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EDITORIAL

THE REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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It is almost a commonplace to reiterate today the formula of the "existential crisis" (Juncker, 2016) of the European Union, as the President of the European Commission named it in his 2016 *State of the Union Address*. Two years after the Brexit referendum, the way forward is still not clear neither for the UK nor for the EU27.

The European elections in May 2019 pose a threat for the Union and represent an unpredictable challenge for the pro-European parties. The quick decline of the President Macron's popular support to 28% (Challenges, 2018) and the approaching of the end of the "Merkel era" give also motives of concern for the supporters of the European Union. The ascension of radical nationalist and Eurosceptic platforms in the West but also in Central Europe resuscitate old cleavages and fears on the European continent. Would it be therefore *more* or *less Europe* the solution for the future of the Union? To reconcile the two divisive options,

President Juncker and the European Commission established in 2017 a task force under a slogan which would be in-between: *"Doing less, more efficiently"* (European Commission, 2017)*.* But this new approach did not stir the enthusiasm neither in the pro-European camp nor in the Eurosceptic one.

Under these circumstances, the "Macron Plan" (Fondation Robert Schuman, 2017) for an "EU re-foundation" seems more than ambitious, but rather a political adventure on high seas. A new EU Treaty is however difficult to imagine nowadays. Not because it wouldn't be necessary after the UK leave, but because of the lack of political consensus in the EU27 and of the high risk that, even if the negotiations between the governments would be successful, a new Treaty would be rejected somewhere in a national referendum. So little political action is really possible today, in the current context.

It seems to be a contradiction between the voices asking for urgent, deep and structural reforms and those claiming a return of competencies and responsibilities from Brussels to national governments. The need of reforms is huge but the instruments and possibilities are very limited. As Stefan Lehne remarks for Carnegie Europe, *"the European Union is stuck in no-man's-land—needing to reform to keep up with changing risks and voter sentiment, yet hardly able to do so because of internal divisions and lack of support from the European public. The negotiations on the next seven-year budget framework may help address some of the most pressing needs for adjustment. Because of their technical nature, however, these talks will do little to restore voter confidence in the EU, leaving a heightened risk of political disruption"* (Lehne, 2018)*.*

It is not only the extended European Union itself which is undergoing a long period of turbulence, but also its vicinities that were left out. The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans lost most of their pro-European enthusiasm in the past decade, while waiting at the EU's door. Today "Eastern Europe" is no longer the communist Europe, but the cleavages persist and the region is still not entirely included in the European Project, almost 30 years after the collapse of the communist regimes. The Eastern Partnership (EaP), the Association Agreements (AAs), the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and even the statute of candidate states for EU accession have not proved to be effective instruments and solutions for a complete and profound Europeanization of these countries, mainly because *"the*

tragedy of Eastern Europe, in its old and new version, is […] represented by the same paradoxical cleavage between its high geopolitical significance and the economic weakness of the region" (Naumescu, 2015: 19)*.*

The recent research of the EU crisis has been usually focused on two main thematic dimensions. The first area of interest regards the *political, economic and institutional capacity* of the European Union to deal with the new problems and challenges, to propose new public policies and approaches in the context of a changing world, including the dynamics of the European societies. The second major subject is a *cultural research of the European malaise*, starting from a growing mistrust in the European Project and the decline of the liberal values and taking into consideration the revival of identity approaches, nationalism and new sensitivities of political culture on the continent, such as the need of protection, security, stability, religion or traditional values.

The current issue of the *On-Line Modelling New Europe* respects the multidisciplinary trends in European studies, debating the crisis of the European Project, but it also converges more on policy studies, solutions and perspectives. The research question that tries to unify all articles is whether the reform of the European Union in its various field is determined by values and principles and responds to theoretical and ideological models or is it driven by more pragmatism, a transactional view and a mix of interests?

"In our minds, European policy is in no way at odds with the patriotic ideal we all share [...] the nation has a role to play vis-à-vis its own citizens, but also, and just as much, vis-à-vis other nations. It cannot therefore retreat into the first of those roles." (Schuman, 2010, pp. 133-134) These words were spoken in 1961 by Robert Schuman, unanimously acclaimed 'Father of Europe' by the first European Assembly, the forerunner of today's European Parliament. Starting at the root of the European unification project to get a deep understanding of its objective, it is clarifying to know that Schuman and the other main Founding Fathers envisioned a European unification process that safeguarded regional and national identities to the extent that they did not go against the European common good. They held that the Greek-Roman traditions and the Jewish-Christian heritage were the common spiritual and cultural roots shared by western,

eastern and central European countries and regarded this as the soul of the European unification project.

The focal point of the project was to be the person with his social and spiritual dimension and the economic cooperation that led to political integration was meant to serve the person's development. (Krijtenburg, 2012, pp. 66 - 76) The European spirit implied, using Schuman's words, *"being conscious of belonging to a cultural family and wanting to serve that community in the spirit of total mutuality, without any hidden motives of hegemony or the selfish exploitation of others."* (Schuman, 1949). Regarding the European project this meant that *"This 'whole' cannot and must not remain an economic and technical enterprise: it needs a soul, the conscience of its historical affinities and of its responsibilities, in the present and in the future, and a political will at the service of the same human ideal"* (Schuman, 2010, p. 58).

The European founders had in mind a unification process consistent with the moral order proceeding from natural law and thus also in accordance with the human psyche. The frame of reference for European integration consisted of: the search for reconciliation where needed; effective solidarity; subsidiarity; and the agreement on supra-nationality when this was required for the broader national, European and universal common good (Krijtenburg, 2012, pp. 66-76). As mentioned in the Schuman Declaration (1950) this would allow Europe to flourish and to foster the world's, especially Africa's, development as *"[The solidarity of] production [would] be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources Europe [would] be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent."*

It can be assumed that if this frame of reference had been put in practice, the majority of African migrants might not (have) come to Europe in search for a better future as they could have secured their livelihood in their own countries. The intriguing fact is that today's crisis in Europe can for a large part be regarded as a consequence of EU's deviation from its initial frame of reference. Economic and technological interests seem to have become the main drive and goal of the European unification project instead of providing the means to serve the person and his social and spiritual dimension. This has also fuelled the so-called "identity politics" of today as

large and minority groups demand to be heard in politics. Political scientist and philosopher Francis Fukuyama suggests that "identity politics" often leads to polarization and is a threat to democracy, taking Brexit and the USA as clear examples (Fukuyama, 2018). Pope Francis stresses the need to continue to build bridges through dialogue between all groups. (Pope Francis, 2017)

The topicality of the original frame of reference for European unification turns out to be increasingly relevant in the search for universal guiding principles that foster interconnectedness and a focus on the common good. It is especially the younger generation that seeks a transformation of current structures into structures of solidarity.

An example is Volt (NRC, 2018), the first pan-European political movement with a presence in 32 European countries, that started as a reaction to Brexit and the rise of the divisive and destructive trend of populism. It is mainly led by people between 20 and 35 years old, but also attracts older and even younger people. The movement aims to start a new and inclusive way of doing politics, wanting to bring real change to all European citizens. Its vision is that of a new pan-European approach which is needed to meet current and future challenges, such as climate change, economic inequality, migration, international conflict, terrorism, and the impact of the technological revolution on jobs. The members of Volt see national parties as powerless in the face of these challenges that go beyond national borders and need to be tackled by Europeans, as one people. In their General Assembly in Amsterdam on 27-28 October 2018, they mentioned that "As a transnational party, we believe we can help the European people unite, create a shared vision and understanding, exchange good practices across the continent, and come up with policies together." This way of reasoning is clearly in line with the original guiding principles for European integration. Their members focus on the acquisition of personal leadership virtues, knowing that leadership is character aimed at service in the interest of the greater good. They foster constructive dialogues with those that could be qualified as their opponents, they practice effective solidarity with people in need, and subsidiarity to elicit the strength in those that should be able to help themselves but need a slight push. They aim at the appropriate modification of laws, market regulations, and judicial systems and seem to agree with the observation of the Social Doctrine of the Church that *"a firm and persevering determination [is needed] to commit oneself to the common good. That is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we*

are all really responsible for all. Solidarity is a fundamental social virtue since it places itself in the sphere of justice. [This means "serving" instead of "oppressing" for one's own advantage]" (Compendium Social Doctrine, 2004, Chapter 4). They acknowledge the strong bond between solidarity and the common good, solidarity and the universal destination of goods, solidarity and equality among men and peoples, solidarity and peace in the world. In this sense they seem to give heed to Schuman's observation that *"What Europe wants is to uplift the rigidity of its borders. They should become the lines of contact where the material and cultural exchanges take place. They define the particular tasks, responsibilities and innovations proper to each country taking into account as well the problems all countries together - and even the continents - face and thus foster solidarity."* (Schuman, 2010, pp. 26, 27) And equally they seem to underwrite Schuman's conviction that "It is in Europe's interest to remain the master of its fate. Splitting Europe up has become an absurd anachronism" and *"We shall have to replace all the tendencies inherited from the past with the notion of solidarity, that is to say the conviction that the real interest of all lies in acknowledging and accepting the interdependency of all. Egoism does not pay any more."* (Schuman, 2010, p.35)

No thorough judgement on Volt can be given as yet as it has only been in existence since 2017, but its intent seems to be a current expression of the original guiding principles of the European project. This movement may support reform that might contribute to Schuman's conviction that "This Europe which is still split up and torn, continues to be ever more aware of its calling to become the heart of a pacific cooperation of all peoples and of all races at the service of a humanity that embraces all continents." (Schuman, 2010, p. 30) The people of VOLT may correspond to Schuman's observation that *"What Europe needs is a living faith, enthusiasm, abnegation and magnanimity. She will be created and her viability will need to be maintained by the young people and because of them, that is, with the active help of those that tomorrow will carry the heavy burden of assuring a future that is more or less threatened. We should not forget in this regard that it are the errors of the past generations that created this situation […] but […] it is absolutely necessary that the continuity and the cooperation of the best people of all sorts of ages and categories be assured."* (Schuman, 2010, p. 58)

One who looks for a unique answer or miraculous solution for this impasse will obviously fail. The local understandings, general perspectives, interpretations and possible solutions are different, taking into consideration various ideological, cultural, political and historic backgrounds on the continent: *"there is no unique answer or panacea to this European malaise, the present crises or the structural threats haunting this changing, unpredictable world"*. (Naumescu, 2014: 13) Therefore we should expect a mix of interpretative theories and directions to go forward.

This collection of research article will show that the political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual dimension of the European integration project all shed a different light on the EU, and also that they are intrinsically connected and cannot be pulled apart. The following articles will provide evidence of their interconnectedness within and beyond the EU project of today and tomorrow.

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EUROPE, DARE TO BE YOURSELF!
FOUNDING PRINCIPLES AS GUIDELINES FOR EU TODAY AND TOMORROW:
SCHUMAN'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

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Abstract: *We know some of the new challenges that divide this family of nations, but what once brought them together? Given today's rumblings of discontent, it is worthwhile to reflect on the founding principles of the European Union, for they are still capable of uniting Europe and bringing it to prosperity. The European unification project started in 1950 with the objective of achieving peace and security on a devastated continent. A flourishing economy was seen as a means to an end. Implementing this political integration project would lead to peace, make states interdependent and thereby war impossible. The main architect of this project, Robert Schuman, highlighted four key principles to guide unification: a) reconciliation b) effective solidarity, c) subsidiarity, and d) supra-nationality. Schuman hoped to see the unification of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe realised as soon as possible. Borders should become lines of communication rather than rigid lines of separation. Above all, Europe needed a soul. Today's crises can be partly explained by Schuman's frame of reference in which the person is at the heart of the economy, technology, and politics and not the other way around. Schuman's key principles can contribute in a crucial way to solve crises and strengthen the ties between the European countries and beyond.*

Keywords: Schuman, frame of reference, heritage, common good.

Introduction

The objective of this article is twofold. The first is to contribute to a better understanding of the causes of today's unrest to facilitate the efforts to work towards sustainable solutions not only

in Europe but also at its borders and beyond. The second is to reflect on and highlight the topicality and applicability of the original guiding principles on European integration to achieve those enduring solutions and provide a source of hope.

The objectives are consistent with Schuman's frame of reference. Schuman is chosen because he is one of the main Founding Fathers of the European unification project and the only one who is unanimously acclaimed "Father of Europe" by the first Common Assembly (1961). In addition, Schuman's personality and background and his thoughts about European integration have been the subject of a thorough doctoral research study by the present author. This will serve also as a valuable source of (insight) information on the four main original guiding principles for European unification: reconciliation, effective solidarity, subsidiarity, and supra-nationality where needed while having the human being and his or her social and spiritual dimension at the heart of all. The article can therefore also be regarded as a continuation of this doctoral research on *Schuman's Europe. His frame of reference* (Krijtenburg, 2012).

The methodology departs from Schuman's frame of reference and observations on European integration, while including and comparing comments from other people such as Nazi death camp survivor, Elie Wiesel and his call for memory transfusion by refreshing the initial thoughts on European integration and Pope Francis's Europe-related speeches. Documents of the Social Doctrine of the Church, that Schuman followed closely, as well as academic and journalistic articles on the EU today provide also valuable insights on the topic discussed. Besides this desk research that includes contemporary and current sources both directly related to Schuman's way of thinking and not linked to his thoughts, exists the information obtained at national and international conferences, congresses, discussions among colleagues, in interviews and through a large amount of literature that is obtained intuitively and has helped to sharpen the thoughts.

Regarding the first objective of gaining a better understanding of today's problems, this article aims to show that these problems can be considered, to a certain extent, to be an outcome of the deviation in the direction of the political, economic, and social structures from the initial guiding principles for European unification. Besides, or because of that, they may be a result of individualistic behaviour and decision making that is not in line with the common good, and of fear, anger or attraction based on historical evidence. History will not repeat itself, but by knowing the past we can put the current situation into perspective (Wijdeven, 2017), and this is very much needed to know how to apply the original guiding principles and contribute to the solution of

today's unrest and see the points that unite beneath the differences while never losing sight of the human being. This article will also take into account generically—for time and word-bound constraints, —the current situation of Europe from a global perspective as no continent is standing on its own in today's globalized world in which everything and everyone is interconnected.

The article shows the reasons why and how those guidelines came about and shed light on ways through which the original guiding principles can be applied and contribute to the solution of current issues such as populism, the different attitudes of states within the European Union towards migration and other matters, economic crises, separatist movements within countries and unrest at EU borders and beyond. It also provides a link between the EU living up to its guiding principles and personal, "virtuous leadership" (Havard, 2014, p. xx).

The first part of the article will focus on Europe, Schuman, memory transfusion of the original guiding principles for European integration and on the Founding Fathers' thinking "outside the box". It will start with an impression of the situation of the EU at its borders and relate this to the tense situation after the Second World War. This will be followed by an introduction to Robert Schuman's life and thoughts about European unification[1] to shed light on how the historical, religious, and geographical context contributed to the launch of the Schuman Declaration in 1950 with which the European unification process began. Schuman's frame of reference will be surprising for its topicality regarding the way to build bridges and dissolve current polarization between peoples, states, and continents. The integrity and coherence of his personal and professional life reflect the key principles of his thoughts on European unification. Hereafter follows Nazi concentration camp survivor Elie Wiesel's call for memory transfusion and application of the Founding Fathers' core guiding principles of integration in Europe today. The

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[1]A lot of information is based on Margriet Krijtenburg's dissertation, *Schuman's Europe. His frame of reference* (2012), translated into French, *L'Europe de Schuman. Ses Racines* (2013). Many references are retrieved from the Schuman Archives (Maison de Robert Schuman, Scy-Chazelles) and the Archives of the Département de la Moselle (Metz). Articles of which ideas have been used are: KRIJTENBURG, M. (2015) "Robert Schuman's Commitment to European Unification: The Inspiring Role of his Roman Catholic faith." KRIJTENBURG, M. (2015) Robert Schuman, Principal Architect of the European Union. KRIJTENBURG, M. (2016) *Schuman hier et aujourd'hui.* KRIJTENBURG, M. (2016) "Schuman in times of Upheaval". PhD converted essence into children'book: KRIJTENBURG, M; WIT, de A. (2018) *The Father of Europe, Le Père de l'Europe, De Vader van Europa, Der Vater Europas, El Padre de Europa, Il Padre dell'Europa.*

first part finishes with the illustration of the topicality and relevance of the appropriation of the Founding Fathers' "thinking outside the box" and the importance of considering the European heritage, which is the European soul, and the common good.

The second part deals with the application of the original guiding principles on current European and global issues when using documents of the Social Doctrine of the Church and others. This will be followed by Schuman's observations and an interpretation of his line of thought on those current issues and show how his ideas can be shaped in the European and globalized world of today and how they can help to derive solutions to the current crises and divisions.

Worldwide topics such as climate change will be linked to ecology, also "human ecology", poverty and social justice, and the responsibility for the betterment of all, also because of its pre-emptive peacebuilding effect. The speed of economic and technological development is another issue that will be pointed at as a development that can be very effective and beneficial, but also extremely detrimental and dangerous when the key principles as those for European unification are not taken into account. The remainder of the article finishes with the observation that there also exists a surprising link between the key principles for integration and the person living up to his or her social and spiritual dimension. This means that each person has the challenge to become the best version of him or herself while contributing to the common good. This "virtuous leadership" will progressively contribute to the solution of today's problems assuring Europe to be herself also for the benefit of others.

EU at its borders and beyond

Migrants keep coming to European shores. Other migrants fail in crossing the Mediterranean, they drown or succumb on the hazardous way from their country of origin towards the African or Asian coast. A great many are the so-called economic and environmental migrants from Asia and Africa who hope for a better life in Europe. While fences are put up in some EU Member States to protect them from these migrants, the EU borders seem to have extended to halfway the Northern Sahara now that people want to cross the Mediterranean Sea out of Libya using Niger as a transit country. These and other African countries have received and will receive substantial amounts of money to foster, especially, education and employment for the youth to keep their people within their borders and occupy the migrants who are sent back from Europe. The migrants that stay in Europe, for their part, should give heed to their responsibility to adapt to the culture

and traditions of the country that welcomes them. This and more were decided upon during the 5th African Union-European Union Summit on the future direction for cooperation that took place in Abidjan, Ivory Coast on 29-30 November 2017. The main topic was "Youth", as this has become a key priority for Europe as well as for Africa because of the major challenges for young people in terms of migration, security, and employment. The proposed alleviations nevertheless do not solve the causes of the backward situation in Africa which go much deeper. These issues will be referred to later in this article. The EU Summit on Migration of June 2018 only strengthened the methods to keep migrants away from the European continent and adapted the way to spread them among the Member States (*The Guardian*, 30 June 2018).

Furthermore, the EU has its EU-Turkey deal through which migrants are kept on Asian territory and do not enter Europe unless through legal migration. The legal basis for this agreement is questioned severely because of the inhumane situation of the people stuck in the asylum seekers' camps in Greece.

Moreover, in the northern part of Europe, the EU has its sanctions with Russia primarily because of the Russian annexation of the Crimea, its invasion in parts of Ukraine and its role in the war in Syrian. Meanwhile, the suspicion that Russia is trying to influence European and international politics and fosters anti-EU campaigns increases the tensions. Another different kind of source of unrest and fear among European citizens are the threats of terrorist attacks on the European continent in the name of the Islamic State.

Together with all these complex situations are the tensions within Europe such as the lack of trust in the institutions of the European Union; the Brexit, the East-West and North-South tensions; and the increase of left- and right-wing populism (Mudde, 2017), which burns bridges and puts up walls within the European Union Member States. We may wonder if this situation, being surrounded by threats and dangers at its borders and the unrest within the EU, is not comparable to the circumstances of post–World War II with the threat of communism invading Europe; the possibility of a third World War; the loss of colonies; and the ruins, chaos and corruption, misery and unemployment inside Europe. A solution "outside the box" was then needed to provoke change and give hope to the people. Schuman and the other Founding Fathers gave heed to this need.

Robert Schuman (1886-1963)

I often think of 9 May 1950 and of your essential role [...] Your name is forever attached to the construction of the future of Europe and of the free world.

Jean Monnet in a telegram to Schuman from Roquebrune-Cap-Martin

For a proper insight into Schuman's thoughts, this introduction to his life and thoughts provides clarification. In 1871, after the Franco-German War, Alsace-Lorraine, the region in the northeast of France, was annexed by the German Empire. Robert Schuman was born several years later in Luxembourg in 1886. He was born a German because his father was from Lorraine and all citizens of this region were given German nationality, rather than French, after Alsace-Lorraine became part of the German state. Schuman was educated in the Catholic faith and excelled in his educational career from young boy onwards. He studied law and constantly searched for ways in which to obtain a stable peace on the European continent which constantly suffered from wars. He obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Strasbourg and became a successful lawyer in Metz, the capital city of Lorraine. He never forgot his wish to contribute to achieving peace—at least between the archenemies Germany and France. Since the Treaty of Verdun (843), there had been constant wars between France and what is now called Germany precisely because of this conflicting border region of Alsace-Lorraine, rich in coal and steel, and therefore of primary importance for the production of arms. Schuman's geographical background partially explains why he looked for a solution to this endless Franco-German conflict and why he discovered the potential of coal and steel as a means to obtain this peace. (Krijtenburg, 2012, pp. 17-24).

His mother's death had a great impact on him and made him even stronger in his desire to take to heart the advice of a friend and put into practice the teaching that "the saints of the future, will be saints in suit" in that he would carry out what God wanted from him as a secular person in the middle of the world. Years later, in 1942, when he was caught by the Gestapo and put on house arrest, he expressed this in a letter to his friend, colleague, and later biographer, Robert Rochefort with the words *'We are all instruments, however imperfect, of a Providence who uses them to accomplish grand designs which surpass us. This certainty obliges us to a great deal of modesty but also confers on us a serenity that our own personal experiences would not justify if we consider them from a purely human point of view'* (Roth, 2008, p. 562). He applied this both to himself and

to any other person and believed that this concept of the person needs to be at the heart of all political, economic, technological, social, and juridical structures, policies and undertakings.

This reasoning implied to him personally after the First World War (1914-1918), in which he did not fight and after which his nationality changed from German to French as Alsace- Lorraine returned to France, that he took on the task assigned to him by the people of his region, *Departement de la Moselle*, to represent them in the French government even though he never aspired to become a politician. He would be so, however, from 1919 onwards. His first "break-through" was the *lex Schuman* through which he knew how to appease both the central government in Paris, characterized by the *laiceté,* and his region in Alsace-Lorraine, where religion at public schools and the existing social laws were much appreciated. He succeeded to adopt only the laws that were necessary to comply with the national laws and to leave untouched the regional laws that were specific to his region. He, therewith, put the subsidiarity principle congruent with the Social Doctrine of the Church into practice in an exemplary way, while showing the solidarity needed with the French central government. It may be observed in this context that the Roman Catholic Church is the oldest and biggest international organization for social development in the world. The Papacy's opposition to ideologies and situations that endanger human dignity is acknowledged by many irrespective of their faith.

Two of the main principles of European unification, subsidiarity and solidarity where needed, were thus made visible already in his way of thinking right after the First World War.

He became Under Secretary of State for Refugees a few months before the Germans invaded France in 1940 and was caught as first Member of Parliament by the Gestapo. He was put into prison for several months and afterward on house-arrest, but he escaped in 1942 to France. He continued his speeches on the need for reconciliation as the only way to achieve peace, convinced as he was, even at the time when Hitler's rise to power was most evident, that the allies would win in the end. This conduct already evidenced his belief in a reconciliatory attitude, which he regarded the first and main principle for peace on the European continent.

When holding ministerial posts following the Second World War, his focus on reconciliation became even more concrete and well-known, also because of his reputation among friend and foe as a highly-esteemed politician. Between 1947 and 1950 came the Marshall Plan; the United Nations; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Council of Europe; and the Schuman Declaration with its supra-national and unique character that he considered essential to making

states interdependent and war impossible. These were crucial Treaties and organisations in which his role as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France were fundamental (Krijtenburg, 2012, pp. 125-174).

One needs to be reminded that Jean Monnet, Head of the French Planning Committee, is often mistakenly regarded as the intellectual father of the Schuman Declaration of 1950. Monnet is one of the main Founding Fathers, together with Konrad Adenauer, first Chancellor of West Germany, and Alcide De Gasperi, Prime-Minister of Italy. Monnet did, however, not 'invent' the European unification project, but acknowledged Schuman's ideas, made them more specific, and put them on paper in a few days (Krijtenburg, 2012, pp. 117-125; Reuter, 1980; Gerbet, 1962). This would become the Schuman Declaration that Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, launched on 9 May 1950. It has brought more than 68 years of peace among the Member States of the EU, the longest period of peace ever among these states. This method of integrating states is unique in world history. Never had states freely surrendered part of their sovereignty to a supra-national institution that took charge of their common interests and supported them with their newly created interdependence to make war among those states "not only unthinkable but materially impossible" which Schuman mentioned in the Schuman Declaration. He referred to the impossibility of war between the archenemies Germany and France as that was the main issue to be dealt with for centuries already but the interdependence applies to all states concerned. The Schuman Declaration can be considered the cornerstone that, in times of poverty, the threat of war, and the perceived danger of communism (Gerbet, 1962), brought about the first peaceful revolution in Europe.

The best evidence of Schuman not having utopian or idealistic ideas that could not be put into practice is the existence of the European Union itself. The European Union is the result of the Schuman Declaration and the best example of how a war-torn society, suffering from severe threats at its borders, has succeeded in achieving the longest period of peace ever among its member states and in becoming one of the world's biggest economies.

In 1961 Schuman was unanimously and officially acclaimed the "Father of Europe" by the European Parliament, then called Common Assembly. Schuman died in Scy-Chazelles (Metz) in 1963. His principles, however, are not outdated and "memory transfusion" will evidence their relevance.

Memory transfusion

"World peace cannot be safeguarded without making the creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it"

(Schuman Declaration)

Schuman's personal and historical background and his thoughts on European integration explain to a large extent not only the birth, key principles, and the structure of the European Union, but also Europe's current situation, precisely for having deviated from the initial frame of reference in which the person plays the pivotal role, not the economy as seems to be currently the case. Pope Francis referred to this in his speech to the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community in Rome on 28 October 2017. The situation these days seems to be to objectify the person ever more, and to personify the structures, from economy to technology and even the values so that these become instruments to be imposed on others instead of serving and caring about others as is their intrinsic aim; as in regarding the values, their need to be open to dialogue and to fostering relationships. Depersonalizing migrants is done by reducing them to percentages, quotas, and matters of agreement, which are without a soul so that they do not need to be "looked in the eyes." The fact that Europe is "walking on ice" and in danger of possible collapse if it does not take corrective action in time, as Polish Minister Radek Sikorski (Alting von Geusau, 2012) warned them in 2011, invites a memory transfusion of the initial guiding principles for European integration to react in time and accurately.

The understanding of Europe today from the historical perspective of Eastern, Central, and Western Europe separately and combined, will explain many of the current frictions and is enriching and necessary to have useful dialogues, but is not enough to solve today's problems. The revival of the thriving strength of the key guidelines for European unification together with their centrality of the human being in economic, political, social, and juridical structures will be paramount. This article supports, therefore, the conviction of the Nazi death camp survivor, Elie Wiesel, that for the solution to today's crises to happen, "memory transfusion" contributes greatly. Wiesel stresses the importance of remembering not only to prevent repeating past mistakes, but also to re-appropriate those experiences that enabled our peoples to overcome the crises of the past (quoted by Pope Francis, Charlemagne Prize, 6 May 2016).

This observation and recommendation imply that the EU needs to re-appropriate the key principles for European integration. This re-appropriation of the Founding Fathers' deep insights in times of severe crises will help to shed light on ways to repair the current upheavals in Europe, at its borders and beyond. Schuman's caveat that 'World peace cannot be safeguarded without making the creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it,' as mentioned in the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950 could not be more accurate and the way he practiced this, more insightful.

Schuman's own creative efforts translated themselves into starting a new kind of politics to achieve this desired peace. He greatly acknowledged that politics is meant to serve and protect the common good and to foster the sense of an inclusive community and not to impose its own national interests on others beyond the national borders. This new kind of politics in which the supra-national level was introduced for the common interests in coal and steel and effective solidarity between the former archenemies France and Germany, opened the way to rebuild the affected territories, to remove the threats of communism, a third world war, and the miserable state of post-war Europe as such. The Marshall Aid from the United States to revive the western economies came at the right time to facilitate this to happen as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. Schuman thus began a supra-national kind of politics in which the person with his social and spiritual dimension plays the pivotal role in political, economic, judicial, and social affairs. He thought 'outside the box' for those days and possibly still. Adenauer and De Gasperi, the two others very first Founding Fathers of the EU—even before Monnet—were on the same wavelength. The revolutionary idea was to put a political project into practice that went beyond the immediate national political, economic, and social interests, for having the focus on the common good, even beyond national borders. This had never happened before in the history of the world. As mentioned before, the EU is still unique in its structure.

Schuman is convinced that starting a supranational integration project, a project that focuses on the common European interests that do not go against universal interests leads to less national egoism, a cause of friction, discontent, and unrest. He foresees that the Member States surrender part of their sovereignty voluntarily to a common supranational entity because it will benefit them immediately or in the shorter or longer run and strengthen the common interests while simultaneously creating an interdependence among the Member States that excludes the possibility of war. Schuman thus gave heed to his conviction of the need for '*The inauguration of a new kind*

of politics that will probably be the strongest effort to protect our continent and to preserve the world from suicide' (Schuman, 16 May 1949; Price, 2003, p. 52; Krijtenburg, 2012, p. 140). With this insight, Schuman became the main architect of the Schuman Declaration (1950). It is worth noting that Schuman, a politician, is in the process of beatification since 2004.

Schuman did not limit himself to the expression "to protect our continent", but added, "and to preserve the world from suicide". His thoughts went well beyond European borders.

