this regard, Nembot Ndeffo (2010) analyzed the impact of FDI inflows on human capital development in 32 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period of 1980-2005 and revealed no significant effects of FDI inflows on human capital development. On the other side, Cao et al. (2017) researched the

influence of FDI inflows on human development in 23 Asian countries through regression analysis and revealed no significant effects of FDI on human development. Zhuang (2017) also researched the impact of FDI on human capital development in 16 East Asian countries for the period of 1985-2010 through panel data analysis and disclosed that FDI positively raised the secondary schooling, but decreased the tertiary schooling. Baranwal (2019) also investigated the effect of FDI on human capital development in India for the period 2001–2015 through dynamic regression analysis and revealed no significant effects of FDI on human capital development.

In the related literature, some scholars have researched the role of human capital in FDI attraction. The empirical literature on the influence of human capital development represented by different indicators such as human capital development index, literacy rate, primary/secondary/tertiary school enrolment rates on the FDI attraction has stayed inconclusive. In this context, Root and Ahmed (1979), Schneider and Frey (1985), and Narula (1996) revealed the human capital as an insignificant determinant of FDI. However, relatively more scholars discovered human capital as a significant positive determinant of FDI (Majeed and Ahmad, 2008; Mollaesmaeili-Dehshiri et al., 2012; Kim and Park, 2013; Dorożyńska and Dorożyńska, 2014; Cleeve et al., 2015; Kheng et al., 2017). The relevant literature revealed that the studies investigating the interaction between human capital and the FDI inflows for early periods especially before 1980s reached the insignificant relationship between the variables, but the recent studies discovered a significant interaction between human capital and the FDI inflows. The aforementioned contradiction was resulted from the FDI composition, that is to say, early FDI inflows generally flowed the industries with cheap and unskilled labor, but the recent FDI inflows have been in terms of technology intensive and service industries (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Dunning, 2002; Ritchie, 2002). Lastly, the limited number of empirical studies verified the positive impact of trade liberalization on human capital development (Effiom et al., 2011; Jadoon et al., 2015).

### **Data and econometric methodology**

The article investigated the effect of FDI inflows and trade liberalization on human capital development in 11 EU transition economies during the 1995-2018 period by panel regression analysis.

The dependent variable of human development was proxied by human development index of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2020) and the index is geometric mean of normalized indices for life expectancy, education index, and gross national income per capita. On the other side, FDI inflows were represented by FDI inflows as a percent of GDP and extracted from World Bank (2020b). Lastly, trade liberalization was proxied by sum of export and import as a percent of GDP and provided from World Bank (2020c). All the variables were annual and the relevant data availability led us to determine the study period as 1995-2018.

Table 1: Data description

Variables	Description	Source
HDI	Human development index	UNDP (2020)
FDI	FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)	World Bank (2020b)
TRADE	Total trade (% of GDP)	World Bank (2020c)

The sample of the econometric analysis consisted of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The econometric analyses were implemented through the software of Stata 14.0 and Gauss 10.0. The main characteristics of the dataset were shown in Table 2. The average human development index was about 0.8 in the sample and nearly same level among the countries. The average FDI inflows was about 4.78% of GDP in the sample, but changed among the countries. The average trade volume was about 110.38% of GDP and varied considerably among the countries.

Table 2: Summary statistics of the dataset

Characteristics	HDI	FDI	TRADE
Mean	0.801943	4.781557	110.3890
Median	0.808000	3.650797	105.0463
Maximum	0.902000	54.64873	190.1551
Minimum	0.673000	-41.45758	43.67839
Std. Dev.	0.051441	7.169832	34.01315
Skewness	-0.367207	2.372114	0.217218
Kurtosis	2.426330	28.33920	2.131242

The impact of FDI inflows and trade liberalization on human capital development is analyzed through regression analysis. First, the analysis was made through fixed effects model regarding the results of Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test, Chow (1960) F test and Hausman test, but the problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity led us to make a selection among Parks-Kmenta estimator, Beck-Katz estimator, and Driscoll-Kraay estimator giving more robust results in case of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Driscoll-Kraay estimator yields more robust estimations in case of  $N > T$ , while Parks-Kmenta estimator yields more robust estimations in case of  $T > N$  (Tatoğlu, 2013). In this study, we preferred the Parks-Kmenta estimator considering the dataset characteristics.

### Empirical analysis

In the econometric analysis, first cross-sectional dependence was tested with Breusch and Pagan's (1980) LM test, Pesaran's (2004) LM CD test, and the  $LM_{adj.}$  test of Pesaran et al. (2008) and the test consequences were reported in Table 3. The null hypothesis suggesting the cross-sectional independence was denied at 1% significance level. So the tests pointed out the presence of cross-sectional dependence among three series.

Table 3: Results of cross-sectional dependency tests

Test	Test statistic	P value
LM	340.6	0.0000
$LM_{adj.}^*$	68.94	0.0000
LM CD*	16.91	0.0000

\*two-sided test

The stationarity analysis of the series was examined with Pesaran (2007) CIPS (Cross-sectionally augmented IPS (Im- Pesaran-Shin (2003)) unit root test taking notice of cross-sectional dependence and the test consequences were reported in Table 4. The test consequences revealed that all the series were  $I(0)$ .

Table 4: Results of CIPS unit root test

Variables	Constant		Constant + Trend	
	Test statistic	P value	Test statistic	P value
HDI	-3.151	0.001	-1.945	0.026
FDI	-3.513	0.000	-2.178	0.015
TRADE	-1.874	0.030	0.404	0.057

Optimum lag length was specified as 1 taking notice of Schwarz information criterion.

\* indicated that it is significant at 5%

The impact of FDI inflows and trade liberalization on human capital development is analyzed by regression analysis. First, the analysis was made through fixed effects model regarding the results of Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test, Chow (1960) F test and Hausman test presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Panel Regression Pretests for Model Selection

Test	p value	Decision
Chow (F)	0,000	Fixed effects model is efficient model.
LM	0.0000	Random effects model is efficient model.
Hausman	chi2(2)= 41.74 P value=0.0000	Fixed effects model is efficient model.

First, the impact of FDI inflows and trade liberalization on human capital development was analyzed through fixed effects model and the estimations were reported in Table 6. The results revealed that FDI had no significant effects on human capital development, but trade liberalization positively affected human capita development. However, the results of Wooldridge (2002) autocorrelation test and Greene (2003) heteroskedasticity test uncovered the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we estimated the same model with a relatively more robust estimator of Parks-Kmenta due to the existence of the correlation between the units, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems and the results were reported in Table 6. The results disclosed that FDI inflows negatively affected human capital development, but trade liberalization positively affected human capital development. However, the magnitude of the impacts was very weak for both FDI and trade liberalization. 1% increase in FDI inflows led a 0.00634% of decrease in the human capital development. On the other side, 1% increase in trade liberalization led a 0,02681% of increase in the human capital development.



Table 6: Regression Estimations

Independent Variables	Fixed Effects Model		Parks-Kmenta Estimator	
	Coefficient	P value	Coefficient	P value
FDI	-0.0001578	0.515	-0.0000634	0.012
TRADE	0.0015696	0.000	0.0002681	0.000
CONS	0.6294318	0.000	0.7681171	0.000
	F(2,251)= 208.89 Prob > F= 0.0000		Wald chi2(1)= 102.88 Prob > chi2= 0.0000	
Wooldridge (2002) autocorrelation test	F value=915.461, P value=0.0000			
Greene (2003) heteroskedasticity test	chi2 (11) = 632.94, Prob>chi2 =0.0000			

The effects of both FDI and trade liberalization on human capital development stayed very low, but the impact of trade liberalization was relatively higher than the impact of FDI. Theoretically a positive impact of FDI on the human development is expected depending of FDI type and relatively more empirical studies have reached a positive influence of FDI on human development. However, FDI inflows flowing to the sectors with cheap and unskilled labor may not have a significant effect on human capital development. In this context, our finding is consistent with Nembot Ndeffo (2010), Cao et al. (2017), Zhuang (2017), and Baranwal (2019) and be resulted from low technological level of FDI. On the other side, the positive impact of trade liberalization on human capital development is consistent with theoretical considerations and empirical findings of Effiom et al. (2011) and Jadoon et al. (2015).

## Conclusion

The FDI flows have increased considerably in the world with the accelerating liberalization and globalization processes and become a crucial external financing instrument for developing and emerging economies and countries tried to attract FDI flows through following fiscal incentives and granting privileges to the multinational corporations. The aforementioned developments motivated the scholars to study on economic and non-economic impacts of FDI flows. In this paper, we analyze the effect of FDI and trade liberalization on human capital development in EU transition economies regarding the limited relevant literature and no studies at the research topic for transition economies.

The impact of FDI and trade liberalization on human capital development was explored through Parks-Kmenta estimator considering the existence of autocorrelation heteroskedasticity problems in fixed effects model. The regression estimations revealed that FDI inflows negatively affected human capital development, but trade liberalization positively affected human capital development and the impact of trade liberalization on human capital development was found to be relatively higher than the FDI. However, the magnitude of the both impacts was very weak. In the light of our findings, the countries should design their policies to attract FDI with high technology and know-how for promotion of human capital, a significant determinant of economic growth.

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## THE CHILEAN MUSEUM OF SOLIDARITY AND TRANSREGIONAL LINKS WITH ROMANIA DURING THE COLD WAR

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**Abstract:** *This article analyses the transregional connections established by the Chilean Museum of Solidarity with socialist countries in Eastern Europe, and in particular with Romania. The analysis employs theories of the cultural Cold War, transnational and transregional studies, and especially the transnational and cross-regional analysis of cultural relations and artistic expressions, to discuss an example of “cultural transnationalism” (Dragostinova and Fidelis) of the Socialist Second World. Through a micro-history approach of the Global Cold War regarding the relationship between Romania and the Museum of Solidarity, this study aims to enhance the understanding of relations between the East and the South as being politicized by the highly bureaucratized cultural institutions. If cultural relations were important in establishing an autonomous policy such as that of Ceausescu, the type of artistic exchanges promoted were the expression of an aesthetic paradox, supporting a traditionalist, nationalist version of art.*

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**Keywords:** Museum of Solidarity, Cold War, transregional, Chile, Romania.

### Introduction

During the Cold War, cultural relations between the countries in the Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe were not exclusive to one another. This article includes evidence of the collaboration of Eastern European socialist countries with socialist countries in Latin America through the specific case of the *Museo de la Solidaridad* (Museum of Solidarity) created in Chile in 1971 and its relationship with Romania.

In 1971, the Chilean socialist government of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) established in Santiago a museum based on donations by artists from around the world: the *Museo de la Solidaridad* (the Museum of Solidarity). It was the first museum in the Americas entirely based on donations from artists intending to create a public collection for Chilean citizens. In the period between 1971-1973, the Museum received hundreds of donations from several countries and artists



around the world. After the military coup of 11 September 1973, the Museum was transformed into the International Museum of Resistance Salvador Allende (MIRSA, 1975-1990), and went into exile to Europe, only to return to Santiago in 1990 as the Museum of Solidarity Salvador Allende (MSSA).

As this is a rather novel case study that has not been thoroughly analysed before, it is important to examine it through an interdisciplinary lens at the intersection of transregional and transnational connections, as a focus for the study of cultural relations of the “Second Socialist World” during the Cold War (Cultural Cold War studies). From a methodological point of view, an institutional archive-based study of the cultural policies of the socialist regimes during the Cold War was undertaken. Following this, a transregional examination of the role of institutions, such as the Museum of Solidarity, in line with studies that have investigated transnational relations between communist regimes was carried out. Significantly, South/East relations were examined in this study, as opposed to East-West or East-East relations exclusively.

The article will provide a detailed analysis, through a micro-history approach<sup>1</sup> to the global Cold War, of the relations between the Museum of Solidarity and socialist Romania, situating this example of socialist cultural exchange into the broader context of the cultural relations between the two countries during the 1970s. Drawing on empirical evidence from the Romanian archives (Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Cultural affairs) this article examines previously unseen institutional documents that offer insight into a specific type of relationship during the Cold War, through the example of the Museum of Solidarity, and “the transnational connections that this museum created across nations” (Velázquez 2018).

Although the memory of this collaboration is not a priority for either of the two countries, their connection was strong as demonstrated by the fact that Romania was one of the communist countries that received an important number of Chilean refugees after the coup of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, 1973.

So, the research method this article employs is that of the qualitative analysis of a case study (the Museum of Solidarity) of the relationship between art and politics during the Cold War

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<sup>1</sup> A micro history approach allows for a small scale, individual focus instead of the large scale of historical macro-narratives that use quantitative measures that can grant a different perspective on the individual case. This approach has been promoted since the 1970s by Italian historians such as Carlo Ginzburg, Giovanni Levi, Eduardo Grendi, etc. See also : [www.microhistory.org](http://www.microhistory.org).

that is examined through a transregional interdisciplinary approach that uses previously unseen archival files. The relevance of this approach is that through a detailed analysis of the transregional relationship of two socialist countries, the understanding of the role of art and culture in the context of the Cold War can further increase the broader importance of studying in more detail art's political role in non-democratic configurations.

This article's hypothesis is that a look at the cultural relations established by the Eastern European socialist regimes serves to disentangle the degree of autonomy of these regimes in relation to Moscow. For some countries, such as Romania, cultural relations were important in establishing an autonomous policy such as that of Ceausescu, but the type of artistic exchanges promoted witnessed an aesthetic paradox, supporting a traditionalist, nationalist version of art.

The article concludes by drawing some implications of this analysis for the future study of cultural relations between the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America during the Cold War.

### **A trans-regional study of cultural exchanges between socialist regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the Cold War**

This article proposes to use a unique case study of transnational and transregional links, the Museum of Solidarity so as to understand one more layer of cultural relations as they were established during the Cold War between socialist countries in the South and the East.

If transregional studies have studied connections between regions, taking their inspiration from the spatial turn in the humanities and social sciences, they have not been used extensively to study the connections established during the Cold War. (Middell, 2019, 10). Conversely, transnational studies have recently included a look at communist regimes, but emphasis has been laid on the relations of Eastern European countries with each other and with the Western countries, and not extensively with the socialist countries of the South (Apor Iordachi, 2013). Using a transnational approach to study communist regimes encompasses a look at different scales of understanding, entanglements and circulations, as does the study of the Global South from a perspective of cultural history (Iacob, 2013, 114). The role of individuals and of personal ties has been considered essential by transnational analyses and is a very important aspect to the understanding of the Museum of Solidarity' establishment and functioning both during its Chilean

phase and through its exile stage, but as I shall show, not for the Romanian case and its donations to the Museum (Wenderski, 2015, 2; Iacob, 2013, 123).

In line with the transnational history of art as proposed by Jérôme Bazin, Pascal Dubourg and Piotr Piotrowski (Bazin, Dubourg, Piotrowski, 2016, 1), this article looks at the role played by the Museum of Solidarity as a transnational institution in establishing a new geography of art exchanges between the South and the East. The Museum of Solidarity is perhaps one of the best examples of transnational and even transregional networks of collaboration, including artists, curators, and art critics from the Americas and Europe. While there are other examples that highlight the collaboration of artists, such as the Museum of Nicaragua or the Museum of Lodz, Poland, none of them goes as far as the Museum of Solidarity in terms of transnational links. The connections with the West included “a complex circulation of objects, persons and ideas, as well as transactions between East and West [were seen] through the Iron Curtain.” (Bazin, Dubourg, Piotrowski, 2016, 1-2). I propose to investigate this kind of relations also with the South.

Piotrowski’s study of art in Eastern Europe in a global perspective in accordance with what the Polish art historian called the “horizontal art history” can be a starting point of this kind of analysis. In *Globalising the Art of East-Central Europe* Piotrowski proposes a project of comparative studies of “geohistorical margins and marginalized cultures of the East and Global South, the Far North, and every other part of the globe located outside the centre-based understanding of culture” (Piotrowski 2018). Piotrowski’s project of ‘globalizing Eastern Europe’ aimed to combine his approach of “horizontal art history” with the practice of “provincializing the centres” and aimed to show how Western models supposedly followed in the peripheries had to be understood in their contexts as well (Hock, 2018, 3).

While scientific literature has shown limited interest in these transregional links, several contemporary artists have investigated transregional solidarity of left-wing movements of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), through their work. For example, the exhibition “Past Disquiet. Narratives and Ghosts from the International Art Exhibition for Palestine, 1978” (20 February – 1 June 2015, Museum of Contemporary Art in Barcelona) curated by Rasha Salti and Kristine Khouri recuperated the stories of several solidarity-related museum initiatives of the 1970s: The International Resistance Museum Salvador Allende, the Artists of the World against Apartheid, Art for the People of Nicaragua, the Salon de Jeune Peinture, the International Brigades of Anti-Fascist Painters, the Japan Afro-Asian Latin American

Artists Association and the 1974 and 1976 Arab Biennials (Exhibition Past Disquiet). Documenting the influence of the Chilean example on projects in other regions, the exhibition subsequently travelled to the Museum of Solidarity Salvador Allende in Santiago, Chile under the title “Pasado Inquieto” (7 April – 12 August 2018). As the two curators remarked, their forensic investigation of the Palestinian exhibition of 1978 led them to discover a “wider, transnational meshwork, composed of artists committed to political struggles, and of militants who could not imagine conducting their struggles without them” (Khoury, Salit, 2019).

Furthermore, the focus on cultural practices during the Cold War, or “the battle for the hearts and minds” (Stonor Saunders, 1999) is a recent focus, which has only limitedly involved other regions besides the United States and the Soviet Union, and if studies have been done on other places they were conceptualized from the perspective of their relationship with the two powers (Stonor Saunders, 1999; Leffler and Westad, 2012; Gould-Davies, 2003).

In what concerns the two regions under analysis here, Eastern Europe and Latin America, they have been studied separately, with very few studies examining the cultural connections between the two during the Cold War. Gould-Davies has underlined how a new cultural approach could be fruitfully mixed with Cold War history using new Eastern European sources (Gould-Davies, 2003, 193). And with respect to Latin America, recently, “a new history of the *Latin American* Cold War – rather than just a history of the Cold War *in* Latin America” has emerged (Joseph, 2019, 9). This new focus is part of the “rise of ambitious transnational and transregional analysis, steeped in multi-sited, multi-archival (and often oral history) research strategies” (Joseph, 2019, 10). In this sense, many of the studies on the cultural Cold War in the region have looked at the intellectuals and artists that were important in the conflict, and only recently a new trend has seen a focus on experts’ roles highlighting as well “transnational contact zones” which have favored new forms of power, including that of networks of artists and intellectuals, such as those involved in the establishment and organization of the MS and MIRSA (Joseph, 2019, 20-22). This type of study can be part of the examination of “cultural relations with the Socialist Second World” (Joseph, 2019).

Moreover, the contacts between the East and the South have been studied for example from the perspective of the cultural policies of Eastern European socialist countries in Latin America (Zourek 2016, Dragostinova 2018). At the same time, these studies have focused on official

exchanges and networks (Rupprecht 2015, Braghoorn, 1976; Pedemonte 2010), and less on “the role of different layers of people in transnational networks” (Mikkonen and Koivunen, 2015, 3).

In a recent article, Dragostinova and Fidelis argue for analysis of the role of East European socialist regimes from the perspective of the “Second World” (socialist countries) that highlight their autonomy in relation to the Soviet Union (Mikkonen and Koivunen, 2015, 14; Dragostinova and Fidelis, 2018, 582, 587). The two authors support the use of transnational methodologies that blend a cultural history approach with transnational history under the term of “cultural transnationalism.” This approach is similar to what Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen call “cultural internationalism that consisted in the cross-national communication, understanding and cooperation” (Dragostinova and Fidelis, 2018, 585; Mikkonen and Koivunen, 2015, 10). This perspective allows for a more in-depth study of East-South relations and of the different “crossings” between the Iron Curtain and into the Global South (Dragostinova and Fidelis, 2018, 587).