Extending his frame of reference for European integration to the rest of the world from outside of Europe, would imply that the person and his spiritual and social dimension in connection with the common good, needs to be at the heart of all EU undertakings in every realm. This again would mean that the key guiding principles of reconciliation, subsidiarity, effective solidarity, and supra-nationality, the latter only where needed, would need to be observed and actively practiced within and beyond European borders. Therefore, no economic, technological, political, social interest should obstruct or instrumentalize the pivotal role of the human being at the heart of EU decisions, policies, laws, and undertakings. This key role of the human being would need always to be connected with the common good so that no individualistic interests endanger the social cohesion and the tendency to see oneself or one's group or nation in isolation from others is avoided. When putting this into practice, political, economic, technological, social, and judicial structures would change. The impact would be enormous.

This statement regarding the pivotal role of the person is currently backed by interpretations like those of Luuk van Middelaar, former speechwriter of the first EU President Herman van Rompuy. Van Middelaar states that the "Brussels' rule-factory" that the EU now seems to be (Middelaar, 2017), is no longer accepted by the European citizens; they want to have a voice and be part of the decision-making process as is manifested by the growing populism and the diminishing political impact the EU seems to have. However, a correct definition needs to be given of this so-called "right of the citizen" to be actively involved in the decision-making process because "the common good" which goes beyond the interests of the individual or the group, should always be considered. This article aims to show, without going into detail, that the deviation from this perspective of the "right of the person" connected to the common good together with the initial principles, precisely explains the polarization in today's society and the "bubbles" people live in. The latter are like not-communicating vessels, in a large variety of domains. The deviation explains

to a large extent the increasing unrest from which the EU suffers within and beyond European borders and noticeably since the economic crisis of 2008.

Thinking outside the box to get Europe and even the world back on track seems to find an adequate source of inspiration in the "memory transfusion" of Schuman's thoughts and those of the other Founding Fathers regarding European unification. The source concerns Europe's own identity, its spiritual and cultural heritage which cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of the world.

Thinking outside the box

Thinking outside the box, walking innovative paths, is needed again as Europe can no longer stand by itself now that we live in a global world and Europe has become part of the multi-lateral and multipolar world. Federica Mogherini, current High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, often refers to the inspiration of the Founding Fathers' heritage and the need to take advantage of this heritage. She quoted Pope Francis in 2016 when he wondered "where is the Schuman or the Adenauer of today". Schuman's main guidelines for integration are as previously explained, reconciliation and effective solidarity, together with subsidiarity and supra-nationality where needed. This requires a search for common interests and common problems, obstacles or points of conflict that need to be solved to open up the possibility of reconciliation and create the common ground on which to practice effective solidarity, changing obstacles into opportunities for mutual benefit in the short or in the long run. The problem of a lack of solidarity could in this way, for instance, become an opportunity to practice solidarity and be a means for dialogue and profound cultural integration. (Pope Francis, European Parliament Strasbourg, 25 November 2015; New Year speech to Corps of Diplomats, 2018) And this idea need not be limited to Europe, but be worldwide, as it characterizes the European soul to look for unity in diversity and to focus on the common interests of communities of peoples also beyond cultures and (non) religions. This can be explained precisely for Europe having its roots in the European spiritual and cultural heritage.

European soul yesterday, today and tomorrow

Pope Francis comments on 'problems as opportunities' in the European Parliament in 2014 saying 'Europe will be able to confront the problems associated with immigration only if it is capable of clearly asserting its own cultural identity and enacting adequate legislation to protect

the rights of European citizens and to ensure the acceptance of immigrants. Only if it is capable of adopting fair, courageous and realistic policies which can assist the countries of origin in their own social and political development and in their efforts to resolve internal conflicts – the principal cause of this phenomenon – rather than adopting policies motivated by self-interest, which increase and feed such conflicts [a solution to those problems can become a reality]. We need to take action against the causes and not only [against] the effects' (Pope Francis, European Parliament, 2014).

The time to just putting a plaster on wounds is over, as the consequences of not or badly healed wounds are evident. The deepest cause of the wounds needs to be tracked down and healed. The Pope sees, like Schuman, the cause of all crises in the lack of acknowledging the European cultural identity or soul. He regards the discovery of this cause however also as a great opportunity to heal the problems and to revive the European spirit. Schuman reminded all of the need of the common European spirit that imbues all undertakings saying '*Such a spirit is thus needed, which means that we need to be aware of our specifically European common patrimony and we need to have the will to safeguard and develop it'* (Schuman, The European Yearbook 1955, p. 19).

The Pope regards, like Schuman, the awareness of one's own identity as fundamental for positive dialogue not only with countries that wish to become part of the Union, such as those of the Balkan, but also with countries beyond the EU especially with those of the Mediterranean with which the EU is constantly in touch because of the migrants. He remarks that 'the roots of our peoples, the roots of Europe, were consolidated down the centuries by the constant need to integrate into new syntheses the most varied and discrete cultures. The identity of Europe is, and always has been a dynamic and multicultural identity'(Pope Francis, Charlemagne Prize 2016; see also: New Year Address Corps of diplomats 9 January 2017).

He points out during the same speech that legislators have in this regard the main task to protect and nurture Europe's identity so that its citizens can experience renewed confidence in the institutions of the Union and in its underlying project of peace and friendship.

Those words about the "linking power" of the European cultural heritage are, as previously mentioned, backed by Schuman several decades earlier, when he mentioned that all countries belonging to European civilization have the calling to join the European community whenever they want, unless they lack an authentic democratic regime, product of the European cultural heritage. Schuman was at that time already convinced that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which in those days were deprived of freedom by a totalitarian system that seemed very

much established, would no doubt join the European Community as soon as they could. (Lejeune, 2000, p. 172) He regarded the wish to stick exclusively to national interests as outdated and absurd. '*It is in Europe's interest to remain the master of its fate. Splitting Europe up has become an absurd anachronism'* (Schuman in *For Europe*, 2010, p. 25). Schuman stressed the need to always keep in mind the common good also beyond national and continental borders. *'What Europe wants is to uplift the rigidity of its borders. They should become the lines of contact where the material and cultural exchanges take place. They define the particular tasks, responsibilities, and innovations proper to each country taking into account as well the problems all countries together - and even the continents - face and thus foster solidarity'* (Schuman in *For Europe,* pp. 26-27; Krijtenburg, 2012, p. 173).

But this did not imply that he did not recognize the need to take care of one's loyalties towards one's homeland. Well known are his words *'serving humanity is a duty equal to the one dictated by our loyalty to the nation'* (Schuman in *For Europe,* p. 131).

Schuman always emphasized the strength of the common European heritage as the pre-eminently binding element. He, however, also acknowledged the danger that people did not want to recognize the importance of this common heritage that bound people together when he said *'Europe is searching for an identity; it is aware that it has its own future in hand. It has never been so close to the goal. May God not let Europe miss the hour of its destiny, its final chance of salvation*' (Schuman in *For Europe*, pp. 143-144). That Schuman had high expectations for Europe as a global player and is hopeful speaks out of the following words: *"We have to, we want to give Europe its radiance back, its strength, its independence, in other words, its secular mission of guide and arbitrator"* (Roth, 2008, p. 513).

What might seem impossible today, may be possible tomorrow. The seemingly impossible reconciliation between France and Germany because of the more than a thousand years enmity and the two world wars initiated by Germany became a reality on 9 May 1950. The Pope comments that Schuman and the other Founding Fathers proved, with the launch of the Schuman Declaration, that 'our problems can become powerful forces for unity' (Pope Francis, European Parliament, 2014). The current global problems of ecology and poverty are examples of matters of common interests to be tackled. It is in favour of everyone and everything that the earth and the (poor) people are taken care of in a proper way. Natural disasters imply human disasters. They become

even worse if the negative consequences of climate change are not addressed properly on a worldwide scale.

Poverty is an issue of global concern. It implies the neglect of human dignity and is a source of inequality, illness, exploitation, and all the consequences these have on the people's physical and mental health, varying from lack of educational and physical growth to migration, crime or other negative outlets. Uprooting poverty can therefore also easily be distinguished as an example of a matter of common interests for all peoples across the world on which Schuman's frame of reference can be practiced. This will not only serve those people and their communities but will also serve the people and communities that get the chance to serve. Acting on behalf of the universal common good is fully in line with Schuman's frame of reference and implies the practice of the four key principles.

Social Doctrine of the Church on the current unrest

"[needed is] a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good. That is to say to the good of all and of each individual because we are all really responsible for all. Solidarity rises to the rank of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in the sphere of justice. [this change of attitude leads to] 'serve him' instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage" (Social Doctrine of the Church, Part I, Ch. 4).

Frans Timmermans, vice-president of the European Commission, pointed out the necessity that this teaching needed to be put into practice and showed at the same time the great challenge this implies as '[it] means that if somebody suffers and I feel optimistic about my future, I will reach out and help the person who suffers, because I want them to come to my level and beyond. It will help both of us. But if I see somebody suffer and I believe I might suffer too, I will stay away from them like they're lepers because they might infect me. And I think this is what is happening in the European Union today, also between nations. […]

The caricatures we've seen over the last ten years – in the north about the south, in the south about the north, in the east about the west and vice-versa – are undermining the very idea of European solidarity. We need to fix that' (Timmermans, Bishops' Conferences European Community, Rome, 2017).

Timmerman's statement recalls Schuman's vision and his stress on the need of the person at the heart of all and therewith on an attitude of reconciliation, solidarity and subsidiarity backed by

policies in those realms which equally have a pre-emptive peacebuilding effect because of their focus on what unites and not on what separates and polarizes. This was then the way to achieve peace and security and to maintain this peace and security until the day of today, and it will always be the way to build bridges.

Schuman himself showed in a practical way how this line of thought of having the person and common good at the heart of all undertakings, also proper to the Social Doctrine of the Church, could be embodied. He dared to think along the lines of reconciliation and to focus on common interests, changing instruments of war – coal and steel – into instruments of peace so as to attain enduring peace and security, the most profound common interest of peoples in which persons and economy can flourish.

The Founding Fathers dared to start a peace project implementing structural change in European – and world! – politics. They used the economy as a means to get the integration across borders going that on the deepest level was meant to serve man and his profound dignity. As Pope Francis mentioned in his Charlemagne Award Speech in May 2016, effective solidarity was encouraged by EU policies and funds and fostered the mutual development of states and their inhabitants. This integration through solidarity increased dialogue among the different cultures and generated ever-increasing understanding, welfare and well-being of the peoples.

Borders became ever more lines of contact and gave ever more heed to Schuman's conviction that they need to be lines of communication and exchange, and foster solidarity.

The unrest today is precisely because the person no longer occupies the pivotal role. Pope Francis recalled this conviction in the European Parliament when he said *"The time has come to work together in building a Europe which revolves not around the economy, but around the sacredness of the human person, around inalienable values […]."*

The unstable situation of EU today is especially visible since the financial crisis of 2008 that started in the United States due to the fact that virtual money was dealt with as real currency, a moral dilemma in the end. This (in)directly caused the possible Grexit of Greece, the unstable economies in southern Europe and the increase of social unrest and populism all over Europe and therewith also to a large extent the Brexit. Populism and polarization between groups also within societies was of course also fostered by the fear because of the large influx of migrants and by the fear of terrorism. People fled and flee more into their own "bubbles".

The previously mentioned African Union-European Union Summit in Abidjan showed mutual interest in trying to alleviate the economic migration pressure with more financial aid from the EU to improve the situation of the young people and decrease their arrival at European shores. However, when following the "Schuman approach" and also the social teachings of the Church, this way of acting is no more than a temporary contribution to soothe the urgency of the deeply engraved fundamental problem of lack of focus on human dignity within the realm of the (universal) common good in economic, political, social and even judicial structures.

This situation of huge influx of economic and environmental migrants from out of Africa could have been avoided to a large extent if the European Union had taken to heart Schuman's words written in the Schuman Declaration about the prosperity the European integration would bring about and the responsibility this would imply for Europe towards the rest of the world and especially towards Africa: *'This [solidarity of] production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources, Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.'*

Schuman's line of thought is clearly reflected in the social teachings of the Church that stress the need for ethical, social solidarity for relationships between persons and peoples. This teaching sees solidarity as a fundamental virtue for belonging to the field of justice as it is connected to the common good, to the universal destination of goods, to equality among peoples, and to peace.

"The new relationships of interdependence between individuals and peoples, which are de facto forms of solidarity, have to be transformed into relationships tending towards genuine ethical–social solidarity. [For this reason] The structures […] must be purified and transformed into structures of solidarity through the creation or appropriate modification of laws, market regulations, and juridical systems. […]

[In short], there exists an intimate bond between solidarity and the common good, between solidarity and the universal destination of goods, between solidarity and equality among men and peoples, between solidarity and peace in the world. The term "solidarity," […] translates [itself] into the willingness to give oneself for the good of one's neighbour, beyond any individual or particular interest" (Social Doctrine of the Church, 2005, Part I, Ch. IV).

What would Schuman say about Europe today?

With the thoughts of the social teachings of the Church in mind, the memory transfusion concept and Schuman's personal history and thoughts about European unification, Schuman would certainly remind the EU primarily of the four key principles led by the concept of the person with his social and spiritual dimension and related to the common good in all realms of life, from institutional to structural, from politics to economics, technology and ecology. He would primarily acknowledge, with even greater impetus, the fact that we live in a globalized world, and that all and everything influences all and everything, and that, therefore, all countries and even continents are fully interconnected. When putting his frame of reference on this insight, he would surely regard the economy and technology as means to foster political unification or cooperation within and across European boundaries to serve the citizen(s) and the common good not only within the European Union but also beyond European borders. The economy and technology would be limited by ethical restrictions in that they cannot go against human dignity and the interests of the common good. Schuman would recall the importance of a correct interpretation and effectuation of the social market economy and technology as a proper way to individual growth within the boundaries of the common good also beyond borders. He again would warn against creating a social market economy and technology that ultimately would result in the pursuit of egocentric interests or economic and technological goals at the cost of the common European patrimony that takes into account the universal common good and human dignity, the soul of all policies and undertakings. "*This whole cannot and must not remain an economic and technical enterprise: it needs a soul, the conscience of its historical affinities and of its responsibilities, in the present and in the future, and a political will at the service of the same human ideal*" (Schuman in *For Europe,* 2010, p. 58).

The Schuman Centre says the following regarding the social market economy to which technology can be added:

"*The social market economy [and technology] aims to combine, on the basis of a competitive economy [and technology], private initiative and social progress. [...] The social market economy [and technology] is not a completed system, but an evolving concept which remains an important factor in the political and social cohesion of the European Union. [...] The personality is the basic idea of the social economic [and technological] market; man is not considered as a purely economic [and technological] agent here, but as*

a social actor as well (everyone has to assume the responsibility for themselves and for others). The state provides assistance only if a man cannot help himself (principle of subsidiarity). The concept of the social market economy [and technology] links the principle of free markets and the one of social compensation. Thus, the advantages of the market economy [and technology], such as economic freedom and technological progress, are combined with social objectives such as a high employment rate" (Reperes, 2011, module n. 7).

These economic, technological, and social policies, however, should never be at the cost of others, also not beyond European borders. Furthermore, economic freedom and technological progress would require their "humane" limits and must take into account global issues such as climate change and the consequences these bring about for the entire world.

The technology, however, can contribute considerably to making the world more human(e) when it helps to fertilize infertile grounds in Africa for instance. But, exploitation of natural resources for economic or technological interests (like iPhone minerals for chips in Africa), can often be regarded as contributing to both the economic and social well-being and welfare of a large group of people, but not be a proper outcome of a social market economy and technology because of the detrimental effects this has on the people who deliver those natural resources and on humanity as a whole.

The way the social market economy and technology works when used properly, i.e., when taking the broader, universal common good into account, is very much in line with Schuman's thoughts and is equally consistent with the social teachings of the Church and Schuman's guiding principles for his politics, economics, and justice. Important to add is that Schuman never created a kind of Integration Plan for European unification, but let time and circumstances tell what needed to be done when and where, while always taking into the account that the integration affected people and could, therefore, never go too fast and never go against the common good also not beyond borders. *'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity'* (Schuman, in *For Europe*, 2010, p. 12).

The social market economy can contribute greatly to fight the consequences of climate change such as lack of drinking water and lack of biodiversity. It acknowledges that the ecological crisis to a large extent is the result of the superfluous needs of the western world and that a mentality

change is needed whereby the people of the West need to restrain their superfluous needs. Therefore, ecology and social justice have a direct link. This implies the need for respectful, authentic dialogue and the practice of social justice (Pope Francis, 2015, *Laudato Si*; Van Geest, 2017, CDA-blad, vol .3, pp. 12-14) and taking responsibility for the betterment of all also because of its pre-emptive peacebuilding effect. When people are happy, they don't want war. All this needs to be addressed by an authentic social market economy.

The observations above are, therefore, in line with Schuman's thinking if the European and universal common good are considered during the process, while the human being with his or her transcendence is at the heart of all undertakings. Theory and practice need to be coherent and integer. And that is precisely what is often lacking today and what causes the gap that needs to be filled to put these thoughts into practice consistent with Schuman's key principles for integration of not only European countries, but also beyond European boundaries. This means that a paradigm shift is needed. This paradigm shift , following the social teachings of the Church *'(…) propose[s] to all men and women (…) an integral and solidary humanism capable of creating a new social, economic, and political order, founded on the dignity and freedom of every human person, to be brought about in peace, justice, and solidarity.*'

This implies that the person together with the common good will be at the heart of economic, political, social, and cultural structures and practices, while reconciliation, solidarity, subsidiarity, supra-nationality with regard to the common good are the key guidelines in practice.

This humanized economy, technology, and politics can become a reality "*if individual men and women and their communities are able to cultivate moral and social virtues [like those connected to reconciliation] in themselves and to spread them in society*". There is, therefore, a direct link between the key principles for integration and the person living up to his or her deeply rooted social and spiritual dimension. This implies that each person is challenged to become the best version of him- or herself, living in harmony with whomever he or she is while taking into account the common good. This means fostering the wish and the discipline to live up to these principles for one's own happiness and for the happiness of others. This "virtuous leadership" will progressively lead to the solution to today's problems assuring Europe to be herself also to her own benefit and to the benefit of others.

"Europe needs a living faith, enthusiasm, abnegation, and magnanimity. She will be created, and her viability will need to be maintained by the young people, and because of them, that is, with the active help of those that tomorrow will carry the heavy burden of assuring a future that is more or less threatened. […] it is absolutely necessary that the continuity and the cooperation of the best people of all sorts of ages and categories be assured" (Schuman, 'Pour l'Unité de l'Europe' in *Du Pater Europae […],* 2010, p. 58).

Europe dare to be yourself!

Therefore, Schuman's way of thinking can still be considered as highly relevant and for this reason Paul de Groote, Commissioner of The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), commented, rightly, in 1963 that Schuman is *the leader for our European conscience and the man who for us will be always the one who showed us the way from which we should never part"* (De Groote, 1963).

Europe, dare to be yourself! is the heartfelt advice to be given to Europe and to the world, as the entire globe will benefit greatly from Europe's correspondence to its authentic being.

Federica Mogherini and her question *"Where is a Schuman or an Adenauer today?"* will surely support Schuman's call for respect and dialogue when he says "*Europe has led to the fulfilment of humanity. It must now show a new way, diametrically opposed to subjection, by accepting a plurality of civilizations that respect each other"* (Schuman in *For Europe,* 2010, p. 135).

And possibly as well Pope Francis's call to action when he reminded the Members of Parliament of the Founding Fathers' vision:

"*Today more than ever, their vision inspires us to build bridges and tear down walls. That vision urges us not to be content with cosmetic retouches or convoluted compromises aimed at correcting this or that treaty, but courageously to lay new and solid foundations*." As De Gasperi stated, "*equally inspired by concern for the common good of our European homeland,"* all are called to embark fearlessly on a "*construction project that demands our full quota of patience and our ongoing cooperation.*"

Conclusion

"This Europe which is still split up and torn continues to be ever more aware of its calling to form the heart of a pacific cooperation of all peoples and of all races at the service of a humanity that embraces all continents" (Schuman, "Pour l'unité de l'Europe" in *Du Pater Europae,* 2010, p. 30).

The current crises can be considered to a large extent an outcome of the deviation in direction of political, economic, technological, and social structures from the initial guiding principles of European unification that put the human being at the heart of those structures and all undertakings, while practicing the four key principles of reconciliation, solidarity, subsidiarity and supra-nationality only where needed for common interests. Schuman's first words in the Schuman Declaration, "*World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it*" could not have been more accurate. Today they call for a similar daring initiative which is to re-structure the EU having all geared around human dignity in connection with the common good also beyond European borders. The Founding Fathers started a new kind of politics that is still unique in world history and provided the longest period of peace ever among the current Member States of the European Union. The EU can similarly apply Schuman's frame of reference to the states beyond Europe.

Europe today must be seen from a global perspective where "all is" and "all are" interconnected. Schuman's life and the appropriation of his thoughts together with the other Founding Fathers' perspective might shed light on how to deal with this. Then by knowing the past and the initial drive and insights of the unification project, we can put the current situation not only into perspective but also acquire the knowledge of the way to contribute to the solution of today's unrest. Memory transfusion, re-appropriating the drive and insights of the Founding Fathers with a focus on Robert Schuman, right after the Second World War, helps to give a clear insight into the most essential needs for the acquisition of sustainable peace and security. The social teachings of the Church that Schuman followed cautiously also provide enlightening insights that underline Schuman's line of thought in that they also put the human being with his or her transcendence at the heart of all structures and undertakings and call for solidarity as a social virtue while linking this to social justice within and beyond borders.

In practice this means that politicians must consider the pivotal role of the person, with his or her spiritual and cultural dimensions, and practice an attitude of reconciliation having constructive dialogues and building bridges, an attitude that leads to effective solidarity, respect, and support of subsidiarity and interest in supra-nationality; the latter only when needed because of common interest in line with universal common interests. This also implies that politicians design the guidelines for a social market economy and technology that has the human being at the heart of all policies and undertakings and focusses on uprooting the causes of negative common crises that

affect the entire world such as poverty and climate change with all their devastating effects for all peoples and countries around the world.

Following Schuman's line of thought, we need to think more from the perspective of the universal good because of the effects of global issues such as climate change and poverty. All are interrelated, and all that is done or not done to reduce the negative effects of climate change and poverty is to the benefit or detriment of society. An authentic social market economy as Schuman would encourage would be fully in line with social justice and the common good as the economy would provide the means for personal development and the benefit of the common good.

Schuman's frame of reference is a source of hope for the EU and beyond, a cornerstone to rebuild upon and revive not only for itself but also for the peace and stability of the entire world! Let's start within the EU, taking the tensions as opportunities for constructive dialogue and more solidarity.

Ending with Pope Francis's and Schuman's concluding recommendations:

"It is a message of encouragement to return to the firm conviction of the founders of the European Union, who envisioned a future based on the capacity to work together in bridging divisions and in fostering peace and fellowship between all the peoples of this continent. At the heart of this ambitious political project was confidence in man, not so much as a citizen or an economic agent, but in man, in men and women as persons endowed with transcend dignity" (European Parliament, 2014).

"We shall have to replace all the tendencies inherited from the past with the notion of solidarity, that is to say, the conviction that the real interest of all lies in acknowledging and accepting the interdependency of all. Egoism does not pay any more" (Schuman in *For Europe,* 2010, p. 35).

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ROBERT SCHUMAN'S   CONCEPT OF "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY": WHAT LESSONS FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE?

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Abstract: *The European Union faces an existential crisis and for the first time there is a risk of dis-integration and growing nationalism. Despite the motto "united in diversity", diversity is often perceived as a threat. This study argues that revisiting the concept of "Community" in the Founding Fathers could give new impulse to the integration process and would allow for a reformulation of Europe's future based on the original principles and values. The human-centred political project of the Founding Fathers can be epitomised in Robert Schuman's definition of "Community".*

It is argued that the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church and Communitarian Personalism are the main sources of spiritual and intellectual inspiration for Robert Schuman, clearly reflected in his thinking and writing. Several texts by Schuman are analysed to identify the main features of Schuman's "European Community". This study argues that the "Community" requires a certain mind-set that can only be achieved through personal encounters and specific policies aimed at promoting trust and mutual understanding among the peoples of Europe.

Keywords: European Community, Robert Schuman, personalism, intercultural dialogue.

Introduction

The European Union is a community of values founded after World War II by six Western countries with the long-term goal of a political federation. This project ensured peace to its member

countries for over 70 years and expanded to today's Union of 28 Member States. However, the project is currently facing an existential crisis. On one hand, the Brexit referendum has for the first time opened the possibility of a "des-integration" process. On the other hand, nationalism, populism and xenophobia are on the rise.

The sense of community has been weakened over time. The motto of the European Union is "united in diversity", but diversity is often perceived as a threat. In fact, growing diversity within and between EU Member States makes it even more difficult to see what brings us together.

We argue that the original vision of the Founding Fathers could inspire a renewed impulse for integration, a refounding and reformulating of Europe's future. The Founding Fathers laid the foundations of a civilisational project based on values and on a human-centred political project. This vision can be epitomised in Robert Schuman's definition of "community".

In this contribution we argue that a united Europe could have been built in many ways, but the values and the life experiences of the Founding Fathers determined the specific shape of the integration process and defined its core values and principles. It also provided a cultural and spiritual frame on which the integration process has been based.

In order to find the essence of the "European Community", first we introduce briefly the concept of "community" as it is proposed in sociology. In a second part we present the historical and intellectual background in which Robert Schuman's concept of community was developed. The third and main part of the paper focuses specifically on Schuman, as one of the EU Founding Fathers: he is the political figure who most explicitly described his vision of a "European Community" and the only one who was officially declared a "Founding Father". In this final part, we introduce the most relevant aspects of Schuman's biography and his sources of intellectual and spiritual inspiration; and subsequently Schuman's writings are analysed in order to identify the main features of his concept of "community". At the end we draw some conclusions and suggest some lines of future research.

Defining the Concept of Community

The term "community" is a very complex one and has evolved over time. It lacks a clear conceptual definition and is used differently in everyday language as well as in several academic disciplines.

Sociology as a scientific discipline starts with the distinction between "community" and "society" introduced by Ferdinand Tönnies in his book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Community and Society*), published in 1887. He compares traditional human groupings to new ways of social life brought by modernity. They represent two kinds of social relations: the "community" being the natural grouping in which a person is born and accepted, without pre-conditions, linked to a family and a land. This would be opposed to the "society", a bigger group in which each person is a stranger to the other and relations are contractual and functional. The community is linked to stability and to the past, whereas society is linked to progress and to a conscious decision of the participants.

However, already in 1924, Helmuth Plessner analysed the danger of this concept in his book *The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism*. He warned of the risks of rejecting modernity, the loss of human dignity and freedom being sacrificed to authoritarian regimes.

Since then, the positive normative approach of Tönnies has constantly been challenged as a dangerous archetype that can lead to exclusive particularism opposed to universal solidarity values. However, the sentimental nostalgia of the "community" can be traced to our days and is often exploited by populist and nationalistic movements.

The Concept of Community: a contextualisation

The origin of the European Communities: the "Community" method

After World War II, all associations advocating Europe's unity met in The Hague for a three-day conference in which two different models of integration became clear, and they produced different organisations.[1] The model of cooperation between states based on international law gave birth to the Council of Europe in 1948; whereas the model based on sharing sovereignty and establishing common institutions and common laws that would prevail over national law gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. According to the later model, a long-term political union would be achieved through sectorial economic integration in what was called

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[1] The major organisations involved in European integration established in Western Europe after World War II are the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Source: https://www.cvce.eu

"The Community". After the ECSC, European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community would follow in 1957.

The institutions shared by the three "Communities" were the High Authority (today the European Commission), the Council of Ministers (today Council of the EU) and the Common Assembly (today the European Parliament), as well as the European Court of Justice. The decision-making process through these institutions was called the "Community method".

The integration process based on the "Community method"[2] was launched on 9 May 1950, with the so-called "Schuman Declaration". That day, French foreign minister Robert Schuman offered to place the coal and steel production of France and Germany under a joint authority. He opened the invitation to all European democracies willing to join.

The Founding Fathers of the European Union

The Founding Fathers are considered to be the politicians who built the first European Communities. The main names are Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet (both from France), Konrad Adenauer (Germany), Alcide De Gasperi (Italy), Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), and Johan Willem Beyen (Netherlands)[3], although many other men and women directly or indirectly contributed to the project in the first half of the 20th century.

This was not the first attempt to unite Europe, but it was the first successful project to create a democratic unity based on the free decision of its constituent members. Their vision of Europe was shaped by their life experiences: they saw the end of the 19th century empires when they were young, they lived the First World War as young men, then the financial crisis of 29, the rise of totalitarian regimes and the destruction of World War II.

Some interesting common characteristics can be detected between these political figures. Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer came from bordering regions, while Spaak and Bech came from small countries that already started to integrate in the Benelux even before the European Communities. Their sense of patriotism also evolved over time, as well as the relation with the

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[2] According to the EUR-Lex Glossary, as can be consulted at the following:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html (from 2002) and
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html

[3] For more information see the European Union's internet portal:
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/founding-fathers_en

"foreigner", either because of changing nationality (Schuman and De Gasperi), or due to the experience of exile (Monnet, Spaak), and occupation (Adenauer) (Schirmann, 2008, p. 19-20). They also moved towards a sense of multiple identities.

In the 1930s there was a sense of civilisational decline, with many reflecting on the decline of the West, as announced by Oswald Spengler in 1918 and (*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*). At the time "the West" (*Occident* in French) was identified with the old Christendom while the term "Europe" was identified with the secularisation proclaimed by intellectuals such as Victor Hugo, Kant and Mazzini.

In April 1926 there was an influential article published in the Catholic journal *Abendlands* under the title "*Europa oder Abendland*" (Europe or the West), by Albert Lotz. The author explained that Europe was a society based on political and economic interests (*Gesellschaft*) whereas the "West" is a community of men who share the same faith and values (*Gemeinschaft*).

In this context, the *Gemeinschaft* was identified with old European monarchies and with Christianity. It is against this background that the group of the so-called "non-conformists of the 1930s" was created in France. (Loubet Del Bayle, 1969). Around these intellectual circles and their journals (*Ordre Nouveau, Esprit*) the philosophy of personalism developed, and it presented a new civilisational project that made Christian values compatible with a pluralistic democracy.

So the success of the European Communities was the outcome of the convergence of the secular Europe of the Enlightenment and a renewed concept of "profane Christendom" (Cheneaux, 2007; Schirmann, 2008; Papini, 1996).

These debates also turned around culture and "Europeanness". In 1937 the Belgian journalist Louis Dumont-Wilden had published the book *L'Esprit Européen,* highlighting what unites Europeans and advocating already a sort of federation. These reflections became even more pressing after WWII. Well-known intellectuals of their time organised a seminar in 1947 to discuss on the "European Spirit" (Benda, 1947).

The main intellectual and spiritual sources which influenced the Founding Fathers' generation are the Catholic Social Teaching and the philosophy of Communitarian Personalism, with both sources being also at the birth of Christian Democratic parties (Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Van Zeeland, Joseph Bech were all Catholic and Christian Democrats). Most scholars agree on the leadership of Christian Democrats in the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s, even if there were other secular sources.

The youth of the Founding Fathers was deeply influenced by the teachings of Pope Leo XIII, in particular by the encyclicals *Aeterni Patris,* (1879) and *Rerum Novarum* or Rights and Duties of Capital and Labour (1891). After Pope Pius IX's tough stand against modernity (with his *Syllabus of mistakes*), Pope Leo XIII encouraged Catholics, and French in particular, to rally the Church and the Republic, showing that Republican values should not be against the Church teachings. In *Aeterni Patris* he asked Catholics to go back to the "golden wisdom" of St. Thomas Aquinas to actualise the relation between faith and reason in the context of liberal democracies.

Saint Thomas Aquinas also inspired the personalist philosophers, who built on Aquinas' definition of the person. These thinkers criticised both individualism and collectivism as dehumanising materialisms, lacking the transcendent dimension of any person's fulfilment. In the 1930's and 1940's, they reacted against anti-Semitism and reflected on the acceptance of "otherness", with a strong emphasis on dialogue and relations.

The philosophy of personalism was also at the basis of European federalism and had a broad influence in the intellectual, social and political trends in Europe after the 1930s and during WW II, also through the Resistance Movements (Papini, 1981).

The concept of "community" at the time of the Founding Fathers

The concept was very much in vogue in 1930s and 1940s France, although it was an ambiguous notion that inspired both a revival of the "national community" and the European federalist movement. (Cohen, 1998)

On the one hand, the non-conformist and personalist thinkers advocated a "communitarian revolution" against the individualisation of capitalism and the collectivisation of socialism. These personalist thinkers understood the concept of community as the social context that would allow for personal fulfilment, open to transcendence and to diversity. However, they did not idealise rural communities or even the past. They wanted a new "*Renaissance*" to launch a spiritual renewal and create a "new order".

Marshall Pétain, on the other hand, promoted a revival of the French State around traditional values of family and duty to the community, what he also called a "communitarian revolution" with a strong emphasis on social links. However, this vision of "community" was far from the inclusive vision of the personalist philosophers and activists, because it fostered xenophobia, anti-

Semitism and established the parameter of what a "true" French could be, excluding Jewish, foreign-born and freemasons as not being loyal to the homeland (Baruch, 2017).

Robert Schuman's Life, Thinking and Writing

Short biography

Schuman (1886-1963) was born in Luxembourg to a Luxembourgish mother and a French-born father. His father, Jean-Pierre Schuman, was a native of Lorraine, but following the war of 1870 this territory was annexed to Germany.

His biographers highlight that he was raised in a multilingual and multicultural environment, with French, German and Luxembourgish languages spoken at home. This multiculturalism and a deep Catholic education in the family are the two main pillars on which he built his personality.

Multiculturalism developed in Schuman a flexible and multi-layered concept of identity, far from any defensive nationalistic patriotism. Schuman always felt much attached to the Lorraine, his "*Heimat*" (home region or "*pétite patrie*"), and a border region between France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium. He had relatives and friends in all these countries, and this life experienced determined his concept of identity as concentric circles which start with the family and grow until the human family. He always defended the specific identity and traditions of Alsace and Lorraine against Jacobine French centralism, but at the same time he rejected any move for independence and never even participated in a local movement for more political autonomy. He believed that there could be compatible layers of identity at the local, regional, national and also European level, and these are not mutually exclusive (Lejeune, 2013, p.81).

Schuman studied Law in Germany and was a member of several Catholic youth organisations created to implement Pope Leo XIII's encyclicals. The bishop of Metz, Mgr. Willibrord Benzler, invited Schuman to set up the French section of *Volksverein* in the Alsace. (Lejeune 2013, p. 53). Bishop Benzler became Schuman's mentor and encouraged the young lawyer to study St. Thomas Aquinas. As an adult, he would always keep in touch with Benzler. The bishop had been the abbot of the Benedictine Maria Laach monastery, and Schuman used to go there to retreats. This is where he had the opportunity to become friends with Catholic personalist thinkers such as Jacques Maritain and Romano Guardini with whom he could discuss about Europe (Krijtenburg, 2016).

All biographers agree on the deep influence of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic Social Doctrine. Fimister goes as far as to say that "Schuman was the perfect Catholic politician that Leo [XIII] had in mind" (Fimister, 2008, p. 27). Schuman's biographer René Lejeune states that Schuman "never ceased to [study Thomas Aquinas] until the end of his life [...] he mastered Thomism to the point where he could debate in Latin with specialists" (Lejeune, 2013, p. 55). Schuman also read philosophers who inspired the personalists, such as Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel (mainly his "philosophy of action") (Krijtenburg, 2012).

In any case, Maritain is the only author mentioned by Robert Schuman in his book *For Europe* (Schuman 2010, p.43). Maritain was one of the main philosophers who engaged in an actualisation of St. Thomas it what was called Neo-Scholasticism. Schuman was attracted to Maritain's proposal for a political Catholicism compatible with modernity and with freedom of conscience (Lejeune, 2013; Cheneaux, 2007). Following Henri Bergson, both Maritain and Schuman believe that the root of democracy is evangelical, as it is embedded in the absolute dignity of each man/woman, made in God's image, and in the equality of all men/women. This view on democracy and human dignity lead Maritain and Schuman to accept a non-confessional and plural State. The role of the State is to provide the means for every person to fulfil his/her divine vocation to enter in relation with the Absolute. Therefore, the spiritual input is one of the elements of democracy (Fimister, 2008; Krijtenburg 2012; Cheneaux, 2006, 2007; Viotto, 2004).

Schuman's writings

During his active life in politics Robert Schuman wrote some articles and gave some speeches and conferences. All along his life he wrote private letters in which he reflects about his life and his actions, but also about Europe. At the end of his life wrote a short book with his thoughts about Europe, based on notes and documents that he had written previously. It was published shortly after his death in 1963 under the title *For Europe*.

For the purpose of this article, we have analysed several letters, conferences, speeches, articles, the "Schuman Declaration" and *For Europe*, searching for the meaning and the main features of Schuman's European community. The chronological order and phased development reflect the most relevant and explicit texts/events about Europe and the community in the first place, followed by other texts which reinforce and back the core quotes.

An analysis of "community"

1) Before 9 May 1950

Long before the 9-May Declaration Schuman reflects on the peaceful future of the continent in private letters, recalling its shared cultural roots. In 1942 he wrote a letter to his friend Georges Ditch, a lawyer in Thionville. Schuman says that peace would only be achieved through European unity, and this had to be done through democratic terms, based on the free will of nations and for mutual cooperation (A. Muñoz in Schirmann 2008, p. 43).

Also in 1942 he wrote a letter to Robert Rochefort, speaking on the need to develop a European spirit:

"*Such a spirit is thus needed, which means that we need to be aware of our specifically European common patrimony and we need to have the will to safeguard and develop it.*"[4]

On 16 May 1949 Schuman gave a speech in the Festival Hall, in Strasbourg, a few days after the signature of the Treaty establishing the Council of Europe. His idea of a European spirit is clearly illustrated in following quotations:

"*I do not have any intention of drawing a geographical line of demarcation between Europe and 'non-Europe'. There is another valid way of setting limits: that which distinguishes those who have the European spirit and those who do not.*

"*The European spirit signifies being conscious of belonging to a cultural family and to have a willingness to serve that community in the spirit of total mutuality, without any hidden motives of hegemony or the selfish exploitation of others. The 19th century saw feudal ideas being opposed and, with the rise of a national spirit, nationalities asserting themselves. Our century, that has witnessed the catastrophes resulting in the unending clash of nationalities and nationalisms, must attempt and succeed in reconciling nations in a supranational association. This would safeguard the diversities and aspirations of each nation while coordinating them in the same manner as the regions are coordinated within the unity of the nation.*"[5]

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[4] Schuman, R. "L'Europe est une Communauté Spirituelle et culturelle," In L'Annuaire Européen I / The European Yearbook I (1955), 19. In Krijtenburg 2012, p. 14.

[5] Translated from French by D.H. Price in *Schuman or Monnet? The Real Architect of Europe,* Bron Communications , 2003.

From these first European related texts we can draw some preliminary conclusions. Schuman defines the "European Community" not as a geographical or limited area, but as a certain spirit. It is an on-going process in which Europe actively defines itself, being the actor that shapes its own future. The European spirit reflects a common cultural heritage and the will of the parts to serve the whole. It implies a whole that transcends nationality without erasing the nation state. He already speaks of a "supranational association".

2) The Schuman Declaration[6]

The Declaration highlights that European community-building is a process, not an end, which is to be achieved "*through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity".* This process is based on the fusion of national interests:

"*There will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.*"

3) Foreword to the book by Paul Reuter *"La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier"* (1953)[7]

This is the first text in which Schuman gives a more nuanced and detailed explanation of the final aims and motivations of the Schuman Declaration. The most important points are the three innovations introduced by the Declaration and the Treaty: the High Authority, the "supranational" character and a new way of negotiating. The federation stated in the Schuman Declaration will not be a super-state or a confederation. It will be something new, reflected in the term "supranational".[8] Schuman himself gives his own definition of supranational:

"*No other word would have better reflected the new idea that we tried to express, distinguishing it from all other categories traditionally accepted. The supranational stands at an equal distance from, on one*

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[6]   https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en

[7] Paul Reuter, a lawyer from the Lorraine, was part of the team who worked with Jean Monnet in the drafting of the Schuman Declaration.

[8] The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1989) defines "supranational" as "*Having power, authority, or influence that overrides or transcends national boundaries, governments, or institutions.*" According to this dictionary, the first known use dates back to 1908 and refers to the Catholic Church. (In Fimister 2008 : 23)

hand, the international individualism which considers national sovereignty as intangible [...] and on the other hand federalism of States which are subordinated to a Super-State [...] ".[9]

The Community was established through a Treaty that was negotiated over nine months. Schuman states that:

"*This was not a traditional negotiation, with the usual merchandising inspired by national preoccupations. Delegates and experts put themselves at the service of one and the same idea, and the Treaty became the undivided piece in which each one has his part of merit".*[10]

4) Lecture at the College of Europe (22 -23 October 1953)

The main message of the lecture is that the community is a process for which the spirits need to be mature. Therefore, "*the spirit had to be changed*" ("*Il fallait changer l'esprit*") as a first step to change the dynamic between France and Germany.

He underlines that the concept of "community" is a ground-breaking change introduced in the existing political conceptions. The "Community is a "core idea", "*une idée force*", only comparable to a scientific breakthrough: "Its achievement not only remains as a new asset for the scientific field, but it also paves the way for further progress, better adapted to the needs of a more developed era."

5) Article "*A European state of mind is possible*?" (1955)

In this article, Robert Schuman retakes the idea of the "European spirit" *("un état d'esprit européen")* as the main constitutive element of the community. Any institutional advancement needs to be preceded by the proper "*état d'esprit*", which can be translated as "state of mind" or "mind-set". This change can only be achieved through personal human exchanges:

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[9] Own translation from Reuter, P. (1953) *La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier*. Paris, Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence: "*Aucun autre vocable ne saurait mieux rendre l'idée nouvelle qu'il s'agit d'exprimer, en la distinguant de toutes les catégories traditionnellement admises. Le supranational se situe à égale distance entre d'une part, l'individualisme international qui considère comme intangible la souveraineté nationale et n'accepte comme limitations de la souveraineté que des obligations contractuelles, occasionnelles et révocables ; d'autre part, le fédéralisme d'Etats qui se subordonnent à un Super-Etat doté d'une souveraineté territoriale propre*".

[10] Own translation (idem): "*Ce n'était pas une négociation de type classique, avec les habituels marchandages qu'inspirent des préoccupations nationales. Délégués et experts se sont mis au service d'une même idée, et le Traité est devenu une oeuvre indivise dans laquelle chacun a sa part de mérite*".

"*The true European spirit is becoming aware of the realities, the possibilities and the duties, in front of which we find ourselves, all of us, above borders, beyond our antagonisms and resentments*".[11]

"*I place at the forefront of these effective progresses those that we owe to human contacts. Learn to know each other, as we are, with our qualities and our faults, our affinities and disparities, our prejudices and our routines, this is the first condition for any rapprochement. There is no trust without frankness, no agreement built on misconceptions. By multiplying the encounters, we create a favourable climate and we lay the foundation for a common action*".[12]

6) Abbey of Fleury's Newsletter: "*What the Community means for a Christian*"

In August 1958 Schuman wrote a contribution for the newsletter of the Abbey of Fleury, "*Ce que signifie la Communauté européenne pour le Chrétien?*" at the request of the Abbey. He gives a very precise definition of what he understands by "community":

"*It supposes first of all freedom of choice, the free adherence of the participating collectivities. Constraint, whatever it may be, is excluded by definition. Moreover, the community proposes to each partner the same objective as the philosophy of St. Thomas has called the Common Good. This is situated outside of all egotistical purposes, the good of each and the good of all and conversely. Finally the means of attaining these objectives are agreement, and mutual understanding, without hegemony or privilege or subordination*".[13]

He continues to explain how such relations, which used to be limited to the frame of a state, are now applied also to the new union of states:

"*Such impartial equality must be guaranteed by the authority of an arbiter which ensures the constitutional conformity of laws and regulation. The opinion of the arbiter imposes itself upon all the powers of the state, on parliament and on the government as on the courts. The arbiter must exercise a special and altogether independent jurisdiction. Thus understood the idea of community is a pledge of*

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[11] Own translation from Schuman, R. (1955) : "*Un état d'esprit européen est-il possible?*" *Écrits de Paris no.75 :* "*Le véritable esprit européen est la prise de conscience des réalités, des possibilités et des dévoirs, en présence desquels nous nous trouvons ainsi placés les uns et les autres, par-dessus les frontières, au dela de nos antagonismes et de nos ressentiments*".

[12] Own translation (idem): "*Je place au tout premier rang de ces progrès effectifs ceux que nous devons aux contacts humains. Apprendre à nous connaître, tels que nous sommes, avec nos qualités et nos défauts, nos affinités et nos disparités, nos préjugés et nos routines, est la condition première de tout rapprochement. Il n'est pas de confiance sans franchise, pas d'entente construite sur des malentendus. En multipliant les rencontres, nous créons un climat favorable et nous jetons en même temps les bases d'une action commune*".

[13] English translation in Fimister, A.P. (2008), p. 200.

liberty for the citizen and of discipline and stability for society within the framework of the same state, unitary or composite. For some years, more exactly since 1950, we have applied the same ideas in the relations between states until then sovereign and completely independent."[14]

The main elements in this definition of community are the objective of the common good, which is more than the addition of the individual interests; having no selfish motivation; the equality between the members; and searching mutual understanding as the means to reach the objective.

7) *"For Europe" ("Pour l'Europe")*

In this book, Schuman further elaborates on some of the concepts he introduced in earlier texts. Here follows a thorough text analysis in reference to these key concepts:

The concept of "supranational", which is inspired by the organic unity between the whole and the parts in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and to the common good. Schuman presents supranationality as opposed to an empire, because it respects freedom and cherishes diversity: "*it is respectful of distinctive features*" (*For Europe*, p. 36). He defines how the Community works, why it is supranational, and why it "protects" from the nation-state:

"The basic principle which was being implemented for the first time, even on an international level, was the principle of community: a community of quasi-unlimited duration, which could not be cancelled. [...] This is what we mean by supranational authority, protected by a supranational jurisdiction. It owes its existence to the national legislators' concordat votes, but from the moment when it actually came into existence, the community led a life separate from the dangers and extravagance of national policy." (p. 100-101)

"The idea is not to merge States to create a Super State. Our European States are a historical reality. From a psychological point of view it would be impossible to do away with them. Their diversity is a good thing and we do not intend to level them down or equalize them. [...] To our mind, European policy is certainly not in contradiction with the patriotic ideal. It encourages the particular nature and characteristics of each of its states and fosters the sound love for one's own country which is a love that does not go in detriment of other countries. It wants to attain a unity in the fullness of its diversity." (p. 16)

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[14] Idem, p. 200.

He further adds that the nation state is transcended by merging individual interests in search of the common good:

"*We are not, and we shall never be, given to deny our mother country; we shall never forget our duties towards it. But beyond each country, we increasingly and clearly acknowledge the existence of a common good, superior to national interest. A common good into which our countries' individual interests are merged.*" (*For Europe*, p. 30.)

"*Therefore, taking the 'national' as a starting point, we shall have to consider this as part of a whole in which matters will finally concur and complement each other*". (*For Europe*, p. 109)

Secondly, he explains that the concept of interdependence strengthens the building of a common destiny:

"*Every one of us must be firmly convinced that we need each other, irrespective of the rank or the power we might hold.*" (*For Europe*, p. 19)

"*The consequence of this interdependence is that it is impossible to remain indifferent to the fortunate or unfortunate lot of a people. For a European with capacity to think it is no longer possible to rejoice spitefully over his neighbour's misfortune; everyone is united for better or for worse in a common destiny.*" (*For Europe,* p. 31)

"*Instead of the nationalism and the mistrustful independence of the past, we shall bind together the interests, the decisions and the destiny of this new community of formerly rival states.*" (*For Europe*, p. 34)

In sum, the common destiny builds the community and gives it a soul:

"*This 'whole' cannot and must not remain an economic and technical enterprise: it needs a soul, the conscience of its historical affinities and of its responsibilities, in the present and in the future, and a political will at the service of the same human ideal.*" (*For Europe*, p. 58)

Thirdly, Schuman conceives culture at the heart of the Community. Therefore, he argues for the need of a cultural dialogue and exchanges to consolidate a policy based on solidarity and

"progressive confidence". (*For Europe*, p. 34). Following quotations in the book refer to the importance of a broadly defined socio-cultural context in Community-building:

> "*Before being a military alliance or an economic entity, Europe must be a cultural community in the most elevated sense of the term.*" (*For Europe*, p. 29)

> "*We shall have to replace all the tendencies inherited from the past with the notion of solidarity, that is to say the conviction that the real interest of all lies in acknowledging and accepting the interdependency of all. Egoism does not pay any more.*" (*For Europe*, p. 35)

> "*What Europe wants is to uplift the rigidity of its borders. They should become the lines of contact where the material and cultural exchanges take place*". (*For Europe*, p. 26-27)

> "*But there is more to it an just breaking the barriers: co-operation must be organised, which presupposes a great number of personal contacts: exchanges and training courses, conferences and field trips, tours, exhibitions, young manuals and intellectual workers' meetings.*" (*For Europe*, p. 37)

> "*Painful memories of the Occupation are obstacles to the natural trend to favour the idea since the wounds are far from being healed. Getting to know each other, as we really are, with our qualities and our failings, our affinities and our differences, our prejudices and our habits, is the essential requirement for any form of rapprochement. There is no possible confidence without honesty, and harmony cannot be built on misunderstanding.* (*For Europe*, p. 90)

Assessment

The main elements of Schuman's concept of a European Community can be summarised as follows:

The person is at the centre of human progress. The Community must therefore look both at the material and the spiritual dimension of the person. In sum, Unity in Diversity reflects the unity of the parts in a whole. The same way that persons are unique and still dependent of a human community, States can be unique and still part of a bigger whole, a bigger community, as advocated by personalist philosophers and the Papal Magisterium.

Culture is the basis for political integration. Europe is an "*état d'esprit*", a mind-set, that will be acquired over time through personal contacts and cannot be imposed by the institutions. Therefore, the need not only to soften or erase borders in order to transform them into points of

contact, but also to actively organise these personal exchanges. Such a change of mind-set would aim at building trust and mutual understanding, raising awareness of things we have in common and learning to appreciate and valuing differences and particularities.

The "Community" as a political project must be democratic and non-confessional, pluralistic and based on the absolute dignity of every person. Because it is supranational, it transcends the nation state without erasing it by reinventing the concept of sovereignty. The Community is open to the world for the common good, in solidarity with the one human family (following St. Thomas' teachings but also the Pontifical Magisterium). The participation of persons and groups should be encouraged beyond the institutions and the state in order to make the Community "alive". Along with participation, the principles of subsidiarity and responsibility are to be promoted.

Conclusions

From our analysis it is clear that the concept of "community" has deep philosophical and spiritual roots for Robert Schuman and the EU Founding Fathers. Even though the legal personality of the Community/Communities disappeared over time, the concept of "community" still recalls a certain quality of relations between the members of the EU, both the nation states and the persons living in them. The ideal type of relations of the "community" and the appreciation of regional and local particularities show some similarities between Schuman and Tönnies. However, in Schuman's vision, the "community" is not limited to a small group or a geographical area. Also, even if it is based on a shared history and culture, it should be oriented to the future, to the common good, and build on creative forces.

Undoubtedly, Schuman and the Founding Fathers put "culture" and a certain "mind-set" at the core of the Community, rather than any geographical or political definition. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the concept and policy relevance of "culture", cultural diversity and diversity management policies would be important for future research.

The concept of multiple identities and the image of the concentric circles of "communities" - from the blood family to the entire human family- is a starting point to reflect on a more complex approach to European identity and to European integration (Bekemans, 2014).

Diversity in Europe today is very different from diversity at the time of the Founding Fathers, but some important principles remain valid: mainly the respect of personal freedom, human dignity, pluralism and also the need to increase personal contacts to strengthen social bonds. As

stated by Schuman, only a dialogue that transforms mind-sets and allows for mutual understanding will contribute to build a true "European Community". Therefore, an analysis of European projects for intercultural dialogue would prove useful to measure the extent to which this kind of "transforming" exchanges is taking place in Europe today (Bekemans, 2012, 2014).

The approach of Schuman and the Founding Fathers overcomes several academic controversies and oppositions. On one hand, they go beyond the traditional opposition between "community" and "society" in Sociology by proposing the goal of bringing community-quality relations to the broader society and even to relations between States. The approach also overcomes the opposition between federalists and intergovernmentalists or realists in the field of European integration studies. A new concept is being proposed, equally distant from the traditional inter-state relations and from the idea of a super-state: the "supranational". The tools to overcome this opposition are the principles of Social teaching: subsidiarity and participation.

The European Community is an open-ending and unique process whose main goal is the transformation of the participants to merge their interests towards the common good without losing their specific identity, but enriching it as an added value.

This is why theories of European integration could also shed light on how to build on Schuman's concept of "Community". The Multi-level Governance approach to integration (Bekemans, 2013, p. 89-107) and its cosmopolitan perspective (Bekemans, 2013, p. 109-129) seem to be the best suited to analyse the political "European Community" as presented by Robert Schuman because it moves from the either/or frame to the and/and frame. In line with Schuman and the Founding Fathers it presents a way to "transcend" the nation state without erasing it and to observe a more complex reality of todays' identities and sense of belonging. Like Schuman and the Founding Fathers, this approach also allows for creativity and for overcoming traditional concepts to adapt to new realities. In this sense, the concept of progress as human-made and the philosophy of action can provide interesting insights as to how to re-orientate the EU towards the future without nostalgia for the past.

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ON ROMANIA'S CROOKED JOURNEY TOWARDS EURO

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Abstract: *This research is focused on the auspices of adopting Euro in the present day economic, social and political junctures of Romania. Starting with the analysis of the economic outlook after the moment of fulfilling the prerequisite macroeconomic criteria, the approach is developed in a particular manner towards the assessment of the domestic social and political conditional ties that are contextually relevant, from a political economy angle, with inflexions towards the current positioning of the domestic political deciding factors. Except for a batch of remarks concerning convergence, the paper does not deal with the specific econometrics of Euro adoption, such as business cycle synchronization or any of the optimum currency area present day debates. Instead it attempts to serve the Euro adoption cause in the predictable future, given the lessons hopefully learned during the years 2015-2016 when Romania was indeed within the Euro compliance margins, but for various reasons never considered taking advantage of this peculiar window of opportunity. Seen from this perspective, combining endogenous with exogenous arguments, mainly of social and cultural consistence, the research is moreover a professional awareness bell for various categories of stakeholders, than an attempt to suggest any sort of normative policy blueprint for such a manifold process as Euro adoption seems to be in this country.*

Keywords: Macroeconomics, Euro adoption, Romanian economic environment, Social and cultural factors, Economic policy.

Premises

There are plenty of decent arguments in order to state that at this point in its history the Romanian society would be rather split between the aspirations of being stronger and deeper integrated within EU structures and the more and more vivid public image of quite the opposite,

in the context of today's Union resets happening under the influence of various national(istic) pressures. Bearing in mind the specter of the confusing history of the so called Romanian "exceptional-ism", dramatically impacting the domestic social and economic life throughout times, more and more voices plead for Euro adoption as a strategic step that would add significant consistency to the overall process of more profound European integration of the country. The common opinion is that either the country will become, procedurally, fully compatible with other Euro Zone (EZ) countries, or we will witness rather soon a process of distancing from the European core and consequently plunging into economic stalemate and overall drift of the country into a periphery that seems unavoidable under these circumstances. All these realities would make a strong incentive to act properly in this ambitious direction.

The fact that the Romanian economy and society was massively exposed to a process of dollarization since the inception of the transition towards free society and market economy, the hard currency (mainly USD and DEM) hedging that was common throughout society during the high inflation period of the early 90s, would make a necessary onset. A decade later, we witnessed a significant volume of remittances that generated a wide popular culture of hard currency and a dedicated market, paralleling the national currency, therefore adding consistence to the statement that Euro adoption would be more or less smooth, both in terms of cognitive and emotional factors. This reality is not necessarily a good premise for Euro adoption, as observes Daniel Dăianu, tackling the issue from the National Bank of Romania's (NBR) macroeconomic perspective. (Dăianu, 2017) Moreover, from the EU's institutional standpoint it is a fact that traditional constraints as well as other conjectural features of the financial system and overall economic outlook of the applying countries matter more and more, increasing the difficulty of the process, just as the recent Euro application submitted by Bulgaria indicates.

The most relevant grand stand suggesting the lack of consistency of a speedy transition towards Euro adoption in Romania became public late in 2016. (Dăianu et al., 2016) A comprehensive and professionally built macroeconomic study, this paper incorporates all the conceivable arguments of economic consistency against speedy Euro adoption. Dealing with the issue from several macroeconomic perspectives, starting with the distance between the theoretical and practical aspects of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and analyzing the evolution of EZ's institutional

framework and policies, the study conveys the clear message that Romania should not adopt the Euro under the 2016 conditions. Actually, the depiction of the investigated prospect of the Romanian national economy, finance and banking systems, when benchmarked to those corresponding within EZ, makes the most reputed economic newspaper of the country to label this academic output as "the most pessimist study about the adoption of Euro in Romania...". (Pâslaru, 2016) Since that moment the horizon of the accession process somehow trailed off in our country, nowadays (September 2018) only 1 out of 4 criteria being fulfilled. (European Commission, 2018)

The approach has strongly impacted on media, with immediate negative labels, but definitely has its straightforward merits of macroeconomic consistence. But we must observe also that the reasons invoked, combined with the political establishments' reluctance to approach systematically and constructively the issue, apparently due to estimated negative impacts on the overall standard of living, or to the foreseen deepening of territorial discrepancies, fueled the engine of postponement, more or less *sine die*. Bluntly said, the steps of the path toward Euro, clearly expressed in the following lines were simply not a political issue in 2017 and 2018. "It is very important to have the time horizon for the accession process clearly in mind. The full integration process is characterized by three major stages: first membership in the European Union; second, membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II; and third, membership in the Euro-system, thus the adoption of the Euro as the single currency. This will be the path for new members, as it has been and will remain the path for the present EU members" (Solans, 2001).