Thus, this article proposes an analysis as part of the focus on “cultural transnationalism” or “cultural internationalism” between the South and the East, or of the “Socialist Second World”. It also takes into account Piotrowski’s concept of horizontal art history and his call to see the union between the marginalized East and the Global South, as well as the discussion put forward by the artistic projects which engaged with the transregional solidarity of artists during the later stages of the Cold War. This analysis examines the constellations of transregional relationships as mediated through institutional collaboration practices of the Cold War period through the case of the Museum of Solidarity. At the same time, the case study chosen, that of the relation with Romania, shows the limit of this model that emphasizes personal ties and not institutional contacts.

This article makes three claims. First of all, it provides further empirical information to support Dragostinova’s find that, in order to better understand the dynamics of the Cold War, it is important to study “the Second Socialist World”. I argue here, in the line of Dragostinova, that in order to understand how the autonomy of Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union functioned and how they used their cultural action as a strategy to establish their global presence, it is interesting to study cultural relations between the countries of the Second Socialist World (Dragostinova and Fidelis, 2018, 582, 587).

The second claim this article makes is that relations between the socialist countries in the East and South are not uniform, but are examples that show how multi-layered practices interacted.

In fact, the Romanian example is different than the other socialist countries. As this article will show, even if Ceausescu was considered as “an independent leader” inside the bloc of Eastern European countries, at a closer look, it can be seen how the choices made in relation to the Museum of Solidarity elucidate his true stance on art.

Thirdly, contrary to the relationship organized between Western artists and the Museum, the relation with socialist countries such as Romania was based on institutional exchanges that were highly bureaucratized. This article demonstrates that, if the relation between Chile and Romania is a good example of transnational links in which individuals, rather than states interact to create cultural institutions of exchange, in what concerns the case of the Museum of Solidarity and its transregional links, it is rather an example of it being taken over by the institutionalized framework of the Union of artists, and not of the personal choice of the artists.

So, this study brings a new focus which employs the perspective of “horizontal art history” through the lens of the connections established by the Museum of Solidarity between the East and the South. At the same time, it discusses the aesthetic paradox of Romanian cultural policies. Even if Ceausescu acting as an autonomous leader used cultural means to strengthen this image, the art promoted was traditionalist, nationalist and not liberating.

### **Cultural transnationalism: the Museum of Solidarity (1971-1973) & the International Museum of Resistance Salvador Allende (MIRSA) (1975-1990)**

The regime of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) inaugurated “the Chilean way to socialism” that produced a series of important changes in Chile in just 1000 days of government that ended abruptly with the military coup d'état of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, 1973. Supported by the broad coalition of Popular Unity (UP) Salvador Allende enacted a comprehensive agrarian reform, nationalized the exploitation of copper, as well as of other industries, and helped strengthen a new model for the administration and production of Chilean culture. He consolidated Chile's foreign relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, but the USSR's economic help did not meet Allende's expectations. Increasingly, the political decisions of Allende, as well as the resistance of right-wing segments supported by the US government, even before the confirmation of Allende as president, provoked an intensely polarized situation, which led to the *golpe*.

The cultural policy of the Allende regime looked to strengthen the state's role in cultural affairs. The Chilean cultural institutional model was based on the action of three actors: the state,

which dealt with the safeguard of the patrimony (DIBAM), the universities that created cultural institutions, and the municipalities, which dealt with the distribution of culture. The increased role of the state in cultural affairs included the nationalization of the Zig-Zag publishing house and its transformation in 1971 in the *Editorial Nacional Quimantú*, which published cheap books on literature, social and economical issues. Film through the 1970 Manifesto of the Filmmakers of the UP and the nationalization of Chile Films, theatre with the amateur groups that performed in factories, the visual arts with the muralist brigades such as the *Ramona Parra Brigade*, music with the *New Song* movement all participated to this period of cultural effervescence promoted by the Allende regime. Important institutions created by the Allende regime include the Institute of Latin American Art (1970) – that depended of the Faculty of Fine Arts of the University of Chile – and which organized meetings such as the *Encuentros de artistas plásticos del Cono Sur (Chile, 1972)* that reunited artists from the Southern Cone in Santiago and collaborated with the House of the Americas in Havana.

Another important institution founded by Allende was the Museum of Solidarity with a call to “artists of the world” to donate artworks for a museum of modern art for the people of Chile. This era is also known as the period of Solidarity (1971-1973) (Rojas Mix, 2016, 18). Since 1975, and until 1990, in exile, it became the International Museum of Resistance Salvador Allende (MIRSA), and this period is known as that of Resistance (1975-1990); thereafter the Museum of Solidarity Salvador Allende (MSSA) reopened in Santiago de Chile in 1991 and is still active today.

The Museum remains to this date one of the most interesting examples of committed artists who collaborate to create a space for the popular classes to enjoy contemporary art. It was created as “a museum against museums, an antimuseum” that “questioned their geopolitical monopoly by calling out the absolute incompatibility of their social function and the principles of the artworks (and artists) in their care” (Berríos, 2017, 140). The Museum is a unique case study that can help us better understand the role played by the networks of intellectuals and artists in the movements of international solidarity (Lebeau, 2018 a, 9).

The Institute of Latin American Art, which coordinated the Museum of Contemporary Art (MAC), assisted the Museum of Solidarity in its endeavours. Another source of assistance was the International Committee of Artistic Solidarity with Chile (CISAC, 1971), which was presided by Mario Pedrosa, who was the director of the Sao Paulo Biennial, and formed by curators, and



directors of international museums. The first exhibition of the museum was planned to coincide with the inauguration of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD III (April-May 1972), Santiago (Zaldivar, 2013, 39). The Solidarity collection included “artworks that supported the ‘Chilean way to Socialism’” with vanguard artworks in opposition to the Latin American socialist realism and its Mexican revolution and Cuban Revolution references (Miranda, 2013, 109).

After the military intervention of September 1973, the Museum was reorganized in exile in 1975, but continued to collect artworks from artists and museums. Elodie Lebeau called this stage “the museum in exile” while Carla Machiavello labeled it “the museums of resistance”, stressing the diversity of the collections in the different countries. The International Museum of Resistance Salvador Allende was “eminently transnational” (Lebeau, 2019, 338) and represents a unique case in the manifestations of transnational solidarity with Chile. It was connected to the institutional sphere and to the political party apparatus of the countries where it implanted itself (Lebeau 2018 a, 9). This transnational institution was structured by national committees that were created in Cuba, Spain, France and Mexico, which had a task to reunite artwork donated by artists who were in solidarity with the Chilean cause (Lebeau 2018 a, 6). For Lebeau the committees were inter-related, and not independent, and their capacity to gather artworks depended on the countries in which it took place ((Lebeau 2018 a, 8; Lebeau, 2019, 334). These artworks were exhibited in different venues during the military regime, “from festivals to international solidarity events” with a clear message against the dictatorship; often, murals were produced by the anti-fascist brigades formed by Chilean and Latin American artists with their European collaborators (Berríos, 2017, 142, 143).

The MIRSA was founded in Paris in 1975, as a reaction to the establishment of the dictatorship in Chile, and under the direction of those that created it in 1971 who were forced into exile (Zaldivar, 2016, 9). The role of the new museum was to denounce the military dictatorship in Chile and to create new forms of solidarity. A new decentralized network of support was created and artists were invited to donate their work with an explicit political objective - that of supporting the “resistance” of Chileans (Zaldivar, 2016, 9). Thus, more than 1,000 -1,100 artworks were donated between 1976 and 1990 (Zaldivar, 2016, 10; Machiavello, 2016, 90). Since 1976, MIRSA collections were created in Cuba, Panama, Colombia, France, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Poland, Finland and Algeria (Yasky, 2016, 85).

In exile, several artists supported the museum. In Paris there was a Secretariat formed by Mário Pedrosa, José Balmes, Pedro Miras, Miria Contreras (in Cuba) and Miguel Rojas Mix (Rojas Mix, 2016, 20). A very interesting example of support by artists is that of the Venice Biennial of 1974, which was cancelled by its director, Carlo Ripa di Meana, who instead organized an event entitled “Freedom for Chile”. This event focused on the International Brigade of Antifascist Painters (created in 1975) in which took part Balmes and Guillermo Núñez (Machiavello, 2016, 58, 60). Following the model, which developed during the Allende regime, other brigades were established in European countries such as Sweden.

A similar project to that of the Museum of Solidarity was the Museum of Solidarity with Nicaragua/Art for the people of Nicaragua<sup>2</sup> (1982) supported by Carmen Waugh. After helping the museum in Nicaragua, Waugh returned to Chile in 1984 and assisted with the arrival of artworks for the Museum of Solidarity Salvador Allende (MSSA), of which she became the director after 1991. Since 1991 the Museum was reorganized in Chile and was directed with Waugh (until 2005) by José Balmes (2005-2010), Ernesto Ottone (2010-2011) and by Claudia Zaldívar since 2011.

### **Transregional donations from the Socialist Second World (1970-1990)**

In what regards relations with Eastern European countries, diplomatic relations with Chile were established during the Eduardo Frei presidency (1964-1970) (Yordanov, 2019, 61). During the Allende regime, despite an effort to receive more economic support from the Eastern bloc countries and the USSR, there was certain scepticism among these governments in relation to the “Chilean experiment” (Yordanov, 2019, 68; Zourek, 2014, 214). Then, following the military coup, the Soviet Union suspended diplomatic relations with Chile on 21 September 1973 and the other countries, with the exception of Romania, did the same (Zourek, 2014, 215).

In relation to the Museum of Solidarity, under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, donations were received until the coup d'état of September 11, 1973. The shipments from artists were organized through the Institute of Latin American Art and the Chilean embassies abroad. There was also an international convocation assembled by ambassadors and

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<sup>2</sup> The Museum of Solidarity with Nicaragua was afterwards called Museum of Contemporary Latin American Art/Museum of Art of the Americas/Museum Julio Cortázar.

cultural attaches that allowed for direct donations to the embassies. This demonstrates the Solidarity Collection was eclectic in terms of the quality and importance of the artworks; moreover, there were more engravings and fewer sculptures because they were being transported with the diplomatic suitcase (Miranda, 110). Thus, in the initial period, the museum was able to collect over 700 artworks through donations (Berrios, 2017, 133).

Interestingly, from the statistical list of the Museum of Solidarity, we find that the socialist countries were not the main collaborators of the Museum. From a total of 823 artists whose artworks are part of the collection, most socialist artists were from Poland (36), Bulgaria (21), USSR (16), Cuba (12), Mongolia (8), Hungary (2), Romania (2) and Czechoslovakia (1) (Museo, 2016, 124). With respect to the artwork, from a total of 1,161, 74 were originally from Cuba (74 or 6.37%), Poland (46 or 3.96%), Bulgaria (32 or 2.76%), USSR (23 or 1.98%), Yugoslavia (9 or 0.78%), Romania (3 or 0.26%), Hungary (2 or 0.17%) and Czechoslovakia (1 or 0.09%) (Museo, 2016, 124). From the 1,161 works by 823 artists of 48 different nationalities, a majority came from Western Europe (51% of artworks), and Latin America (34 %), while those from Eastern Europe (11%) were fewer (Lebeau, 2018 b, 2). Another interesting detail is that the Cuban collection of MIRSA includes both Latin American artists and artists from Socialist European countries (the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Bulgaria) and Asian countries (Machiavello, 2016, 89).

The artworks donated to the museum were diverse, including paintings, sculptures, graphic art and photography, authored by both professional artists and amateur artists. The topics of their work are similar and include: “the war in Vietnam, the Cold War, the interventionism of the USA in Latin America and other regions, scenes of repression and violation of human rights, homage to Salvador Allende and the Chilean people, rejection of Pinochet and the members of the military junta in Chile, and the call to the liberation of figures such as Angela Davis” (Machiavello, 2016, 89). Lebeau observed that the artwork donated to the MIRSA had a “transnational imaginary along with a transhistorical imaginary of the fight against fascism” (Lebeau, 2018 b, 7). On the contrary, solidarity manifested differently in Eastern Europe, as “in the so-called real socialist countries in Eastern Europe, solidarity largely met the need to revitalize the revolutionary and internationalist ethos of regimes that were going into decline” (Lebeau, 2019, 337). The Polish sent abstract artworks for the International Exhibition UNCTAD III organized in Santiago by the National Museum of Fine Art (MNBA), which were donated thereafter to the Museum of Solidarity, including works by: Stefan Gierowski, *Warszawa* (1968), Dominik Tadeusz, *Kamienie* (1969),

Jan Tarasin, *Koleckja* (1971) (Miranda, 131).

Out of the Eastern European countries, Poland was the most active. From Poland the most important actors were the Polish Committee of Solidarity with the people of Chile, led by Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, the director of the Museum of Art in Lodz, Ryszard Stanislawski, the director of the Museum of Art in Lodz, and the Ministry of Culture and Art of the Popular Republic of Poland. Poland was one of the first countries to establish a Solidarity Committee with Chile, and Ryszard Stanislawski was in charge of the selection of the donations (Museo, 2016, 394). Ryszard underlined the common origin of the two institutions, as their collections were based on the solidarity of international artists (Museo, 2016, 394). Between June 4 and July 23, 1978 artists from Poland donated to the MIRSA and were exhibited in the Art Museum in Lodz. Poland donated 44 artworks (a total of 1,161 artworks) to the museum and organized an exhibition in June 1978 in Lodz, which subsequently travelled to Havana, Cuba.<sup>3</sup> According to Maria José Delpiano, who curated an exhibition on the connection between the Museum in Lodz and the Museum in Santiago, 50 artworks were donated to the MIRSA (Exhibition “Museo de arte de Lodz”). In December 1978 there was a Polish exhibition of their donations to the MIRSA in the Galería Centro de Arte Internacional, in Havana, Cuba, and in January 1980 there was an exhibition of Chilean *arpilleras* and *molas* from Panama in the Gallery TPSP from Warsaw (Museo, 2016, 105, 106). Thus, the collaboration with socialist countries was rather institutional, and in the instances collaboration developed outside of the official framework, it was because of personal ties, as the Polish example shows.

### **Chilean-Romanian cultural relations and the Romanian missing donation to the Museum of Solidarity**

The regime of Nicolae Ceausescu (1965-1989) wanted to present itself as autonomous in relation to Moscow and it did not end relations with the Pinochet regime after the military intervention of 1973 arguing Romania had relations with countries, not with governments. Ceausescu even stressed his independence in taking the decision of condemning the coup by saying

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<sup>3</sup> The exhibition of Polish artworks donated to the MIRSA was organized by the Ministry of culture and the arts of Poland, the Polish Committee of Solidarity with Chile, and the Art Museum of Lodz. *Museo Internacional de la Resistencia Salvador Allende 1975-1990*, Catalogue raisonné.

”we were the first to protest and we did not wait for someone to tell us to protest or not”,<sup>4</sup> but then decided to maintain relations with the Pinochet regime.

Ceausescu diversified Romania’s foreign policy trying to establish connections with countries in Latin America and Africa and used cultural relations to strengthen this autonomous policy in relation to countries in the Third World. Following the coup of September 1973, Chilean refugees were received by the Romanian communist regime with the direct intervention of Nicolae Ceaușescu. The Romanian communist leader was supposed to visit Chile in August 1973 and several events had been prepared for his official visit, but this plan was not accomplished. According to archival Romanian official documents, until October 1974 Romanian authorities had accepted 1.600 Chilean refugees (members of the Communist Party, of the Socialist Party, of MAPU, the Radical Party and sympathizers of the UP), of which 1.300 were in Romania in December 1974 and were given by Romanian authorities, shelter, a job or a scholarship.<sup>5</sup>

The cultural policy of the Ceaușescu regime combined a nationalist perspective, clearly expressed after 1971, with a socialist imperative. Art had to mirror the social reality and help build the new “multilaterally developed society”, while respecting the party line as expressed by the Romanian leader himself. So, artists had to serve the fatherland and find inspiration in the previous accomplishments of Romanian cultural figures. In the visual arts this led to the imposition of the so-called “humanist realism” after Socialist Realism was abandoned. This meant that the cult of Ceaușescu became increasingly present in the arts, but also that a nationalist art was promoted. Artists tended to adapt to this new logic, in order to be able to continue to create their own art and to have certain advantages.

Cultural exchanges between Romania and Chile were intermediated by the Cultural relations section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Institute for Cultural Relations Abroad (IRRCS), the Ministry of Culture (called the State Committee for Culture and the Arts (CSCA), and then since 1971 the Council for Culture and Socialist Education (CCES)), and by creative unions such as the Union of Artists (UAP).

The Romanian Institute for Cultural Relations Abroad (IRRCS, 1948) was established by the Romanian communist regime (1948-1989) to handle cultural relations with foreign countries.

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<sup>4</sup> File 297/1974, Fund 3285 (The Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Foreign Relations Section), Romanian Central National Historical Archives (ANIC), 4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 8.

This institution was similar to the Soviet Union model, the “All Union Society for Cultural Ties” (VOKS, 1925), and its subsequent transformations in the “Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries” (SSOD, 1957), as well as the State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS, 1957). The archives of the IRRCS safeguard details concerning the friendship associations with countries in Latin America including Chile. Furthermore, the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs document the cultural relations Romania had with Chile during the Allende regime (1970-1973), but also prior to 1970 and after 1973. In fact, the IRRCS witnessed the change of foreign policy the Ceausescu regime enforced after 1968 and observed thus a transcontinental turning point for cultural relations, which were strengthened with Africa and Asia, as well as with Latin American countries.

Moreover, the first important actor of cultural relations between Romania and Chile was the Chilean-Romanian Institute of Culture (ICCR) established in Santiago de Chile in 1952.<sup>6</sup> In this case, cultural relations preceded the establishment of reciprocal embassies in the two countries; the Romanian embassy opened in Santiago in 1965 and the Chilean embassy opened in Bucharest in 1966.<sup>7</sup> Humberto Mewes presided over the Institute in Santiago in the 1950s and 1960s with the poet Nicanor Parra as vice-president in 1960. In 1973 it was presided over by one of the most important Chilean painters, Nemesio Antúnez, who also visited Romania in the same year. According to a document of the IRRCS of 1970, the Institute of Santiago was under the patronage of the University of Chile. In 1971 the Commission of intellectual cooperation of the University (which coordinated the bi-national institutes) appointed as its president, Nemesio Antúnez.<sup>8</sup>

The Institute organized events for the Romanian national day of August 23, including exhibitions of photography and popular art (handicraft), theater plays, etc. The Institute asked the IRRCS to send cultural materials such as books, discs, radio shows, popular art, commercial and cultural films, etc. It also requested Romanian authorities to assist in paying the rent, arguing all

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<sup>6</sup> At the time known as the Chilean-Romanian Center of Culture.

<sup>7</sup> As Radoslav Yordanov shows in a recent article, this was part of a broader decision of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) to establish relations with the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Radoslav A. Yordanov, “Warsaw Pact Countries’ Involvement in Chile from Frei to Pinochet, 1964–1973”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2019): 56–87, doi:10.1162/jcws\_a\_00893, 61.

<sup>8</sup> File IIB/1972, IRRCS Fund, Romanian Central National Historical Archives (ANIC).

other bi-national institutes functioned with the help of the partner state.<sup>9</sup> The Romanians sent art albums of some of the best-known Romanian artists: Ion Țuculescu, Nicolae Tonitza, Corneliu Baba, or albums of Romanian architecture and contemporary Romanian painting. They also sent Nicolae Ceaușescu's speeches to the Party congresses, in addition to Romanian literature.

In 1972 in Romania was organized an exhibition of Chilean militant graphic art; 21 engravings were exhibited and then donated by the Chilean artists to Romanian art institutions. At least from the titles of the 21 works sent by Chileans, Luis Libiot, *The cat*, Medardo Espinosa, *Family*, or Carlos Hermosilla, *Old peasant* they don't seem to be ideological works, but rather neutral artworks.<sup>10</sup>

In response, in June 1973, Romania sent a retrospective exhibition of "Romanian militant graphic works" to celebrate the day of August 23<sup>rd</sup>. The works sent were lost during the events that followed the military coup of September 11 1973, and were retrieved only in February 1974 when they were in the Romanian embassy in Santiago. The Romanian authorities wanted to present a selection of the works but were unsure if this type of graphic work could be presented.<sup>11</sup> After the military intervention, the institute was searched, certain goods disappeared, and the institute was subsequently closed.<sup>12</sup>

Of note is that the Romanian authorities privileged popular, traditional artistic expressions as cultural ambassadors, and not socialist or globalist inspired artworks and cultural productions. This was also true of their relations with aspiring socialist regimes such as the Chilean one.

The second actor of this transregional cultural relationship was the Romania – Chile Friendship Association, created in May 1973 in Bucharest. Structurally, this Association had 4 acting vice presidents which included; Mihai Florescu, the Minister of Industry, with Gheorghe Achiței, Rector of the Nicolae Grigorescu Institute of Visual Arts in Bucharest, and Marcel Chirnoagă, Vice-President of the UAP.

The two institutions, in Santiago and Bucharest, seem to be the result of the actions of individuals in the two countries that acted transregionally for the establishment of cultural relations between the two countries.

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<sup>9</sup> File 37/1970, IRRCS Fund, Romanian Central National Historical Archives (ANIC).

<sup>10</sup> File IIB/1972, IRRCS Fund, Romanian Central National Historical Archives (ANIC).

<sup>11</sup> File 220/1966, Chilean Fund, The Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>12</sup> File 1540, 217/1974, Chilean Fund, The Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



The MSSA retrospective album registers, under the title “The lamentable loss of the Romanian shipment”, that according to documents from the Chilean embassy in Bucharest,<sup>13</sup> there was a Romanian shipment which included paintings and sculptures donated by the Romanian government and artists. On the Chilean side, there is no information concerning the arrival of the artwork, except for a receipt of transport from September 25, 1973 when the Museum had been closed by the military. The Romanian artists who donated were part of the Union of Artists of Romania and included some well-known artists, such as, Corneliu Baba, Alexandru Ciucurencu, Geza Vida, Ovidiu Maitec, and George Apostu.<sup>14</sup>

The Romanian National Archives have preserved a file in the Union of Artists’ fund entitled “Donation to the Solidarity Museum of Chile” (September 25, 1972), which includes the list of the six artworks that were sent with short bios of the artists.<sup>15</sup> From the titles of the artworks, these were not openly propaganda art or politicized art, but seem to be neutral artworks. The list includes some of the best-known artists: Corneliu Baba, *Portrait* (1972), Alexandru Ciucurencu, *Landscape*, Constantin Piliuță, *Woman Singer*, George Apostu, *Father with sons*, Ovidiu Maitec, *Baroque gate*, and Vida Geza, *Character from the Maramureș fairytales*. We may therefore surmise that Romania sent three paintings and three sculptures with neutral themes. The accompanying letter, addressed to the Chilean ambassador in Bucharest, states that the Romanian artists, members of the Union of Artists, having learned about the call of the “International Committee of Artistic Solidarity with Chile” for the creation, on a donations basis, of an art museum of modern and experimental art, decided to donate their artwork to this institution that would foster relations between the Romanian Socialist Republic (RSR) and Chile.<sup>16</sup>

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
<sup>13</sup> Official document 148/59, 23 October 1972, by the ambassador Julio Hornero and official document 130/38 of 10 July 1972, Archive MSSA in Miranda (2013, 130).

<sup>14</sup> Embassy of Chile in Bucharest, oficio 175/55, 9 October 1972, Archive MSSA, in Miranda (2013, 130).

<sup>15</sup> File 48/1972, UAP Fund, ANIC.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

Figure 1: the Romanian donation to the Museum of Solidarity<sup>17</sup>



LISTA DE LAS OBRAS donadas por los artistas para Chile	
<u>P I N T U R A</u>	
Baba Corneliu	- Retrato cartón al óleo 0,350 x 0,270 firmado debajo a la derecha con rojo Bana, fecha 19/72
Ciucureanu Alexandru	- Paisaje cartón al óleo 0,460 x 0,610 firmado debajo a la derecha con verde con monograma A.C. sin fecha
Filiuță Constantin	- Cantante lienzo al óleo 0,900 x 1,000 firmado debajo a la derecha con carmelita C.Filiuța, sin fecha
<u>E S C U L T U R A</u>	
Apostu George	- Padre e hijos madera 1,920 x 0,600 x 0,600 sin firma, sin fecha
Maidec Ovidiu	- Puerta barroca madera 0,650 x 0,650 x 0,430 firmado debajo a la izquierda con un monograma incrustado O.M. sin fecha
Vida Geza	- Personaje de cuentos de Maramureș madera 1,530 x 0,600 x 0,600 sin firma y sin fecha

According to Kristine Khouri and Rasha Salti (2019), who analysed the large number of donations by Polish artists to the 1978 Palestinian Art exhibition, “it was common during the communist era for artworks to be collected from artists under the aegis of the People’s Republic [of Poland]; the works were dispatched[...]perhaps via embassy and official contacts. Most artists[...]were unaware their work had been donated to an exhibition in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle” (Khouri, Salti, 2019).

<sup>17</sup> File 48/1972, UAP Fund, ANIC.

Hence, in the Romanian case as well as in the Palestinian case we can suppose the Union of Artists received the Chilean call for artworks and designated the artists who would contribute. Thus, at a first glance, this would be another example of the bureaucratic, highly institutionalized Romanian artistic socialist field. Artists would not independently decide to support a certain cause, but would rather obey the hierarchical environment that was applied to the artistic world as well. The Romanian example thus negates the logic of artists acting in solidarity with a cause put forward by the socialist artists of Chile, and introduces the possibility of the institutionalization and politicization of the cultural field by the socialist state. This approach also applies to the transregional cultural links, which although were the result of the action of certain individuals in Chile and respectively Romania, are thereafter taken over by this institutional logic.

### **Conclusions**

This article has put forward an argument for an investigation of the transregional links that were forged between countries of the Second Socialist World, through the specific case of the Museum of Solidarity. This museum constitutes a very good example of “cultural transnationalism” during the Cold War, and can act as a motif to further study the type of connections established during the 1970s and 1980s between various left-wing movements. Moreover, the article endeavours, through a micro-history approach, to investigate the case of the Romanian-Chilean connection, as mediated by the museum, as well as on the basis of archival material unused until now, which documents the cultural relations between the two countries.

The theoretical framework used is that of transnational and transregional links between communist regimes in the East and the South during the Cold War, specifically from the point of view of cultural relations, independent of the two super powers, the US and the USSR. Several arguments for this type of comparison were recalled stemming from very different theoretical perspectives: a history of art and the input of Piotr Piotrowski that proposed to create a “horizontal art history”, the artistic projects that have investigated the transregional connections established by artists and museum projects in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and Cultural Cold War studies that have only marginally dwelt upon the connections between the East and the South.

Analysing the relations the Museum of Solidarity established with the Second Socialist World, with the countries in Eastern Europe, this article demonstrated that these were not central to the museum; only 64 of the 823 artists were from Eastern Europe and only 11% of the 1,161

artworks donated were from Eastern Europe. The aesthetic register also differed in relation to the artwork sent from other parts of the world. Eastern European artists privileged an abstract aesthetic vocabulary (the Polish case) or a neutral aesthetic imaginary (the Romanian example). Although these were socialist regimes, the type of connection they established rather depended on personal ties, as the Polish example shows. Otherwise, these relations remained highly institutionalized and bureaucratized as the Romanian case exemplified. In fact, as Hurtado-Torres recently showed, through the relationship between Josip Broz Tito and Allende, the relations between the Chilean regime and the communist regimes were not always an automatic response to ideological alignments, as it would appear at a first glance.<sup>18</sup>

Based on the unused archival documents of the IRRCS and of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs documenting the relation between Romania and Chile, this study showed what was the bureaucratic perspective offered by the institutional archives. The Romanian-Chilean cultural institutional relations were based on personal initiatives of Romanian exiles in Chile, and on the local initiatives, which invited the Romanian institution (IRRCS) to send them materials in order to organize local events. The types of events they organized testify to a traditionalist approach of the cultural field, emphasizing the expressions of popular art. The donation to the Museum of Solidarity of Chile, which was lost in the aftermath of the military coup of September 1973, attests of a bureaucratic logic; the Romanians sent artwork by important Romanian artists whose titles are not openly mobilizing or ideological, but on the contrary seem rather neutral. The six artists signed the list of artworks they donated. Moreover, although the Ceaușescu regime supported the arrival of 1600 Chilean refugees in 1974 in Romania, the regime did not participate in the efforts to support the Chilean cause in the following years, and did not collaborate with the museum in exile, the MIRSA because this was openly against the dictatorship of Pinochet with whom Ceausescu maintained relations.<sup>19</sup> Ceausescu refused in his meetings with the leaders of the

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<sup>18</sup> Hurtado-Torres (2019, 41) recalls how Tito favored, in the 1970 elections won by Allende, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, Radomiro Tomic. Another reason not to open up to Allende's victory was the Chilean Communist Party's support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, along with Castro's support for Allende and Tito's "deeply negative opinion of Castro and his brand of socialism".

<sup>19</sup> According to the Museum's documents, for the period 1975-1990 there were only 2 Romanian artists who donated 3 artworks, and it seems these were in fact artists born in Romania, but who lived abroad, in France and Mexico. *Museo Internacional de la Resistencia Salvador Allende, MIRSA 1975-1990* (Santiago, Museo de la Solidaridad Salvador Allende, 2016), 124.

Chilean Communist Party to follow the line imposed by the party in exile, in what concerns breaking relations with Chile under Pinochet.

The Romanian case shows that art considered in solidarity with the Chilean museum was traditional, nationalist, in agreement with Ceausescu's perspective on the arts, and in stark opposition to the logic of art of resistance and solidarity that was collected from other Western countries. Moreover, transregional and transnational studies discuss how individuals and networks of actors matter more than state relations, and the establishment and consolidation of cultural relations between Chile and Romania confirms it. But if the specific case of the relation between the Museum of Solidarity and Romania is analysed, we see that institutions matter more.

So, if the Museum of Solidarity represents a novel case study, by studying its relation with the Romanian regime of Nicolae Ceausescu what becomes evident is the difference in line with the reflections opened by Dragostinova and Fidelis. Interstate relations with socialist countries and personalized in the case of Poland, but not so in the case of Romania so the many layers of the transregional cultural relations have to be taken into account.

With respect to the study of Cultural Cold War relations, the example of the relationship between Romania and Chile as mediated by the Museum of Solidarity supports the idea of a highly bureaucratized institutionalized relation with the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it was the cultural institutions that mattered, rather than personal initiatives on the Romanian behalf. An area for further research is how the Romanian officials acted in relation to their Chilean counterparts eventually by interviewing surviving artists from the Union of Artists that could testify of the reactions to the Chilean call of the Museum.

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## THE MULTICULTURALISM POLICY IN EUROPE

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**Abstract:** *The aim of the article is the analysis of the genesis and contemporary content of the multiculturalism policy, implemented in European countries. The authors also consider the attitude of the European states to the increasing migrants flow. The attention is focused on the theoretical and practical differences in the understanding of the concept of "multiculturalism". Additionally, the analysis of the successful experience in implementing the multiculturalism policy from several non-European continents is presented in this article, which can be also applied in Europe. The authors also analyse the strategic mistakes and the reasons why the policy of multiculturalism is considered to be not effective in Europe today. The article is based on the case study, explicit-diagnostic, descriptive and evaluationary approaches, as well as an analysis of the works of various authors, who have been studying ethno-cultural diversity and multicultural societies for a long time, and on the critical discourse analysis of the recent publications in the media, related to the multiculturalism policy in Europe.*

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**Keywords:** multiculturalism, migration, multiculturalism policy in Europe, European lifestyle.

### Introduction. The aim and methodology

Taking into consideration the new priorities of the European Commission for the new term (especially the importance of the fourth priority "Promoting our European lifestyle")<sup>20</sup>, the issue

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<sup>20</sup> See more: European Commission, *6 Commission priorities for 2019-24*, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024> (18.02.2020)

of developing a common European concept of the multiculturalism policy (or alternatively – developing a program supporting the actions of individual Member States in the face of the growing problem of migration) has become a common problem in public<sup>21</sup> and scientific discussion (e.g. Triandafyllidou, Modood & Meer 2012; Cuyjet et al. 2016; Meer 2016; McCoy 2018). For this reason, it is important to critically analyse the experience of the selected multicultural strategies on the level of the Member States. Culture is the realm used to uphold the concept of Europe; its ties, links, shared paths, as well as art, literature and music are the result of the diversity of the European Union, and the EU is a great example of a true commitment to interculturalism (Meer 2016).

The aim of the article is the analysis of the genesis and contemporary content of the multiculturalism policy, implemented in European countries. The attention is focused on the theoretical and practical differences in the understanding of the concept of "multiculturalism". Additionally, the description of the successful experience in implementing the policy of multiculturalism from other continents is presented in this article, which can be applied in the European countries. The authors analyse the strategic mistakes and the reasons, why the multiculturalism policy is considered to be not effective in Europe today.

The article uses theoretic research methods, mostly descriptive and evaluationary approaches, as well as the explicit-diagnostic one, which are based on the deductive reasoning and a generalisation of the gathered information.

The main sources of the analysis are the academic subject literature, political decisions on multiculturalism policies, research reports on multiculturalism policy in the particular countries, publications in the media, etc. The case study method, which has been used to analyse the multiculturalism policy in European countries, is particularly important for this research.

### **The term “multiculturalism” in the different contexts**

The contemporary world is characterised by the existence of a large number of different cultures, which often interconnect within one state. The term “multiculturalism” appeared in

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<sup>21</sup> See more, for example: European Commission, *European Agenda on Migration – Legislative documents*, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en); European Commission, European Web Site on Integration. Migrant Integration Information and good practices, <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/> (18.02.2020)

Switzerland in 1957 to characterise the structure within the country, since Switzerland is a state where four languages are spoken and several different religions are manifested. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, the term “multiculturalism” received a slightly different content and became the marker of the multicultural state, which accepted the migrants, having already many of them, and at the same time this state respected the other cultures. As B. Parekh states, in the early 1970s the multicultural movement appeared in Canada and Australia for the first time, and then in the USA, Great Britain, Germany and the other countries (Parekh 1999). Immigration to Canada and Australia called into question the bi-culture and British-European monoculturalism. To the United States immigrants arrived mainly not from Europe, but from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia. In the 1960s, Europe was already a continent covered by networks of immigrant flows, and by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, even those European countries that were the main suppliers of immigrants – Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, themselves began to include large immigrant communities, mostly non-Europeans. In the United States, the development of multiculturalism or “identity politics” was initiated by student and youth movements in the second half of the 1960s, which challenged established stereotypes and institutions. In the United States, these movements from the very beginning had a strong anti-racist connotation, which was associated with black people speaking for their rights. Similar movements, expressing pride in their culture of previously discriminated, marginalised and often despised ethnic groups, have spread among the indigenous population of countries created by immigrants, in particular in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Terborn 2001).

Representatives of the Chicago School of Sociology introduced the study of the processes of cultural adaptation of migrants even before the development of such a term as “multiculturalism.” The Chicago School of Sociology from 1915 to 1935 occupied a dominant position in American sociology and had a significant impact on the development of sociology as a whole, determining its empirical orientation. The problem of population migration was studied in-depth by representatives of this school. This circumstance was caused by the fact that in the first quarter of the XX century the United States attracted a huge number of immigrants. In this regard, the issue of adaptation and, accordingly, the integration of migrants into a new society was extremely important. As a very valuable contribution to the issue of migration research must be considered the work “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America” by W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (Sitnikova 2009). The subject of the above mentioned study was the family of Polish peasants

who, after moving to the United States, entered the transition (adaptation) period from the old forms of social organisation to its modern forms. The theorists of Chicago School while studying migration processes made one of the first attempts to sociologically reassess the phenomenon of spatial displacements from the point of view of social changes taking place in society, as well as the consequences of migration for both the host society and the individuals. The adaptation features of migration were studied, which then formed the basis for developments on the cultural assimilation of migrants. On the basis of the Chicago School theoretical and practical findings (because the adaptation features of migrants were studied and described) we can argue that the beginning of critical multiculturalism has roots in the United States.

The term “multiculturalism” has a range of meanings in sociology and in political philosophy. In sociology it is a synonym for “ethnic pluralism” or “cultural pluralism”, where various ethnic groups collaborate and enter into a dialogue without having to sacrifice their particular identities. For example, it can mean a mixed ethnic community area or a country, where many cultural traditions co-exist. Moreover, in sociology “multiculturalism” is the end-state of the natural or artificial process (e.g. legally-controlled immigration) and it occurs on a large national scale or on a smaller scale (e.g. the nation's communities). On a large scale, it can be a result of the legal or illegal migration around the world.

In political philosophy, the ideas of multiculturalism are focused on the ways in which societies should respond to cultural and religious differences. It is often associated with “identity policy”, “the policy of difference”, and “the policy of recognition”. It is also a matter of economic interests and political power. Recently, political multiculturalist ideologies have been expanding in their use to include and define disadvantaged groups with arguments often focusing on ethnic and religious minorities, national minorities, and even people with disabilities. The article investigates the term “multiculturalism” in the most commonly understood, e.g. broad context, what includes the before mentioned issues.

During last years, multiculturalism has been the subject of wide debate.

Many debates over multiculturalism are centred on the question: whether or not multiculturalism is the appropriate way to deal with cultural diversity and immigrant integration. The arguments regarding the perceived rights to a multicultural education include the proposition, that it acts to demand recognition of the aspects concerning a group's culture subordination and its entire experience in contrast to the non-multicultural societies. Multiculturalism is seen by its

supporters as a fairer system that allows people to truly express who they are within a society, that is more tolerant and that adapts better to social issues. In this case, the culture is not based on one race or religion, but it is rather the result of multiple factors, that change as the world changes.

### **The multiculturalism policy: an analysis of selected cases**

Nowadays, the multiculturalism policy is one of the priorities in many countries, especially in Europe. In general, it should be said that European states first encountered multiculturalism in the period of colonisation of the 15<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Many modern cultural studies have noted that colonisation is the root cause of globalisation and cultural integration (Babich & Rodionova 2009). In the countries such as Austria, France, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland and, of course, Germany, the majority of immigrants were seen as “labour” migrants and refugees.

Many European countries faced the “challenges” of migration throughout the twentieth century. French experience can be considered as an illustration. In the first half of the XX century migrants began to come to France: “Russian aristocrats fled from the Bolshevik regime, Jews from the Nazi regime in Germany, and Armenians from Turkish genocide” (Veretevskaya 2018). Initially, French society treated migrants positively, but as the economic situation worsened, the attitude became more hostile. In 1889, the Citizenship Law was revised, which now gave the government the right to refuse immigrants to naturalise if they “did not deserve it” or were recognised as “undesirable”. However, after the loss of a large number of able-bodied people during World War I, attitudes towards immigrants changed again and the legislation became more liberal. In the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a new flood of immigrants poured into France – after the war, Spaniards and Portuguese fled to France from autocracy and economic problems. In the 1960s immigrants from former French colonies began to come to work in large numbers. Algeria is an example. The Algerian colony has long been considered virtually and legally part of France. Algerian citizens, respectively, of both European and non-European descent, enjoyed the right of free movement to France, as well as French citizens – to Algeria. During the War of Independence, many French citizens living in Algeria rushed to their historic homeland. Algeria's independence did not stop the flow of immigration to France. Moreover, almost immediately after the recognition of the independence of Algeria, France and Algeria signed the Evian Agreements, which, in particular, laid the legal basis for labor immigration. In the future France will attempt to revise

these agreements due to the too large flow of Algerians. In the early 1970s, due to a reduction in labor requirements, France began to restrict immigration and managed to restrain migration flows until the beginning of the 20th and the modern wave of migration in Europe (Veretevskaya 2018). It is worth saying that in essence, France began to implement the policy of multiculturalism only at the end of the 20th century, despite the long experience of migration.