Meanwhile one can observe that even less effort, if any of this sort of amplitude and consistency, was dedicated to the investigation of the Euro adoption from a multidisciplinary perspective, culturally, socially, politically or even geopolitically layered. Arguments of such consistence were occasionally stigmatized by economists as "soft" and therefore unworthy to interfere with such an econometrically patterned process. I believe that the pan-European public debate concerning the alternative scenarios for the future of EU, as presented in the EC's *White Paper* issued on February 22, 2017 would significantly change this outlook due to the fact that more and more people would perceive the *de facto* process of splitting EU into EZ and non EZ or even worse, in more layers, with the obvious negative consequences for a country such as Romania. Or, alternatively considering this larger research framework and putting it in Peter

Drucker's programmatic words: "The policies that worked in the last forty years were very different from those development economists and development politicians advocated." (Drucker, 1989) It makes a lot of sense, I believe, to tackle the issue from this angle too, as for instance Jeffrey Sachs does when expressing his concerns about the diminishing international stature of the US dollar due to present day American administration wrong policies and their even worse reflection on the world stage. (Sachs, 2018)

Last but not least in this row of ideas, we must debate the topic at a time when the single currency was adopted, one by one, by several CEE countries namely Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic countries. They are proof that the propensity to adopt the common currency stands valid today too, despite the rather bumpy history of the Euro during the last decade. No doubt there is plenty of common sense in the idea that without a competitive economy, structurally EZ compatible, there is no point in a politically rushed Euro adoption. But positioning a country as firmly as possible in the dispute "Big bang *vs.* gradualism" adoption policies, as Fidrmuc (2003) labels them during the early days of the Euro, becomes a more and more relevant dichotomy pattern, during these days plagued by Euro-skepticism. Moreover, under the new set of constraints of mainly extra-economic and geopolitical consistence, having a clear commitment, just as our Southern neighbor Bulgaria, a firm anchor for Euro adoption and consequently coherent dedicated institutions, policies and procedures covering this business, seems to be the most appropriate if not the only path enabling deeper economic integration of Romania within EU.

The mixed-up EU-RO political economy

Beyond the wordplay of the section's title, the period between *annus mirabilis* 1989 for CEE and *annus horribilis* 2016 for the whole EU was indeed a time of massive economic and social changes throughout Europe. It is also beyond doubt that the decades that followed the demise of the communist regimes made their marks on the fabric of the societies of CEE, probably just as heavily as the previous decades were marked by the totalitarian doctrine. The "stampede of Western liberalism" that characterized life in countries such as Romania coexisted with a wave of relative resilience towards neo-liberal ideas in the Western European economic environment of the last quarter of the XXth century (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013) and occurred in a landscape illustrated by scarce public administration reform (Mora and Ţiclău, 2008). The last (and worse)

European aperture, of illiberal consistence added a significant dimension to the entropy of the political and economic environments. Therefore, the failure to properly deliver the initially forecasted results of European integration, Euro adoption included, could be considered a direct consequence of the significant gap between the rhetoric of policy deciders and the daily reality of erratic economics, lack of convergence, business cycle (lack of) synchronization, etc.

The *Stability and Growth Pact* and the associated *Stability Programs* are imposing on candidates balanced budgets, the acceptance of the signals sent by the early warning indicators and to conduct appropriate actions in case of any wrongdoing. The *single supervisory mechanism* and the *single resolution mechanism* along with the European deposit insurance scheme would complete the track towards the *Banking Union*, also as a preliminary step. In the situation of Romania there was enough constructive, one might say visionary, political momentum in order to sign in 2012 the *Fiscal Compact,* namely chapter III of the *Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance,* thus voluntarily undertaking supplementary automatic correction measures consistent with the *Medium Term Objective.* Such kind of political approach cannot be interpreted otherwise but as prudential and worthwhile for the long run outlook of our economy, particularly if the landscape is evaluated in the present day (2018) Romanian juncture.

This actually means that countries that do fulfill nominal criteria, but somehow fail to fully comply with other real prerequisites, could theoretically still be admitted in the EZ provided the fact it is obvious they are considered reliable from an overall economic perspective. It is precisely this track, implying a faster procedure towards the Euro that was seen as the most profitable for present day economy's climax, by significant authors, thus opposing the more or less *quasi*-official position of indefinitely postponement. (Cerna, 2018a) It is also contextually important to underline the reality that from the *European Central Bank*'s (ECB) perspective, no additional criteria than those applied to EZ countries should be imposed on the applicants. Sustainable convergence measures and their thorough application must be the absolute pragmatic priority of each country and not the very debate on when and how Euro should be adopted. Can we say that Romania complies with this basic pragmatic request today? Definitely not, but any advised observer of the phenomenon could say that today such this is the mood throughout *Central and Eastern Europe*

(CEE), in practically all those countries that are supposed to adopt the common currency according to their accession treaty.

Facing the reality that Euro adoption is, no matter how we take it, an elitist project, at this point available only to the chosen ones, but contractually unavoidable on the long run, several Euro adoption anchors were thrown in Romania in time, the rationale behind them being mostly to uphold the issue in terms of public relations than introducing a feasible benchmark. From the initial one in 2014, seven years past joining EU in 2007, to the symbolic year 2019, when Romania will hold for the first time the *Presidency of EU's Council* (Lungu, 2012) up to the recently unveiled 2024, there is no lack of Euro inception benchmarks in this country. The conformity of the nominal criteria for the previous three years, but also the fact that the country currently reached, according to *Eurostat* data, almost 60% of EU 28's average GDP (PPP) *per capita* while being the EU champion of growth rate in both 2016 and 2017 seemed insufficient in order to gather critical mass for an affirmative political decision in this respect. But even worse, the manner of coordinating the process since joining EU, up to this moment by the NBR, since 2018 by several institutions under the coordination of the Government (Guvernul României, 2018), was somehow crooked and effectively lies under ambiguous auspices, as quite recently even the President of the country stated. (Buican, 2018)

Between the two temporal benchmarks invoked in the opening, our country had a truly peculiar economic track, evolving on eclectic coordinates. Since the beginning of the transition period, domestic policies focused more than anything else on the exogenous constraints induced by the request to build a functional market economy out of the most obsolete and conservative economic system CEE could see during the late '80s. Actually, no matter of the "waves" such a move would have implied, the desire of belonging to the EU was a matter of national consensus, even to a larger extent than in other CEE countries, and therefore the economic distortions, (Mattli and Pluemper, 2004) sometime painful adjustments, apparently exogenously imposed, were willingly accepted. But the unconventional, *stop and go* type of process of conveying towards free market, starting from the realities of Romania, marked the country in a peculiar way. EU became the formal benchmark in all respects, particularly due to the observed comparative inefficiency of the domestic political class, but also the "whipping supervisor" easy to blame for a various set of

transition liabilities. Overall, as series of *Eurobarometers* reveal, the Euro-enthusiasm, measured on various layers of the society peaked in the country more than anywhere else in the region. No wonder in this context than joining as soon as possible the EZ was in the plan even since acceding to EU in 2007 (Isărescu, 2014).

We must face it: gradually, Romania got in line with other CEE countries in this respect. Much of the Euro-skepticism that can be observed today in both professional and common European milieus and even beyond has much to do with the lack of appropriate reforms of the European monetary system. This conclusion surfaced following the Greek bail-out and the reluctance to debt mutual tackling, revealing significant heterogeneity between financial markets, to the extent that the only applicable solution was the acceptance by the ECB of quantitative easing measures that would be shared by all the players of the financial game. (Balcerowicz, 2012) So, an increasing lack of confidence in the future of the common currency acquired more and more ground, attitude that draws both from its birth sins (in some views a utopian vision derived from political targets) and from the Euro adoption route setbacks. These realities are vividly indicated by the evident gaps of various consistencies between the so called Northern richer flank of EZ and the less rich Southern one (Joffe, 2012) and more obscurely by the increasingly wider policy gap between liberal and illiberal politicians throughout EU. It is precisely this shaky balance between the hard values of the EU, that are obviously epitomized by Euro, and the national interest that is politically parameterized to convey to different values, that probably explain best the crooked Euro adoption policies in Romania.

Macroeconomics, Geo-economics and Culture

Why adopt Euro when its demise has been proclaimed by many important observers? Such an outcome would be theoretically perfectly illustrated by Joseph Stiglitz' radical pessimistic views, largely shared today throughout CEE. In his comprehensive *Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe* he deals with unmatched accuracy on the failure of Euro to deliver according to the plan. (Stiglitz, 2016) Even if the last chapter indicates a couple of potential remedies, the overall conclusion seems obvious: the European single currency system is doomed. It is a fact that Euro-skepticism is mostly of American consistence (Cerna, 2018b) but gradually many Europeans became more and more influenced by this kind of view following the global

crisis. (Gibson et al., 2014) It is precisely this induced mood that has nowadays an unhealthy influence over the position of macroeconomists and econometricians concerned with the adoption or rejection of the common currency. (Ryc, 2015) Obviously this generates a complex procrastination climate that does not take much in consideration many political happenings of 2017, positive or negative, such as *Brexit*, external threats of various kinds, or the open attempts to reform the Union by launching the alternative scenarios for further evolution.

This being the crux, it seems only logic that significant policy differentiations concerning the issue of Euro adoption have emerged in those countries that should adopt Euro, often fuzzy approaches that were intensified by various political interests and not necessarily by authorized voices of the economic establishment. We must acknowledge in this respect that many cultural biases play a peculiar role in the process of deeper integration within EU structures in general, belonging to EZ in particular. One could find the most solid grounds for considering the peculiar cultural reasons of adopting a supra-national currency in Hayek's *Denationalization of Money*. (Hayek, 1990) In several editions, since 1976 till 1990, it is described how the world got used to the existence of a distinct national currency in each country, currency that is most often considered as natural, a very must for structuring the economy, for balancing the level of domestic prices as they move together relatively to the price levels pattern of other countries. In other words an economy gets rooted in its currency and the proportionality of this process would be generated by the overall success of that particular economy and this generates specific territoriality of geo-economic consistence. Newer approaches of the kind link the issue to the so called "convergence trap" that allows more competitive Euro countries to exploit *de facto* the weaker ones through trade and financial channels, beyond the classic political bullying and thus actually acting as a divergence factor. (Pruchnik and Zowczak, 2017)

As one of the most reputed pioneers of the theory and practice of the *European Monetary System* diagnoses, "culture can be easily brought to the realm of economics judging it as a public good". (Kindleberger, 2000) Sometimes public values emerge naturally; sometimes they should be imposed, always only for the benefit of recipient societies. True, these public goods are in many cases also symbolic, money included, so they should be conceived in such a manner that starting from a certain representation of an idea, fact or history, they should generate the situation that a

certain social layer, not necessarily the whole society, reaches critical mass in order to perform a crucial task in front of that particular society, at that specific moment. Factors external to the phenomenon itself could trigger significant socio-cultural changes. (Sorokin, 1970) I would say that Euro undoubtedly played such a symbolic role in several countries, if not all of them, evidently beyond its basic monetary functionality. In fact, in many material and non material ways it encapsulates the very essence of the European process of integration, as seen both from inside and outside the EU. Ignoring this cultural feature would mean to self-inflict a strategic wound, especially if the case is about a smaller, less exposed to the world economic flows, country, economy and society.

So, restating the undeniable connection between extra-economic elements, of mainly cultural consistence, as observed in economic history by Mandeville, Hume, or Hayek we shall clearly observe this "competition" between vital traditions and modern practices. It is a fact that only the latter are objectively shaping the true path towards Euro and it seems that the process of analyzing whether Euro adoption should be accelerated as much as possible, or quite the opposite, in present day Romania, should be interpreted also from this professional culture's angle. "What culture establishes is moral order. Culture regulates right and wrong, lays down what attracts reward and what attracts punishment. It offers a model of the good life and establishes a complex web of obligations, rights and duties" (Schoepflin, 2012). After all, during the whole transition process Romania, as well as other CEE countries, was constantly in search of moral order benchmarks, unfortunately so seldom found in our society. Linking the process of Euro adoption exclusively to the rigid econometrically built framework simply does not offer the social impetus necessary in moments like this. In 2014 only 36% of Latvians supported the Euro adoption, but the country being fully prepared acted accordingly. (Fontanella-Khan and Milne, 2013). Today Romania is still the most Euro adoption enthusiast country in EU, 54% of the Romanians believing that such a monetary step would have positive consequences for the country, but an even larger batch, namely 68% support the fast adoption! (European Commission, 2015)

It is definitely not my purpose to depict in this paper the state of process seen from the macroeconomic angle. I will use only one indicator here, for a comparative approach purpose, contextually relevant, I believe. In terms of convergence, it is a fact that the Romanian economy

fulfilled the nominal criteria between 2015-2017 and, as observed from *Eurostat* data, generated a GDP (PPP) *per capita* convergence level of 57% of EU 28's average in 2016, a figure that is comparable with Slovakia's at the moment of Euro adoption there, the strong 2017 of 7.1% (2018 estimations are also in this vicinity) being poised to improve this percentage, in simple econometrics, to an estimated level of around 62%. Isn't this comparative level of convergence relevant for Romania? Indeed, as the Governor of NBR observed that "even though there are no accurate criteria indicating sufficient real convergence for the successful Euro adoption, a common-sense benchmark would be the minimum real convergence level at which new member states entered the Euro area - 58.3% for Estonia, 59.6% for Latvia, 65% for Slovakia". (Isărescu, 2015) Mirroring this situation we would appreciate that in the presence of sufficient structural convergence, a real convergence rate over 60% is enough to accommodate the common monetary policy and thus giving a green light to Euro adoption.

When the country joined EU in 2007, NBR assessed that it will take 5 years in order to join ERM II and consequently Euro adoption will occur in 2014. Conditions were met in 2015 but the reluctance to adopt the common currency was mainly explained (actually all throughout CEE) by the huge negative effects of the global crisis that hit the world in 2007. (Gajewski, 2016) This was the main reason for various governments to openly oppose the move, due to concerns over the economic dynamics following adoption. A major theme of the opponents of a faster track towards Euro was and still is the vulnerability induced by the developmental discrepancies among the regions of a certain country, triggered by a mechanism that inexorably leads to more discrepancies that the opposite. (Fingleton et al., 2015) In the case of Romania, we probably should supplement, not replace, such an argument with the conclusions derived from information concerning the superior pace of development of several Romanian regions today (Milken Institute, 2017) and start analyzing the overall countrywide driving effect of some regional really dynamic clusters and their spinoff effect. But once more, the cultural bias, always emerging when the question is about participating or not to such an optimum currency area as EZ, it is clearly a stronger issue in other countries as in Romania.

A country with a proven resiliency to harsh economic and monetary conditions, heavily tested by inflation the 90s, with a consequent dollarization process, as well as the *de facto* Euro-ization

during the 2000s, following the massive emigration of Romanians towards EZ states, probably can cope decently the initial macroeconomic adjustment period. Such a country could definitely culturally cope even better with the inherent micro and macro initial shocks and setbacks involved by the move. Let me give a petty example here: investigating the current use of Euro banknotes, 7 out of 10 Romanians are fully aware of them, while less than 4 Poles would fit in the same situation. Romania has also the highest proportion of people (62%) who consider that EU institutions are more trustworthy than the equivalent in their own country. (European Commission, 2017) Again, invoking the Slovak example, because I believe it is contextually relevant, this country has seen robust growth after joining the EZ, whilst its former federate partner, the Czech Republic, which decided to remain independent and keep its old crown, has done comparatively worse. (Monfort, 2017)

It is clear that general entropy, either of economic and/or political consistence, or "lack of smoothness", to say the least, in the evolution of EZ could have important and severe repercussions for the emerging economies, such as Romania's. (Maniu, 2014) So, no matter if the country embarks, willingly or forcefully on the Euro track, or opposes it by all means, the long range outcome could be forecasted with reasonable accuracy as more or less the same in terms of harmonizing business cycles. It is quite indicative to notice in this framework that Poland, the country that is strongly opposing today Euro adoption (it is not by chance that this paper uses more Polish sources than any other in terms of comparative approach) simply cannot have an efficient countercyclical policy due to various exogenous constraints. (Janikowski, 2018) So, It seems to me that for those opposing Euro adoption, in Romania or else, though accepting the rationale of both the *status quo* and of the institutional change that will inevitably occur in the years to come, the genuine economic question that arises regards not the very adoption but the impact and sustainability of such an action, in other words and methodologically speaking an outcome that could be properly described only with means beyond the clear macroeconomics of Euro adoption.

Can we conclude on the matter?

Summing up and interpreting both exogenous and endogenous factors speeding or delaying Euro adoption, I would say that there is no better "public good" to restate Kindleberger's formula, that could underline Romania's dedication towards deeper European integration than at least

attempting through proper institutional means to join the EZ as soon as possible. From both cultural and social perspectives, such an approach fully resonates with the recent years' developments within the Romanian society. From the macroeconomic standpoint it would be a daring move, but definitely not a hazardous one, as relevant voices claim. (Cerna, 2017) No major economic disequilibrium could be forecasted, grounded on the available data. Strictly from the political economy angle, even the harshest introductory period would not generate major economic and social malfunctions. But on the other hand, postponing adoption without a clear anchor would certainly induce a counterproductive mood that would sooner or later affect the outlook of the rather sound economy today, not for long, as consistent assessments predict. Lack of certainty about the future is precisely the reason for a clear strategy (Bradley, Hirt and Smit, 2018) the opposite being simple ignoring the developments, always and everywhere with worse consequences.

Can and/or should Euro adoption become a case of self fulfilling prophecy in the present juncture of the Romanian economy and society? Acceding to the EZ would be indeed a situation that could boost the nation's energies in the years to come, but obviously this process has also embedded liabilities, hidden traps that could overturn the whole operation into its opposite. From an axiological perspective this is a link to superior norms that are supposed to boost morale and implicitly overall social efficiency. It is probably the fear of failure in coping with higher economic benchmarks imposed by the use of the common currency that made several eligible CEE countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) to postpone the adoption of the Euro, while others (Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic countries) boldly moved forward without jeopardizing their growth and developmental trajectories. Moreover, if the expectations of a clear cut between EZ and non-EZ countries are going to be fulfilled in the foreseeable future, the "fall out" from the *status quo* could strongly jeopardize the chances of a country to a fair position within EU. This argument, obviously grounded on reasons of political strategic thinking mere than anything else, is perennial for those embracing the idea of moving faster towards the Euro, despite the adversities and unforeseen dangers.

It is my point that without reliable governmental measures, public debates, specific institutional buildups with proper social impact (Cojanu, 2010) and meanwhile constant EU

benchmarking, lower induced expectations or no expectations at all, cannot but generate a weaker performance towards a future goal of Euro adoption even if the macroeconomic prerequisites would be in place. What is called in psychology and sociology the *Rosenthal effect* of the proportionality between induced expectations and results accomplished, would be automatically replaced by its corollary, namely the so called *Golem effect,* straightforwardly leading to the decrease of the overall performance following the lack of adequate economic landmarks as social stimuli. While the intricacies of the Euro adoption mechanism unquestionably fall in the responsibility of the professionals of the economy, the responsibility to improve as soon as possible the existing design of the country's Euro adoption blueprint, from the political economy's angle, falls at this point in history almost entirely on the shoulders of the existing political class.

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TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN UNION IMMIGRATION POLICY: NAVIGATING A DIFFICULT OBSTACLE COURSE

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Abstract: *The following article focuses on the various attempts that have been carried out to reform the migration and asylum legislation of the European Union. It examines the current perceptions about migration following the 2015-2016 migration and refugee crisis, and then briefly traces the historical evolution of the current legal framework on migration and asylum. My aim is to show how this evolution has reached the point where any attempts to reform the system are primarily driven by security, rather than humanitarian considerations, which makes consensus on any contentious issue very difficult to achieve, a fact highlighted in the third section of the present contribution. The conclusions discuss the limited scope of the latest attempt to overhaul the existing immigration framework, arguing that EU member states are still reluctant to transfer decision-making responsibilities to the supranational level regarding what they consider a matter crucial to their national sovereignty.*

Keywords: European Union, immigration and asylum policies, migration crisis, securitisation.

Preliminary considerations

Europe has had a long history of being the final destination that millions of people throughout time have tried to reach in search of a better, more secure, more fulfilling life. As such, migration has been an integral part of the continent's history and, for better or worse, has shaped and transformed it in many different ways. It is clear that migration still shapes and transforms the contemporary European Union – but these days, more often than not, the omnipresent discussions and fears triggered by a "migration crisis" appear to transform it into a rather hostile environment designed to make life difficult for newcomers and to deter others from following suit. The term

"fortress Europe" has become an ubiquitous phrase in public discourse and the media, and its over-use can make one wonder whether the EU is gradually abandoning the liberal foundations it was built upon and is undergoing not just a migrant crisis, but crisis of immigration policies as well (Fekete 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). The idea of hospitality and welcoming strangers is now a deeply politicised issue on both sides of the Atlantic, as recent developments in the United States have shown.

While in the past, the relatively steady flow of migrants caused fairly little concern among governments and citizens alike, recent events – particularly the massive wave of refugees displaced by the turbulent events in the Middle and Greater Middle East (especially the Syrian civil war and the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict) – coupled with fears of terrorism and violence, have given rise to a visible "inward turn" in which Europe is gradually closing its doors and building up fences to keep "the other" out. The European Union legislation concerning migration and asylum reflects this historical evolution: earlier directives were designed to regulate the situation of those who came to European countries with a view to help them adapt and integrate as residents (especially following the large-scale labour recruitment programmes implemented by many Western European states after World War II), or to protect those who were given refugee status (Murray 2017). However, more recent measures and pieces of legislation reflect a clear influence of security concerns that dominate the agenda for EU immigration reform. The main steps in this process are analysed in the second section of the present article, while the third will examine the reasons and consequences of this securitisation of migration in the European Union. The concluding section will discuss the very recent legislative steps adopted in an attempt to kick-start a comprehensive reform and a few possible avenues for the future of the EU immigration system.

The issue of immigration is not likely to disappear from the European political agenda any time soon, given the current predictions concerning population growth, especially in the developing countries of the Global South (which means more and more people might be inclined to leave their countries of origin and become immigrants) (Balch 2016) and the worldwide level of instability and insecurity which often results in significant population displacement. Therefore, the focus of EU immigration policies starting with the mid-1990s had been on deterrence and on reducing the appeal of "pull" factors that represent incentives for migrants to undertake the often dangerous journey bringing them to Europe (such as economic opportunity) or to make life difficult for those who are already there, rather than designing policies to tackle the "push" factors

(i.e., the reasons why migrants leave their countries of origin), which would mean interfering in the internal affairs of other states (Balch 2016; Jünemann et al. 2017; Collier 2013).

This state of affairs is clearly demonstrated by the exodus of refugees who started arriving in Europe in the spring of 2015, fleeing from the devastation caused by conflicts in Syria, Libya and other parts of Africa and the Middle East. Interestingly enough, most of those who are nowadays fleeing war and destruction come from regions and countries indisputably shaped by the European states' colonial past (De Genova 2017; Geddes and Scholten 2016). These people often chose to embark on a very risky journey across the Mediterranean (which has become a water grave for thousands of them and their often makeshift vessels) in the hope that Europe will offer them a safe haven (Comte 2018); for many of them, this hope never materialised. In many instances, what they found instead was a hostile environment seemingly built on the principle of "enforcement by attrition" illustrated by an increasing use of deportation and detention of undocumented migrants (Balch 2016). This fact points to an growing level of public anxiety over immigration in both Europe and North America, evident in the figures revealed by the 2016 Transatlantic Trends Survey; these uncover an evident "perception-reality" gap regarding the number and types of immigrants; in other words, the levels of fear reported are not directly correlated to actual immigration realities and they are rather based on a kind of "imagined immigration" and on how it is perceived by the public (Balch 2016). This perception is often influenced by political discourse, especially the one coming from the far-right end of the spectrum, in which there is a clear "us" versus "them" dichotomy between the prosperity, rights and freedoms of European citizens and the barbarity of those who come to threaten this way of life and to partake in undeserved benefits.[1] The main targets of this "politics of fear" type of discourse (not confined to the realm of right-wing parties alone) are immigrants of Muslim origin who are seen as dangerous, subversive and backwards (Khory 2012). The same voices also habitually argue against the possibility of a uniform EU-wide immigration system, as they see immigration as a primarily

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[1] Given the current international political climate, much of the public hostility and fear is directed against immigrants of Muslim origin, who are seen as incapable of integration and prone to violence. In fact, former UK Prime Minister David Cameron argued at a security conference in Munich that the failure of Europe's Muslims to assimilate the values of host societies greatly increased the chances of terrorist attacks throughout the European Union (Khory 2012). This attitude is symptomatic for how many European leaders see Muslim identity as homogenous, transnational and profoundly resistant to change and integration. As early as 2011, German chancellor Angela Merkel was very clear about the failure of the so-called "multicultural policies" because of their over-emphasis on difference and diversity and too little focus on commonality (Geddes and Scholten 2016; O'Nions 2014).

domestic concern where state sovereignty should rule supreme. This attitude has so far paid off for far-right parties from the UK to Poland and Hungary, and from the Netherlands and Germany to Italy, judging by their electoral success and the support they enjoy among large segments of the population who embrace their challenge against the liberal political establishment (Jünemann et al. 2017).[2] One clear consequence of this fraught political and social environment is the emergence of the immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict. While before 2015, these two types of conflicts were mainly determined by economic conditions and the scarcity of resources in any given region, nowadays fear and reluctance stemming from ethnic differences are the main factors in the relations between migrants and citizens of host countries, while preventing migrants from accessing welfare benefits has taken a somewhat secondary position (Dancygier 2010; Korkut et al. 2013).

Over the last two decades, the European Union has tried to persuade states to harmonise their immigration and asylum policies, while at the same time, gradually adopting measures to manage and control migration flows, despite mounting evidence of a looming demographic crisis triggered by declining birth rates and an aging population (Fekete 2009; Lazaridis 2015). As a result, the skills-based recruitment programs for foreign workers (such as the Blue Card Directive) have been rather limited in scope and have not yielded significant results. In turn, EU member states have been reluctant to support a common immigration and asylum system primarily because of the impact of large-scale migration on three fundamental pillars of the nation-state: sovereign control over external borders, regulating the right to receive citizenship, and national identity (Koopmans et al. 2005). The rather limited paths of arriving legally in Europe have driven many migrants to resort to alternative means of making the journey, thus swelling the numbers of those labelled as illegal, irregular or undocumented migrants and making illegal migration a key feature of contemporary global migration (Düvell 2006).

The arrival of significantly large numbers of non-European, mostly Muslim migrants seems to have affected the unity of Europe by bringing once more to the surface the old fault lines between east, west and south (Samaddar 2017), and this is one of the reasons why consensus on an efficient set of immigration rules and policies has proven so difficult to achieve; other reasons include

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[2] One piece of evidence in this respect is the result of the Brexit referendum in the UK. Anti-immigration discourse and highlighting the dangers posed by migrants were core components of the "Leave" campaign's message (Comte 2018).

differences in the size and composition of the migrant population in different EU states and varied attitudes towards immigration and asylum (Wiesbrock 2016). As it turns out, it is currently much easier to erect physical barriers than to sit at the negotiation table: if this trend keeps up, Europe might soon have more borders than it did during the Cold War, with Greece and Bulgaria constructing fences on the border with Turkey, Hungary sealing off its border with Serbia, and Sweden fencing off platforms at Kastrup railway station in order to stem the flow of migrants from Denmark across the Oresund bridge (The Economist 2016).

European Union immigration law in historical perspective

The various meanings of citizenship (as a status, as a relation between political authority and citizens, or as a process for inclusion and exclusion) have been at the core of immigration politics in Europe.[3] EU migration policies include three major aspects: free movement for EU citizens within the single market, asylum policies, and immigrant policies that offer some social and legal rights to legally residing third country nationals (Geddes and Scholten 2016). In drafting immigration policy, the EU Commission and Parliament have tended to adopt a less securitised view on immigration, but their efforts have often been thwarted by national governments (Demeny 2006; Abdou 2016).

If, for many decades before World War II, Europe was an area of emigration, this situation changed dramatically after 1945, with successive waves of immigration altering the composition of population in various European states: between 1945 and 1975, most arrivals were done through labour recruitment programs, while after the mid-1970s, the focus shifted to family reunification, then to refugees and asylum seekers after 1990, to highly-skilled migrants from the 2000s onwards

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[3] I believe it useful to introduce here a distinction between immigration policies (dealing with regulation of migratory flows, border controls, the admission of foreign nationals, etc.) and immigrant policies, combining all the legal measures and administrative practices that govern the life of an immigrant in the host country (Martiniello 2006).

and, once more, to refugees starting with 2015.[4] The present section will focus on an overview of the main tenets of the EU's immigration regime, both in terms of migration for economic, study or family reunification purposes and asylum.

The postwar European economic boom led to a growing demand for labour force recruited mainly from developing countries (often former colonies) and Southern Europe. This system was regulated by association agreements and guest worker programmes, such as the one signed between Germany and Turkey. All these schemes were based on the idea of temporary migration, although at first the issuing of labour and residence permits was done on a fairly liberal basis (Martiniello 2006). However, the economic recession at the end of the 1960s and the first major oil crisis in 1973 marked the start of European legislation meant to restrict the flow of foreign workers so as to avoid a growth in domestic unemployment. One unintended consequence of these restrictions was that many temporary workers, for fear they might not be able to return if they went back to their countries of origin, became permanent settlers; in turn, over time, this led to an increase in the number of family migrants (Wiesbrock 2016). If, at first, the entry and residence conditions of migrant workers fell entirely in the responsibility of national governments, beginning with the late 1970s one can notice a gradual transition towards more cooperation among the EEC members in matters of migration and asylum policies. For instance, in 1968, the EEC adopted the first legal regulations concerning the freedom of movement of European workers (Council Directive 68/360/EEC; Martiniello 2006).

One of the first major European decisions affecting migration was the 1986 Single European Act, which created a single internal market where borders were abolished and free movement of people, goods, services and capital was guaranteed; consequently, this implied a closer cooperation in the area of domestic affairs, including migration and asylum policy (Wiesbrock 2016; Abdou

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[4] Despite these general continental trends, many European countries have had different experiences with migration: for instance, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had been major sending countries before turning into preferred destinations in the late 1970s and 1980s; nowadays, these Southern EU members are among the states with the largest migrant populations, primarily due to their Mediterranean location (Wiesbrock 2016; Roos 2013). Conversely, countries like Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark traditionally relied on guest worker programmes to address their labour shortages in the first three postwar decades, while former colonial empires such as Britain and France welcomed unskilled labour migrants from their former colonies. These diverse experiences account for a variety of approaches to immigrant integration, from forced assimilation (France) to multiculturalism (The Netherlands, Sweden) and segregationism (Germany, Austria). In terms of language, Britain and the Netherlands prefer the phrase "ethnic minorities", Germany refers to immigrants by their national origin, whereas in France one is reluctant to speak about immigrant minorities at all (Geddes and Scholten 2016).