Currently, ethnic minorities are increasingly demanding in the question concerning the recognition of their cultural identity and their cultural practices, which are not “usual” for their receiving countries. An example is the requirement to recognise the customary law of ethnic minorities (Vasilyeva 1992; Abashidze 1996), or the demands of immigrants have their religious or cultural practices accepted, and in some cases to take them into account at the state level.

It can be said that the process of development and formation of new multicultural states is underway, but this is a complex and sometimes ambiguous process, which affects the interests of a large number of people and communities. In the foreground, there are the problems of the economic and social integration of cultural minorities, the tensions in the world facing terrorism issues, and, in addition, the increasing migration flows. Thus, the lives of migrants in their new countries of stay are causing a serious public response.

It is worth noting that nowadays a number of scientists claim that the multiculturalism policy only strengthens the cultural differences and does not weaken them. On the basis of such policy, cultural differences may be additionally emphasised and even exaggerated. The described policy has a negative impact both on the culture itself and on the possibilities of integration of the population within the society. In this case, the idea of multiculturalism is considered a source of destruction of social unity (Babich & Rodionova 2009; Hasanova 2015; Tishkov 2002; Fukuyama 1995). In this context, an interesting point of view was expressed by F. Fukuyama, who, at the end of the last century, spoke about the inconsistency of multiculturalism, that it only cultivates disunity in the states (Hasanova 2015). According to Fukuyama, multiculturalism covers the reluctance of truly accepting other cultural values, and it integrates the lives of the minorities into the lives of the majority: “Let you have your own schools, your own religion, your community, and we will leave you alone if you leave us alone” (Fukuyama 1995: 310).

In the broadest sense, the multiculturalism policy is a range of ideas about the support and significance of ethnocultural diversity (Babich & Rodionova 2009; Veretevskaya 2018; Tishkov 2002; Tully 2002; Raz 1994; Kucheryavaya & Kucheriavaia 2016; Kucheriavaia 2018; Koroteeva



1999; Van Dyke 1982; Blinova 2009; Volkova 2011). However, additional clarifying questions are appearing: on which particular groups of the population should be the policy of support focus, what exactly it should consist of, and who should deal with these striking theoretical and practical contradictions. Thus, despite the very widespread multiculturalism policy, it is impossible to speak about the formation of an unequivocal understanding of this phenomenon.

For example, according to the Canadian and New Zealand approaches, multiculturalism is understood as a policy of supporting ethnic diversity and ethnic minorities, by including and integrating them into a wider cultural group. A similar policy is being pursued with respect to the indigenous peoples and the immigrants. The measures themselves may differ depending on the state and the specific political situation in it. In Europe, multiculturalism appears to be a kind of specific and unpopular policy to support the cultural identity of the immigrants. An interesting point is that the inherent multiculturalism policy towards indigenous peoples or national minorities is not perceived by the European people as a manifestation of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007).

V.A. Tishkov (2002) proposed to utilise the concept of multiculturalism from the point of view of several aspects:

- 1) descriptively, when it comes to characterising a society with a large number of different ethnic, religious and cultural groups;
- 2) regulatory, when it is said about a certain group of political principles on which interaction with society is built;
- 3) in the political sphere, where multiculturalism is a series of political measures.

An important note on these aspects should be made based on the works of B. Parekh: it is necessary to distinguish a culturally diverse reality from a multicultural society itself (Parekh 2006). Multiculturalism should be discussed only when diversity is recognised in the society as a value and is supported both by political doctrine and by the society. Parekh introduces two terms in relation to society: “multicultural” and “multiculturalist”. In the first case, it means the state, where there are several or more different cultural communities, and, in the second case, the similar societies demonstrate a positive attitude towards the introduction of diversity in value. However, the term “multicultural society” is not so ingrained in literature and is less commonly used to compare the effects. Thus, the mere presence in the state of a large number of isolated cultural groups does not make it a multicultural society, that society can rather be called “heterogeneous”.

A heterogeneous society, in which cultural diversity is regarded as a problem that needs to be overcome, will not be multicultural in the strict sense (Veretevskaya 2018; Parekh 2006).

Today, among the many different definitions of multiculturalism, there is no one that would allow us to judge, whether we are dealing in each case with multiculturalism, with a kind of multicultural approach, or with something resembling multiculturalism only by its shell. At the same time, as noted by W. Kymlicka (2007), with all the variety of understanding of the essence of the multiculturalism policy and the phenomenon as a whole, this is a very obvious phenomenon and can be recognised in various political conditions. Nevertheless, in spite of the solidarity with the above-mentioned opinion about the recognition of the phenomenon of multiculturalism, in order to make the notion of multiculturalism functional, it must be endowed with more specific internal content and made more capacious. It is also noteworthy that the goal of multiculturalism in the most general sense for the majority is seen in one thing – to ensure a non-conflict existence of a multicultural society in an economically prosperous and politically stable liberal state, based on the voluntary and full-fledged political integration of all cultural groups of society (Veretevskaya 2018). Only through the full inclusion of all cultural communities in the dialogue can be achieved the success in shaping a multicultural policy and its implementation. In our opinion, the key problem of multiculturalism in Europe lies in the absence of such a multicultural dialogue between all parties. Other reasons of the problems of developing a common multicultural policy in the European Union are the peculiarities of the decision-making process at the EU level (Lawniczak 2018).

In our opinion, Canada can be proud of having the most successful experience in implementing the multiculturalism policy. As mentioned above, Canada was the first country where the policy of integration was fixed at the legislative level. In addition, most of the Canadian population is ethnic Europeans, and, in terms of standard of living, Canada is comparable to the most developed European countries (Veretevskaya 2018; Lyalina 2014; McCoy 2018). Despite the fact that, obviously, Canada does not belong to the states of Europe, its political traditions go back to the European ones. The goal of implementing the multiculturalism policy in Canada is to ensure a comfortable and conflict-free existence of diverse cultures within one country, based on voluntary and full-fledged political integration. The achievement of this goal is primarily based on the acceptance and respect for a different culture by all parties of the dialogue (Bak et al. 2019).

The principles underlying the multiculturalism policy in Canada are the following:

- 1) the awareness of the importance (but not absolute) of the cultural component in the social and political life of the individuals and the society;
- 2) the equal inclusion of the representatives of all cultural groups of society in the public life of the society (e.g. ensuring access to participate in the definition of the common good);
- 3) the need for a partial voluntary cultural transformation in order to achieve a political consensus on the common good – a multicultural compromise;
- 4) the perception of a broad multi-format multicultural dialogue (polylogue) as the best way to achieve a legitimate multicultural compromise.

It is important to understand that all the goals and principles indicated above are fully observed, and this fact contributes to the successful implementation of the multiculturalism policy (Veretevskaya 2018).

The sharpest contradictions now arise due to the high increase of migrant flows from Muslim states. In most states, the society was not ready to accept them, in some cases even despite the fact of getting used to the arrival of migrant workers. It is important to understand that in this case the role is played not only by the unreadiness of society to seek a compromise and accept other cultural traditions and practices, but mainly by the unwillingness of the migrants themselves to adapt to life in a different culture. In this regard, there are natural contradictions, migrants cannot identify themselves with the state in which they are currently arriving and can join extremism in search of identity, which even James Cameron spoke about (Veretevskaya 2018). In such situation, we can understand the reluctance of some European states to take part in the multiculturalism policy and adapt to new reality, that is visible in political decisions and media discourse.

Despite the fact that at that time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were invited to accept a smaller part of the refugees, who were being admitted by Germany and other countries, they put up fierce resistance. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, said that his country would accept only Christian refugees, since the opposite would be “false solidarity” – to force Muslims to settle in a country without a single mosque. Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, called the refugee flow a “riot of illegal migrants”. The disagreements further divided the union, which then faced an unprecedented flow of migrants. Lech Wałęsa, who led the Polish independence movement, said: “Our salaries and homes are still smaller than in the West. Many people here do not believe that they have something to share with migrants. Moreover, they see that migrants are often well dressed, sometimes better than some Poles” (Lyman 2015).

## Conclusions

The findings of our research demonstrate, that – unfortunately – nowadays there is a tendency to neglect the solution of the problems of multiculturalism. Instead of dealing with the mentioned issue by consistent implementation of the multiculturalism policy aiming at integration, ethnic, religious and cultural differences are even aggravated by the current policy makers. Immigration communities, and the migrants in general, do not have communication channels with the national and cultural majority; they cannot associate themselves with the state, where they are at the moment. Often, identity is not the product of a multicultural compromise accepted by the majority, but only a reflection of those values, which a large number of cultural communities do not have access to (Nikolaeva et al. 2018).

In conclusion, it should be said that the statement about the failure of the multiculturalism policy in Europe is controversial, due to the fact that in the end it cannot be said that such policy has ever been fully applied (Nechaev & Volkova 2014; Kondratyeva 2011; Asa, Kivilehto & Koljonen 2009; Csereklye 2014). Multiculturalism mostly remained only in political rhetoric, and the initiatives implemented in practice were chaotic and unsystematic. In addition, it is worth noting that the most successful multiculturalism policies in the selected European countries were aimed at non-immigrant minorities, while immigrant policies are more suited to either segregation or assimilation. All the efforts of European “multiculturalism” were aimed at making immigrants look like the people in the states they came; however, this is not integration, and certainly not multiculturalism. The real multiculturalism policy is based on the respect for different cultures and worldviews, but absolutely all aspects of multicultural dialogue should certainly come to this respect: multiculturalism did not fail in Europe, they simply did not try to instill it truly (Bakır 2018). However, the events of the last decade demonstrate, that the popularity of the idea of multiculturalism is declining with the growing number of those Europeans who want to return to the “traditional Europe” with borders closed to migrants and with the traditional division in accordance with ethno-cultural criteria. This means an existential danger to these states, and, unfortunately, in this case there can be no prospects for the development of multiculturalism. Instead, radical ideas and radical politicians have great prospects.

During the last years the concept of multiculturalism has anchored itself in the speech of politicians and media in many European countries. Multiculturalism has become an ideology (not only a policy), that has on one hand gained a lot of support from some parties and, on the other

hand, received a lot of criticism. In the academic discussion different views have been expressed: how multiculturalism can enrich culture and life or, as opposite, how multiculturalism can threaten the coherency of the nation (Asa, Kivilehto & Koljonen 2009).

On the basis of the presented partial analysis it is difficult to make wide-spread and going to the distant future prognosis. However, when drawing conclusions, it should be assumed that, unlike the examples analysed at the national level, the prospect of success of the pan-European programme will also be determined by transnational trends and glocalisation processes – as a feedback wave effect on globalisation processes (Witkowska 2013). These trends mean that today it is impossible to create the reasonable assumptions for the projection of the future of multiculturalism policy at the European level. At the same time, we understand that the raised issue of multiculturalism policy is extremely important nowadays and it deserves in-depth research and a wide scientific discussion. However, taking into consideration formal requirements for this particular publication and the aim of the article, we are not able to present wider aspects of the topic and the in-depth analysis of all related issue. Although, paying careful attention to the importance of the problem we will continue research on the topic and present the outcomes of our work in the future publications.

The Canadian experience analysed in this article can be useful for the European states in improving and implementing the current multiculturalism policy. The process of solving the problems of multiculturalism is very long and laborious; an important role in it is played by the desire of minorities themselves to integrate and become part of a larger culture, while maintaining their own traditions. Thus, the success of the multiculturalism policy lies in the systematic, consistent and continuous multicultural dialogue aimed at reaching a compromise and finding effective solutions.

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## EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE: IN SEARCH FOR SCENARIOS

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**Abstract:** *The article makes an attempt to explain key developments of the European integration processes in the aftermath of Euromaidan events in Ukraine. The analysis covers brief summary of the above mentioned processes in years 1994-2004 and puts major emphasis on the directions and peculiarities of the EU-Ukraine cooperation concerning deliberation and introduction of democratic reforms as well as the main impediments to their successful implementation. The methodology of the research is predominantly based on the method of scenarios aiming to give arguments in favor and against the most probable directions of further relations between Ukraine and the EU. As a matter of fact, on the grounds of the conducted study of political and social situation in Ukraine as well as the policies and position of the European Union and Russian Federation toward the European integration of Ukraine, three scenarios are proposed with a view to evaluating the potential directions of Ukraine's development: 1) successful European integration and a full EU membership; 2) successful European integration without the perspective of a full EU membership; 3) the change of Ukraine's pro-European course. Finally, the conclusive remarks summarize of the most significant developments in reference to the systemic reforms launched in 2014 and a set of recommendations regarding the perspective steps that would bring Ukraine closer to the European Union.*

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**Keywords:** European integration, Europeanization, Association Agreement, anti-corruption reforms.

### Introduction

The issue of European integration has been on political agenda of the Ukrainian authorities since Ukraine regained its independence in 1991. The most recent and dramatic example attesting to the topicality of integration with the European Union (EU) was refusal by Viktor Yanukovich to sign the Association Agreement (AA) in 2013, which led to protests in Independence Square in Kyiv known as Euromaidan.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the purpose of the article is to explain the mechanisms

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<sup>22</sup> The term "Euromaidan" is used in reference to a series of anti-government protests in Ukraine which began on 21 November 2013 in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (in English: "Independence Square") in Kyiv, as a reaction to the government's decision to withhold from association with the EU.

of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine which resulted in particular political decisions in Post-Euromaidan period. In reference to the stated purpose, the major research tasks are the following:

- to analyze the key stages of the European integration processes in Ukraine in 1991-2018;
- to evaluate the current state of Ukrainian reforms in context of the EU integration criteria;
- to explain the possible scenarios of European integration of Ukraine.

Furthermore, the article makes an attempt to verify the main hypothesis stating that the success and the scale of the Ukraine's European integration greatly depends on the cooperation mechanisms between the European and Ukrainian policy-makers as well as on the involvement of representatives of civil society and scholars in the reforming processes. Meantime due to the dynamic nature of the process, such factors as political and social situation in Ukraine, level of the EU engagement and the Russian position toward the issue of Ukraine's integration with the European Union seem to have a considerable impact on the choice of scenario regarding the direction of transformation process in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine in the nearest future.

As far as the methodology of the article is concerned, the research purpose, tasks and hypothesis determine the use of a certain set of methods. It is the method of scenarios that is supposed to give arguments in favor and against the most probable directions of further relations between Ukraine and the EU. Thus, the article analyzes the political and social circumstances in Ukraine that have impact on the vector and pace of the reforms and are directly connected with the prospects of European integration. As regards other methods used in the political science research, the structure of the paper is based on the comparison of major political actions and decisions aimed at adoption of legal regulations and changes necessary to meet the requirements set by the EU institutions. In addition to the comparison, the historical method is used in order to explain the essence of analyzed political actions and their outcomes for the perspectives of Ukraine's European integration in different periods of state's independence.

### **Literature Overview**

Prior to the analysis of the European integration prospects of Ukraine, it is important to analyze the available definitions of such terms as European integration, Europeanization and external Europeanization, and the state of scientific research in given field.

Overall, experts agree that the concept of European integration has a wide range of meanings and interpretations. Konstanty Adam Wojtaszczyk (2015, p. 103) underlines such

elements of its definition as peaceful and voluntary nature of unity between societies, political and legal systems of member states “at the level of common values and standards”. Dariusz Milczarek (2012, pp.28-29) defines “exceptionally unique and greatly complex nature” as major feature of the EU. According to the author, the European values based on the principles of democracy and human rights have become a specific feature that is associated with the EU and that makes the EU a unique entity. Consequently, the EU has a reputation of a democracy advocate and support provider for the rest of the world.

Similarly, the term Europeanization has “many faces” as well. Almost two decades ago, Johan Olsen (2002, pp.921-952) offered five uses of this term: 1) as territorial expansion of the EU/Europe; 2) as institutionalization on European level; 3) as a transfer of norms and regulations outside Europe; 4) as a political action aimed at strengthening the integration; 5) as changes of state and regional system of management. More recent definitions describe Europeanization as the impact of Europe, or the process of European integration in the context of the EU’s impact on the political systems of its Member States (Miecznikowska, 2018, p. 39).

Concerning the impact of Europeanization, Radaelli and Pasquier (2006, p. 46) assert that Europeanization might have a varied impact on domestic structures overall or on their components, be it state-building, development of capitalism, democratization, nation-formation or development of welfare systems. According to Nadalutti (2015, p.39), some studies have shown that using different channels has had both domestic and local impact: with the help of institutional models, which should be taken into account by governments at national and subnational levels; with the help of EU policy implementation at the domestic and local level that resulted in the change of balances of power inside particular countries; or with the help of winning hearts and minds of social actors at the local level. In his turn Bartolini (2005, p.389) summarizes that the essence of the Europeanization hypothesis lies in cross-border coordination among different actors with similar interests.

In regard to the dimension of the Europeanization process, Konstanty Adam Wojtaszczyk (2018, p.288) highlights its two major forms in the EU member states: 1) downloading - in the sense of the transfer of preferences from the level of the EU to the level of a member state; 2) uploading - or the transfer of state preferences to the level of the EU. In this context, Tanja Borzel (2010, p.8) states that the top-down perspective seems to be relevant in reference to the states with a weak position in the EU decision-making process. Apart from the vertical dimension, scholars

point to the horizontal dimension of this process (cross-loading), meaning the transfer of European standards and regulations between the states without direct participation of the EU institutions (Miecznikowska, 2018, p. 41).

As regards the European integration of non-EU countries, the emphasis should be put on the Eastern policy of the EU and the Eastern Partnership program in particular. As Ruszkowski puts it (2019, p. 203), while studying the issue of Europeanization and its impact on institutions, states or regions, one should take into account the influence of the Europeanization on other actors of given process such as people, social groups, or elites. From this perspective, a group of authors analyze the issue of the external Europeanization. Olga Barburska (2018, pp.188-189) summarizes that external Europeanization involves the transfer of EU standards and regulations to candidate states that are expected to adjust their political systems in order to meet the membership criteria. Rafał Riedel (2010, p.237) adds that the external Europeanization is likely to foster the dynamic of integration processes in the candidate states.

Due to the stated purpose and hypothesis, the article research is based on the concept of external Europeanization that is understood as transfer of European norms and regulations aimed at the transformation of Ukrainian system of governance on the one hand, and the impact on the role of political and social actors in Ukraine in transformation processes on the other.

### **European Integration Processes in Ukraine in 1994-2014**

The 21st EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv on 8 July 2019 included joint political statements on “the strength of the political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine”. In fact, a general overview of the implementation of the AA demonstrates that the “progress of performance of the scheduled objectives in 2018 increased by 11% against 2017 and amounted to 52%” (Consilium.Europa.EU, 2019). Additionally, the number of Ukrainians supporting integration with the EU has been constantly growing and increased from 48% in 2013 to 69% in 2019 while 63% of Ukrainians expressed a high level of trust towards the EU as a strategic partner of Ukraine (Eurointegracijnyy portal, 2019).

Meanwhile, former Vice-Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Oksana Syroyid, in her keynote lecture at the XXIV Ukrainikum summer school at the University of Greifswald entitled “Geopolitics, war and Ukraine’s success”, presented a viewpoint on EU-Ukraine cooperation

stating that the EU should „open the door” for Ukraine.<sup>23</sup> This article makes an attempt to explain the major milestones of the EU-Ukraine cooperation since 1991 in order to understand whether, using the door metaphor, the door is more opened now than it was before.

It is in fact year 1994 that might be regarded as a starting point of the EU-Ukraine relations, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine, adopted on 14 June 1994, provided the framework for cooperation between the two parties in such areas as political, trade and economic relations (EC.Europa.EU, 2019). However, the document entered into force only in 1998.