2016). Moreover, the 1985 Schengen Agreement stipulated the abolishment of internal border controls among the original signatories of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (France, Germany, and the Benelux countries) (Abdou 2016). The field of internal affairs was transformed into one of European policymaking after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; ever since, progress in adopting a common European framework has been slow, given the reluctance of member states to relinquish control over matters considered to be at the heart of state sovereignty. Before the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU was not able to adopt legally binding directives in the area of justice and home affairs, but the new treaty established an area of "freedom, security and justice" and gave the European Council the clear legal basis to adopt measures concerning asylum and immigration, including illegal immigration and the repatriation of undocumented migrants (Wiesbrock 2016, p. 163; Abdou 2016). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty abolished the former pillar structure and unified all matters of visas, asylum and immigration (formerly under the first pillar) with those of police and judicial cooperation (formerly under the third pillar); it also expanded the co-decision procedure to cover measures on legal migration (Abdou 2016).

Since the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has developed its immigration and asylum policies according to five-year multi-annual programmes. Following the European Council meeting at Tampere in October 1999, the leaders of the member states agreed on the adoption of the so-called "Tampere Programme" through which the EU could adopt measures in four policy-making fields pertaining to immigration and asylum: partnerships with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals and management of migration flows (Wiesbrock 2016; Balch 2016). The initial momentum following the Tampere Council was stopped by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which confirmed, to a certain extent, that the vulnerability of the western world stemmed from porous borders, generous entry policies and violation of terms of access (Lazaridis 2015); afterwards, the focus of EU policies shifted to combating illegal immigration and strengthening border controls, which further delayed the adoption of common policy instruments.

The 2004 Hague Programme on migration was much more security-focused than its predecessor, also considering the fact that Europe itself was being confronted with its own terrorist threats (Eisele 2016); it also provided for the cooperation with UNHCR to improve the protection of refugees. In 2005, the EU heads of state and government launched the Global Approach to Migration designed to ensure an in-depth dialogue, close cooperation and partnerships with third

countries in matters of migration and asylum.[5] This initiative became the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011, which also covered international protection and asylum for third country refugees in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Eisele 2016). A key feature of GAMM are mobility partnerships, i.e., non legally-binding declarations between various EU member states and third countries, based on the specific needs of the third country and the EU's interests in the region.[6]

In July 2008, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy proclaimed the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, endorsed by the European Council two months later. The document includes several Commission proposals for a common EU immigration policy and puts forward five basic commitments: managing legal migration, a renewed fight against irregular migration, a common European asylum system, effective border control through FRONTEX and cooperation mechanisms with third countries. The Commission established a system for monitoring the implementation of the pact based on input from member states (Eisele 2016; Korkut et al. 2013).

In December 2009, the EU Council adopted a new multi-annual policy programme designed to cover the period 2010-2014, the Stockholm Programme, whose aim was to balance security concerns with respecting fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Charter of Human Rights. The programme highlights the need to fight against illegal immigration and trans-border criminality, while at the same time facilitating legal access channels to the EU territory (Wiesbrock 2016; Eisele 2016).

The current legal basis for the regulation of migration and asylum policy in the European Union is Title V of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The EU seeks to promote economic liberalisation and free movement for its own citizens, while at the same time strictly regulating the entry of non-EU nationals; this became evident during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, when several EU states reinstated ad hoc border controls to stop the flow of people across the Union (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Despite adopting a number of instruments regarding the two policy areas, member states are still the main deciding factors in matters of admitting

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[5] Under GAM, the first priority was given to the Mediterranean region and to Africa, and in 2007 the agreement was expanded to cover the eastern and south-eastern regions of Europe, including Turkey, the West Balkan states, the European Neighbourhood Policy partners in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, as well as Middle Eastern ENP partners, Central Asian countries and other Asian sending states. The particular emphasis of the GAM was fight against illegal immigration.

[6] So far, mobility partnerships have been concluded with Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Morocco.

foreigners and regulating the conditions of their stay. So far, relatively little has been accomplished in the development of a common immigration policy that would regulate the conditions for admission and residence, for issuing visas and long-tern residence permits, the rights of legal third-country nationals and freedom of movement and residence in another member state. The most important directives adopted until now regard family reunification (September 2003; Council Directive 2003/86/EC), long-term residence status (November 2003; Council Directive 2003/109/EC), students and researchers (December 2004; EU Directive 2016/801), and highly skilled workers (May 2009; Council Directive 2009/50/EC) (Lyons and Huegle 2010). All these directives have come under criticism for various reasons.

The family reunification directive merely outlines minimum standards, thus grating member states a wide margin of discretion on how these standards should be incorporated into national law; these may impose age and financial resources and integration (such as a language or civic knowledge test) limitations on third-country nationals who wish to join immediate family members residing in an EU country, which, in turn, may contravene to article 8 of the ECHR that guarantees the right to family life (Roos 2013). The long-term residence status directive grants third country nationals with a legal and continuous five-year residence in EU countries the right to long-term residence provided some conditions are met, such as stable and sufficient resources and health insurance (Geddes and Scholten 2016; Roos 2013). Those who qualify are also granted protection against expulsion, access to employment and social security. However, the directive includes considerable restrictions to the extent of rights granted to long-term residents compared to the rights given to internal migrants who are citizens of EU member states.

The directive on students and researchers defines the rights of third country nationals who were accepted by a higher education institution in an EU member state, such as the right of free movement to other member states and the right to part-time employment (Roos 2013). The admission of researchers from outside the EU is also facilitated, especially if they are involved in research projects with EU partner institutions. Criticism against this directive stems from the fact that, under its current provisions, universities and research organizations are given a key role in the admission procedure (Wiesbrock 2016).

Regulating economic migration has probably been the most controversial aspect of the common EU policy on migration, precisely because the admission of foreign workers is a very sensitive issue at national level, where oftentimes they are perceived as a threat to the job security

and income of state citizens. In 2007, the European Commission introduced a "sectoral approach" legislation meant to regulate the entry and residence of distinctive categories of labour migrants: highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, remunerated trainees and intra-corporate transferees (Roos 2013). In December 2011, a directive establishing a unified application procedure for single work and residence permits for third country nationals and a common set of rules for third-country workers legally residing in a member state was adopted.

The directive on highly skilled workers, known as the Blue Card directive, was adopted in May 2009. Those who are eligible under its provisions receive a residence permit for between one and four years and a considerable minimum salary, yet it does not establish a firm legal clarity, certainty and predictability (given that this is a temporary scheme) in terms of national legislative procedures (Wiesbrock 2016; Geddes and Scholten 2016; Lazaridis 2015; Orrenius and Zavodny 2016). Member states still maintain control over the number of highly skilled workers on their territory. Two more recent EU legal instruments on labour migration are the directives on seasonal workers (February 2014) and intra-corporate transferees (May 2014). The former is expressly aimed at preventing temporary workers from becoming permanent, while giving member states considerable discretion concerning the volume of admission and the rejection of applications. The latter makes it easier for multinational corporations to temporarily transfer highly skilled employees to branches inside the European Union.

These directives have been criticised from a human rights perspective because they seem to be based on an "utilitarian approach" to immigration that considers the economic needs of the receiving country (Roos 2013). Moreover, the provisions they include are unlikely to make the EU an attractive destination for highly skilled workers, students and researchers, because their stay is limited in scope and they enjoy a small number of rights. Nevertheless, the fact that member states were able to commonly agree on these six directives, despite immigration being an unlikely case of EU integration, should represent a solid starting point for future legislative regulations and may point to the fact that, even though the nation state is not disappearing, it is changing (Roos 2013; Abdou 2016).

One of the fundamental objectives of a common European immigration policy is to combat the threat of illegal migration[7] by developing an effective removal and repatriation procedure and discouraging illegal employment. This policy shift is especially visible after 2001, when migration ceased to be a matter of "low politics" and became instead a question of "high politics involving national security" (Lazaridis 2015, p. 34). So far, the main EU instruments dealing with illegal migration have been the Return Directive, readmission agreements and the sanctions against employers directive (2009/52/EC). The Return Directive was adopted in December 2008 (2008/115/EC) and provides minimum standards and procedures at EU level for returning the immigrants found illegally staying on the territory of a member state to their country of origin or to a country of transit. Those who fail to voluntarily comply with the return decision of a member state are subject to forcible removal or detention, accompanied by an entry ban of up to five years. This directive has been heavily criticised for its minimum standards approach that grants a lot of discretion to member states (Wiesbrock 2016).

Readmission agreements are concluded with third countries based on the reciprocity of admitting their own nationals who do not fulfil the conditions for entry or residence on the territory of the requesting state (Eisele 2016). So far, the EU has concluded readmission agreements with numerous states; however, these instruments are controversial, as they raise concerns about the human rights protection of the individuals who are readmitted, because the EU effectively hands over responsibility in this area to a third party, especially since the agreements contain no provisions on supervision or monitoring of they way in which the retuning migrants are treated.

The directive on sanctions against employers was adopted in June 2009 and contains a general prohibition against employing illegally staying third country nationals. Thus, the issue of controlling access to employment is given over to employers and may discourage them from employing third country nationals for fear these might present them with false work permits and identity papers.

Another long-standing aim of EU policies has been strengthening external border control and surveillance, especially considering that the Schengen system means that internal borders among

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[7] Illegal immigration can take a variety of forms, from illegally entering the territory of a member state by sea, land or air, using false documents or organised crime networks to entering with a legal visa and overstaying, or to unsuccessful asylum seekers who fail to leave the EU after receiving a final negative decision. For more details about the various types of illegal migrants, see Düvell 2006, pp. 15-16.

its member states are abolished. The responsibility for protecting the external frontiers of the Schengen system has been given over to FRONTEX, an agency that supports member states in securing external frontiers, trains border guards and assists in joint return operations, but can only act upon request, or in cooperation with member states (Lazaridis 2015). The surveillance of the Schengen borders is done through the Schengen Information System (SIS I and II) and Visa Information System (VIS) (Geddes and Scholten 2016).[8]

As far as the asylum policies of the European Union are concerned, their legal basis is the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees; over the past three decades, the EU has developed a system designed to ensure the protection of those who arrive in Europe as refugees and qualify for receiving asylum (Cherubini 2015). Initially, this system was one of intergovernmental cooperation, but later on, EU institutions were given more responsibility in the field of asylum policy (Karamanidou 2015). This system was tested to the limit during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis and it has revealed a number of significant flaws. Following the massive influx of people coming into Europe in the period in question, there was a relatively widespread perception among European citizens that the newly arrived were little more than economic migrants who would not qualify for entry under the regular immigration system and was thus bypassing them by using the asylum route (O'Nions 2014).[9]

The Treaty of Amsterdam moved asylum from the third to the first EU treaty pillar, while the Treaty of Lisbon definitely communitarised the asylum policy field (Cherubini 2015); since its adoption, a number of legislative pieces have been passed, mostly based on the minimum standards approach and burden-sharing among EU member states. As in the case of immigration legislation described above, the main focus of these measures was to prevent irregular migration, the abuse of the asylum system and the strengthening of the borders. The common European asylum system was to be introduced in two stages: first, the national legal frameworks would be harmonised and then, higher common standards of protection at the level of the EU would be adopted (Wiesbrock

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[8] SIS aims at identifying people who are a potential threat to the security of the EU by allowing member states to exchange information about third country nationals considered inadmissible, while the VIS is a system for the exchange of visa information among member states. The EU visa policy operates with a "positive" and "negative" list, the latter containing a large number of mostly Muslim and developing states; this has been criticised as a measure of keeping the "undesirables" out (Wiesbrock 2016).

[9] If one is to admit this assumption to be true, then it begs the question, why did all these people wait until 2015 to come to Europe, if they were not refugees forced to flee war and conflict, but simply migrants in search of a better life?

2016). The Tampere conclusions also included a commitment on the part of member states towards the establishment of a Common European Asylum System, a commitment reaffirmed by the Hague Programme (Martiniello 2006; Fekete 2009; O'Nions 2014; Geddes and Scholten 2016). The current CEAS has four components: the Dublin III Regulation, minimum standards for reception and detention, minimum standards for processing asylum claims, minimum standards for granting or withdrawing refugee status (Balch 2016). Although the harmonisation of asylum policies was officially declared complete by 2012, recent events have revealed the need for a reconsideration of current asylum regulations.

The main pillar of international refugee law is that of non-refoulement, which means that neither refugees nor asylum applicants can be returned ("refouled") to any territory (including that of their country of origin) where their life or liberty would be endangered (Craig 2013; O'Nions 2014; Cherubini 2015; Hassouri 2017).[10] The most important EU legislative instruments regarding asylum policies include the Dublin Regulations (the first one signed in 1990, it entered into force in 1997), the directive on the reception of asylum seekers, a directive on the qualification of refugees and another on procedural standards, all of which have gone through several revisions (Vink 2005).

In June 2013, the EU adopted an asylum package containing some changes to the asylum legislation (Wiesbrock 2016). This package includes the Dublin III regulation replacing the Dublin II Convention of February 2003, which determines the state responsible for processing asylum applications and is meant to prevent the secondary movement of asylum seekers through Europe (Martiniello 2006; O'Nions 2014; Cherubini 2015; Geddes and Scholten 2016): according to its legal provisions, an asylum seeker must file a claim with the state authorities of the EU member state in which he/she first arrived. The purpose of this regulation is to prevent the so-called "asylum shopping" by which asylum applicants would seek to file their claim in the EU member state with the most favourable asylum system (Craig 2013; Cherubini 2015). This system, however, is not without criticism: as the 2015-2016 events have shown, the southern European countries (primarily Greece and Italy) which, under the Dublin regulations, would have been responsible for processing hundreds of thousands of asylum applications for the people arriving on their shores, were simply too overwhelmed and often allowed refugees to travel further without examining their asylum

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[10] This principle is enshrined both in the 1951 Refugee Convention and in the European Charter of Human Rights.

claims (Murray 2017)[11] so that their case would be examined in another member state where their request would be treated according to different standards.[12] If this should happen, the state where the asylum claim is filed has the obligation to transfer the applicant to the state in which he/she first arrived, so that their application can be processed there – which means that the states least able to deal with massive numbers of refugees find themselves placed under a disproportionate burden (O'Nions 2014). This situation raised serious questions about the principle of uniform processing of asylum claims throughout the EU (Wiesbrock 2016). However, unlike the previous Dublin regulations, the 2013 one expressly stipulates that a member state cannot transfer a person to another member state if there is a risk the subject would endure inhumane or degrading treatment.[13]

A directive adopted in January 2013 is the one on the minimal standards for the reception of asylum seekers, applicable to anyone who files an asylum claim in the territory of a member state (2013/33/EU). Eligible asylum seekers have the following rights: receiving information about their benefits and obligations they must observe while their application is processed; receiving a document certifying their status; maintaining family unity; receiving medical attention on public health grounds; access to education for minor children; freedom of movement within the territory of the state; conditional access to employment – although this right is not universally guaranteed, but depends on national regulations (Wiesbrock 2016; O'Nions 2014; Cherubini 2015).[14] The directive also contains more detailed rules on the detention of asylum seekers, but fails to establish uniform conditions for detention: for instance, detention for asylum seekers in Germany is an exceptional occurrence, while all claimants arriving in Malta are routinely sent to detention centres, except for those with special needs.

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[11] In fact, five southern European countries, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Italy and Spain have called for the urgent revision of the Dublin system to include a suspension of transfers to states facing considerable pressure on their national asylum systems (Geddes and Scholten 2016).

[12] An illustration of this reality is the fact that, prior to the 2015 refugee crisis, the percentage of asylum claims approved annually was 84% in Finland, 51% in the Netherlands and only 2% in Spain (Cherubini 2015).

[13] During the 2015-2016 crisis, about 80% of all refugees arrived through Greece, where the functioning of the asylum system was known to be deficient, especially as far as reception conditions and processing procedures were concerned. This fact reinforced the idea that main aim of the Dublin system is the transfer mechanism between states and a deflection of refugees, not a fair determination of protection needs (O'Nions 2014; Craig 2013).

[14] The directive allows a one-year delay in access to the labour market; after this period, the member state must grant employment access subject to national conditions.

The revised Procedures Directive, also adopted in June 2013 (2013/32/EU), stipulates minimal procedural standards for the processing of international protection applications, rules and guarantees for examining asylum claims, as well as procedures for the withdrawal of refugee status, which must be based on a single procedure. Procedural guarantees include the right to access the procedure, to legal assistance, to remain on the territory of the member state until a decision is made and receive a motivated decision on the asylum claim (Cherubini 2015). The most problematic aspect of this directive is that it includes the concept of so-called "safe countries" where the applicant might be returned to if he/she receives a negative decision, i.e. any country to which the asylum seeker might have a connection and that respects the principle of non-refoulement and fundamental human rights. Moreover, member states have the right to refuse the examination of an asylum claim if the applicant comes from a country designated as safe by the European Council or by member states, which are allowed to draft their own lists of safe third countries (O'Nions 2014).[15] In practice, the problems stems from the fact that there is no procedure to review the classification of a third country as "safe" (Wiesbrock 2016).

The Qualifications Directive was adopted in 2011 (2011/95/EU) and it sets out the criteria for recognizing persons in need of international protection and the type of protection granted. It also includes a distinction between a refugee and someone eligible for subsidiary protection, as the two types are granted differential treatment; the definition of a refugee is borrowed from the 1951 Geneva Convention, while a person eligible for subsidiary protection is "any other third country national or stateless person in respect to whom there are substantial grounds to believe that the person would face real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country or origin or country of habitual residence" (Wiesbrock 2016, p. 179).

In recent years, there have been sustained efforts, especially on the part of individual member states, to export or externalise the burden-sharing regarding refugees beyond the borders of the Union through various arrangements such as readmission, external processing and resettlement (Karamanidou 2015; Geiger 2016). However, if the responsibility for determining refugee status

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[15] The current European list of safe countries includes Albania, Jamaica, Republic of Korea, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, South Africa, Ukraine, India, and Bosnia Herzegovina, Mauritius, Peru, Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Malawi, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone. One of the main objections against the practice of member states creating their own lists of safe third countries or safe countries of origin is that it affords them too much discretion.

and processing asylum claims is transferred to a third country, this raises serious concerns in terms of accountability and the protection of human rights. Readmission agreements are designed to ensure cooperation over the return of illegal migrants and thus combat illegal immigration and reinforce border control. External processing, modelled on the Australian "Pacific Solution", means processing asylum claims away from the destination state, which keeps both the applicant away from the host state and the latter away from its legal obligations. Resettlement has been promoted by the EU Commission and the UNHCR as a lasting solution to refugee protection: under this scheme, refugees can be transferred to another state identified on the basis of family, educational or cultural ties to the applicant or other demonstrable links (Fekete 2009; O'Nions 2014).

While more progress has been achieved, in comparison to immigration policy, in creating a common European asylum policy, there is still some way to go before the full implementation of uniform procedures (Cherubini 2015; Craig 2013); as it is, the system is still undermined by state practices that continue enjoy a wide margin of discretion largely focused on preventing irregular migration (which shows that, in the states' view, asylum is just another channel of irregular migration), since most, if not all the directives adopted so far fail to detach refugee protection from immigration control and therefore reinforce the securitization of asylum policy and the deflection of refugees rather than their acceptance (Craig 2013). A truly efficient asylum policy in the European Union needs to be liberated from the current state in which it serves two masters, often with opposed views and interests.

The contemporary securitisation of EU migration policy

Regarding migration as having security implications has always been a characteristic of European Union policies, especially after the Schengen Agreement (where it appeared rather marginally), which abolished the internal borders among the signatory states, entered into force (Squire 2015), but it was only after 9/11 and the subsequent waves of terrorist attacks carried out throughout western Europe that it has emerged as a prominent concern behind any attempt to reform the European immigration system whose failings have been highlighted by the 2015-2016 migrant and refugee crisis. The framing of migration in terms of security influences several political issues, such as the one of citizenship, the relationship between EU nationals and third country nationals, and the relation of the EU to its external environment (Munster 2009). The

following section will examine how migration has been securitised in the past few years and what its contemporary implications are (Karamanidou 2015).

The constant calls for a greater securitisation of migration policies, especially coming from increasingly popular far-right political parties, has not created a safer Europe, but rather a society that lives in constant fear, never knowing where the next attack might come from, a society where ethnic groups (especially those of Muslim origin) feel scapegoated and excluded (Lazaridis and Wadia 2015; Amelina et al. 2016). The European public discourse is practically dominated these days by a constant reiteration of the connection between migration and terrorism, based on the fact that most of the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, etc. were European nationals of immigrant descent (Squire 2015; Pickel 2018; Murray 2017).[16] An indicator of how influential this type is discourse is lies in the fact that recent Eurobarometer polls have consistently shown that European citizens consider immigration to be the most important issue facing the EU in all member states; a majority of 58% of all respondents listed immigration among their top two concerns (Welsh 2016), which basically shows that what started out as a temporary migrant crisis has now become the new normal across the EU.

The three main pillars of this type of discourse are "bogus' asylum seekers, illegal migrants, and criminals, all of whom profit from Europe's liberal policies to undermine the western way of life by affecting national identity and threatening the economic, social and political stability of the host state (Lazaridis 2015; Martiniello 2006). The criminalisation of migration is visible in the recourse to traditional criminal law procedures against migrants, such as surveillance and detention, and through various mechanisms of prevention and pre-emption (Mitsilegas 2015). The portrayal of migrants in the political discourse, as well as in the media, has also marked a renewed significance of the religious factor in a previously strongly secularised Europe (Schmiedel and Smith 2018).[17]

There are four major scenarios according to which the migration-security nexus threat plays out: first, fear of a massive flux of irregular migration that puts enormous pressure on the borders

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[16] The November 2015 Paris attacks and the subsequent March 2016 Brussels attacks were linked to predominantly the Moroccan and Algerian Molenbeek district in Brussels, labelled by many European newspapers as „Europe's jihadi central" (De Genova 2017).

[17] This revival, however, is rather ambiguous, because, on the one hand, Christian arguments have been invoked to save the identity of Europe by accepting migrants, and on the other, to save the identity of Europe by rejecting them (Schmiedel and Smith 2018).

of the receiving state; second, fear of a major imbalance between immigrant and existing minority groups in the host country that are often exaggerated to create the impression that migrants profit from the welfare policies of the host state; third, fear of the inability of the migrants to integrate, which leads to the creation of "parallel societies" with little to no interaction with the mainstream; fourth, fear of terrorist attacks (Lazaridis 2015). Moreover, illegal migrants may also be seen as burden for the relations between their country of origin and the host country, since they might be instrumentalised by their host government against the sending government (Martiniello 2006; Volkel 2017).

Recent developments in the field of asylum and migration policies have been guided almost exclusively by security concerns: the creation of FRONTEX,[18] the SIS I and II systems, the VIS, the EURODAC (the EU asylum fingerprint database), the externalisation of asylum and migration policies[19] through third country agreements under GAMM are all examples of viewing migration through the lens of security and the threats it might pose (Karamanidou 2015; O'Nions 2014; Mitsilegas 2015; Scheel 2017).[20] The practices of detention and deportation of migrants who are already within the EU territory single them out as threats that must be removed so that order and security can be restored; both practices have a long history of controlling "undesirable" populations and groups and casting them as political and social enemies.[21]

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[18] By engaging in joint operations of border surveillance and control, deportation flights, research and risk analysis, all of which are central to the securitised management of migration in the EU, FRONTEX becomes part of what amounts to "preventive refoulement" operations.

[19] One relevant example of externalisation is the EU-Turkey refugee deal signed in March 2016, by which, for every irregular migrant sent back to Turkey, the EU undertakes the obligation to host a corresponding number of qualified asylum applicants. So far, this agreement has been successful in reducing the immigrant flood to a trickle, but it has also been beset with problems and mutual accusations of breaching the terms of the deal. The final text of the EU-Turkey deal signed in March 2016 is visibly rooted in the idea that undocumented migrants are primarily seen as a security threat rather than a humanitarian crisis.

[20] Securitisation is a process that involves both discursive elements and social practices: according to the Copenhagen School, securitisation designates various issues as security threats through "speech acts" implying the shared understanding among political elites and the public as to what constitutes a security threat; this threat is based on the construction of opposing identities – in this case, an "us" (European citizens) versus "them" (migrants) locked in violent battle for survival (Munster 2009; Karamanidou 2015).

[21] The detention and deportation regime has been expanded after 2000 and a 2001 Directive on the Mutual Recognitions of Decisions of the Expulsion of Third Country Nationals (2001/40/EC) allowed the reinforcement of an expulsion decision by one member state on the territory of another member state (Karamanidou 2015). The detention and deportation of migrants stem from a securitisation logic that places their subjects outside the legal protection afforded to other categories of people and, rather than being an exceptional occurrence, they have become the norm in the securitised approach to migration.

Removing migrants from the EU territory appears to be a political priority for EU member states, because they wish to be perceived as being in control of their borders – a fact made clear by the Return Directive discussed in the previous section, which aims to speedily remove migrants, while at the same time legitimising the criminalisation of migration by allowing member states to detain migrants (Mitsilegas 2015; Balch 2016). As such, more often than not, this highly securitised approach might come in contradiction with the EU as an "area of freedom, security and justice" and with human rights commitments (Munster 2009). Moreover, the considerable recent financial investment in border protection might not actually reduce the number of migrants who intend to cross them, but have the opposite effect: it will probably make them resort to even more dangerous options to find a way through, options that are reduced to clandestine and increasingly criminalised routes.[22] This fact places refugees and asylum seekers in virtually the same category as economic migrants and complicates the differentiation among categories within these mixed migration flows (Welsh 2016).

The many thousands of death among migrants who tried to cross the Mediterranean in 2015-2016 bear witness to this argument and have prompted Brussels officials, invoking humanitarian concerns, to find a solution to this problem[23] while at the same time trying not to jeopardize the security of the EU's external borders, which has been a point emphasised time and again by the governments of the member states (Völkel 2017; Geddes and Scholten 2016). These attempts have revealed a significant difference between migration-related practices (mostly supported by member state representatives in the EU Council) and migration-related discourses (mostly coming from the Commission and the European Parliament).

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[22] For instance, while it is true that the EU-Turkey deal considerably reduced the number of migrants coming via the Aegean Sea and Turkey, there was a visible increase the number of migrants (and deaths) on the dangerous route from Libya to Italy (Traub 2016).

[23] The EU has launched a series of measures to prevent human trafficking networks from bringing more migrants into Europe and to save those who are in distress: the 2014 FRONTEX Triton mission and the EU Naval Force Operation Sophia (established after 700 migrants drowned off the coast of Italian island Lampedusa); while thousands have been saved through these missions, these search and rescue acts may have also encouraged the very actions they were trying to combat and prompted migrants to try crossing the sea in unsuitable vessels, knowing there is a good chance of them being saved by EU patrolling ships. Moreover, faced with the growing number of deaths caused by the perilous Mediterranean crossing, German chancellor Angela Merkel announced in September 2015 that the Dublin system was suspended and that Germany would welcome any refugees arriving in the country, regardless of the number. This added to the state of chaos, because many hundreds of thousands of migrants tried to make the journey north by crossing several EU member states where their presence caused significant political and social turmoil (Schmiedel and Schmidt 2018; Murray 2017).

The European Asylum Directive and the European Asylum Support Office have proven rather inefficient in combating the practical view that access routes to Europe should be kept as narrow as possible, mainly because most decisions on migration policy are made in the Justice and Home Affairs Council consisting of the member states' ministers of interior and justice (Völkel 2017). A case in point is the recently adopted European Agenda on Migration of May 2015, whose first two pillars to improve migration management express a point of view clearly rooted in securitisation: "reduction of incentives for irregular migration and improvement in border management with the aim of securing borders and saving lives". The other two main ideas are the strengthening of the common EU asylum policy and establishing new approaches to legal migration (Völkel 2017, p. 87).

Following the 2015-2016 refugee and migrant crisis, many EU member states (Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and Sweden) started reintroducing temporary border controls that undermined one of the major achievements of European integration, the Schengen agreement (De Genova 2017; Lehne 2018). In addition, in September 2015, the countries of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia) vehemently opposed the scheme of relocating 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU countries based on a quota system, which meant that this measure was very difficult to implement and only 20,000 people of the total refugee number were actually relocated (Geddes and Scholten 2016; Grigonis 2016). This measure was part of a wider set under the European Commission's Agenda for Migration, proposed in May 2015, designed to comprehensively deal with the migration crisis; this included the proposals for the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard (to supplement the existing EUROSUR, European Border Surveillance System, created in 2013) and devoting more emergency funds to cover the costs entailed by these measures.

In 2016, the Commission once again proposed a small change to the core Dublin regulation: although the point of entry would still determine which state was responsible for handling the asylum claim, in case a state faced a disproportionate number of asylum seekers, a "corrective allocation mechanism" would facilitate the transfer of applicants to states facing a lesser burden (Lehne 2018, 3). This proposal divided EU states into those who believed the Union should uphold its humanitarian commitments and those who felt that an obligatory quota system was unfair and that the solution was a stronger control of the external borders, and was eventually scraped. The

inability to agree on this measure revealed once more a vast difference in capability among member states, as well as deficits in trust and cooperation.