As regards the relations between the EU and Ukraine in 1994-2014, the relations during the Kuchma’s presidencies are described by Taras Kuzio (2006, p.89) as “troubled” due to multivectorism of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Interestingly, Oleksiy Haran and Maria Zolkina (2014, pp.1-2) argue that multivectorial navigation by Kuchma was eventually slightly dominated by the direction toward the West, pointing to such documents as “Strategy for Ukraine’s Integration into the EU” issued in June 1998, and “Law on Fundamentals of National Security in Ukraine” drawn up at the end of Kuchma’s second term that declared joining the EU and NATO as aims of the Ukrainian state and were unanimously supported by the parliamentary faction of the Party of Regions whose leader Viktor Yanukovych served as the Prime Minister of Ukraine at the time. On the other hand, Kataryna Wolczuk (2003, pp.1-3) argues that such political steps as the ones mentioned above were only “declarative Europeanization”, while in reality the Ukrainian authorities were reluctant and/or unable to introduce the necessary changes and transform the political system of Ukraine in order to meet the criteria of European integration.

In terms of changes after the 2004 Orange revolution, Kuzio uses the same metaphor as Syroid in her lecture, stating that the EU door for Ukraine remained closed. The EU approach to Ukraine after the Orange revolution was based on the European Neighbourhood Policy that was supposed to create an Action Plan for every member. Ukraine found itself placed on the same level as Northern African states, Israel, or Russia – countries that either were not part of Europe at all, or have never declared their willingness to become part of the EU (Kuzio, 2006, p.90). Despite the official pro-Western position of Viktor Yushchenko and the actions demonstrating the pro-

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<sup>23</sup> based on the author’s notes from the keynote lecture by Ms. Oksana Syroid on 5 August 2019 at the Alfred Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald as part of the XXIV Ukrainian Summer School “Ukraine’s Forced Choice”.

European approach, such as lifting the visa requirement for EU citizens, there were no similar actions in response from Brussels. Meantime, a positive change for Ukraine was joining the World Trade Organization in 2008 that was one of the foreign policy aims of president Yushchenko (Haran and Zolkina, 2014, p.3). Furthermore, in 2009 Ukraine officially joined the Eastern Partnership initiative of the EU which focused on four main elements: association with the EU, creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), dialogue on the establishment of a visa free regime, and energy cooperation (Szeptycki, 2014, p.4).

Finally, relations between the EU and Ukraine in 2010-2013 involved a number of significant developments. Viktor Yanukovych was sending mixed signals to the West. His Party of Regions initiated and supported a new law that introduced the non-block policy, thereby excluding integration with NATO on the one hand, and leaving integration with the EU as a priority of Ukraine's foreign policy on the other. At the same time, Russia took a series of steps to convince Yanukovych to join the Customs Union with the former Soviet States. Finally, Yanukovych made a decision not to sign the AA with the EU in November 2013 and accepted a significant financial assistance of 3 billion dollars from Russia. This financial incentive was a considerable argument for the Ukrainian government in the light of political declarations of Prime Minister Azarov that the AA would lead to Ukraine's bankruptcy (Szeptycki, 2014, p.14). Yanukovych's decision led to mass protests of Ukrainians who demanded signing the AA with the EU, and a dramatic development of Euromaidan events leading to the escape of Yanukovych, annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the military conflict in Donbas.

### **EU-Ukraine Relations in the Post-Euromaidan Period**

Prior to the analysis of the EU-Ukraine relations in the light of the AA implementation, the following part concentrates on the brief explanation of the official position of the EU concerning the Ukraine's declarations of its pro-European course and negative attitude of some European politicians toward signing the AA with Ukraine in 2014.

In their reflections on the process of external Europeanization, mentioned in the previous part of this article, a number of scholars speak about the principle of conditionality. On the one hand, the principle of conditionality is analyzed in reference to conditions that should be fulfilled by the candidate states in order to become a member of the European Union (Ruszkowski 2019, p. 184; Riedel 2010, p. 235; Skolimowska 2015, p. 71). On the other hand, it is underlined that the



success of the conditionality in the case of ENP states is unlikely due to „effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of their domestic institutions” and no clear prospects for EU membership (Börzel 2011).

Meanwhile, Burluk and Shapovalova (2017, p. 36) address the issue of conditionality in reference to the EU performance toward Ukraine before 2014 stating that the case of Ukraine demonstrated "two faces" of given principle: in addition to government as a target group of the conditionality principle, the impact is put on the civil actors observing the EU policies. Therefore, it is of equal importance for the EU to build alliances with non-political actors on the domestic level of particular state. At the same time, according to Piskorska (2018, p.90), the offer of the European Union may be regarded as inadequate to the expectations of such countries from the Eastern Partnership Initiative as Ukraine. In fact, scholar points to the differences between the EU's enlargement policy requirements toward the Eastern European states and the states already aspiring to become the EU member states. Such lack of precision might result in discouragement of potential candidates in their attempts to join the European Union or even in changing the direction toward Russia.

As far as the ratification of the AA is concerned, the document was expected to be ratified by the EU institutions as well as all EU member states in accordance with their constitutional procedures. The position of the EU institutional leaders was unanimous. In their joint statement on 16 September 2014 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, and Herman Van Rompuy (2014), President of the European Council welcomed the simultaneous ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the Verkhovna Rada and in the European Parliament and considered it to be a significant step on the way to „Ukraine's transformation into a modern and prosperous European democracy”. Similar ideas were expressed three years later after the ratification of the AA by all member states. The President of European Council Donald Tusk (2017) emphasized the benefits of the fully ratified AA for strengthening political and economic cooperation between two parts.

Despite the unanimous position stated above as well as successful ratification in all member states, it was the ratification process in the Netherlands that led to a delay in the finalization of the agreement. Even though the Approval Act for the ratification of the agreement was adopted by two Chambers of the Dutch Parliament: on 7 April 2015 by the House of Representatives and on

7 July 2015 by the Senate respectively, its entry into force was influenced by referendum procedure (Van der Loo, 2016).

The referendum itself took place on 6 April 2016 resulting in 61% of the Dutch voters saying „no” to the ratification of the AA between Ukraine and the European Union. Despite the fact that the referendum had low turnout (32%) and did not have a binding character for the Dutch authorities, it did influence the ratification process in the Netherlands and the negotiation on the wording of the AA regarding the prospects of the EU membership for Ukraine. In fact, the referendum outcomes were seen as anti-EU signal and as „an embarrassing blow” to the Dutch government who was in charge of the rotating EU presidency at the time (Euractive 2016).

Finally, the Netherlands ratified the EU-Ukraine AA a year later, on 30 May 2017 with the support from two-thirds of the senate and opposition coming mostly from far-left and far-right parties. At the same time, the positive vote came after the negotiation on the wording of the document initiated by the Dutch Prime Minister Rutte in December 2016 at the EU summit. Based on the referendum results, Rutte successfully argued for the need to adopt the annex to the AA stating that the EU membership is not guaranteed to Ukraine, and that the Netherlands is not obliged to provide Ukraine with military assistance. Meanwhile, the Head of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker regarded the positive vote of the Dutch parliament as „an important signal” to Ukrainian counterparts ensuring them that they are welcome in Europe (EU Observer 2017).

Interestingly, the AA consists of 1200 pages on which 1943 tasks in 27 areas have been presented. Parts of the AA have been provisionally introduced since 1 November 2014 while the Agreement as such came into force on 1 September 2017 (EU-UA.org, 2019). The analysis below summarizes the major changes that have taken place or are in the process of implementation in terms of the AA. The emphasis is put on the reform processes in regard to the constitutional and anti-corruption reforms that directly or indirectly influence all sectors mentioned in the AA, and are crucial for the democratic development of Ukraine.

### *Constitutional reform*

The constitutional reform was declared to be one of the most important for the transformation of Ukraine, on its path to integration with the EU. What is more, President Petro Poroshenko initiated the discussion on the constitutional amendments aimed at establishing

Ukraine's strategic course toward its full membership in the EU and NATO in the Preamble of the Constitution which was supported by 334 members of parliament on 7 February 2019 (Evropeyska Pravda, 2019). The analysis below takes into account such reforms as the reform of decentralization and local self-governance and the judicial reform, in order to explain the political developments in relation to the constitutional reform in 2014-2018, and to evaluate the prospects of European integration for Ukraine in the nearest future.

As far as the Constitutional reform of Ukraine is concerned, the parliamentary debate on Bill number 2217 On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (concerning the decentralization of power proposed by President Poroshenko) vividly illustrated the complexity of the Ukrainian political scene. The document was a topic of discussion on many domestic and foreign forums, including the discussions between Ukrainian top officials and leaders of the Normandy format or the European Venice Commission, whose Head described it as probably the only real approach that was possible in the existing situation (The Insider, 2015).

However, the fragment of the document stating that "peculiarities of local governance in certain districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions are defined by a separate law" led to a major disagreement in the Ukrainian parliament. More dramatically, after the vote which resulted in 265 votes in favor of the bill, there was an attempt to storm the parliament building by the protesters. As a result of a grenade attack, four soldiers from the National Guard were killed and more than 150 people, mainly members of law enforcement agencies, were injured (Olszański, 2015).

At the same time, a number of legal initiatives were successfully adopted in relation to transformation of local governance in Ukraine. These changes included voluntary amalgamation and the status of the starosta (head) of villages and settlements. In fact, the amalgamation of hromady into larger territorial communities facilitates their more effective management and creates conditions for a more successful implementation of local initiatives. As a matter of fact, the number of amalgamated communities has been constantly growing since 2014 and by July 2019, 924 amalgamated territorial units have been created. Thus, as of July 2019, almost 30% of the Ukrainian population lived in amalgamated territorial units (decentralization.gov.ua, 2019). However, full decentralization of power is impossible without the constitutional amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution (Zheltovskyy, 2019, p.100).

In terms of the judicial reform, on 2 June 2016 335 Ukrainian MPs adopted the constitutional changes in this regard. Among the main principles of the judicial reform were the

return to the three-layer judicial system, establishing the Supreme Council of Justice, mandatory re-attestation of all Ukraine's judges, mandatory asset declaration for judges and their family members as well as stripping them off the immunity (Ukraine Crisis Media Centre, 2019).

Unlike the judicial reform, the bill amending the constitution concerning the local self-government reform was never submitted to the second voting. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the constitutional amendments regarding the decentralization and self-governance will take place in the nearest future.

### Anti-corruption reforms

As Anders Aslund (2014, pp.64-66) asserted in his article *Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration*, in the aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan events "the endemic corruption" appeared to be the most significant informal institution in Ukraine that exerted considerable impact on the political and economic life of the Ukrainian state. The analysis of legal acts and civil initiatives introduced since 2014 by both members of the Ukrainian parliament and civil society activists may thus provide an insight into the directions of anti-corruption actions. The analysts from the Reanimation Package of Reforms organization define the following four goals of the anti-corruption reform: 1) comprehensive system of criminal punishment for corruption offenses; 2) effective system of corruption prevention in the public sector; 3) effective state supervision over the right to access public information; 4) effective measures against political corruption (Anti-corruption reform).

In this regard Vox Ukraine research analyst Olga Rybak (2019) points out that from 2015 to 2019 102 regulatory acts in the framework of anti-corruption reform were adopted. Among the most successfully implemented laws aimed at the fighting with corruption the analysts depict the reforms that concentrate on establishing mechanisms for open access to information connected with the state and local budget expenses or functioning of the public servants that eliminate the risk of abusing power and thus lead to the minimization of corruption.

Having said that, the international analysis of corruption rates around the globe keeps indicating significant problems with corruption in Ukraine at present. Even though there has been a slow positive dynamic in comparison to year 2013 when Ukraine found itself on 144 position, according to the Transparency International research project Corruption Perception Index, in year

2018 Ukraine was put on 120 position out of 180 countries and territories (Transparency International, 2019).

In addition, corruption remains the major impediment to foreign investment in Ukraine. Three consecutive annual surveys conducted in 2015-2018 by Dragon Capital, the European Business Association (EBA) and Centre for Economic Strategy (CES), demonstrated that widespread corruption and lack of trust in the judiciary remained among the most formidable obstacles to investment in Ukrainian assets. At the same time, respondents pointed to positive developments in Ukraine since 2014 such as: the steps undertaken in the fight against corruption, relaunch of the judicial system, and a tangible progress in separating politics from business. Among the main detrimental factors they mentioned potential political pressure on independent anti-corruption institutions and the National Bank of Ukraine, and rejection of democratic values (Dragon Capital, 2019).

As regards the most recent developments in the judicial system of Ukraine, the law on anti-corruption court was adopted by the Ukrainian MPs and signed by President Poroshenko. In its official statement the EU called this step “a positive development” and “a significant step” in the fight against corruption, as well as “a key component” of the EU-Ukraine AA (eeas.europa.eu, 2019). At the same time, there were concerns expressed by domestic and international observers regarding the selection process for the 39 judges who would sit in the court (Freedom House, 2019).

### **European Integration - Scenarios for Ukraine**

The analysis of major developments in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine has brought some ambivalent findings on the prospects of European integration. On the one hand, experts whose work is analyzed in the previous part of the article point to an unprecedented number of reforms since 2014, while on the other, the pace of their implementation as well as cases of political opposition toward the reform processes evoke negative responses from domestic and international observers. Such state of events makes the issue of Ukraine’s European integration a debatable one, with a number of possible developments. Therefore, the article defines possible scenarios for the future directions of the EU-Ukraine relations. The scenarios proposed below are based on three key issues that have direct or indirect influence on the success and pace of the European integration of Ukraine:

- 1) the political and social situation in Ukraine;
- 2) the EU approach toward its closer ties with Ukraine;
- 3) the Ukrainian-Russian relationship in the light of the European integration processes in Ukraine.

*Scenario 1 - successful European integration and a full EU membership*

The first scenario argues for the likelihood of plausible grounds for the successful European integration with a full EU membership for Ukraine. To reach this objective a number of crucial criteria should be fulfilled. Following the logic of three key constituents of successful integration, there must be not only political consensus and social support for such step among the Ukrainian elites and civil society, but also international support or at least a lack of aggressive opposition toward such a step.

As far as the domestic situation in Ukraine is concerned, there has been a phenomenal political victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in presidential elections and his party Servant of the People in parliamentary ones. The landslide victory demonstrated a unique ability of Zelenskyy team to unite, in the election processes, Ukrainian people of different social and educational background and age. Such level of public trust, coupled with the declaration of President Zelenskyy to be only a one-term president, may serve as a significant incentive for speedy reforms aimed at combating corruption.

The presidential efforts to ensure independent functioning of anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine as well as to eliminate the political impact on the judicial system, and the newly established anti-corruption court in particular, together with professional appointments of the General Prosecutor and the Head of the Service of Security of Ukraine, will undoubtedly lead to continuation of anti-corruption policies and will speed up the pace of these processes. Furthermore, despite the potential disagreement in the Ukrainian parliament, the support for issues related to the EU integration may find the constitutional majority of 300 votes. All parties represented in Verkhovna Rada, with the exception of Opposition Platform “For Life”, will most likely support the presidential initiatives to pursue pro-European policies.

The experience of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in conducting a professional media campaign seems to be of equal importance and might serve as an effective tool in promoting the benefits of becoming a part of the EU. Particularly, such campaigns could bring fruitful results in eastern and

southern regions of Ukraine where the support for the accession is traditionally lower than in western or central parts of Ukraine. The high level of popularity of president Zelenskyy in these regions, as well as the fact that he originally comes from the city of Kryvyi Rig in eastern part of Ukraine, may act as additional positive factors contributing to the success of such campaign. The increase in public support for the closer ties with the EU will undoubtedly be another convincing argument in the negotiation talks on the international level.

As regards the position of the EU institutions, the democratic nature of the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine and the continuation of anti-corruption reforms are likely to encourage the European officials to increase the level of support for Ukraine and bring the issue of its formal membership to the table. The recognition of the EU membership for Ukraine may be considered as a “wise move” that would serve as an incentive for modernization (Szeptycki, 2014, p.15). Additionally, the 13% support for the pro-Russian party in the Ukrainian parliament might be a warning for the EU that more decisive steps are needed to persuade Ukrainians to support European integration. That, however, requires substantial financial support. Therefore, the increase of financial assistance for Ukraine and international investment may speed the process significantly. In the light of presidential promises to fight corruption as the main obstacle to international investments, such situation may be taken into account.

In terms of Russia’s reaction to the potential prospect of Ukraine’s full EU membership, the Ukrainian efforts alone may not be sufficient to reach consensus on the matter. In this context, the EU, Great Britain and the USA appear to be crucial partners in the negotiation with the Russian Federation. The unanimous position of the West on the one hand and the success of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in persuading a considerable majority of Ukrainian population (especially among Russian-speaking Ukrainians) to support the EU integration on the other may stop Russia from aggressive policies as a reaction to such step.

#### *Scenario 2 - successful European integration without the perspective of a full EU membership*

The second scenario argues that the European integration is likely to be successful without the prospects of the EU membership for Ukraine. Such a scenario seems to be a compromise for all three components that are taken into account.



First, as far as the domestic political scene is concerned, pro-European policies might serve as a consolidating element for the former political rivals in the 2019 presidential elections, and create a strong pro-European coalition in Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, the domestic political actors who declare pro-European values as central to their programs, such as Petro Poroshenko or Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, may disagree with the perspective of European integration without membership, and criticize Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his party for insufficient actions towards a full membership in the EU. However, these parties will have to cooperate on integration efforts and if European integration turns out to be successful it may be a win-win situation for all of them, since all three might argue that their policies brought Ukraine closer to the EU standards.

Moreover, the second scenario of European integration without the membership prospects seems to be the most relevant from the EU perspective. The reasons for such approach have been the same since 1994. On the one hand, the EU has made an effort to reduce the Russian influence on Ukraine and encourage democratic mechanisms. On the other hand, the official authorities in Brussels might not be willing to deteriorate the already tensed relations with Russia by offering full EU membership to Ukraine. In this regard the AA states that the EU welcomes “European aspirations” of Ukraine but the document does not clearly state that the EU declares its political commitment to welcome Ukraine as a full member. Additionally, the EU could promote a closer Ukrainian integration with the EU Single Market that is not strictly connected with the membership requirement. In such a way the EU position in the Black Sea region might be strengthened as well (Szeptycki, 2014, p.2).

As for the Ukrainian-Russian relations under the conditions of closer ties with the EU, the developments might again directly depend on the international and domestic pressure on Russia. The West may present a solution which would include a compromise that respects Russian demands for not expanding the Western influence. Meantime, the EU might continue the strategic support for democratic mechanisms building in Ukraine in order to have a reliable partner that meets the criteria of an EU member state. Russia, on the other hand, might agree to such scenario presenting it as the strength of the Russian foreign policy that halted the expansion of the West and proved its hegemony in the region. Sooner or later, however, the question of a full membership might resurface, which will directly depend on how strong economically Ukraine will become and how fruitful the results of the reforms will be.

*Scenario 3 - the change of Ukraine's pro-European course*

The third scenario suggests a failure of the European integration for Ukraine. Given scenario seems to be the most improbable due to the current political situation in Ukraine and a long tradition of pro-European aspirations among Ukrainians. As Alex Motyl argues, the reforms under the Poroshenko presidency established a new state “that is highly unlikely to tolerate too much incompetence or Russian interference” (Motyl, 2019). At the same time, this scenario takes into consideration the possible aspects that might negatively influence the willingness of Ukrainians to become a part of the EU.

As for the social support, this might greatly depend on the economic situation. The case of the 2019 presidential elections results proved that despite noticeable changes in many state-related areas and the launch of systemic reforms, public support may be easily lost if the level of corruption remains on the high level and the economic growth is not high enough to change the quality of life of an average citizen in a meaningful way. Therefore, if no substantial progress in implementation of anti-corruption reforms is made and if there is no transparent and objective investigation of criminal cases related to top corruption, there might appear a growing disappointment with the idea of European integration.

Additionally, professional propaganda techniques used by media and deliberately biased coverage of pro-European policies' failure, aimed at convincing the viewers of the necessity to stay either independent of the European influence or to build closer ties with Russia, may result in the increase of anti-European tendencies across Ukraine. In such a way, the issue of European integration might become a controversial topic leading to political and social disagreements that would disrupt the reform processes.