In early 2016, the European Commission announced the proposal of reforming the Common European Asylum System, and especially its Dublin component (Grigonis 2016), which was supposed to be completed by December of that year. However, the inability to agree of a reform framework meant that the proposed comprehensive revision was postponed until the European Council of June 2018 (to which I will refer in the concluding section of the present article) and that measures finally adopted represented relatively minor changes to the previous provisions. In October 2017, the EU Council President Donald Tusk set the first half of 2018 (under the Bulgarian presidency) as the deadline to finalise the package of EU asylum reforms, following a series of meetings under the Maltese and Estonian presidencies where little progress was achieved (Lehne 2018). The only notable progress was the reform of the EU's asylum support agency EASO, based in Malta, tasked with monitoring how states implement EU asylum standards and rules (Nielsen 2017). The attempt by the Maltese presidency to broker a Dublin reform by which states opposed to accepting migrants would be able to trade off technical and financial support instead of hosting asylum seekers was a failure, as were attempts to revisit the reception conditions directive (where the main contentious point was the matter of access to the labour market), the qualifications regulation and the asylum procedures directive. However, despite such setbacks, the EU commissioner for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, declared in May 2017 that an agreement on the reform of the Dublin System could be achieved within a few months, admitting that the current system was unfair in terms of burden-sharing (Barigazzi 2017).

In November 2017, the European Parliament, which decried the lack of common solutions and condemned the practice of externalising borders by singing deals with Turkey or Libya, took the initiative and supported a reform of the Dublin system with a large cross-party majority. The EP insisted that this reform should take the form of a package approach to prevent member states from "cherry picking" which aspects they wish to discuss and which to ignore (EURACTIV 2018). In December 2017, the Commission put forward a road map for reaching an agreement on a comprehensive package of migration reforms by the summer of 2018 – most likely, at the European Union Summit in June 2018.

4. Concluding remarks: (small) steps towards reform and prospects for the future

A series of findings presented at a June 2017 conference organised by the European Social Survey and the Migration Policy Group revealed that 72% of Europeans of all ages, education levels and political orientations, support a fair allocation of refugees based on the country's reception capacity (population size, GDP, employment rate, number of asylum applications) and regardless of its economic situation; a majority of them (56%) remain in favour of proportional allocation even though this method could very well increase the number of asylum seekers present in their country (Huddleston and Mikaba 2017). These findings reveal a wide gap between opposing political attitudes (especially in some member states such as Hungary, which has been adamant in its refusal to accept any refugees on its territory) and more tolerant public perceptions – a gap that mirrors the divide at EU level between supranational institutions and member state governments.

The twelfth-hour agreement on immigration reform reached at the EU summit on June 28-29, 2018 is an attempt to bridge this gap and to avert a crisis that would have further destabilised the Union by throwing one of its backbones – Germany – into political chaos. Two weeks before the summit, chancellor Merkel's Bavarian government partners, the CSU, gave her what amounted to a political ultimatum: formulate a convincing reform plan that would reduce migration into Germany or they would abandon the coalition with Merkel's CDU and force her either to lead a minority government or resign (Saltz 2018; Carter 2018). Faced with dire circumstances, the German chancellor and her traditional partner, French president Emmanuel Macron, met before the Brussels summit to draft a list of proposals to be discussed during the official meeting of heads of state and government, which included a streamlined and more fair migrant distribution system among EU member states, as well as plans to strengthen the borders and target the causes of migration (Rickman 2018).

Events occurring days before the June EU summit showed that, although the scale of migration into Europe is only a fraction of what it was at the height of the crisis in the summer of 2015, the problem is far from being resolved: Italy's new far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini refused to allow the migrant rescue ship Aquarius, carrying 141 migrants from Libya and Eritrea, including 67 children, to dock in an Italian harbour, declaring that his country would not take in any more

migrants.[24] Eventually, the ship was finally allowed to dock in Malta and France, Germany, Portugal, Luxembourg and Spain agreed to each take in a share of its passengers. This incident clearly showed that the idea of burden-sharing, which the Commission hoped would be the basis for the reform of the asylum system, was not welcomed by countries like Austria, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Czech Republic, whereas France, Germany or Spain still insisted on the need for a common solution (Carter 2018).

Under those circumstances, Angela Merkel characterised the summit as the "make or break" moment for the European Union, while Hungarian Prime Minister Orban, in keeping with his earlier positions, declared that "the main issue is not migration, the issue is democracy in Europe" (Reuters 2018). The key issue to be dealt with at the summit was the reform of the Dublin regulation in such a way as to ease the pressure on southern EU countries and avoid the much-maligned mandatory refugee quotas. Many of the previous Commission and Parliament proposals were discussed during the long and difficult negotiation process that eventually proved to be conducive to a compromise, since nearly everyone, in the words of an unnamed EU diplomat, "was almost equally unhappy with them" (Baczynksa 2018).

The final text of the agreement – which is more a reaffirmation of earlier principles than a comprehensive reform of any kind – was agreed after marathon negotiations on June 29, 2018. Its main points include: a commitment on the part of Commission to "continue and reinforce policy to prevent a return to the uncontrolled flows of 2015 and to further stem illegal migration on all existing and emerging routes"; an intensification of efforts to stop smuggling networks operating on the central Mediterranean route, especially from Libya and a support for Italy in this respect, including in matters of voluntary resettlement; efforts to fully implement the migrant deal with Turkey through the readmission agreement and bilateral readmission agreements so as to prevent new crossings from Turkey; cooperation with partners in the Western Balkans to prevent the development of new land routes, illegal immigration and increase border protection; a new approach based on shared member state actions for the disembarkation of those who are saved in search and rescue operations through regional disembarkation platforms outside the EU in cooperation with the UNHCR or the International Organisation for Migration; those who are saved

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[24] Following elections in both Italy and Hungary in the first half of 2018, strong far-right anti-immigration parties assumed (or re-assumed, in Hungary's case) power in both countries, which proves that nationalistic anti-immigration discourse has not lost its appeal with voters.

on the EU territory become the responsibility of member states through a shared effort and transferred to controlled centres in various member states on a voluntary basis so that it could be swiftly determined whether they are irregular migrants who are subject to return or refugees in genuine need of international protection; the allocation of the second tranche of financial aid to Turkey under the 2016 migrant deal; a closer partnership with Africa to prevent migration through a substantial economic and social transformation of the continent; a more significant external migration component; more financial support for member states to ensure effective control of the EU's external borders; the need for member states to take all necessary and legislative steps to counter secondary movements of asylum seekers among them and to cooperate with one another in that respect; more resources and an enhanced mandate for FRONTEX; the need to find a consensus for the reform of the Dublin Regulation based on "a balance of responsibility and solidarity", taking into account the progress made up to that point; the need to find a speedy solution to the entire reform package that the Council should adopt "as soon as possible" (CNN 2018; Blanchard and Kirkegaard 2018).

Based on the points listed above, it is evident that the measures agreed upon do not, in any way, represent the "comprehensive migration reform" that several EU officials had announced; if anything, they are a reaffirmation of earlier principles included in already approved pieces of legislation and, ultimately, an agreement for further talks with no clear deadline in sight. Probably the most important part of the new "migration deal" (as it was labelled by the press) was the one concerning relocation and resettlement to controlled centres on the territory of member states, which would be done on a strict voluntary basis, "without prejudice to the Dublin reform". This clearly indicates that the previous idea of quota relocation was abandoned in an effort to accommodate the position of countries vehemently opposed to it.

While the text agreed in Brussels in June 2018 does indicate some small progress on the path to an effective reform of the EU's migration and asylum system, it also reveals that the securitisation of the migration issue is probably stronger than ever, since many of the provisions included in the final draft discuss aspects such as border control, prevention of illegal migration and cooperation with third countries in matters of readmission and tackling the root causes of

migration.[25] If anything, the migration compromise is designed to set in motion the much-needed effective reforms to the EU's fragile immigration system. Any such reforms must be based on two pillars: efficient control over the Union's external borders and a new set of internal rules. As far as the former is concerned, the bases have been laid at the recent summit, yet FRONTEX should be given responsibility over the regional disembarkation platforms and it should cooperate with asylum processing centres to determine the validity of asylum claims based on a common, harmonised set of rules. Another efficient method for dealing with the question of refugee flows could be an alternative to traditional resettlement schemes and naturalisation policies: the EU may issue "humanitarian visas" to refugees transiting countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, which would not only ensure a safe passage to the EU, but would also minimise the risk of resorting to smugglers or embarking on dangerous journeys (Welsh 2016).

Moreover, FRONTEX should also assume responsibility for integrating the national border guards into a coherent European force, because a centralised agency would be much better equipped to manage the EU's external frontiers (Lehne 2018). Concerning the latter, if the concept of quotas should be revisited, this should be done based on a bottoms-up approach to avoid the crisis triggered by the September 2015 situation; in addition, there should exist a complete mutualisation of costs associated with refugees admitted through the processing centres at the level of the EU, by which all countries should contribute to the common pool and any state that refuses to accept refugees should make a larger financial contribution than a state willing to take on a larger number of people (Blanchard and Kirkegaard 2018).

Regardless of how the immigration reform process will be finalised, one thing remains undisputed: issues of migration and asylum will continue to be central to European political debates, both at the supranational and national levels. Member states will not agree to completely relinquish control in favour of EU institutions in matters they consider crucial to their sovereignty and, for the foreseeable future, national contexts will continue to influence decisions made in Brussels, especially if the current rise of Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant parties that link opposition to European integration to opposition to immigration continues. At the same time, it is equally

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[25] This aspect has been rather marginalised until now in discussions concerning immigration reform, yet any efficient changes in this respect need to address the combination of push and pull factors that determine people to migrate and to understand that, for instance, while it is true that today's refugees are, in most cases, pushed out of their countries by forces beyond their control, they are also closely intertwined with other migratory streams, particularly economic migrants or environmental migrants (Welsh 2016; Samaddar 2016).

undisputed that Europe cannot face another migration crisis the same way it did the last time: divided, conflicted and indecisive; to do so would undoubtedly spell dark days ahead for the European project.

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THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE REFUGEES ON EUROPE.
COSTLY ON THE SHORT TERM, BENEFICIAL ON THE LONG RUN?

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Abstract: *We witness an unprecedented Age of Migration, with massive inflows of refugees in search for survival, escaping conflict and persecution in their home communities. In the last two years, migration as a whole, and asylum and border management in particular, were put under severe pressure, with a relevant input given by media coverage in Europe, often portraying refugees as main source of instability in EU - "marginalization makes them easy targets for scapegoating by far right parties, which have gained increasing support throughout Europe by exploiting fears and inciting resentment" (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003: 12). Member States seemed unable to respond effectively to such crisis. The latest influx of newcomers reopened the debates on border controls and humanitarian aid, but also on the social and economic challenges that need to be addressed. The article investigates the socio-economic impact of the refugees in EU, with a focus on the costs and benefits, starting from the assumption that the short and medium term costs will be shadowed by the long term benefits.*

Keywords: refugees, migration of third country nationals, migration out of choice, migration out of necessity, cost-benefit analysis.

Preliminary

The latest inflows of refugees should not be understood as new or unexpected. The need to escape conflict and persecution from a war-torn land, as an act of despair or an attempt to survive has always led people to use migration, as an *out of necessity* strategy[1]. However, in the last two years we witnessed huge influxes of refugees in Europe. According to UNHCR, "an estimated

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[1] Migration *out of choice* and migration *out of necessity* are mainly analysed in the context of the *migration development nexus*.

number of 362,000 refugees and migrants risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean Sea in 2016, with 181,400 people arriving in Italy and 173,450 in Greece. In the first half of 2017, over 105,000 refugees and migrants entered Europe". This journey is a dramatic one, with more than 2,000 deaths on the sea. All these figures have an emotional impact, on both refugees as well as receiving communities, and media contributed in putting a face on suffering, as we accept that behind migration statistics there are … people!

The data gathered by the European Commission reveals that the asylum applicants admitted in host countries originate mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, countries facing instability and poverty:

Graph 1. Recognition rate for asylum applications in the EU, by citizenship

Source: European Commission

According to the data provided this year by Eurostat, "the number of persons seeking asylum from non-EU countries in the EU 28 during the second quarter of 2018 was 137 000, a number around the levels recorded in 2014, before the peaks of 2015 and 2016" (Asylum Quarterly Report, 2018). The latest inflows of newcomers led to some extreme approaches adopted by many receiving countries, from negative media coverage to denied access to EU borders, as signs of a revival of *Fortress Europe*. Still, no one can ignore the following facts:

- Europe is facing an unprecedented number of newcomers, diverse in terms of educational background and skills, a challenge for any socio-economic integration programs;

- Germany absorbed more refugees than any other country in the EU, in absolute terms. Still, on a per-capita basis, Sweden and Austria are the largest destination countries. In 2015, Germany adopted the highly criticized "open border" policy, taking in 890,000 refugees and receiving 476,649 formal applications for political asylum (Trines, 2017);

- In the latest inflows, a relevant part is represented by unaccompanied children, exposed to serious emotional and physical distress;

- Economic migrants are blended in the general inflows of refugees, so it is important to distinct between those in need for humanitarian support and those in search for a better life, who may return to their home countries, without endangering their lives;

- Most of the newcomers used illegal networks to access transit and destination countries in Europe;

- EU allocated more than 2 billion euros for humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid, in order to support refugees;

- Due to the forced nature of their migration and the traumatic experiences frequently associated with it, many refugees suffer from psychological strain, a topic barely included in any host country intervention programs;

- Despite the criticism of inefficiency, in the last 20 years, EU applied high standards in terms of asylum and border management.

The socio-economic impact of the refugees in EU

In the following sections, we intend to balance the costs and benefits of the latest inflows of refugees in EU, starting from the assumption that, on the short term, costs overweight benefits, while on the long term, benefits prevail.

According to the *Dublin Mechanism,* asylum seekers can only apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter, and they risk deportation if they try to apply in another state. It is important to distinct between asylum seeker status and the refugee one, the latter, referring to "persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution, facing a situation that it's often so perilous and intolerable that they cross national borders to seek safety in nearby countries. These are people for whom denial of asylum has potentially deadly consequences" (UNHCR, 2016). Thus, the refugee status implies migration *out of necessity* in a real sense, while migrant status is a result of the migration *out of*

choice. The controversy related to the uneven application of the Dublin regulations by different states heated the debate on the need for a profound reform of the entire system.

Most of the cost-benefit analysis of migration phenomena focused on the role of economic migrants, in the context of the migration–development nexus[2], revealing the beneficial impact of labour migration on source countries, in terms of financial remittances, as well as non-financial remittances like transfers of new ideas, attitudes, behaviours, practices (migrants acting as change agents as they return to their home countries).

In order to tackle the issue of the costs and benefits of the latest refugee influx, we will refer to their impact on demography, labour market, especially employment, and fiscal contribution of the employed newcomers.

The impact of the refugee inflows on demographics

No one can deny that EU is facing alarming demographic trends. It is well known that Europe is dominated by a dramatic shrinking of the population, along with the aging phenomenon, costly in terms of granting social benefits, providing care and health services for the elderly, in the context of increasing aged dependency ratio (in EU 28 it reached 28.8 % in 2015, and a projected ratio of 50.3% is expected for 2050, according to Eurostat (2016). Nevertheless, Europe witnesses a drop in the fertility rate (1.5 children per woman), along with low population growth (the lowest being registered in the main destination countries like Germany, Greece or Italy).

Moreover, according to *2015 Aging Report* released by the European Commission, "in 2060 people will live (on average) six years longer than today. According to Eurostat statistics, the proportion of the population aged 65 or older will rise from 18.5% in 2014 to 28.4% in 2060. As a consequence, […] the old-age dependency ratio is expected to decrease from around 4 to 1 in 2013 to 2 to 1 by 2060" (European Parliament, 2015: 4). It becomes clear that Europe is in real need of a demographic boost, therefore, the refugee influx with large proportion of young active persons should be considered a proper answer. The host countries need to start designing and implementing family oriented policies, supporting access to health and care services (previous inflows proved to be beneficial in terms of return on investments: once on the labour market,

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[2] Probably, the most relevant contributions belong to Papademetroiu and Martin, 1991 and Van Hear and Sørensen, 2002.

migrants contribute more to the social security system than they benefit from), educational services, including language training and support services for the newcomers to facilitate integration of the ones that do not plan any return to their home countries.

The impact of the refugee inflows on labour market

Regarding the labour market, migrants can fill important niches both in fast-growing and declining sectors of the economy, and contribute to labour-market flexibility. According to dual labour market theory, newcomers tend to fill the secondary labour market, characterized by "low skill levels, low earnings, easy entry, job impermanence, and low returns to education or experience" (Piore, 1970: 57). There is evidence in Denmark, that "the inflow of low-skilled immigrants may encourage natives to upgrade and adjust their jobs, taking advantage of immigrant-native complementarity as those two groups specialise in different occupations" (Foged and Per, 2015).

The so-called *3D jobs* (dirty, difficult and dangerous) are usually undertaken by the newcomers, risking de-skilling or social stigma.

In the same time, developed economies are in continuous search for skilled workforce, in the context of the alarming shrinkage of the active population.

Nevertheless, while analysing the education endowment of the refugees, UNHCR (2016b) reveals clear gaps in opportunity for the refugee children and youth:

- 61% of refugee children attend primary school (a clear risk for illiteracy), while at world's level, 91% of children attend primary school;
- 23% of refugee teenagers attend secondary school, while 84% of world's adolescents attend secondary school;
- Only 1% of refugee youth attend higher education, while 36% of world's youth is enrolled in higher education programs.

In order to address the problematic aspects of granting access to education for refugees, in 2015, it was launched *The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants*, signed by 193 countries, which emphasized education as a critical element of the international response to the present crisis. Newcomers should enjoy equal access to an education of good quality, to gain skills

and flexible career routes. More active measure need to be properly implemented and intermediate assessments to be carried out to check the results against the set objectives.

The restricted or denied access to labour market in host societies are still problematic, and labour mobility remains limited, due to different migration policies adopted by EU member states, as synthetized in Box 1:

Box 1 Access to labour market in EU host countries (European Commission, 2016: 21)

A. **full access without work permits** — granted in Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Sweden

B. **more restricted access** (e.g. limited to certain sectors) as in Cyprus (where asylum seekers have access only to farming, animal food production, waste management, gas station and cleaning and food delivery) or in Austria, the UK, Bulgaria and Romania (where asylum seekers only have access to seasonal work, tourism, agricultural sector).

C. **The so-called *labour market check*** - in some countries (Austria, the UK, Luxembourg, Hungary, and Germany) asylum seekers may only work after this procedure is ended, Other criteria apply in the Netherlands, such as time limitation (asylum seekers are allowed to work for 14 or 24 weeks per year and only if they stay in an open reception facility).

D. **EU, EEA and legally residing third-country nationals** may all be prioritised over asylum seekers when filling a post.

The need for long term investments in educational and skill attainment is clear, in order to grant refugees access to labour market in the host countries, meaning access to genuine socio-economic integration.

A 2016 report launched by OECD stated that "refugees represent one of the most vulnerable groups of migrants on the labour market.... It takes refugees up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate as the native-born" (OECD 2016: 5-6), due to their incapacity to provide proper documentation that would clarify their level of education or skills, to their low host countries' language proficiency and limited access to up-skilling trainings. The refugees' employment rate tends to start at a lower point than any other migrant category, but what is remarkable is their catching up process, as the graph below shows:

Graph 2. Employment rate by different categories of migrants

Source: European Commission

The economic migrants as well as the ones migrating for studies enjoy a higher employment rate, as expected. The ones in search for family reunification, as well as those with refugee status face the difficulties of finding jobs, but the latter perform better once they enter the host country labour market, a sign of commitment for integration in the country of destination.

As Safaya and Cramarenco (2016: 72) stated, a more balanced perspective on the newcomers' integration is highly needed, taking into consideration both costs (access to accommodation, jobs, education, culture, etc.) and opportunities (addressing the demographic disequilibrium, labour and skill shortages in fast-growing and declining sectors, as many refugees arrive with marketable skills, contributing to labour-market flexibility).

When analysing cost, we need to understand that a newcomer who receives benefits today can generate tax revenue tomorrow.

In terms of costs, Germany, the main EU receiving country for asylum claims, seems to spend more than 20 billion euros for accommodating the newcomers.

According to OECD (2017: 4), we can find various models of financial support for refugees, such as:

- *Switzerland* provides to cantons CHF 6 000 per refugee, earmarked for refugee integration.

- *The United Kingdom* developed time-dependent transfers, which decline with the number of years that have passed since a refugee arrived in the country – from GBP5 000 per person in their second year in the United Kingdom, to GBP1 000 per person in the fifth year.

- In *France*, the ministry of interior provides a lump sum of €1 000 per asylum seeker to municipalities, to support the development of new reception facilities for asylum seekers, a clear attempt to de-centralize the support system.

- In *Germany*, the federal government provides a fixed sum of €670 per asylum seeker per month.

Despite the fear that the cost of refugees' integration programs are a huge burden to national budgets, 'a less comprehensive and less costly strategy might involve the risk of a long-term integration failure and the political costs of a massive political polarization' (Konle-Seidl and Bolits, 2016: 13)

Since 2011, in order to expand the limited knowledge on the refugees' integration in the host countries, EU and OECD carried out a general report on refugees' integration in Europe, the so-called *Indicators of Immigrant Integration*. In terms of employment, the main findings of the 2015 Report revealed:

- Income inequality is higher among immigrants than among the native-born;

- In 2013, the employment rate for immigrants reached 62%, 3 percentage points lower than of the native born;

- Immigrants with high level of education struggle more to access jobs than their native born peers (the so-called invisible barriers built up by employers);

- 42% of highly educated immigrants perform low skilled jobs (risk of brain waste);

- 19% of the immigrants with lower incomes live in overcrowded households, compared to 8% of their native-bon peers.

Other reports (European Parliament, 2016; Errighi and Griesse, 2016) reveal that refugees tend to perform worse in the labour market than other migrant groups who have otherwise similar characteristics. Once recognized, refugees tend to perform better than other migrants, resulting in "higher wages and longer working hours for them after ten years than the other migrant groups of the same cohort. One reason for this is that refugees with a permanent residence status are less

likely than other migrants to plan to return to their home country. Permanent immigration provides a greater incentive to invest in human capital than stays of a temporary nature." (European Parliament, 2016: 23).

Throughout 2016, several reports on *Managing the refugees' crisis* have been launched by the European Commission, in an attempt to analyse the most problematic issues such as granting access to newcomers, securing borders, preventing illegal migration, including the dismantle of smuggling networks and only one proposal with specific reference to integration of migrants with high education levels - a new *DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment.* Most national integration programs generally consist of three main components: language training, orientation sessions and introduction to the culture of the host society and professional training and reorientation (contextual training), closely linked to labour market. These programs, which are compulsory to a certain extent, are, in most cases, individualized to the needs of immigrants (Safaya and Cramarenco, 2016: 81).

The medium and long term economic impact of the refugees depend mainly on their integration on the labour market. There is a clear need to reduce the restrictions imposed to refugees waiting for the asylum application to be processed, as well as a faster skills' equivalence systems. Granting early access to private and public jobs, by providing wage subsidies as a financial stimulus for employers, as well as to self–employment[3] or jobs gained in the immigrants' business networks will speed up integration, and revenue generation. A relevant best practice is represented by the *Swedish Introduction Program,* accessible to all refugees, aged 20–64 years (active population), regardless of background or routes of entry. The plan comprises 3 support services: language training, employment preparation and social studies to provide a basic knowledge of Swedish society. Participation is voluntary, but comes with financial benefits that continue for six months after participants have found work, with the benefits being reduced in proportion to the time spent working, as a stimulus to find and preserve jobs (Swedish Integration Policy, 2016: 2)

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[3] It became common knowledge that immigrants originating from Syria are highly oriented towards entrepreneurship, thus host countries should focus on reducing the administrative burden for start-ups, and granting fiscal incentives for new entrepreneurs.

According to Ayar et al., 2016, the fear that taking care of the newcomers is costly is contradicted by available data - on a GDP-weighted basis, average budgetary expenses for asylum seekers in EU countries could increase by 0.05 and 0.1 percent of GDP in 2015 and 2016, respectively, compared to 2014. The same report states that the level of GDP is lifted by about 0.05, 0.09, and 0.13 percent for 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. The impact is quite different across countries, reflecting the asymmetric distribution of the asylum seekers relative to countries 'own population. By 2017, the largest impact is in Austria, with GDP rising by 0.5 percent, followed by Sweden (0.4 percent) and Germany (0.3 percent).

Moreover, the research conducted in 2017 by Kancs and Lecca revealed that, "although the refugee integration […] is costly for the public budget, in the medium- to long-run, the social, economic and fiscal benefits may significantly outweigh the short-run refugee integration costs. Depending on the integration policy scenario and policy financing method, the annual long-run GDP effect would be 0.2% to 1.4% above the baseline growth, and the full repayment of the integration policy investment (positive net present value) would be achieved after 9 to 19 years (Kancs and Lecca, 2017:38).

Despite the efforts to quantify the fiscal impact of migrants as a large group, or even of refugees as a specific group, the data collected especially by OECD, cannot reveal a clear link between the migration stock and the net fiscal balance. Still, their fiscal contribution depends on the employment status, wage level, working age, etc. It is expected that the refugees' contribution is lower than the economic migrants' one, due the above mentioned barriers to labour market.

Still, using the QUEST methodology[4], the European Commission made a simulation on the impact of newcomers on growth, public finances and labour markets. Two extreme scenarios were used:

1. *High-skilled scenario,* the skill distribution of migrants is assumed to match that of the EU;
2. *Low-skilled scenario* - all migrants are assumed to be low-skilled.

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[4] QUEST - the global macroeconomic model the Commission uses for macroeconomic policy analysis and research.

Table 1: Combined effects of increase in spending and labour force - EU

	High-skilled scenario						Low-skilled scenario					
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
GDP	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
GDP per capita	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Employment	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Current account (% GDP)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Real wages	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Gov. Debt (% of GDP)	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Gov. balance (% of GDP)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

Level difference compared to base-line scenario.

Source: European Commission, 2016: 23

Regardless the scenario, in 2017 we may expect a 0.2% increase in GDP, but both scenarios reveal a small negative impact on GDP per capita and on real wages, no impact on current account and no impact on government balance in the case of the high-skilled scenario. Despite its limitations, the above mentioned exercise attempt to sketch the potential macroeconomic effects of the latest influx of new arrivals in EU, dismantling the exaggerated claims on severe negative impact on host countries 'economies.

At both OECD and European Commission level, there is a clear understanding that overcoming the crisis has a lot, if not everything, to do with a genuine commitment of the host countries to the integration programs.

For raising awareness, OECD launched in 2016 a 10 lessons report for host countries facing the latest influx of new arrivals:

1. *Begin activation and integration services as soon as possible*, especially for groups of asylum seekers with likely high recognition rates (such as Syrian and Iraqi nationals).

2. *Facilitate labour market access for applicants with high prospects of remaining,* e.g. by abolishing possible 'labour-market tests' for humanitarian migrants that would show that no domestic worker could have filled the post before an employer is allowed to recruit an asylum seeker or a provisionally admitted humanitarian migrant.

3. *Locate humanitarian migrants according to the availability of jobs, not housing*. Notwithstanding a wish to distribute asylum seekers across and within countries and a tendency to place newly arrived in areas where housing is available, local labour-market conditions at arrival have proven to be a crucial determinant for lasting integration.

4. *Avoid underutilisation of skills by documenting foreign qualification, work experience and skills earlier in the integration proces*s. Many humanitarian migrants have higher skill levels than the average population in their country of origin (reflecting that the poorest can often not afford the costly journeys).

5. *Customise integration policy instruments* given the growing (skill) diversity among humanitarian migrants, as a one-size-fits-all approach may not be appropriate for refugees with different educational backgrounds, language skills and career prospects.

6. *Identify mental and physical health issues* early on to prevent any distress from turning into chronic and severe disorders and ensure that they are addressed in a targeted manner.

7. *Speed-up access to education and training for unaccompanied minors* as they are a particularly vulnerable group and, for most coming at the end of

the age of compulsory schooling, risk ending up in neither employment, education or training.

8. *Take into account future 'family reunification'* when designing integration policies for humanitarian migrants as many of the newly arrived are adult men and have the right to family reunification.

9. *Limit differences in access to integration services across a country.* Integration primarily takes place at the local level.

10. *For some humanitarian migrants (little or no prior education),* sustained support will be needed. In their case the long term benefits are improbable.

This report may serve as a guideline for the simplification of the access procedures applied to the newcomers, as a clear reform of the national strategies as well as national integration programs became a must.

Concluding remarks

The recent refugee's crisis brought into attention that newcomers do not represent just a financial burden for the host countries, but contributors to improved demographics, labour market equilibrium, by performing jobs that natives refuse to take anymore, to the social security systems as tax payers, just to mention a few.

The free movement of labour is one of the most tangible benefits of European integration. Therefore, Europe needs a genuine comprehensive new strategy for both granting access and integration of the new comers. The focus on the humanitarian aid is understandable, but once accommodated in host countries, the refugees are in a clear need for access to language training, professional training, safe jobs and socio-cultural integration programs, as well as educational programs for their children. After leaving everything behind, they need protection and support mechanisms, in order to make a living, again!

In the nowadays migration turmoil, the integration of newcomers in Europe remains a project in the making, with opposite approaches, various needs to be met: the native workers to preserve their jobs and way of living, the second or third generation migrants to preserve their integration level and the newcomers to access a safe and stable life, outside their countries of origin.

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THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE CHESSBOARD OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

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Abstract: *The European Union can be considered as the triumph of liberal institutionalism. However, the international community only seems to understand a realist rhetoric. It is therefore questionable to what extend the EU needs to move towards a more realistic outward perspective rather than its current liberal institutionalist. To understand the extent of this necessity three cases studies have been conducted to identify windows of opportunity in policy areas where the Union is currently fragmented. At the same time these situations expose the necessity for the EU to take on a stance which is more pragmatic and oriented on the protecting and promotion of its interests. The dependency of the Union's members on Russian energy offers an opportunity to further integrate the single market and build a more stable relationship. The issues surrounding NATO membership and the current U.S. approach are discussed to further explore possibilities for a more autonomous EU military and further harmonisation and integration of the Unions Defence and Security policies. By exploring these subjects, a conclusion is drawn that the EU is in a position where it can harmonise its internal liberal institutionalist perspective with an outward realist position to withstand the international power struggle.*

Keywords: Defence, Integration, Europe-Russia-U.S., Energy.