As for the position of the EU, the 2019 elections in Ukraine have brought new political actors who did not clearly state their foreign policy priorities during the election campaigns. Therefore, the EU authorities might decide to pause their active support for the Ukrainian counterparts, in order to observe the first political decisions and adjust own policies. Such pause may encourage Russia to take an advantage of the situation and escalate military conflict in further parts of Ukraine forcing president Zelenskyy to refrain from European integration strategies.

## Conclusions

European integration was regularly declared to be a priority aim of state development by the majority of political leaders in Ukraine. However, these declarations did not find reflection in their joint efforts toward the successful implementation of democratic reforms that would have overcome corruption and economic problems. Moreover, while the EU welcomed the declarations of Ukrainian politicians on the pro-European course, there were no considerable actions to support the transformation financially or to encourage the transformation processes by introducing procedures that would reinforce pro-European aspirations in Ukraine.

The nature of relationship between Ukraine and the EU has changed considerably after the dramatic Euromaidan events. One of the first actions of the Ukrainian authorities elected in 2014 was the adoption of the AA. Among other achievements was the abolition of visas for Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports, thus building closer ties between Ukraine and the EU. Another symbolic gesture made by the Ukrainian authorities was the constitutional amendment introducing the integration with the EU and NATO as a strategic goal for Ukraine.

Apart from that, the analysis of reforms launched and implemented since 2014 leads to the following conclusions:

- the number of crucial reforms for the democratic development of the state is higher than the number of reforms implemented in years 1991-2014, which illustrates the positive dynamic in the development of the legal basis for the transformation;
- key reforms directed at overcoming systemic corruption have been launched. Even though the implementation process is sometimes slow or blocked by officials, the pressure of civil society organizations and the EU officials has led to the positive dynamic in a number of cases. There has been a slow but positive change in the international evaluation of the corruption rate in Ukraine, which brings ambivalent conclusions on the pace of anti-corruption policies;
- joint efforts of Ukrainian lawmakers, civil society activists and international advisors led to discussions on such reforms as the judicial reform or the reform of local self-government in accordance with the European standards that fosters European integration by establishing legal mechanisms of preventing corruption, engaging civil society into the state building process and creating grounds for the economic development of the state;
- while there was a successful vote on constitutional amendments regarding the judicial reform, the example of decentralization reform illustrated the complicated nature of political

disagreement over the part of the bill referring to peculiarities of local governance in occupied parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and raised further questions on the future of the proposal and timing for the second reading vote. At present, it remains to be seen whether the bill proposal will appear in the new parliament for the second vote.

The conclusions presented above give grounds to argue that there have been a significant number of positive developments in the European integration process in Ukraine since 2014. At the same time, the continued systemic implementation of anti-corruption policies is of crucial importance for the development of Ukraine and its successful integration with the EU. The nature of this integration remains dynamic and depends on political and social actors involved in the decision-making process. Therefore, different scenarios of events should be taken into consideration in order to successfully complete the democratic transformation of Ukraine's political system and avoid obstacles that could delay the process of the European integration.

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## AN AMBIGUOUS PHENOMENON OF HYBRID WARFARE. THEORY AND POLICY PRACTICE OF GEORGIA

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**Abstract:** *Despite the growing actuality of hybrid warfare, modern democratic political institutions have not yet been able to formulate a generally accepted and coherent view of hybrid warfare, nor formulate one consolidated definition for this new form of warfare. Considering the fact that for modern revisionist forces, hybrid warfare is a tool for changing the existing world order and achieving their political goals, it is worth noting that international law has not yet defined the legal status of "hybrid warfare". Therefore, there is a grey area which allows revisionist forces free rein, according to the current state of affairs, because they are not bound by appropriate legal obligations. In view of the above, understanding the political-strategic characteristics and concepts of hybrid warfare are essential for developing hybrid defence strategies and other mechanisms to protect against hybrid threats. This is also critical in terms of maintaining the world order, in a sustainable way, and for developing effective national security policies. Given the current state of affairs, this article analyses the key characteristics and political strategies related to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, considers the approaches taken by individual states (including Georgia) and reflects upon scientific opinion. Then, based on the induction method and conceptual analysis, the latter part of this article proposes a political and strategic conceptual framework of hybrid warfare, in which the tools/methods and means of conducting hybrid warfare are explored, along with the groupings, objectives and actors involved in hybrid warfare.*

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**Keywords:** Hybrid Warfare Concept, Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy, Georgian Hybrid Defence Policy.

### Introduction

Strategic approaches to security policy have undergone significant changes in recent history. As D. Barno notes, modern wars are increasingly taking an amorphous form (Barno, 2014), and this phenomenon becomes increasingly unclear, as the modern concept of hybrid warfare develops.

Despite the growing actuality of hybrid warfare, in the context of global and national security, modern democratic political institutions have not yet been able to incorporate this new form of warfare into one consolidated definition. Furthermore, they have not yet been able to

formulate a generally accepted conceptual view of hybrid warfare. The homogeneous definition of hybrid warfare is further complicated by a diversity of terminology. For instance, some refer to this phenomenon as "hybrid warfare", while others use the term "hybrid military action" or "hybrid conflict", all within a similar context.

The term "hybrid threat" is most commonly used when attempting to define hybrid warfare. However, in general, this approach is not recommended because the word 'threat' itself implies something that might happen (Oxford English Dictionary). Therefore, something can be perceived as a threat, when in actuality it is likely, or very likely, to happen. Consequently, the term "hybrid threat" is so narrow that it cannot cover the entire spectrum of probabilities and importance, in the context of hybrid warfare. Moreover, the use of the word "warfare" instead of the word "threat" similarly does not provide sufficient information.

Some of the most prominent organisations have been unable to formulate and agree upon a final definition for hybrid warfare. These organisations include the Department of Defence of the United Kingdom, the U.S. Department of Defense, and other research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Royal Institute for Joint Services in Defence and Security Studies, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Two organisations that have made an attempt to institutionalise a conceptual framework for the hybrid warfare phenomenon are NATO and the EU. However, their conceptual framework is so comprehensive that it loses all of its practical value. Another example is that of the Munich Security Conference (a non-profit foundation), which in 2015 sought to develop a pan-European conceptual framework for hybrid warfare (i.e., a combination of conventional and non-conventional means) (Munich Security Conference, 2015). However, this conceptual framework again created ambiguity and uncertainty, which was primarily due to the multiplicity of the factors associated with this new phenomenon (diplomacy, information warfare and propaganda, support for local disturbances, irregular troops, special forces, regular armed forces, economic warfare and cyberattacks), and in particular the endless combinations associated with these factors.

In this context, it can be argued that every attempt to define a conceptual framework for hybrid warfare makes a significant contribution to the development of the overall knowledge and understanding of hybrid warfare. At the same time, however, this has further compounded and complicated the understanding of the increasingly complex phenomenon of hybrid warfare.

### **A Conceptual Framework for Hybrid Warfare**

The ideas that underpin hybrid warfare have been derived from the analysis of conflicts in the recent past. However, as the renowned expert Keir Giles has argued, this type of warfare has existed for centuries, and only some aspects are new additions. These additions are primarily due to the widespread adoption of Internet based media and the adaptation of these centuries' old methods into modern technological security strategies. Moreover, the impact of propaganda and misinformation can be further enhanced by its skilful dissemination, so as to subtly influence and shape the many shades of public opinion, both at home and abroad.

It is difficult to determine the exact origin of the term "hybrid warfare". However, according to most sources, this term was first mentioned in its current form by William J. Nemeth in his 2002 paper, where he theorised that hybrid warfare would be the dominant form of warfare into the future. In his work, Nemeth used the first and second Chechen wars as an example, and it was here that the concept of hybrid warfare was born in his mind. Firstly, Nemeth described Chechen society as hybrid-like, because of their more or less communal/tribal organization. According to Nemeth, Chechen society was in a hybrid state as a result of the blending of the past and the present, and so the structure of society was based on the traditional family clan system (Nemeth, 2002.pp.3-29).

This hybrid-like structure of Chechen society allowed Chechens to mobilise for war, and subsequently actively support the war, through family ties. A new hybrid form of war therefore emerged from this hybrid society, which combined both regular and irregular forces in a very flexible and effective manner. Although the article does not provide a clear definition of hybrid warfare, we can understand Nemeth's thesis. In particular, Nemeth considers hybrid warfare to be the practice of hybrid societies that have evolved in a way that is different to the modern state based system. In his opinion, hybrid warfare is a modern form of guerrilla warfare, which has become more effective thanks to modern technologies and modern methods of mobilisation (Nemeth, 2002, pp.3-29).

Based on Nemeth's work and the later events of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, F. G. Hoffman developed the most well-known definition of hybrid warfare (threats). According to Hoffman, hybrid warfare simultaneously includes a number of methods, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations (Hoffman, 2007a. p.14). In Hoffmann's analysis of various forms of modern conflicts, hybrid threats are defined as follows: threats are hybrid when

any enemy simultaneously uses the relevant combination of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour, in the domain of the conflict, to achieve their political goals. Hoffman also recognises that the problem with the definition of hybrid threat is that it focuses on a combination of different tactics related to violence and war (excluding criminal acts), but does not include other non-violent actions (Hoffman, 2014b). Hoffman also emphasises the fact that the hybrid warfare is characterised by widespread terrorism and various forms of crime.

One criticism of the definition developed by Nemeth is to do with his characterisation of non-state actors, to which Hoffmann proposes to use the term hybrid warfare, in which hybrid wars are waged by both state and non-state actors (Hoffman, 2007a).

After the 2006 Lebanese war, the debate about hybrid warfare temporarily ceased and the debate instead focussed on a new generation of conventional warfare, with asymmetric elements. Subsequently, U.S. defence experts argued over whether the 2008 Russian-Georgian war was a hybrid conflict, and two approaches emerged: the U.S. Air Force viewed the conflict as a hybrid war, while other institutions used the term "hybrid threat" (possibly because of political restraint) to reflect the dialectics of the conflict (Government Accountability Office, 2010. p.140).

Although there is still no official definition of the term hybrid warfare that has been formulated by the U.S. Department of Defense, there are unofficial definitions of this term in the military concepts of the U.S. armed forces. For example, the United States Joint Forces Command explains hybrid warfare as a conflict conducted by a state and/or non-state actors using various methods, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and criminal offences (Government Accountability Office, 2010. p.18).

Since 2010, NATO has been providing an overall explanation of hybrid threats and presenting their multidimensional characteristics. Hybrid threats are those that are characterised by parallel capabilities - the ability to convert conventional and non-conventional means from one form to another, with the overall effect of achieving the desired goals. According to M. Miklauci, the concept of NATO's actions against hybrid warfare supports the approach of a coordinated use of the capabilities of allies (diplomatic, economic, intelligence, etc.) (Miklauci, 2011).

The United Kingdom also pays great attention to hybrid threats, albeit in a different form. The Joint Defense Doctrine states that hybrid threats arise when state and non-state actors apply different methods of warfare simultaneously, while using the latest conventional weapons,

irregular tactics, terrorism, and destructive criminal actions to destabilise the existing order (Ministry of Defence, 2009).

Attitudes towards the phenomenon of hybrid warfare have changed significantly since the events in Ukraine in 2014 (including the annexation of Crimea). Russia's actions in 2014 were a wake-up call for Western societies to resume debate (e.g., the final report of the 2015 Munich Security Conference) on Europe's future security, and the fight against these new types of threat.

In April 2017, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the EU, a new international hub called the Hybrid CoE (Hybrid Centre of Excellence) was established in Finland, for the purposes of understanding and defending against hybrid threats, and in particular for assessing the methods and actions directed against the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of targeted enemies (Hybrid CoE, 2018).

According to Treverton et al (2018), hybrid threats in the 21st century involves the complementary and simultaneous use of various instruments and tools. Propaganda is a key instrument, and long known, however the ubiquitous adoption of media technology gives it new means. It is also possible to list: fake news, influence over domestic media outlets, strategic leaks, funding of organisations, political parties, organised protest movements, oligarchs, economic leverage, proxies, religious organisations, parliamentary organisations and in particular the synchronisation of these tools. Clearly, the coordinated use of these tools is a powerful means to achieve the political objectives of an adversary, especially when used simultaneously, they combine to greater effect. In addition to the complementarity just described, the other defining feature of hybrid warfare is the strategic use of these instruments of power, both horizontally and vertically. The meaning of this is that the adversary will target the vulnerabilities of their target state, for instance political divisions, social media, energy dependence, as well as proximity and access. The targeting of such vulnerabilities is also dynamic, in the sense that they are employed to achieve specific objectives, which may, or may not change, as the campaign proceeds (Treverton et al, 2018. pp.46-67).

In his 2017 report, the NATO Secretary General indicated that hybrid warfare includes both military and non-military action, covert and open tactics, ranging from misinformation and propaganda to the use of irregular armed groups or regular forces. Hybrid warfare erases the boundaries between war and peace. Modern hybrid threats include complex cyberattacks,

economic and political pressure, and the exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities (NATO Secretary General Annual Report, 2017).

The 2018 NATO Secretary General's report, which also discusses hybrid warfare, states that in a century of hybrid warfare, countries may not be aware that they have been hit by a hybrid attack until they have suffered serious damage. Hybrid methods of warfare, such as propaganda, fraud, sabotage and other non-military tactics, have long been used by state and non-state actors to destabilise an enemy (NATO Secretary General Annual Report, 2018).

To clarify the dialectics and structure of hybrid warfare, it is important to consider the broad view proposed by D. Kilcullen that hybrid warfare is an event that establishes a link between armed and unarmed forces, military and non-military activities, governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as domestic and international factors, both with and without violence (Kilcullen, 2009).

In addition to military force, hybrid warfare includes various instruments of influence, including economic pressure, religious indoctrination, humane actions calculated to sway allegiance, intelligence service actions, coordinating the formation and activities of criminal groups, as well as sabotage and misinformation.

To augment the above, A. Jacobs and G. S. Lasconjarias offer a rather general, but at the same time universal explanation of hybrid warfare, which is eminently plausible. According to their theory, hybrid warfare is to do with a violent form of conflict involving governmental and non-governmental actors, who have unlimited means of conventional and non-conventional influence on the battlefield, or a particular territory. The authors argue that all traditional, irregular, and field-tested forms of armed conflict have gradually merged and coalesced to effect a large destructive power within the strategic framework in which hybrid warfare has become a driving force, for the planned and desired outcomes (Jacobs et al, 2015. p.2-3). This, according to A. Deep, is achieved by using asymmetric methods and tactics, and is thoughtfully synchronised on the multidimensional battlefield (Deep, 2015. p.1).

T. McCulloh and R. Johnson also introduce a variety of cultural aspects to the theory of hybrid warfare. They describe the theory of hybrid warfare as a form of war in which, based upon an optimally designed structure of the armed forces and in specific cultural contexts, all available methods and means - both conventional and non-conventional are applied, and aimed at achieving synergetic effects against an enemy acting in a conventional way (McCulloh et al, 2013. p.1).



Based on an analysis of the experience gained during the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, J. J. McCuen is developing the idea of a broad interpretation of hybrid conflict as a full spectrum military action. According to McCuen, hybrid conflicts represent the full spectrum of military operations in both the physical and conceptual dimensions. The first is the fight against the armed enemy, and the second is a broader struggle to secure the support of the local population in the theatre of war; at the same time, the struggle for general support in the domestic and international arenas. Moreover, in order to consolidate and stabilise the theatre of war, security, necessary utilities, local government, defensive structures and important elements of the economy must be restored immediately (McCuen, 2008).

The approach of the American researcher R. Glenn to the phenomenon of hybrid conflict is equally interesting. Glenn was one of the first to emphasise the growing importance of non-military tools for the success in the modern era of warfare. Glenn provides an in-depth analysis of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006, and in addition to military force, shows that both the state and private actors pursuing the interests of the state, use both economic and diplomatic means, as well as criminal and terrorist methods, in a hybrid conflict (Glenn, 2009).

The definitions and characterisations of hybrid warfare, as discussed above, are both enlightening and illuminating, and yet there is still an overall lack of coherence. This, as previously mentioned, argues for a more precise strategic and dynamic definition of hybrid warfare. The use of the word 'dynamic' so as to stress that as the phenomenon of hybrid warfare continues to develop, its definition must also necessarily evolve.

Nevertheless, before formulating such a consolidated definition, we can at least posit that a "hybrid war" should comprise of the following characteristics:

A. An adversary who engages in a form of low-intensity conflict (political and military confrontation between competing states, or groups, at a lower level than conventional warfare, albeit beyond the normal peaceful competition between states (Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1990); because their goal is for the conflict to remain below the brink of a full-scale war, although we must remember that a relatively small-scale conventional war is part of the concept of hybrid warfare.

B. An unconventional, complex and flexible adversary, which may be a state (for example, Russia's role in the Ukrainian conflict), or a non-state group/organisation (for example, Hezbollah, or the so-called Islamic State) (Fleming, 2011. pp. 2-4).

C. An adversary who always uses a combination of conventional and non-conventional methods.

D. A hybrid adversary who is characterised by flexibility and quick adaptability, whose methods involve the use of modern high-tech weapons and associated means (Deep, 2015).

E. An adversary who makes widespread use of the media and propaganda to disrupt the political landscape and recruit supporters. Moreover, to make false accusations and portray an "alternative truth" (e.g. misleading propaganda by Russia against Georgia and Ukraine).

### **Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy**

The military doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2010, identified new issues related to the conduct of war and the resolution of unforeseen problems, but these issues were more about the characteristics of modern conflict than about the armed forces themselves. The doctrine addresses the issue of the integrated use of military and non-military targets, along with the requisite resources. The doctrine emphasises the importance of the informational space, as a new dimension. The doctrine assumes that information warfare allows for the achievement of political goals, without the use of military force or alternatively creates conditions for the use of such force (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2010).

A subsequent military doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2014, contains provisions on asymmetric methods of action; such as actions to eliminate the advantage of the adversary, allowing for the participation of irregular military units and private military contractors in the conflict. Considerable emphasis is placed on the cultivation of political forces and social movements that are managed and financed from outside the country (Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 2014).

These changes in doctrine are well illustrated by the opinions of Russian strategy experts, expressed in their articles on warfare.

A retired general of the Russian army, M. Gareev, uses the term "future war" instead of "hybrid war". Gareev stresses the importance of technological development and the growing importance of the information war; propaganda can more effectively demoralise the enemy, as well as destabilise the situation, in order to contribute to the success of the aggressor (Gareev, 1998).

Gerasimov V., the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, wrote in February 2013 that he envisions a gradual erosion of the line between war and peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, just as the line between the actions of uniformed personnel and undercover personnel disappears. Currently, countries do not declare war, but simply start with unknown and usually unpredictable events. He refers to the experience of the 'colour revolutions' in North Africa and the Middle East and argues that a stable state can be reduced to chaos in just a few months, or face a humanitarian disaster, or civil war, in just a few days, as a result of armed conflict and unconventional intervention. Gerasimov points out that the importance of non-military tools is changing, and that in many cases its effectiveness exceeds that of conventional armed forces. He stresses the value of an increased role for special operations against the internal opposition, which aims to create a continuous front that supports information operations throughout a hostile state. Moreover, he advocates the deceptive use of regular armed forces in supposed peacekeeping operations, at a certain phase in a conflict, for the purposes of achieving ultimate success (Герасимов, 2013a).

Gerasimov V. uses the words "future war", but suggests coining the term "a new generation war", or "non-linear war", in which different rules will apply. Small groups will start hostilities in peacetime and then escalate to more aggressive actions, taking the situation to the brink of full-scale war. In this "new generation war", there will be remote clashes between highly manoeuvrable groups of hybrid units, as well as precise and targeted attacks on military and civilian infrastructure, aimed at defeating the enemy's armed forces and economic power. The primary focus of V. Gerasimov's paper is a so-called "central-network war" and "non-linearity", and these ideas became the basis for the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces, planned for the 2008-2020 timeframe (Герасимов, 2013b).