Introduction

Currently, the European Union is being challenged from many different directions, both internally (Brexit, populism, a two speed Europe) and externally (migration, trade wars, conflict, new (re)emerging powers). While the Union tries to cope with these challenges and seems to turn more inwardly the world outside its borders moves on quickly. These developments could leave the Union paralysed and perhaps hamper its future development and position on the world stage.

The other actors seem to have a more realist orientation in their pursuit of interests, which leaves to question if there is still room for a liberal institutionalist oriented project. This has raised the question: *To what extent do the opportunities for the European Union within the international community move the European project from a liberal institutionalist to a realist perspective?* This article is too short to answer this question in its totality, therefore three windows of opportunities of the EU will be analysed. First the energy relationship between the EU and Russia is reviewed to see if there is an opportunity for further EU integration and a rapprochement between the Union and Russia. Secondly the integration of European Defence policy and the relation with NATO will be analysed. This will also put the EU - U.S. relations in perspective and will look at the internal perspectives on the issue. It will then move on to discuss the EU dependency on the U.S. and the impact it has had on its own development. Finally, the article will be concluded by answering the before raised question and by discussing the relevance, importance and potential of the European project. But first a more in-depth understanding of the two different schools, realism and liberal institutionalism, of international relations.

Realist Versus Liberalist Institutionalist Union

The European Union is possibly the greatest triumph of liberal institutionalism. States have sacrificed their sovereignty on subjects such as climate, agriculture and trade for the greater good and the benefit of all. The individual members of the European Union understand, like no other, working together is a necessity to ensure a brighter future. It took the founding European states two world wars to discover that pursuit of individualistic competition results in more sub-optimal outcomes for all. After the Second World War it was the shadow of the future and a push from the Americans that allowed the foundations of the Union. Ever since, it has gone through remarkable changes and membership to the project has become a goal towards many European states have and still are working. The EU has become a shining example of how supra-national institutions can succeed and that realists are not always right.

Classical liberalists assume that the individual is driven by self-interest and is therefore most capable to decide what is needed. To achieve these interests are exchanged on a market (Dryzek, Honig and Phillips, 2009). On an international scale trade and finance forge relationships between states that were unimaginable before. These ties are then used to spread democratic norms (Snyder, 2004). But unconstrained competition frustrates this freedom and will eventually lead to sub-

optimal outcomes. Therefore, the emergence of international institutions is logical as this will provide the competing states with a "leader" which enforces rules, regulations and policies to which all parties have agreed. Which, in turn, will eventually provide a more optimal outcome for all. Within such collaboration states are willing to sacrifice sovereignty and national interests (Little, 2014). These institutions are also the main tools used for international relations and are even considered an actor alongside the sovereign state (Snyder, 2004). 'Many liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions' (Snyder, 2004, p.56). This unshakeable faith in international institutions is supported by plenty of hard data. Democratic institutions and values have proven to help states to cooperate (Snyder, 2004).

On the other hand, Krasner argues realists only accept sovereign states as actors in the international sphere (1993). These sovereign states will only sacrifice certain interests to serve greater and more important interests (Little, 2014). They view the world as anarchic where there is no higher power than the sovereign state which can enforce rules and regulations, therefore they are forced towards self-help (Krasner, 1993; Little 2014). States are focused on their own security so to protect their territory and political integrity, as rational actors 'domestic politics, individual rationality, or organisation failures have only a marginal impact on policies' (Krasner, 1993, p. 453). International institutions are therefore only used to coordinate strategies to prevent sub-optimal outcomes. Actors within the international community pursue their own interest and strive to maintain the balance of power in their favour. A shift in this balance will trigger reactions by other actors to ensure their own security both physically and economically (Little, 2014). Hall (2006) argues that the threat of another nation becoming more powerful and infringement on sovereignty are the personification of evil, this gives realists incentive for control and alliances without considering identity or religion, "(y)our enemy's enemy is your friend" (Hall, 2006, p. 189).

The U.S. has withdrawn from many international institutions and others refute their influence, authority and even usefulness. There are also those who have come to use these institutions to their own benefit. Within this turbulent era the European Union is often challenged. Internally the members understand cooperation is more important than competition, however, if the Union wants to survive and protect the securities, freedoms and interests of its citizens it may need a more realist

outward orientation as its fellow players seem to lose interest in liberal institutions. The following windows of opportunities will show how this identity crisis has taken shape.

The Russian Question

The pen is mightier than the sword and the current tumulus surrounding media shows words can be interpreted differently depending on who reads them and in what context. Therefore, it is important to clearly define certain words which will be often used in this, and also other, sections of the article. When Russia is mentioned this refers to the state and their general population, though as a writer I do not claim to know what their preferences or interests are. The Kremlin and Moscow refer to the (ruling) political elite of the state of Russia and the policies that come forth from it. NATO and the European Union refer to the institutions and its interests and not to its individual members. When members of NATO or the EU or other states and their capitols are mentioned this refers to the general interests expressed by the (elected) representatives of these states.

Russia is part of the European peninsula and therefore of importance to the survival of a peaceful Europe. The current relationship between Russia and the West, mainly existing of the EU and the U.S., is in precarious waters. The EU, its members and Russia have a difficult relationship when it comes to energy resources. As prices soared and resources seemed to become depleted, policies concerning the constraint on existing, and finding new sources became political charged. In such a case who controls resources can influence national politics. Most of Europe's natural energy sources are situated within the territories of Russia. Rises in oil prices and its gas resources led Russians, and the Kremlin, to believe these exports could be used as a foreign policy tool to regain ground as a global influential power (Harsem and Claes, 2013; Trenin, 2016).

It is every state's desire to become independent of its reliance on resources. Any shortcomings are often balanced by the development of human capital or technology. Dependency relies on how important supply is to the receiver, how easily it can change suppliers, find other ways to suffice its needs and how important the compensation is to the exporter. Within the energy department, gas is special in some respect, namely by its infrastructure. Both importer and exporter are dependent on the pipelines transporting the gas, making diversification of supplier and importer difficult. In the case of energy trade between Russia and European member states, we can also speak of an asymmetrical interdependence. Both are dependent on the other, however, the inability of Europe to diversify in supplier or find another source gives considerable power to the supplier,

in this case Russia, more specifically the Kremlin. Several members within the EU are quite able to resist the Kremlin's influence, although this becomes more difficult as Moscow controls ever more energy companies within the Union. However, the more Eastern member states are very dependent on Russia's supply, which buys the Kremlin coercive power to create silence or moderate resistance in internal EU issues. The current bilateral agreements have created different stances among European members towards Russia and internal EU issues. For instance, Cyprus and Greece look favorable on Russia, while France, Germany, Italy and Spain enjoy a special relationship with both Russia and the Kremlin which sometimes undermines common EU policies. Then there is a large group which clearly separates politics from business and is willing to speak out against Moscow. Finally, Lithuania and Poland will block any negotiations by the EU with Russia or the Kremlin (Harsem and Claes, 2013; Dos Santos, 2010). The latter's stances can be well understood as the Kremlin was willing to put its threats of cutting supplies into action when trying to coerce these states (Trenin, 2016).

It is important to put the relationship in a wider perspective. 50% of Russia's gas exports go to Europe, and 50% of the gas used by the EU comes from Russia. Some members are more dependent, like those in the east, than others. This makes the EU more dependent on Russia when it comes to energy supply. On the other hand, Russia, and thus Moscow, is dependent on the EU for other trade. With gas demand expecting to rise national governments develop different policies. Such policies hamper a possible common strategy making members more vulnerable to pressure from Moscow. Direct pipelines from Russia to certain member states, like Germany, also undermine the bargaining position of their Eastern counterparts, as they are currently transit countries. While the EU is looking for diversification in its energy sources Russia is also trying to diversify its clientele and is looking towards Asia (Harsem and Claes, 2013; Dos Santos, 2010). Kratochvíl and Tichy (2013) looked deeper into the Russian discourse on diversification and found that Moscow has interests in, and dialogues with Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary concerning its energy exports. On the other hand, they found that most of the Kremlin's efforts are focused on constructing more supply lines of oil and gas towards Europe and strengthening the position of Russian companies in that market. Moscow believes diversification of such supply lines are necessary as certain transition countries can be unreliable. It also stresses that rhetoric about the importance for the EU to diversify as it is too dependent on the Russian market and should limit the latter's access to the EU market, is exaggerated. Thus, the EU should not be

surprised when Russia starts looking at other markets because of such statements and policy developments (Katrochvíl and Tichy, 2013). It also needs to be considered that Russia may not be able to cope with demands and will need the EU's technological advances to drill into new resources. This may paint a more balanced picture of interdependency, but Moscow will be able to find other suppliers for its current trade with the EU, while the EU will not easily find another supplier of gas. And even if it could, putting down the infrastructure will take tremendous time (Harsem and Claes, 2013; Dos Santos, 2010).

Fortunately, the EU has made considerable progress on the issue. The energy market has been liberalized with the Third Energy Package, preventing Russia from both controlling and owning the pipelines. Member states have started to increase their diversification by importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) and by looking for other suppliers willing to invest in infrastructure. Soft winters have also lowered demand and left considerable reserves. On the other hand, the Kremlins biggest worries are concerned with its state coffers as energy prices keep lowering (The Economist, 2015; Harsem and Claes, 2013). As these prices keep dropping this energy tool is becoming impractical and seems to be turning on Moscow. The low prices might leave the Kremlin with more depts than surpluses giving the West a tool for discipline and limiting Moscow's freedom to manoeuvre (Trenin, 2016).

To understand the Russian perspective Kratochvíl and Tichy put the Russian discourse in perspective in their article from 2013. According to them integration is an important subject within Russian energy discourse. As the EU gradually tries to have Russia integrate its energy policies, Moscow on the other hand stresses the importance of an equal relationship in which both parties' benefit. Sergei Shmatko (2009) as cited by Kratochvíl & Tichy (2013, p.400), made a clear statement about this 'what is important for us is dialogue, not a diktat'. Lavrov and Medvedev go on to state that energy is an important aspect in the Russian - European relation. According to them energy is a product from which many Europeans benefit and which enables them to live comfortably. Chizhov (2008) as cited by Kratochvíl & Tichy (2013, p.400), puts it even more plainly 'you need gas, and we need the money'. The interdependency by both parties is seen as something positive by both Putin and Lavrov. But Putin also sees the relationship as asymmetrical, with the EU importing 44% of its gas from Russia, while at the same time Russia exports 67% of its gas to the EU (Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013). In an official document published by the Russian Government transcribing a meeting between members of the Russian Government and the

European Commission in 2013 Medvedev is quoted to say '(o)f course, we discussed energy. We have huge potential here… this cooperation should be implemented on a mutually advantageous basis… (w)e believe that our colleagues in the European Commission must hear Russia's arguments… In this case we will be able to build stable and mutually advantages cooperation for decades to come'. He then goes on to stress the intensity of the relationship by stating that the EU receives 80% of Russia's oil and 70% of its gas exports. Barroso on behalf of the European Commons underlined that the EU is not afraid of Russia and considers it be 'an important part of European civilisation, and we are proud of that'. In a report on the Russia-EU energy relations Likhachev (2017, p.6) states that 'Russian-EU relations in the gas sector have now shifted from a strategic partnership to ordinary commercial cooperation that is further aggravated by serious political disagreements. He goes on to argue that the Russian side of the relationship is not always market-based in nature.

'Russia is often accused of implementing divide-and-rule policies towards the European Union. It is indeed difficult not to engage in this practice, given the absence of a common foreign policy in the EU' (Trenin, 2016, p.41-42). This is a natural tactic for states, whether it is Russia, the U.S., China or any other, as it will, first and foremost, promote and further their own interests. The asymmetric interdependency surrounding the energy trade shows the importance for the EU to move towards a common policy on the issue. Likhachev (2017) argues that one of the fundamental reasons for the EU's existence is to have a unified voice in third party negotiations. However, national interests still triumph. To move forward the European Union will have to make a better effort to understand and acknowledge both the fears of its Eastern members as those of Russia and the Kremlin. While there may never have been a relation of trust between the West and Russia, it is now also dominated by a lack of respect. European history shows us that such a lack and inability to integrate a former advisory will result in a new conflict (Trenin, 2016). It is important to note that a rapprochement towards Russia does not mean a pro-Putin stance or favouring the current Moscow political elite. A harmonised foreign policy will, eventually, be inevitable as it becomes a functional spillover from other policy areas. As the EU harmonises and integrates other policy areas, such as climate change, sourcing defence production, the single market, immigration, a common foreign and security policy will be inevitable. The democratic deficit also shows that the European citizen is tired of the European project and unable to keep up with the great leaps being made. It is therefore important to move forward with small steps. A

common policy towards Russia and the Kremlin concerning the energy trade is a window of opportunity the EU should seize.

European Defence Integration and NATO's relevance

In one of his energetic speeches, Guy Verhofstad mentions '(t)here is no longer a question of more or less Europe, there is a question of another Europe. The world order has changed and Europe can bring an added value on a number of issues that are clear. Defence for example.' The development of a common European defence policy has become intertwined with NATO. While the latter's uncrowned leader, the U.S., urges European states to become more independent in their defence department it openly opposes the idea of a common defence policy. Europeans historically preferred to buy their equipment from the U.S. as it created a special relationship besides NATO, which might get severed when the EU pushes forward with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and PESCO. Currently, most of the equipment produced by EU companies is done so locally and against high prices, the main reason for doing so is to protect jobs and ensuring a supply chain in times of crisis. When the EU would harmonise its standards and source together production and research, prices will drop and military staff from different states will be able to train with the same equipment, simplifying potential cooperation (Valášek, 2018). Certain NATO members and large defence companies do not like such developments. As stated before one of the points in the agreement aims to source together production, at the same time this will make things more difficult for external suppliers. The priority of the EU's defence production is mainly to serve its missions and not NATO, which is understandable as the Union itself is not a member of NATO. Some argue that the European companies benefit from unfair rules, however the U.S., for instance, does the same for its national defence companies. Some question that these policies might even make the EU and NATO competitors (Valášek, 2018). This is, however, not a question but already a reality.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, NATO found itself in an identity crisis. From the beginning its core purpose, as stated by its first secretary general Lord Ismay, was 'to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down'. In the early 90's some hoped to see NATO go, but former Soviet states, fearing renewed Russian expansionism in the mid-90's, offered the alliance a lifeline. We now know that such fears were misplaced as Russia neither had the will nor the power to regain influence in its near abroad. At

some point it even applied for NATO membership itself, would it have been accepted it would probably have only caused more problems than solved. The Kremlin would have undermined the structure with its demands and challenged U.S. leadership by building coalitions against it. Furthermore, NATO's enlargement served political rather than security interests, in which Russia's were bluntly ignored (Trenin, 2016). These, and to some extend also the EU's, enlargements remain a thorn in Russia's eye, which needs treatment rather than being ignored or worse, being pushed further in. In the mid-90's NATO found itself with a new purpose defending and advancing democracy. It even exerts certain military and political stability before membership would be considered (Hirschman, c.2017; Wallander, 2018). NATO portrayed itself and still does, as the defender of liberal institutions such as democracy and the rule of law. However, its history paints a different picture, as it once included dictatorships like Salazar's Portugal, facilitated military coups in Greece and Turkey and cooperated with Franco's fascist Spain (Heartfield, 2016). Since the Cold War NATO has pushed for military and political reforms amongst its (potential) members (Hirschman, c.2017). The alliance might not function as it used to do during the Cold War but has become a powerful tool for the U.S. to exert pressure (Steele, 2004). Some even argue it has become an international intervention force at the disposal of the U.S. to secure the Wests's energy supply. Congressman Ken Paul went as far as to say that NATO's expansion only serves the American defence industry, selling equipment to new members (Hirschman, c.2017). So, the EU and NATO cannot become competitors as they are already in each other's business, even more so NATO has become a drag on the EU's leg towards its own security institutions (Steele, 2004). What is even more worrying is the ability of certain EU and NATO members to use its good stance in either one of the organisations to justify its deteriorating commitment in the other (Wallander, 2018; Kolyakova and Haddad 2018). 'For example, Poland often cites it's good standing in NATO, where it is a strong military ally that assumes a tough stance on Russia, to excuse its growing illiberalism' (Wallander, 2018, p.80).

In its origin, NATO is but an alliance which was aimed to secure Americas Marshal Plan and form the first line of defence against the Soviet threat. With the threat gone it has started to develop towards a tool for political interests and has become a somewhat politicised organisation. None of its current members seem to oppose this, while on the other hand, some do oppose the EU's development towards independent and strong security institutions. It is thus only fair that scholars and politicians question if NATO is still relevant, or if it is a leftover from the cold war with no

place in modern times (Simons, 2015). During his campaign, Trump stated that NATO was obsolete, after taking office his stance slightly changed. Currently, both Trump and his administration are emphasising the fact that other members are not living up to the 2% norm. During the Brussels summit, he even went as far to accuse the European members of not pulling their weight. The differences surrounding the Iranian nuclear deal are not helping either (Anonymous, 2018). The European members, on the other hand, argue that the money which is not spend on defence is used to strengthen other tools of security, like trade and investments in international relations.

The often-used term "West" encompasses mainly the members of NATO and might give the idea its members are similar, but they only share institutions rather than norms and values (Steele, 2004). Isn't it therefore somewhat odd that NATO promotes and enforces certain interests upon potential members on the European continent. As discussed before the membership of both NATO and the EU allows certain states to play one organisation against the other, while the third benefits. The alliance also gives the U.S. an unfair finger in the European pie of foreign affairs. Over time NATO members felt obliged to fall in line with U.S. foreign policies, even if they were against their own interests. Some EU countries have not joined NATO as they do not feel there is an added value besides their existing relationship with the U.S. However, dissolving NATO does not mean there shouldn't be relations or an alliance between EU members or the EU and the U.S., it should just be on different terms and with reciprocal influence (Steele, 2004).

Further integration of the CSDP and PESCO is but a logical step as this becomes another case of functional spillover. As members of the EU opened their borders and reduced constraints on the movement of goods and, to some extent, human capital military equipment and personal were exempted. But as the armies of European states, like the Dutch and German and the French and Belgiums, start to cooperate more with one another the free movement of military goods and staff become more important. While the EU's economic strength often bolsters its foreign policy both the crisis in the Middle East and Ukraine have shown that it falls short of credible military hard power. A clearer and more robust foreign policy strengthened by the two classic hard powers, economic and military, on which the U.S. had a monopoly for a long time, will enable the EU to push back on U.S. policies going against the Unions interests (Biscop, 2018). If it does so it could even aim to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. in many areas or even deter its policies that might risk conflict, harm the global economy, or be overall dangerous to the international peace and defence

of human rights. However, internally some of the leading members are divided. While the financial crisis propelled Germany to an unofficial leaderships role it is reluctant towards conflict intervention, but it does prefer to develop and invest in EU defence rather than in national defence. France, on the other hand, seems to be taking a lead in developing a European army and pushing for further integration on defence and security. It is important to remember that these two states have been able to cooperate not because they agree, but because they disagree (Simón, 2018; Walshe 2018). In this particular case, such a cooperation can be fruitful. Germany's adversary can serve as a basis on which checks and balances both for the CSDP, PESCO and a future European army can be created.

It is also important to acknowledge the positive influence NATO has had on its members. During its life, NATO has provided its members with security but also prosperity in one way or another. However, as tensions rise, interests diverge and the global order changes, it is important that the EU seizes yet another window of opportunity for further integration and a stronger position on the world stage.

U.S. Dependency

For decades the U.S. has been a haven for those aspiring the American Dream, a term associated with free markets, endless possibilities and freedom of oppression. After the Second World War, it emerged as the hegemon in a new world order divided by communist and capitalist powers. As the Cold War dragged on the U.S. became the leader of the free world, rushing to the aid of those seeking independence from oppressive regimes. It founded the League of Nations which became the United Nations and stood at the cradle of many institutions working towards a safer and more stable world. It has defended many liberal freedoms which are, far too often, take for granted. But in the past years, this crusader has started to withdraw from the fight as political and economic turmoil at home demanded more and more attention. Trump's words "America First" aren't new, as they were uttered by U.S. congress in the early 1940's preventing president Franklin D. Roosevelt from getting involved with the conflict on the European continent (Walshe, 2018). The result of this policy is well known today. After assuming office, the Trump administration has pulled the U.S. out of 70 years of commitment to the European project, which has also brought more security and prosperity to the U.S. (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018). It has also backed down from important international commitments such as the Paris Agreement, the

Iran nuclear deal, the UN Human Rights Council and started numerous trade wars. The EU is wrong in thinking it can wait out the Trump administration, previous, and also coming, presidents have been well aware of the Unions dependency on the U.S. defence apparatus. In recent interviews, Trump bluntly said that the EU, from its outset, aimed to exploit the U.S. and by failing to fall in line with its recent foreign policy changes has become a "foe" (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018).

Trump's position on NATO, the EU, its rapprochement with autocratic governments and nationalistic orientation has caused major concerns around the world. While a direct relation with the increase in demagogues, populism, undemocratic and illiberal regimes with the decline of U.S. leadership, which would make for an interesting research, cannot be established, there is a desperate need for a new crusader. There are those who look towards the European Union to fill this vacuum, an idea that might not be as crazy as it seems. For over 60 years the EU has been a successful experiment, putting trade and the value of a human life on equal footing and, if necessary, even put the humane interest first. But the Union is internally divided, coping with economic problems, populism and challenges to the liberal values of its members. Trump's U.S. has become a predator rather than a partner to this weakened EU. Offering members different and bilateral trade agreements, for instance in the case of France on the condition it would leave the Union. The EU's once biggest ally is now copying Russia's approach. 'As great powers compete for influence across the globe Europe, like the Middle East or Latin America, will become another battleground' (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018). If the EU wants to play a role, instead of being played, on the global stage its members need to unite and use their advantages. Current efforts for military autonomy and independent security and defence policy are admirable but not enough. While the EU is economically strong, it does not flex this muscle sufficiently and has been unable to combine it with military power (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018). Europeans these days still rely on the U.S. for security and leadership, but '(w)ith the latter gone and the former at risk, Europe will need to unify at home and undertake some savvy diplomatic manoeuvring abroad if it is to continue to pursue its interests on a global stage' (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018). The current U.S. strategy may be short sighted but that doesn't mean the EU should sit by, watch and take the damage. It would do wise to look for new friends like Russia and China (Polyakova and Haddad, 2018). If the EU would be able to overcome these hurdles it can defend liberal values and human

rights, come to the aid of those seeking relief from oppressive regimes and rebalance the worrying shifts in power. Instead of being the minor partner to the great powers it could become equal.

Conclusion

So, *to what extend do the opportunities for the European Union within the international community move the European project from a liberal institutionalist to a realist perspective?* The answer to this question is twofold. As discussed before, the European project is a triumph of liberal institutionalism and should, above all, remain so. If the past decades have shown the world anything it is the success of the Union, and as people vote with their feet, more seem to find a way towards it. A common energy, defence, security and foreign policy are a logical next step within this project. As the analysis of the Russian question has shown it is within the own interests of the members, and of the EU as an institution, to form a common strategy concerning energy. These unified policies will provide the Union with a stronger negotiation position towards its partners and will benefit every member, ensuring profitable deals and a lower risk of being cut off. The shared outcome for the Union and its member states will be higher than the sum of their individual endeavours. The analysis of European Defence Integration and NATO's relevance has shown that a common security and defence policy will provide the EU with financial benefits, independence from other security providers and a second hard power tool. The relationship with NATO is another reason for a more independent position of the Union, as membership to the alliance is often used as an excuse for not keeping to internal EU rules, regulations and agreements. With NATO's transformation during the 90's, the alliance and the EU have become competitors rather than a cooperation providing optimal outcomes for its members. Further integration, either on energy, defence, security or foreign policy, is therefore not a threat, and should neither be dreaded, but an opportunity. The current turbulent arena in which the great powers play their chess game should motivate, not paralyse, the EU members to do what they know is in their best interest. As the economic and monetary union, integration of policy areas such as agricultural, climate control, free movement of goods and persons has brought prosperity to each member state, so will further integration of other policy areas. Above all the European members should not feel threatened by external powers, trying to fragment them, but believe in the power, strength and success of their liberal institutionalist project.

The other side of the argument, however, is in order for the EU to ensure respect of its interests and the security, wellbeing and prosperity of its citizens it will have to take on a realist position within the international community. Other actors have shown to only understand a pragmatic, secure oriented position while pursuing their own interest. Even the once proud defender of liberal democracy, who stood at the cradle of many international institutions, including the EU, has shown preferring to put self-interest above the common good. The analysis of the U.S.-EU relationship and the relevance of NATO have shown that, although the U.S. wants the members of NATO, and especially the EU, to become more independent, it does not want the EU to develop a common defence and security policy. Let alone source its production together and cooperate more on the military level. The Russian question underlines the need for self-interest of the Union. Moscow uses the absence of a common security, foreign and energy policy to divide the members, and even influence the internal politics, of the EU. It does so for its own security interests, as it feels threatened by both NATO and the European Union. Within this ideology it does not want to understand the benefits of such a liberal institutional project, but it does reap the benefits of its vulnerabilities. Therefore, in order for the Union to handle such a partner it should deal with equal coin and adapt a more realist stance for its outward perspective. As Polyakova and Haddad wrote; '(a)s great powers compete for influence across the globe Europe, like the Middle East or Latin America, will become another battleground' (2018), therefore the Union should do anything in its power to prevent Europe from becoming such a battleground.

This position provides the European Union and its members with an opportunity. As it has done many times before it will have to rise to the challenge of harmonising two rivals, realism and liberal institutionalism, to further its internal integration and prosperity while withstanding the international power struggle. While the international community only seems to understand a division between these two schools the Union will be able to wield a unique position. And if its members dare to move forward to further integrate on some crucial policy areas the Union will find its toolbox dramatically expanding, able to take on any international superpower. In such a situation rapprochement with Russia and new international alliances with other states than the U.S. will not be a strange phenomena. And when it has established itself as an international player, rather than a playground for other powers, it will be able to use sticks and carrots to move these actors towards partnerships where the common good trumps the national interest.

On a Final Note

'Human progress isn't measured by industry. It's measured by the value you place on a life. An unimportant life. A life without privilege' (Doctor Who, 2017). History is scattered with examples of both industrial and humanitarian progress, but they never occurred simultaneously. Whenever there were industrial progress large groups suffered. The Golden Age of Europe went hand in hand with slavery, oppression and exploitation of overseas colonies. Enlightenment in the 18th century saw bloody revolutions bringing down, literally, heads of state and those benefitting from industrial progress. The industrial revolution in the 19th century left the larger part of the European population impoverished and working in atrocious conditions. What followed was the formation of unions, the establishment of the universal vote, and in some cases again bloody revolutions. The following world wars showed the willingness to let others suffer to benefit from industrial advantages and raw resources. From this short history lesson, we might deduct that progress with only industrial benefits in mind leave large groups suffering and are followed by major, and maybe even bloody, change.

After the Second World War, a group of men with differing interests sought a way to prevent future wars on the European peninsula. Robert Schuman can be considered as one of the key founders of the European Union. In his reasoning we can clearly hear the importance of a human life vis-a-vis industrial progress '(T)he economic capitalism lent itself too easily to methods of egoistic exploitation and neglected the meaning of human responsibility' (Schuman: 57). The basis of the European project was cooperation to prevent another war over the resources on the French and German soil. At the core, a healthy combination of humanitarian and industrial interests can be discovered. Neither party on the European peninsula wanted new human suffering at the cost of industrial benefit, thus beneficial trade was a logical solution. The Americans did not want to be drawn into another war to prevent strain on both its population and its industry. The project flourished and has become what it is today with a mindset of maximising human benefit combined with industrial progress, instead of one at the cost of the other.

This reasoning leaves to question how things are today. Human life within the Union is of a high standard and well protected by both national government and the European Union. Both works to protect its citizens from exploitation, discrimination, climate change, bad trade, pollution, bad products, and so on. Here, however, also lies an uncomfortable realisation that the value we place on a human life, in general, is very different from the value on the life of a European citizen.

Economical, climate and conflict refugees seek their way to a better life, for whom our Union is like a lightbulb to all creatures fleeing from darker places. Irresistible and hopeful. But as the European citizen puts more value on his or her iPad where does that leave the "unimportant, unprivileged life"?

Industry and trade have fueled human progress for centuries, but, as stated before, putting a human life second to industry is destructive to general progress. Industrial progress and trade are directly related to living standards. But in the past decades the European project has proven that both can go hand in hand, it is thus important to show the world and ourselves time and again the successes while working hard to solve internal and external problems. Although some may consider the Union ill or even say its time to disband it, there are hopeful movements too, new political parties, young people willing to fight for the European project and their ideals, think tanks looking beyond the problem towards constructive solutions. As the U.S. moves further away from its role as promotor and defender of liberal democracy and human rights, hopeful eyes turn to Europe. But are the members willing and is the European Union ready?

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HOW TO DEAL WITH THE GERMAN MENACE? WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT, PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN ARMY, AND THE DUTCH AND WEST GERMAN RESPONSE, 1949-1955

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Abstract: *At the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, the question whether or not to rearm West Germany was a fiercely and hotly debated topic in Europe. The Americans suggested doing this by integrating the Federal Republic in NATO. However, many Europeans feared the resurgence of German militarism. Nowhere was this more true than in France. Therefore, the French Foreign Minister René Pleven launched the so-called Pleven Plan, designed to allow West German units to be established, but only in small units. That way, Europe could profit from West Germany's manpower, without the country becoming a military threat. Discussions on the European Defence Community were tough, but in the end was signed by the six Founding Fathers. The Dutch did so reluctantly, especially because the Americans were left out, favouring security arrangements in NATO and rearming and incorporating West Germany in the Western alliance. To the Netherlands, it was essential to incorporate the British and especially the Americans in the Western defense; the Dutch always favoured an Atlantic alliance, opposing too much supranationality in the European integration project. The Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to regain sovereignty. In the end, the French National Assembly did not ratify the EDC-Treaty, opening the way to rearming West Germany and making it a full member of NATO.*

Keywords: The Netherlands, West Germany, West German rearmament, NATO, Pleven Plan, EDC.