With reference to other recent Russian publications, one of particular interest is that of Colonel-General A. Kartapolov, of the Russian Army. In his opinion, it has become necessary to develop unconventional methods and tactics to defeat the enemy, especially when they are superior in terms of technological and combat power. Also, it is worth noting that A. Kartapolov not only supports the use of hybrid methods to carry out covert aggression, as in the case of Ukraine, but also when conducting larger scale combat operations (Andrey, 2015).

Another text of particular interest is allegedly by the head of V. Putin's administration – V. Surkov, published under the pseudonym of N. Dubovitsky. In Dubovitsky's 2014 essay, "Without Heaven", he speaks of a future war that would be comprehensive, waged in any legal or illegal

way, that would target all aspects of life, but at the same time would be a war that would be ‘under the radar’ and sufficiently covert so as to be barely perceptible (Дубовицкий, 2014).

Other experts believe that hybrid warfare is a military strategy that is a mixture of conventional and non-conventional warfare, along with cyber warfare. Furthermore, according to the existing state of affairs, combat operations are combined with clandestine anti-state actions, with responsibility for such actions carefully transferred to proxies. Consequently, the aggressor seeks to avoid accountability to the international community and thus, as far as possible, avoid retaliation within the framework of international law (NATO review magazine, 2014).

The theory of “rebellious war”, developed by the Russian strategist E. Messner, is regarded as a prototype for hybrid warfare.

According to E. Messner's concept, a state can officially avoid participating in a war. Nevertheless, a state can undertake irregular actions (such as diversion, terror, guerrilla activities and uprisings) that will give the conflict the appearance of a civil war, and internal chaos. Moreover, he posits that the line between regular armed forces and the civilian population is gradually disappearing, as are the boundaries of the theatre of military actions. It then becomes difficult to distinguish between the objective realities of the parties involved in the struggle. The level of aggression may also vary widely, so that it is not so easy to distinguish between the legal and illegal means of armed struggle. Furthermore, with regular combat forces slowly losing their monopoly on warfare, this inevitably leads to unethical warfare. Messner notes that active diplomacy in a rebellious war plays a big role and compares active diplomacy to a form of war in itself. He also characterises diplomacy as a white glove policy that uses various forms of intimidation to impose compliance with one’s own objective(s) or to achieve an agreement on important issues (Месснер, 2005. pp. 70-110).

In addition to the above, Messner pays special attention to information activities that can be aimed at causing dissatisfaction among the general public and confrontation within the political elite. Also, information activities that attempt to undermine a state’s reputation, as well as foment political isolation or negatively impact on the opinion of the international community (Месснер, 2005. pp. 232-246).

Finally, one observation that distinguishes Russian authors is that they do not write about how to protect their own state from hybrid threats, but about how to succeed with these methods.

### **Conceptualisation of Hybrid Warfare in Georgia's National Security Framework**

Georgian political institutions have been documenting and discussing the use of hybrid warfare tactics against Georgia, since 2017. However, it should be noted that official explanations by the leading political figures in the country suggest that hybrid war has been waged against Georgia since the early 1990s, and that belligerent forces continue to use these methods (President Margvelashvili, 2018).

Given that Georgia's political elite are well aware of the above, the country has still not been able to address the institutional shortcomings identified by S. Neil McFarlane in Georgia's National Security Concept (i.e. neglecting important hybrid threats, misunderstanding the significance of threats and having unrealistic expectations, in the face of real contradictory evidence) (MacFarlane, 2012). The National Security Concept document explains national security values and interests, develops a vision for the country's safe development, identifies threats, risks and challenges facing the state, and defines the main thrusts of national security policy. Therefore, it is a critical document in terms of Georgia's national security, and especially in the context of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare.

With the above situation in mind, and in order to better address the conceptualisation of hybrid warfare, Georgia is considering both reviewing the conceptual national security document at the state level ("Strategic Defence Review of Georgia 2017-2020"), which deals with hybrid threats, as well as analysing the official approaches taken by individual state bodies, including the (unclassified) parliamentary reports of the State Security Service for 2017 and 2018, which most clearly elucidate the goals, objectives and tactics of hybrid warfare.

At this point it is useful to provide further detail about the Georgian Strategic Defence Review of 2017-2020 (SDR, 2017). It was developed using a threat-based methodology, as Georgia still faces potential/ongoing aggression from the Russian Federation, and should therefore be prepared to address any escalation of the situation, as well as counter hybrid challenges. However, it is important to note that the Georgian Strategic Defence Review document does not attempt to define hybrid tactics of warfare, and does not provide a clear understanding of what hybrid warfare methods mean. However, it is noteworthy that the text of the document does contain important provisions for the understanding of the political aspects of hybrid warfare, from a Western perspective:

A) In the section about the Georgian national environment, it alludes to the Kremlin's use of economic leverage and “soft power tools”, which are to the detriment of the Georgia's national interests. In addition, this section describes the dangers associated with Russia's "creeping" occupation, unilateral recognition of the occupied territories within Georgia and the placement of Russia's military infrastructure there. Clearly, this increases the probability and risk of provocation, along with renewed military aggression;

B) In the Planning section, it is assumed that the Russian Federation has the propensity to ignore the sovereignty of its neighbouring states. In particular by neglecting the norms of international law, using open military aggression and hybrid methods of warfare, as well as perpetuating a serious security situation; Russia will continue its efforts to weaken Georgia's national unity and civil accord, increase division within Georgian society and destabilise the tolerance that exists between ethnic and religious groups. The Kremlin will pay particular attention to strengthening soft power elements under its influence, in order to weaken Georgian state institutions, strengthen pro-Russian social and political groups and discredit the Western paradigm for foreign policy; The Russian Federation continues to use its political and economic leverage to limit international political support for Georgia and limit opportunities for Georgia to deepen its international cooperation aimed at strengthening the country's defence capabilities;

C) In the context of the assessment of the situation in Georgia's region, it is stated that one of the strategic goals of the Russian Federation is to obtain and maintain control over the region's energy resources and their distribution systems. Furthermore, in light of future threats from the Russian Federation and other actors, ensuring energy security and maintaining its transit function will remain a challenge for Georgia.

Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy document for 2019-2022 also refers to hybrid threats. The document makes the assertion that the Russian Federation and its military forces are increasingly using hybrid warfare methods to achieve its foreign policy goals, which seek to overturn well-established Western values, by subtly pushing its own agenda in all strata of society, in particular countries (FPS, 2019). It should be noted that this document presumes that Russia, on the one hand, will use conventional military force, and on the other hand, hybrid warfare, for its foreign policy agenda. The purpose of these actions being to roll back, as far as possible, Western leaning values in society. But here, as in other documents, it is not explained what Georgia's government means in terms of hybrid warfare methods.

On the related subject of soft power, more clarity is provided by the Foreign Policy Strategy 2019-2022 document, as compared to the Strategic Defence Review document. The 2019-2022 Foreign Policy Strategy document makes the assertion that together with cyber security, soft power is increasingly important in international relations, and the document defines the means of projecting soft power as political, economic, informational and technological. Also, in the context of information warfare, we should consider the following extract from the document: “The speed of the dissemination of information has increased, along with the role of social media. Consequently, the use of propaganda and misinformation techniques, designed to achieve the goals of specific countries and institutions, requires a timely adaptability and response” (Akubardia, 2017).

In view of the above, it would be logical to assume that the methods of hybrid warfare set out in the Foreign Policy Strategy, which primarily focuses on the threat of Western values being rolled back, should coincide with the goals associated with the use of "soft power". However, this is not explicitly stated in the strategy, and the methods of hybrid warfare are separate from the methods of so-called "soft power".

An Agency Level document, the Communication Strategy for 2017-2020, approved by the Georgian Ministry of Defence, duplicates the concept of hybrid methods, as per the Strategic Defence Document. However, cyberattacks, and information warfare, are detailed separately in this strategy. Additionally, although the so-called "soft power" policy is mentioned as a concern, its concept is not detailed or explained (CS, 2017).

Another Agency Level document, the Defence Minister's Directives 2018, clearly conveys the actuality of hybrid warfare methods being used against Georgia: "Russia's use of hybrid methods of warfare, especially propaganda, poses a significant challenge to the country". In order to implement these directives and overcome these challenges, the Ministry of Defence took a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, to implement improved strategic communications, involving the communication of a shared, coordinated vision to all state agencies, on the importance of state defence. Secondly, to provide national and international training of personnel, so as to increase overall defence capabilities, as well as to improve intelligence capabilities (including the development of a doctrinal framework for training, so as to more effectively respond to hybrid actions). Finally, to develop the combat capabilities of the Special Forces, ensuring their readiness



for hybrid warfare methods, as well as their flexibility in terms of asymmetric action and special operations (MD, 2018).

The Defence Minister's Directives, 2019, refer to the complex hybrid security challenges facing Georgia and the requirement to rapidly adopt the lessons from the international experience of hybrid warfare, in terms of hybrid countermeasures and defence strategies. Therefore, in 2019, special attention will be given to the preparedness of the Georgian armed forces, so that they can more effectively operate in a hybrid environment. To this end, 2019 has been declared the "Year of Cyber Security", and priority will be given to the development of cyber security capabilities. Thus, it can be concluded that cyber security is seen by the minister as the primary solution to the hybrid challenge (MD, 2019).

The State Security Service offers another perspective on the hybrid threats facing Georgia, in its recent annual parliamentary reports. These reports are not included in the list of conceptual documents at the National Level, so this imposes some limitations. Nevertheless, the State Security Service is a government agency working in the area of national security, and is legally required to be involved in the planning and coordination of national security policy.

In the State Security Service's 2017 report, the primary objectives of adversarial foreign security services in Georgia were as follows: "To cultivate anti-Western sentiment in Georgian society; to undermine Georgia's image as a reliable partner at the international level; to create distrust, uncertainty, despair and nihilism in the society; to create pockets of ethnic and religious destabilisation in order to foment disintegration processes in the country and to polarise Georgian society". If we compare this text with the later 2018 report, we find that the situation is even more difficult in this regard, as is the domain pertaining to hybrid warfare and tactical actions. The report states that the analysis of information obtained as a result of counter-intelligence activities revealed key security challenges facing the country, including encroachment affecting territorial integrity, destabilisation, the creation of separate hotspots of disorder and attempts to polarise society, as well as the threats to economic expansion and attempts to negatively affect the foreign exchange rate. The fact that the list of key security challenges has increased over the past year, along with threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty is a serious challenge in the context of Georgia's national interests (GSSSr, 2017).

According to the 2018 report of the State Security Service, adversarial countries interested in strengthening their influence in Georgia actively used hybrid warfare methods to achieve their

goals. With regard to the objectives of foreign intelligence services using these methods, the report lists them as follows: Instigating confrontation between different ethnic and religious groups living in Georgia, inciting anti-Western sentiment, actions calculated to cause the deterioration of bilateral relations between Georgia and the countries of the region, and relationships with strategic partners (a novelty in this report), undermining Georgia's image as a democratic and stable country, gaining economic leverage, contributing to constant internal political tension and promoting uncertainty and nihilism in society. The report also notes that destructive political forces and social groups, as well as media and social media, were actively used by stakeholders during these hybrid warfare activities. As for the hybrid methods of warfare, they are listed as the following: A disinformation campaign characterised by false news, distortion of facts and falsification of history, aimed at polarising the population, spreading false beliefs and fears, influences on important processes through the manipulation of public opinion. A separate chapter in the report is devoted to the use of cyber tools during cyberattacks and cyber-intelligence operations carried out by foreign intelligence agencies, as well as coordinated hacking activity against government and critical infrastructure sites (GSSSr- 2018).

The overall analysis of the documents reviewed, shows that different agencies (whether it be the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the State Security Service) provide some sort of classification of hybrid threats to the country, and yet in some cases refer to them as hybrid methods, and sometimes even "soft power". However, in this case, the problem is not only in terminology. The essence of the problem is that the assessment of this phenomenon is not based on a unified state approach, set out in the national security concept documents, at the National Level.

## **Conclusion**

For the purposes of this article, we have analysed the concepts underpinning various political and scientific approaches to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, which allows us to formulate a comprehensive view of hybrid warfare from a laconic and political-strategic point of view - Hybrid warfare is the joint and synchronised use, by state or non-state actors, of all available tools/methods, including conventional or non-conventional, legal or illegal methods and instruments, against predetermined weaknesses of a target country, to achieve the desired political goals.

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## ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN IN THE ENP - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES?

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**Abstract:** *This article is devoted to the relations of the European Union with Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. Due to strategic location between Europe, the Middle East, as well as Central Asia the above mentioned instruments are very important for the European Union and its Member States, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's rich resources of crude oil and natural gas combined with the dominant role of the Russian Federation in the region make these two countries geopolitically important. In the context of the diversification of fuels in the EU energy sector this situation poses challenges for Brussels. Russia is the main supplier for many EU countries (the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline shows that important EU members want to strengthen the observed realities, as does the Russian Federation) and the European diversification efforts are a threat to a stabilization of the energy dialogue with Moscow. The growing importance of the discussed countries of the South Caucasus has not caused significant interest among scholars in this issue. This is probably due to little interest in Armenia and Azerbaijan so far of major actors in the international political scene - with Russia as an exception. This text is an attempt to at least partially fill this gap.*

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**Keywords:** European Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, energy resources.

### Introduction

The policy of the European Union (EU) concerning the states that emerged from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is not a common subject of scientific research. While relations between the EU and the Russian Federation (RF) have been explored to some extent, the EU's relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus remain almost untouched, and this is one of the main reasons behind the topic of this article. The research field has been narrowed down to the EU's relations with two countries of the Southern Caucasus - Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan and Georgia are the most important states for the European Union in this region, but a relatively large amount of research work has been carried out on Georgia, therefore the article is focused on Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, Armenia's activities (mainly regarding Nagorno-Karabakh) have a great impact on the position and activities of Azerbaijan (the country with the largest potential possible area of cooperation with the EU) on the international arena - also in the field of relations with the EU. The focus of research on those relations based on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is related to the fact that these are the latest initiatives of the European Union towards the Southern Caucasus; they comprehensively regulate mutual relations, and therefore have the most significant impact on the present and future relations of the indicated parties.

Being the subject of this article, the relations of the European Union with Armenia and Azerbaijan are considered through the prism of relations based on the ENP. The article also discusses interactions between those parties which are based on the EaP, initiated by Poland (RP) and Sweden, and which aimed at setting the direction for earlier EU activities in respect of its neighbouring states to the East and Southeast formed after the collapse of the USSR. The key questions to be answered are: Do the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan make optimal use of the potential for cooperation? What are the causes of the current state of affairs? Do the most likely scenario for the development of further relations assume progress, regression, or perhaps stagnation?

In answering these questions, it will be helpful to verify the following research hypothesis: The countries of the Southern Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, are potentially key to the EU's energy security and as a transit territory. The supply of energy resources is one of the main elements of security in EU countries. The importance of these issues has not changed the fact that the European Union's relations with the region are not optimal. This state of affairs is the result of the perception of the South Caucasus countries through the prism of the *Russia first* principle, according to which all activities concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan should be analyzed by taking into account their impact on the EU's relations with the Russian Federation. In addition, Armenia and Azerbaijan are often perceived by decision makers (representing EU structures and Member States) as small, young states, formed after the collapse of the USSR, and which have virtually no significance in international relations. The two sides perceive international realities quite differently. In addition, major EU countries have different strategies for supplying Member States



with energy resources. They assume that FR should be the main supplier of energy resources. This practically means giving up Azerbaijan's potential in this respect (also as a transit country).

The purpose of this article is to show the place of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the EU's external activities, based on the ENP and the EaP. The text is time-bound – the EU's relationship with Armenia and Azerbaijan are considered only from the moment of entrance into force of regulations which have formed the ENP, and then have created the EaP; this limitation follows logically from the topic itself, as does the use of a territorial delimiter (the research area was narrowed down to Europe and Asia). In respect of Europe, the article is focused mainly on the territory of the EU member states and the RF. In respect of Asia, the focus is mainly on the South Caucasus countries and their neighboring states. A subject limiter was also used in the paper - the research concerns the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, based on the ENP and EaP - as it results from the topic of this article.

The issues involved are considered from the perspective of neoliberal theory – the EU's activities towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Neorealist theory - the activities of those countries under the ENP and EaP. Descriptive method, as well as comparative, factor and scenario methods are used. The first of these is employed to analyze the source materials, which make it possible to determine the facts relevant to the studied issue. The second method is used to compare how Armenia and Azerbaijan cooperate with the EU, and to compare the achievements of each of them in different areas of cooperation. The factor method is used to examine the determinants affecting the potential of EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the course thereof, which makes it possible to indicate the aforementioned factors and determine how they interact (positively or negatively), their weight, and with what intensity they affect the examined matter. Finally, the scenario method is used to determine three possibilities for the development of the phenomenon under study in the future, and to indicate which of these three is the most probable.

### **EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership**

Objectively, the European Union's policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus is very important to EU. Cooperation with Azerbaijan (to a lesser extent cooperation with Armenia) may be of particular importance for energy security - at a time when one of the EU's eastern neighbor, Russia, the main or one of the most important suppliers of natural gas and oil to many

EU countries, conducts unpredictable foreign policy, contrary to international law (e.g. Annex Crimea). Under such conditions, energy security is of great importance to security in general.

The region is also potentially very important for the EU for other reasons. It is located on a narrow strip of land connecting the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea. It connects the EU (in the west, through its members on the Black Sea - Romania and Bulgaria) with the Middle East (through Iran to the south) and with the countries of Central Asia, rich in oil and gas deposits (to the east, through the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). The region adjoins to the Russian Federation on the north. If we notice that it borders Turkey on the southwest, we see that the South Caucasus lies at the crossroads of the most important political players in this part of the world (Stepniowski, 2011, p. 197). Most of the communication routes connecting the areas specified above cannot bypass the countries of the South Caucasus if they are to run in the shortest possible way, and thus the most economic one. China (PRC) has recognized this by proposing that the transport route associated with its enormous Belt and Road Initiative (the new Silk Road) should run through the South Caucasus (Fox, 2018).

The question therefore arises: why do not Azerbaijan and Armenia gain a higher position in the hierarchy of importance of EU external action? This reality makes research on the EU relations with the above countries very significant.

### **Objectives of the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership**

When analyzing the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we must not omit one of its most important initiatives – the European Neighborhood Policy.

The main objectives of the ENP initiated by the European Commission (EC) and adopted on 12 May 2004 in its “Communication from the Commission European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper” (European Union, European Commission, 2004) are listed below. These are: an intensification of the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan and their transformation into relations of a unique, privileged nature; changes in those countries based on EU values (and compliance with them); administrative efficiency; support for good neighbourly principles; facilities for short-term travel; interparliamentary cooperation; and greater European Union's involvement in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as matters related to illegal migration and corruption. In the long term, the ENP was supposed to lead to increased stability, security and prosperity. However, the sole responsibility

for implementing reforms to improve governance was to be borne by both South Caucasus countries. What became a novelty was the introduction of the more-for-more principle, according to which, in the event of greater involvement, Armenia and Azerbaijan would receive greater support from the EU, including financial support. Such differentiation was possible due to individually negotiated action plans (Kapuśniak, 2010, p. 26). The most important economic goals included actions for: introducing and consolidating the free market economy in both countries, sustainable economic growth, and economic reforms. The more specific objectives were: agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA); the conclusion of multilateral agreements in the fields of energy and transport, and the development of energy and transport networks; support for activities to encourage investors to invest funds in these countries; increased economic integration; cooperation in the most important areas; intensification of financial cooperation; increased employment; improvements in social services; and increased direct investment. Activities towards the two countries under the ENP were to lead to a equalization of disparities in the development of individual regions and to developments in agriculture and rural areas. Another goal was to strengthen cooperation and commercial connections, as it was also planned to sign Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) (Stawarz, 2017, pp. 239-242). Guidance on economic issues would seem to be more specific and realistic to implement. Other goals are of a directional nature. However, in both cases, there remains a drawback that , the institutions concerned are not able to enforce earlier obligations made by the parties under existing legal regulations.

Presented below are the main objectives that were to be achieved in cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan under the EaP (the first initiative of this type dedicated exclusively to the EU's neighbouring countries formed after the collapse of the USSR, which is thus better suited to their needs). The EaP project was established by the European Council at a summit held in Brussels on 19-20 June 2008, and the EC included the principles of its functioning in "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council *Eastern Partnership*" (European Union, European Commission, 2008). Those principles are: tightening as much as possible relations between the EU and Armenia and Azerbaijan , carrying out reforms; deepening political cooperation; initiating and intensifying regional and cross-border cooperation, as well as developing relations based on compliance with international law; cooperating in matters

of security and stability and supporting people-to-people contacts. The EaP was to become a new framework for the European Union's political cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a space for the exchange of information and experience regarding the progress of these countries in the field of change, reform and modernization. It has also been an instrument through which the EU supports these activities. The main purpose of the association agreements, which were supposed to be the basis for EU's political cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, was to bring about a convergence of the legal norms and standards in force with those in force in the European Union. Another goal was to intensify cooperation under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Barabasz and Piechocki, 2012, pp. 261-262). Mobility and security have also been very important issues, and the purpose of the planned mobility and partnership agreements was mainly to control illegal immigration and to standardize the asylum system of both countries in accordance with EU standards (Stawarz, 2017, pp. 172-174).

The EU's bilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan have been aimed at strengthening the ties between the two, which would lead to increased stability and prosperity in both countries. The purpose of multilateral cooperation, however, has been to create a space to help Armenia and Azerbaijan deal with problems they face together. Multilateral cooperation has been also intended to support bilateral cooperation.

One of the main goals of cooperation has been the implementation of EU values; security and defense reforms, and civilian control over the military one. Detailed, individual expectations were communicated to Armenia and Azerbaijan. In case of Armenia, a reference was made to: the need to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman; establishing legal regulations that would strengthen the independence of the courts and prosecution; improving the implementation of the country's anti-corruption strategy; improving the functioning of the public service; independence of the media; freedom of association; improving the penitentiary system and reforming the police. The EC also pointed to the need to resolve the conflict with Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in case of Azerbaijan, the list of expectations included: improving electoral law and conducting further changes in order to ensure a balance between the legislative and executive authorities; human rights issues, including a reorganization of the judicial apparatus, particularly with regard to its independence, activities aimed at strengthening civil society and its forms such as non-governmental organizations and

associations, and the freedom of association and compliance therewith. (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2013, p. 247).

Regarding the institutional provisions (a new institutional structure was to be introduced after the Association Agreements would have been signed), meetings of heads of state and heads of government were planned to happen every two years. Foreign ministers were to meet regularly. Their task was to control the progress made so far in the five main areas of cooperation. Other competencies included providing guidelines for further policy. Ministerial conferences were to be organized to support ministers' work (Mizerska-Wrotkowska, 2011, p. 50).

An equally, if not more, important element of the EaP is the EU's cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan on economic matters, where the main objectives are: to strengthen cooperation by establishing the DCFTA; to phase in integration of the economies of Armenia and Azerbaijan with the economy of the European Union through agreements establishing the DCFTA and through sectoral measures aimed at facilitating access by the partner countries to the EU market; to ensure long-term energy supply and transit; and to support economic development, including regional development, infrastructure, human capital and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2013, pp. 244-245). Plans were made concerning the implementation of EU legislation on SMEs; increased access to financing; increased number of SMEs; improved information exchange between SMEs from the EU and EaP countries; the promotion of regional energy markets and efficiency in the field of energy and renewable energy sources; and the implementation of the southern energy corridor project. Cooperation in the field of taxes and public finances, as well as customs, was to be strengthened. A further goal was to initiate cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Stawarz, 2017, pp. 250-252).

### **Results of the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership**

Unfortunately, the results of the implementation of the ENP and the EaP have not proved optimal. In the case of political cooperation between the EU and Armenia, it should be noted that in the most important areas Armenia was willing to take action. As the effect there appeared changes expected by the European Union in the laws regulating issues in the indicated areas. The situation was worse, however, when it came to enforcing those legal provisions, especially in the fight against corruption. However, as indicated by the Eastern Partnership Index (Eastern

Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2017, p. 115) in 2017, Armenia came third among the states covered by the Eastern Partnership, in terms of success in combating corruption, quite successfully. There were also differences in the number of aspects of cooperation in a given field. The smallest numbers of cooperation aspects have been observed in democracy and the rule of law, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms - in principle, the implementation of the legal provisions focused mainly on electoral procedures, although in this area as well, the most recent period of EaP implementation has brought about improvements - Armenia now ranks fourth (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2017, p. 107), and in this area particular attention is merited by the high assessment of the independence of the judiciary (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2017, p. 113). Few achievements have been made in respect of regional cooperation, but there has been much wider cooperation in the areas of internal security and combating crime, concerning: the protection of the national borders; visa facilitation and readmission; combating organized crime, especially regarding child sexual exploitation, arms trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and the fight against drugs, as well as police and judicial cooperation. The fight against corruption mainly focused on increasing transparency regarding the revenues of government officials (Stawarz, 2017, pp. 216-217). In the case of economic cooperation, the best results have been achieved in such areas as: the liquidation of barriers to the trade in goods, and the principles of starting up and conducting business activity. Worse results have been observed in the field of competition policy, with the weakest results in the field of energy resources (Stawarz, 2017, pp. 281-282). In case of Azerbaijan, attention should be paid to the great successes it has achieved in implementing cooperation in the area of internal security and combating crime, in areas such as: border management; migration; combating organized crime in matters such as human trafficking; cooperation in criminal matters with the Commonwealth of Independent States countries and Turkey, Iran and Bulgaria; cybercrime; protecting children against sexual abuse; combating cross-border crime; the fight against drugs; combating money laundering; terrorism; legal assistance and legal relations in civil, family and criminal matters; data protection; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fight against corruption has been less effective, with implementation in such areas as: increased transparency in decision-making mechanisms; recruitment for the civil service; the national budget; the financing of political parties; public procurement; privatization; public administration bodies and the protection of witnesses and persons cooperating with the judiciary in corruption cases; limitations on the

immunity of judges suspected of corruption (Stawarz, 2017, p. 218). The implementation of legal provisions in the field of democratization and human rights have received lower marks. As for economic cooperation, Azerbaijan has made significant achievements apart from the area of competition (Ostapenko, 2019). Also, the energy independence of the state deserves special attention - in this category, according to the Eastern Partnership Index, Azerbaijan ranks number one (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2017, p. 142).

In summary, it can be observed that the effects of EU cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan under the ENP and EaP have been diverse, despite same assumptions and legal provisions. Compared to Armenia, Azerbaijan has made significant achievements in economic cooperation - in almost all major areas there is now a significant spectrum of areas of cooperation, and the implementation of made commitments is going well. In Armenia the situation is worse, which is largely due to the fact that the country has no deposits of energy resources, and that the infrastructure for gas transmission is almost entirely owned by subsidiaries of the Russian authorities, which are not enthusiastic about relations between the Post-Soviet countries and the EU. The situation is similar in other industries. As for political cooperation, both countries have made big commitments and achieved results in matters related to security although Azerbaijan decided on a larger area of cooperation in this field. Cooperation with the EU in the fight against corruption has not been as successful as it had been hoped for. There are also shortcomings in the areas of democracy and the rule of law, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although Armenia is carrying through on its commitments, they relate to only a very few issues, still it should be emphasized that the assessments made in this respect have improved recently. Azerbaijan's scope of commitments is greater, but not all of them have been successfully implemented. In respect to regional cooperation, Azerbaijan has achieved more than Armenia.

The fact that neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has signed an association agreement, albeit for different reasons, has become the main failure of the EU; an association agreement was to be the culmination of a certain stage of cooperation within the EaP. The decision by both countries not to sign have put cooperation under the EaP in a kind of limbo as regards the direction for further development<sup>24</sup>, and the EU can only react to this state of affairs to a certain extent. A

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<sup>24</sup> With hope and optimism, the EU adopted the changes that occurred in Armenia as a result of the so-called Velvet Revolution of 2018. Because of mass protests by the Armenian community, Serž Sarkisjan, who had ruled for many years as president and then prime minister of Armenia, has resigned from his position. Opposition leader Nikol



comprehensive and extended partnership agreement (CEPA) represents one such attempt. It does not intensify mutual relations to the same extent as the previously rejected proposal, but it does allow an intensification of cooperation in some areas, where it is possible despite Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Sadowski, 2019). In case of Azerbaijan, advanced negotiations have been ongoing for several years regarding the content of a new comprehensive agreement to replace the PCA (European Union. European Council, Council of the European Union, 2019).

Thus, it can be seen that, in those areas defined by the ENP and the EaP, the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been optimally developed. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, when designing its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU have viewed them through the prism of neoliberal theory, and the goals and logic of the EU's cooperation were set accordingly. It was assumed that absolute profits were the most important, and that interrelationships would render war practically impossible. However, the reality of the location of Armenia and Azerbaijan is better explained by Neorealist theory, according to which the governments of both countries act, as well as Russia does. The most important elements are state security and relative profits. This means that the EU is not an enough attractive partner for the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. What is most important for them is to ensure their own security and survival. That is why Armenia has chosen to strengthen its relations with Russia rather than the EU. The country knows that the RF is reasoning in accordance with Neorealist assumptions (as evident in Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and the current situation in Ukraine) and in case of conflicting interests it is capable of resorting to force. As an ally, however, Russia can also provide real military support, as it did to Armenia during the latter's open armed conflict with Azerbaijan that began in the first half of the 1990s when the Armenian majority of Nagorno-

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Pashinian has become the new prime minister. In the same year, as a result of early parliamentary elections, the supporting party have gained a majority. The new prime minister and the supporting forces declared they would introduce reforms for democratic systemic changes in the state and the modernization of state structures towards Western standards (Sadowski, 2019). Still, too little time has passed to determine whether those declarations will eventually become reality, although there have been many positive signals. If they do, this will affect the EU's relations with Armenia in a very significant and positive way, and which should also improve mutual relations. However, the Russian Federation, which still has very considerable political and economic influence in Armenia, may also act as a restraint, in part due to Armenia's unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan. These elements may cause that the potential for mutual relations will not be fully realised to a lesser extent than before.

Karabakh, part of Azerbaijan, announced the territorial independence. Armenia supported the change, and this ultimately led to a war between the two countries (Carley, 1998). Although the "hot" phase of the conflict ended with a ceasefire signed in Bishkek on 5th May 1994 (Adamus, 2016), the dispute still has not been officially or actually resolved. On the basis of a *fait accompli*, part of the territory of Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) remains outside its actual jurisdiction, while the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – proclaimed in 1991 - has not been recognized by any state (Jarosiewicz and Falkowski, 2016). The military victory over Azerbaijan (which caused Azerbaijan to lose control of part of its territory) was mainly the result of support, and especially military support, from Russia (very large supplies of modern weapons, and even the participation of military troops). Against this background, for Azerbaijan the EU is an unreliable entity as it will not attack another country, but in the event of a threat will only condemn the actions of the hostile state (the most radical measure the EU has decided on is sanctions - imposed over the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but these are selective sanctions and so far they have not affected any change in Russian policy). This is why Azerbaijan focuses on its economic relations with the EU. The state is seeking the way to use this cooperation to strengthen its own position in the region, to be a more equal partner for Russia than Armenia, for which a side effect of Russia's support is heavy dependence on the RF. The Armenian authorities are aware that maintaining the current status quo regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, in the absence of formal grounds, is possible only thanks to the support of its very strong military and political protector, the Russian Federation. Russia, of course, is also aware, and therefore sets the conditions, making Armenia's foreign policy almost completely dependent on the will of the RF, and the country is economically-dependent, as well (most entities that are part of key sectors of the Armenian economy belong to enterprises associated with the Russian authorities; they were often transferred for symbolic amounts, e.g. the strategic pipeline connecting Armenia with Iran) (Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2006). Recent events related to the 'Velvet Revolution' have raised hope for change, or at least some modifications, in this regard. Thus, it is clear that, even if both countries of the South Caucasus are intensifying cooperation with the EU in a given field, they are doing so for reasons other than those envisaged by the ENP or EaP. Armenia and Azerbaijan have always considered what steps they should take from the perspective of increasing their own security.

One disadvantage of the ENP, and the EaP although to a lesser extent, is the underfunding of these initiatives, which does not have a mobilizing effect on the implementation of their

assumptions (Benedyczak et al 2019, p. 8). This is a result of the fact that the European Union, and especially its most significant member states, have perceived (and to a lesser extent still perceive) Azerbaijan and Armenia as small, remote territories of little significance for.

Another disadvantage is that the general assumptions of the ENP are directed to both the eastern and southern neighbours of the EU, and they are thereby not ideally suited to any of them. However, this defect has been eliminated in the EaP.

The ENP and EaP also suffer from the fact that, unlike the programmes offered to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, they do not hold out the promise of EU membership (Dassonville, 2019). There is no clear goal to be reached by ENP and EaP participants (the EaP offers a substitute goal of signing an association agreement, but neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is interested in doing so). Such actions on the part of the EU confirm that its approach towards relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan relies on the rule that the states are not among those countries with which relations are a priority. This situation also stems from the *Russia first* principle, which is being followed, albeit to a lesser degree, in the EU's contacts with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The European Union gives primacy to Russia in the region, without taking more intensive actions - unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before their accession to the EU.

In addition, the ENP and EaP agreements contain no effective instruments of mutual enforcement by the parties of the agreed arrangements. These appear only in the Eastern Partnership, and only after the conclusion of an association agreement. When Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, it ruled out the signing of such an agreement - another example of how Russia's position vis-à-vis Armenia is stronger than that of the European Union. Armenia had fulfilled its obligations under the EaP, and there seemed to be a real chance that it would have signed an association agreement. However, Russia opposed such a scenario, fearing that the EU would strengthen its position in relation to Armenia at Russia's expense, and managed to persuade Armenia to join the EEU, formed at the RF's initiative (Strzelecki, 2016), which has binded Armenia to Russia even more and at the same time prevented the conclusion of an agreement with the EU. Azerbaijan, which has a much stronger position in the region, has chosen independently not to sign an agreement with the EU. Considering the country's assets (mainly energy resources, pipelines and a convenient transit location), the Azerbaijan authorities have recognized that they have such a strong position, including relation to the EU, that it is more advantageous to maintain

the status quo than to enter into an agreement with the European Union which would contain many problematic commitments.

The EU's cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the ENP also involves negotiated individual action plans; this makes the ENP more suited to the needs of a given country, although it is still true that the overall assumptions lack precision as they are directed to neighbouring countries in both the south and the east.

The ENP and the EaP have brought some success. In case of Azerbaijan, these include its exemplary implementation of economic and security-related components. Armenia, on the other hand, has presented itself well in implementing programmes related to cooperation on security, and it has recently achieved good results in the areas of democracy and the rule of law, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms. The abandoned NABUCCO pipeline project stands as confirmation of the importance of the region for the EU's energy security, but also of its failure to exploit the potential of Azerbaijan, which has ownership control over the oil and gas deposits in its territory and a good location as a transit country for energy resources from Central Asia (Wójcik, 2013). This has mainly been a consequence of the *Russia first* principle that guides the most important EU countries, and of the selecting by some of those countries (e.g. Germany) a different strategy for the supply of energy resources that is based mainly on cooperation with Russia<sup>25</sup>. This further reinforces the effects of these two determinants, as they naturally support each other. Currently, a project similar to NABUCCO is being implemented successfully but by Azerbaijan, not the EU (Wójcik, 2013).

### Summary

The facts discussed above allow to state that research hypothesis set out at the beginning of this article has been positively verified. Armenia and Azerbaijan have made a certain amount of progress in achieving some of the objectives of the ENP and the EaP, although their motivations have been different than those assumed by the EU, and mutual misunderstandings concerning expectations have damaged the intensity of cooperation. Of course, the EU is not a state, and will never be able to act like a state unless it is transformed into this type of entity at some point. But

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<sup>25</sup> The effect of this approach is the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the construction of the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline through which gas will flow from Russia via the Baltic Sea to Germany and then to other EU countries. The gas pipeline bypasses countries such as Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.

this does not mean that its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan should not be adjusted to become more effective. In this respect, it would be helpful if the European Union changed its perception of Armenia and Azerbaijan and quickly came to realize that these two countries are important for the development of the EU itself; one element of this would be to discontinue the application (this process has already been started) of the *Russia first* principle in the EU's policy.

In attempting to answer the last but not least of the questions posed at the article's beginning regarding the future of the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan as based on the ENP and the EaP, three scenarios are possible.

The first scenario implies that association agreements with the Union will not be concluded, and that the EU will lack initiative. The countries concerned will not redefine the assumptions of their existing cooperation to change them in such a way that there will be a further chance for development (however in the case of Armenia, some measures have already been taken – the CEPA agreement. Also, Azerbaijan is negotiating a new agreement). This state of affairs is not favourable for either side. A lack of prospects for further development of cooperation deprives the parties of motivation to intensify their activities, and usually results in discouragement and the marginalization of mutual relations.

The second possibility for developing relations is regression, meaning that the parties withdraw from the stages of cooperation already achieved. This is obviously the least optimistic vision of how the situation may develop.

The third option is intensification of cooperation. This may require a change in Armenia's and/or Azerbaijan's decisions not to sign an association agreement, or the EU's decision, accepted by the countries concerned, to change the existing cooperation assumptions for the ones that are attractive to the European Union, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan (such steps have already been discussed).

Knowing the basic possibilities of how relations between the parties may develop, one should consider what factors are most crucial in determining the future direction of the current situation. Armenia and Azerbaijan are perceived by most of the most important EU countries in accordance with neoliberal theory. If this approach does not change radically, and if member states continue to perceive those countries as small, remote and insignificant for the EU, as well as located firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, then the scenario of stagnation may come true. It would also be favoured by the policy of basing the EU's supply of natural gas on

cooperation with the RF, forced by a key EU country - Germany. In order for the stagnation scenario to fully happen, Armenia and Azerbaijan will also have to maintain cooperation with the EU in its current form. Russia should also continue its current policy towards these countries.

A change of government could be a determinant of the second scenario, especially in the most important EU countries, which leads to a positive assessment of the current Russian authorities and the wish to strengthen cooperation with that country. The growing importance of parties of this sort can now be observed in even the largest EU countries.

The third, most desirable variant of developing the EU's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, namely progress, requires a change in the European Union's approach towards the countries of the South Caucasus. This does not mean a complete reevaluation and change in perceptions of the South Caucasus in line with Neorealist theory, which would in any case seem to be impossible if we take into consideration that the EU is an international organization, not a state – that is, it is an entity for which neoliberalism is a natural way to view international relations. Nevertheless, if the EU wants to be effective, it has to take into account the realities of the regions which it desires to strengthen relations with, and in which it wants to be an important actor. Therefore, some elements of the Neorealist vision of international relations should be taken into account by the EU in its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and this is possible provided the current governments of the main EU countries, or future governments after elections, change how they perceive the realities of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Finally, it should be decided which of the above scenarios is the most likely. The key element in this respect is how the governments of the most important EU countries perceive the South Caucasus. Countries such as Poland know much better the realities of conducting policy in the immediate vicinity of Russia, and so it seems that they have the greatest responsibility as regards raising the awareness of Germany, France or Italy in this respect. In relation to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the policy of the most important EU state – Germany - is gradually beginning to change, but remains ambivalent. On the one hand, the state supports the sanctions imposed on the RF in connection with the conflict with Ukraine, which is also important for both countries of the South Caucasus, but on the other hand, it implements the joint Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project connecting Russia with Germany, which will make the EU significantly dependent on the RF on energy issues, being not conducive to energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. Some important EU countries do not recognize the threat arising from the policy of Vladimir Putin. Thus, it can be seen

that the Republic of Poland and other EU member states holding similar views still have a lot of work to make other members aware. Some changes in this regard have been visible for a long time, which may suggest that the third scenario has a greater chance of becoming reality, although the situation is so complicated and dynamic that especially in the medium and long run any of the above scenarios is possible.

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