Introduction

In late 1951, Siewert Bruins Slot, journalist and member of the Dutch parliament for the Anti-Revolutionary Party and later on MP of the European Coal and Steel Community's parliament,

addressed the Pleven-Plan, the French prime-minister's proposal for a common European army of October 1950. According to Bruins Slot, in principle this plan was a good idea. However, he stated: "The endeavour for a European defense community should not, in any way, interrupt or delay the normal progress of the Atlantic rearmament and build-up of the Dutch army" (Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK), 475/2300, 'Vaststelling van Hoofdstuk III (Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken) der Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1952', 29 November 1951). Bruins Slot's statement was characteristic for the Dutch response towards Pleven's proposal: it above all wanted the Americans and NATO to be responsible for the security of Western Europe.

Emmanuel Macron's recent call for a EU army and a shared defense budget are nothing new. Already during the 1950s, with the Cold War arguably at its peak, a plan was launched for the European Defence Community (EDC). Initiated by the French prime-minister Pleven, it envisioned the resurrection of a force of forty divisions, which should replace the armies of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.

Every bit as revolutionary as Robert Schuman's proposal to supranationally pool European coal and steel, the EDC basically had two goals: to defend Western Europe against the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, and, secondly, to incorporate West Germany in the European defense community without allowing it to have its own army. The re-armament of West Germany had been a hotly and fiercely debated topic since the late 1940s. France resisted West Germany to be part of NATO, and welcomed the Pleven Plan. The EDC-treaty was signed on 27 May 1952, but never came into force as, ironically, the French parliament voted against it in August 1954. Soon afterwards, in May 1955, the Treaty of Paris stipulated that West Germany would indeed be part of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, which automatically meant re-arming the country.

This article analyses the thoughts on and initiatives for a European army in the 1949-1955 period. This time-period is chosen, because already at the end of the 1940s such ideas came to the fore, especially in the light of strong and emotional discussions on a possible re-armament of West Germany. Although much has been written on France's role in the design and eventual refusal of the EDC, this article particularly focuses on the Dutch and West German reactions to these ideas and plans, more explicit on the EDC. The Hague and Bonn both supported this idea and were among the signatories, but from different points of view and with varying enthusiasm. The Netherlands, for example, did join the negotiations for the ECSC, but initially denied the invitation

of the same partners to investigate the establishment of the EDC (Segers, 2013). As such, this article can tell us more on the early European integration process and how two of its Founding Fathers responded to it.

The fear of a resurgent German army

When the Treaty of Versailles, which formally ended the First World War, was signed on 28th June 2019, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch stated: "This is not peace; it is an armistice for twenty years" (cited in Murray, 2009). Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, he was right. Between the start of the First World War in 1914 and the end of the Second World War, referred to by some historians as the Second Thirty Years' War, Germany plunged Europe and in its wake the world in two devastating world wars. Unlike after the 'Mutterkatastrophe' of 1914-1918, when the guns fell silent in Europe on 8 May 1945, the former Third Reich was occupied by the victorious allies. In fact, Germany now no longer existed as an independent and sovereign nations. It was split up in four occupations zones, almost hermetically sealed off from each other, hindering a rapid post-war (economic) recovery of Germany. The Potsdam Conference of 17 July – 2 August 1945, although installing the Allied Control Council (AAC) that was supposed to rule occupied Germany, above all showed, however, that the Americans and British on the one hand and the Soviets and French on the other, had many disagreements. Soon, cracks began to appear in the former wartime alliance, which had, basically, been "a shotgun marriage forged upon them by World War II" (LaFeber, 2006).

Strictly speaking, the British and Americans on the one hand and the Soviets and to a lesser extent French, held totally different views on Germany's future. Whereas the former, despite early policies that focused on punishing the former enemy, already soon after the end of the Second World War started to focus on integrating Germany in the Western alliance, Moscow and Paris wanted to keep Germany as weak as possible, quite understandable given the events of the Second World War, with France being occupied for four years and the Soviet Union, although it in the end succeeded in decisively defeating the *Wehrmacht*, loosing something between 25 and 30 million people, while the whole western part of the Soviet Union was basically one large ruin.

This in practice meant that from its inception, the AAC was incapable of action. As the commanders of the various zones of occupation in practice held a veto in the AAC, "the inherent differences in views concerning occupation objectives could undoubtedly sabotage uniformity of

action between the occupying powers that would and in fact became one of the causes of the division of Germany as early as the summer of 1945" (Szanajda, 2015). Although there is still much debate on when the Cold War actually started, it is clear that relatively soon after the Second World War animosity and suspicion between the Soviets on the one hand and especially the Americans and British on the other strongly increased.

As historian Hans-Peter Schwarz has stated, Walt W. Rostow, the future national security advisor to US President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s and who had been involved in planning US policies towards Germany in 1946, was aware of "the fear, the despair, and the hatred that German warfare, German occupation of Europe, and German atrocities had stirred up. But by 1947 most American decisionmakers had shifted their worries from Germany to the Soviet Union" (Schwarz, 2010). As soon as the White House was convinced that there was no future for cooperation with the Russians, a West German state "would have to be integrated with western Europe in order to succeed" (Westad, 2017).

The impact of the Korean War

When it became clear that the Soviet Union and the United States could not agree on the future of Germany, the division of the country became inevitable, making it the main battle ground of the early Cold War, that began in earnest in the summer of 1947. With the further widening and sharpening of the Cold War as of 1949, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949 followed by the birth of the German Democratic Republic in October that same year, and especially after the invasion of North Korea of South Korea of June 1950 – which, according to some, offered a possible striking resemblance of the situation in Europe – Western Europe was ever more confronted with the question what to do with West Germany. Without the Federal Republic, there was a huge hole in the Western defense, as by the early 1950s relatively little US and British forces were present in the FRG. For example, only after 1950, when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union further deteriorated, did US troop levels triple between 1950-1953, reaching approximately 250.000 troops in West Germany (Kane, 2004).

In 1950, however, the Western allies united in NATO had nowhere near the 54 divisions estimated to be necessary to defend Germany and in its wake Western Europe from a possible Soviet attack. Between them, the three occupying countries in West Germany – the United States, France and Great Britain – had fewer than 10 division available, with the Americans having

roughly the equivalent of only two divisions, as well as two fighter-bomber groups. In fact, "secretly, American planning for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union assumed that its occupation troops would have to evacuate the continent, returning only at a much later stage of the war" (House, 2011). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, the CIA estimated, had around 3.700.000 men available in its armed forces, with an additional 6.750.00 trained reservists (CIA, 1950). At the same time, in 1949 the CIA did not see signs of the Soviet Union preparing an attack on Western Europe. It above all feared the "increasing danger of an undesired outbreak of hostilities through miscalculation by either side. Such miscalculation could occur in underestimating the determination of the opposing side or in exaggerating its aggressive intentions". To American planners it was obvious that in one way or another, West Germany would have to contribute to Western Europe's defense.

In that respect, the Korean War was a decisive moment in the early Cold War, as well as serving as a cataclysm in thinking about Western European security and defense. The conflict, which lasted three years and claimed almost as many American lives as the Vietnam War would in the 1960s and 1970s, also changed opinions on the position of Europe, (West) Germany and possible West German rearmament. The conflict in Korea, combined with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Berlin blockade of June 1948 – May 1949, accelerated a shift in the public opinion in Western European countries with regard to the willingness to integrate the Federal Republic so that the economic relations of West Germany – as of the late nineteenth century the dominant European economic (and military) power – with the rest of Europe could be strengthened (Kleßmann, 1991).

As such, the Korean War was not only a turning point in the history of Southeast Asia; the conflict also had important consequences to Europe and the rest of the world: "The conflict militarized international politics far beyond previous levels" (Stueck, 2010; Halberstam, 2007). It stimulated the French and the British to expand their forces considerably, and NATO – until then little more than an American guarantee to interfere, even though Washington had little actual troops deployed in West Germany – became an organisation with a formidable military striking power (Malkasian, 2001). In the early 1950s, for a short time there was even talk of an integrated NATO army (Reynolds, 2006).

Many analysts saw striking resemblances between the situation in Korea and divided Germany. North Korea had attacked the capitalist south; the same could happen in Europe, i.e. a communist

attack from Eastern Europe and an invasion of the western part of the Continent. An attack by the Soviet Union was seen by many as a very real option (Jervis, 1980; Hoffenaar, 2004). It was an important reason that an opinion poll of September 1950 showed that 63 percent of West Germans was prepared to accept West German military forces as part of a European defense system (Jarausch, 2006; Seipp, 2011). The US government now also started thinking about rearming West Germany (Judt, 2007). As early as September 1950, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, proposed to rearm the Federal Republic and make it a full member of NATO.

The European Defence Community

Acheson's proposal came as a huge shock to the Europeans, although Winston Churchill had already suggested that Western forces should include German soldiers (Herbert, 2014). Acheson's initiative caused a hotly and very emotionally laden debate. Many Europeans countries, especially France, rejected the rearmament of West Germany, fearing a renewed German military aggression. Although the Americans had started to increase, by the fall of 1950, their number of divisions in West Germany to five divisions, at the same time "earmarking 3.5 billion dollars in additional defense aid to the Europeans" (House, 2011). Still, the question if and if so how to deal with the military participation of German forces in the Western alliance, remained. It would start a "long, painful and ultimately fruitless debate about German rearmament and how to best effect it while not recreating a sovereign German army" (Hitchcock, 2004). To Paris, the idea of West Germany joining NATO was a phantom, and had to be avoided at every cost (Judt, 2007).

France above all wanted to prevent the establishment of an independent West German army. Therefore, the French came with a solution of their own, very much in line with the earlier initiative for the European Coal and Steel Community, the brainchild of Jean Monnet (Lak, 2016). He wanted "to submerge Germany in international structures, thus providing the stability and prosperity in Western Europe and simultaneously ensuring France's security" (Stone, 2014). The ECSC "would offer an olive branch to Germany while placating French anxieties over German recovery" (Hitchcock, 2010). As the historian Jonathan M. House has stated: "It was no surprise that Monnet should quietly suggest to Pleven [the French minister of Foreign Affairs, M.L.] that France use the model of the Schuman Plan to create a pan-European army" (House, 2011).

What the French and in their wake other European countries were searching for, was an alternative for the creation of an independent West German army. As such, Europe would have to

create its own conventional military forces and integrate German troops in them in one way or another. As stated by historian Tom Buchanan, this was problematic to say the least: "Not only was this economically unpalatable, but it also raised the spectre of the rearmament of West Germany at a time when many still feared German militarism" (Buchanan, 2012).

To find a way out of this dilemma, on 24 October the French launched the so-called Pleven Plan, partially also because the Americans became ever more impatient about rearming West Germany within NATO. Core of the Pleven Plan, also referred to as the European Defense Community (EDC) was to place national units of about 900 men under a supranational organ, which would be governed by a European minister of Defense who was responsible to a European parliament, which at that time did as yet not exist. As the Dutch historian Mathieu Segers has written: "European integration could be the way to control future German forces. As the recovery of the former war industry via the Schuman Plan was embedded in the ECSC, the Pleven Plan should make possible a German rearmament under European auspices" (Segers, 2013).

That way, German forces could participate in a European army, but only with small units: the largest purely German unit would be a battalion of 1000 soldiers. Moreover: these German units were "integrated within multi-national divisions and corps" (House, 2011). There would be no separate German headquarters. However, "other participants in the new army would retain control of those portions of their military forces that were not assigned to the new European army" (House, 2011). To allow the other countries some room to manoeuvre, they kept control over those parts of their armed forces that were not assigned to the European army.

Responses to the Pleven Plan were mixed to say the least, also in France itself. Immediately, a difference emerged between European states that focused more on the Continent and those that looked across the Atlantic for security. The Americans and British preferred Atlantic cooperation. The former, for example, had at least partially backed the Pleven Plan "in the hope of reducing the costs of keeping its troops on the continent" (Hopkins, 2018). Even in France itself, opinions were mixed. The Communists and Gaullists strongly opposed it. Public opinion was divided; polls showed "that 64 percent favored European unity while 57 percent viewed the arming of German troops as a threat to France" (Bronson, 2015). According to historian House, "from the very beginning, French politicians were sceptical of Pleven's idea. Even Monnet and other supporters of European integration wanted to complete the negotiations for the ECSC before focusing on the military issue" (House, 2011). The German historian Ulrich Herbert agrees to House's

observation: "In France, the idea of equal membership of the Federal Republic in the EDC from the start met with little approval" (Herbert 2014).

Despite strong opposition, from February 1951 negotiations on the EDC started under the supervision of Schuman in Paris. At first, only France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and West Germany actively participated in these negotiations. Of the six Founding Fathers of the ECSC, only the Netherlands lacked: it followed the British example and only sent an observer to Paris. The negotiations were tough, representatives often being on the brink of despair as agreement seemed impossible. For example, "military envoys suggested that because of language barriers it was far more efficient to use national units of divisional size, around 13.000 to 16.000 soldiers per unit" (Van Dieren, 2013).

Predictably, the French strongly opposed this. In line with the Pleven Plan, they would only agree to smaller units. The issue dragged on endlessly, only to be ended by Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, in July 1951. To him, the whole issue was a semantic one. Therefore, he suggested changing the word 'division' for 'groupement'. Curiously enough, the unit size of the latter was the same as the division size proposed earlier. However, 'for France this new terminology was more acceptable, and the Germans were satisfied, because with these 'groupements' they would have at relatively larger military independence'. Despite the tough negotiations, eventually the European Defence Community Treaty was signed on 27th May 1952, "along with contingent documents affirming that once all the signatory countries had ratified the Treaty, the US and Great Britain would cooperate fully with an EDF and that the military occupation of Germany would come to end" (Judt, 2007).

Dutch reactions to the EDC

The Netherlands was the first of the Six Founding Fathers to ratify the EDC-Treaty (Hellema, 2001). However, the Dutch did so very reluctantly, above all because the British and Americans were not formally part of the EDC. Partially on Dutch initiative, the bond between the EDC and the non-participating United States and Great Britain was formally stated. What caused the Dutch reservation and hesitation? One of the main reasons was the fact the United States – seen by the Dutch as the main defender of European security – was basically kept out of the EDC, although they later were enthusiastic about it (Lak, 2017). Indeed, John Fuster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, during a closed session of the North Atlantic Council of 14 December 1953 claimed that the

EDC was a test of Western Europe's ability to bury past differences and build a peaceful future. If this test was not passed, "it would force from the United States and agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policy" (Ruane, 2002), although Dulles did not make explicit what he meant with that. Another important reason for the Dutch hesitation towards to the Pleven Plan – which came as a shock to the Netherlands, as het the Schuman Plan of May 1950 – was that the Dutch government resisted supranational and political integration.

Therefore, in the beginning, the Netherlands refused to participate in the EDC negotiations: it preferred cooperation in security with its British and American partners in NATO. The Dutch government 'was unhappy with the French plans for a European Defence Community and for integration of West Germany's armed forces into a European army […] At first, the Netherlands only participated in the EDC negotiations as an observer' (Hellema, 2009). On 21st February 1951, the Dutch minister of War and Navy, Hendrik 's Jacob, stated: "The Dutch government has the intention of being represented by a delegation, the character of which will be determined at a later date when concrete proposals have been formulated. Only then will the Dutch government decide if it will join the negotiations in the form of observer or if the delegation will be authorized to actively participate in the discussions" (HTK, 'Aanhangsel tot het verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer. Vragen, door de leden der Kamer gedaan overeenkomstig art. 116 van het Reglement van Orde, en de daarop door de Regering gegeven antwoorden', 21 February 1951). Especially under strong American pressure did the Dutch government eventually decided to join the EDC-negotiations (Vollaard, Van der Harst, Voerman, 2015), although Dutch historian Duco Hellema has labelled this as "a gesture to please the United States" (Hellema, 200).

In the Dutch case, there was a remarkable difference between the government and the parliament when it came to the EDC-Treaty. With the exception of the orthodox Christians and the communist party – which referred to it as "a Nazi treaty" and "provocation to add fuel to the flames of international tensions" (Brouwer, Van Merriënboer, 2013) – the majority of Dutch parliament strongly supported European integration and the EDC. However, the Dutch government was less enthusiastic. For example, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Uipko Stikker, was reserved to say the least. He showed himself to be more in favour of an Atlantic federation. As the Dutch historians Jan Willem Brouwer and Johan van Merriënboer have shown, Stikker feared that the limited geographical scope of the EDC would undermine Atlantic unity (Brouwer, Van Merriënboer, 2013). The minister of Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that the Western alliance

should be as strong as possible, pleading for closer cooperation in the Atlantic alliance (Brouwer, Van Merriënboer, 2013). He also feared dominance by France and Germany, a continuous fear in Dutch European and foreign policy.

When it came to defense, security and foreign policy in general, the Netherlands almost always opted for, as Hellema has stated, "an Atlanticist stand. Successive Dutch cabinets were of the opinion that Dutch interests were best served by the formation of a political and military alliance that would link the United States to Western Europe. This was considered of vital importance, not only as a counterweight against Soviet expansionism but also because American hegemony would stabilize political relations within Western Europe itself" (Hellema, 2009). This became clear during the negotiations on the EDC, in which it was very obvious that the Dutch strategy was one of limiting European political and military integration as much as possible, and involve Great Britain and the United States closely in the Western European defense (Hellema, 2001).

The strong Dutch support for West German rearmament should also be seen, at least partially, in this light. When Acheson launched his plan for rearming the Federal Republic and include it in NATO, the French rejected it fiercely, as they saw this as "a stalking horse for the remilitarization of Germany" (Judt, 2007). The Netherlands, however, warmly welcomed the American proposal, showing itself a strong proponent of West German rearmament and full integration of *Bundesrepublik* in NATO. Already soon after the end of the Second World War, The Hague was convinced of this, or at least of an active West German role in the Western defense. As the Dutch historian Friso Wielenga has stated, pragmatism was the leading element. This was not to say that "discomfort, mistrust and vigilance towards the Federal Republic did not remain strong. But a Western defense demanded that the Netherlands accepted the former enemy as an ally in the East-West conflict" (Wielenga, 2001).

The Dutch cabinet and especially Stikker supported Acheson's proposal. To start with, it would be beneficial to the Netherlands if they were separated from the Soviet Union by an area that was defended as strongly as possible, instead of a zone in which a military vacuum existed, which would be the case of the Federal Republic remained unarmed. A West German rearmament would shift the frontline hundreds of kilometres to the East, from the river IJssel to the Elbe. However, West German rearmament was only acceptable to the Dutch within an Atlantic framework, i.e. under American guidance (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA AA), Berlin, Bd. 93, Microfiche 93-2; Letter Du Mont to West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Die niederländische

Haltung in der Frage eines Beitrags der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu der europäischen Verteidigung', 8 November 1950). At a meeting of the NATO Council in September 1950, the Netherlands indeed was the first member state to officially address the question of West German rearmament (Hoffenaar, 2004).

As of 1948-1949 there was little doubt among Dutch politicians that it was vital to have the FRG as an ally in the Cold War. Already at the end of the 1940s, the Dutch 'German trauma' – caused by the German occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War – was overshadowed by the fear of communism (Beunders, Selier, 1983). The various postwar Dutch cabinets were utterly convinced that the Federal Republic should be integrated in the Western alliance and be rearmed.

There were also less moral reasons for the Dutch support of West German rearmament. One of them was money. After the start of the Korean War, the Americans pressured the Dutch to increase their defense budget (Brouwer, Megens, 2003). As this was a considerable burden to the Dutch budget, including West Germany in the European defense could ease this burden, in itself a good reason to support West German rearmament. In the words of historian William Mallinson: "Despite their general dislike of the Germans, the Dutch knew that they needed them for economic reasons – since around 1850 Germany had been the Netherlands' most important trading partner – and because the more Germany was brought into Western European Defense, the less they, the Dutch, would have to spend" (Williamson, 2010). Finally, integration of the Federal Republic meant "the necessary Western reinforcement against the Soviet Union. Moreover, West German integration meant that Western Europe could without risk continue the West German recovery, while at the same time profiting from its potential" (Wielenga, 1999; Lak, 2015).

The Dutch position towards the Pleven Plan and the EDC – "an integrated pan-European military" (Hyde-Price, 2018) – should be seen in this context. It also feared French dominance, which was also partially the reason why the Dutch wanted Great Britain to be involved in the EDC.In its opposition towards the EDC the Netherlands joined forces with Belgium. Both opposed a common European budget and armament programs. Moreover, they wanted the bond between the EDC and NATO to be as strong as possible. The Belgian-Dutch tandem had success: there would not be a European minister of Defense, the authority of the EDC would be far less restricted than that of the ECSC, and "EDC-forces would be subordinated to NATO" (Segers, 2013). That the Netherlands in the end decided to join the EDC Treaty had mostly to do with American

pressure, especially when they saw the formation of a European army, without the as yet possibility of the FRG becoming full member of NATO "as the only way to involve Germany in the defense of the West", as the Dutch Defense Minister Kees Staf stated (cited in Mallinson, 2010). In the words of Mallinson: "The Dutch joined the talks unenthusiastically, with the aim of doing their best to ensure that the European Army idea would not detract from NATO, which was more important to them" (Mallinson, 2010).

Paradoxically, the EDC Treaty was not ratified by the French, as on 30 August 1954 the National Assembly refused to do so. The EDC, "a watershed for the political and military landscape of Europe" (Dwan, 2001), was dead. With it went the idea of a rearmed Germany in a European army. The Netherlands was not unhappy about this, as it reopened the way to full inclusion and rearmament of West Germany in NATO. Rapidly afterwards the United States, Britain and France met in London and Paris. This resulted in the so-called 'London Agreements', which "were to form the basis of European defense policy for the next half century" (Judt, 2007). In short, the 1948 Brussels Treaty was extended into the Western European Union (WEU), of which West Germany also became member. The newly established West German army – the *Bundeswehr* – would only be 500.000 men strong, and the FRG joined NATO as a sovereign state in 1955. This defense constellation would last until the end of the Cold War in Europe.

The EDC and West Germany: a chance to regain sovereignty?

Like in the case of the Netherlands, West Germany initially also responded quite reserved to the Pleven Plan, although it did not reject it outright. However, the FRG approached the whole question of a possible European army and West German rearmament from a radically different point of view than did the Dutch government. Whereas the Dutch most of all approached the question from the point of view of security and including the British and especially the Americans in the Western alliance, to the *Bundesrepublik* these questions above all evolved around the possibility to regain parts of its sovereignty. The first *Bundeskanzler*, Konrad Adenauer, initially saw little in an autonomous German army, "fearing a resurgence of militarism […] Adenauer opposed either an autonomous Federal Army or the service of Germans in other armies […] Thus, while the possibility of German troops was openly discussed in 1949-50, there was too much opposition (and German reluctance) to resolve the issue" (House, 2011). In fact, in a speech to his CDU/CSU in January 1949, Adenauer had stated: "Should, in due time, German units be

established, these cannot be German forces, but 'European' forces, in which German forces are integrated" (as cited in Ebert, 2013). This all changed with the outbreak of the Korean War, which made the possible rearmament of West Germany ever more urgent.

Adenauer saw a chance of taking a leap forward in regaining German sovereignty. He saw the EDC as a way to do so, and perhaps via this institution also achieve membership of the FRG of NATO (Ebert, 2013). He declared himself to be willing to contribute to a European army with German troops, but in exchange demanded the end of the Occupation Statute and full sovereignty of the Federal Republic (Herbert, 2014). From the birth of the *Bundesrepublik* in 1949 onwards, this had been the main goal of Adenauer. However, he had little room to manoeuvre because of restrictions imposed by the Allied powers. Nevertheless, the Chancellor had two, partially overlapping goals. Via 'Westbindung' and 'Westintegration' the FRG should be integrated in the Western bloc (Kitchen, 2000).

In practice this meant integrating West Germany in European and Atlantic organisations by reaching agreements with the Western allies. As such, Adenauer endeavoured for a recovery of West German sovereignty and an equal place in Europe (Boterman, 2005). The Chancellor was heavily criticized, both externally as well as internally. A member of the communist party labelled him "nothing but an American general" (cited in Van Clemen, 2009), while Adenauer's main rival, Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the social-democrats, referred to him as "Chancellor of the Allies" (cited in Kleßmann, 1991).

Nevertheless, the Pleven Plan opened new possibilities for improving West Germany's sovereignty. As had been the case with the ECSC, the Pleven Plan was above all of importance from a political point of view (Lak, 2016). Even though the French proposal was in fact discriminatory towards West Germany – after all, Germany could not have units larger than battalion size and there was to be no separate West German military headquarters, for example – Adenauer was prepared to approve the proposal.

In a discussion in the West German parliament – the *Bundestag* – in November 1950 he stated that he saw the Pleven Plan as an essential contribution to the integration of Europe. In his words: "We are of the opinion, that the establishment of a European army – possible including Great Britain – is an important step on the way to the end goal: European integration" (Deutscher

Bundestag, 98th Meeting, Bonn, 8 November 1950).[1] Adenauer's statement was strongly criticized, especially by Schumacher, who stated that "the spirit of the Pleven Plan is not that of reconciliation" (Deutscher Bundestag, 98th Meeting, Bonn, 8 November 1950).[2] Adenauer was prepared to agree to the Pleven Plan, but only under the provision that West Germany would have the full and same rights. As Adenauer stated in the West German parliament: "A European defense community is impossible when one of its members is occupied. Therefore, the end of the Occupation Statute is a precondition for the EDC-Treaty" (Deutscher Bundestag, 221st Meeting, Bonn, 9 July 1950).[3] As Herbert has stated: "To him, it was decisive that the establishment of a European Defence Community and the revision of the Occupation Statute were linked" (Herbert, 2014). However, this would not be the case. Although West Germany would have to form an army of around 400.000 men, revision of the Occupation Statute was as yet out of the question to the Allies, let alone give the FRG full sovereignty. In short, "one needed the Germans, but they were not trusted" (Herbert, 2014). Adenauer resented this. For example, in an interview with CBS in December 1950, he had stated that only if the German forces were considered equal and treated as such in a moral and material way, they would be useful and reliable ally (Interview Adenauer with CBS, 22 December 1950). At the same time, the fact that no state could have more divisions than France – i.e. at the most four – led Adenauer to claim to the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak that this would make the combined strength of the EDC "militarily worthless" (Conversation Adenauer with Spaak, 18 August 1954; https://www.konrad-adenauer.de/dokumente/gespraeche/1954-08-18-gespraech-spaak?highlight=Truppe [Accessed 28/11/2018])

Adenauer's main opponent in parliament, the social-democratic SPD, opposed the EDC, like it opposed most attempts at European integration as well as NATO membership in the 1950s (Bootsma, 2017). Schumacher and his immediate successor Erich Ollenhauer had different views on Adenauer's strategy of *Westbindung* and especially the West German contribution to defense alliances that might be the result of it (Hanke, 2005). Above all, the SPD rejected the EDC as it saw such a West German contribution as, in the words of Ollenhauer, "incompatible with the

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[1] The original reads: "Wir betrachten den Pleven-Plan als einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Integration Europas […] Wir sind der Auffassung, daß die Schaffung einer europäischen Armee – möglichst unter Teilnahme Englands – einer sehr wesentlichen Fortschritt zu dem Wege zur Erreichung des Endzieles: Integration Europas, bedeuten wird".

[2] The original reads: "Denn der Geist des Planes Pleven ist nicht der Geist der Aussöhnung".

[3] The original reads: "Keine Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft ist möglich mit einem Staat, der unter Besatzungsstatut steht. Daher ist die Aufhebung der Besatzungsstatut Voraussetzung des Vertrages über die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft".

German reunification" (Deutscher Bundestag, 47th Meeting, Bonn, 7 October 1954).[4] When the French National Assembly voted against the EDC Treaty, shortly afterwards Ollenhauer sneered: "All doubts of the SPD on the establishment and workability of the EDC were seen as 'un-European' and put aside as pure 'no-politics' […] The social-democratic assessment of the continuation of the integration policy has shown itself to be far more realistic than that of the government and governing parties" (Deutscher Bundestag, 47th Meeting, Bonn, 7 October 1954).[5]

In fact and somewhat cynical, the French refusal to sign the EDC Treaty in August 1954 offered a far better chance to Adenauer for regaining sovereignty. With the failure of a European army, the British and American returned to their original plan of an independent West German army integrated in NATO. For the West German government this was far more beneficial, as it gained for more sovereignty here than it would have in the EDC. Churchill, the one who had opened the whole discussion on West German rearmament, had referred to the EDC as "a sludgy amalgam", and told Eisenhower that he did not blame the French for refusing the plan, only for inventing it (Lundestad, 1998). In Bonn, these remarks likely met strong approval. The rearmament of West Germany could now, finally, start in earnest.**Conclusions**

When, in October 1950, French Foreign Minister René Pleven launched his plan for a European army, including West German units, he left many in Europe completely stunned. Every bit as revolutionary as the Schuman Plan launched in May that year, Pleven's plan proposed an alternative for including national German units in NATO, at a moment in time when the Americans had begun suggesting rearming West Germany to strengthen the Western defense against a possible and highly anticipated attack by the Soviet Union. The question prevalent at the end of the 1940s, with the Cold War reaching boiling point after the Berlin Blockade, the definitive division of Germany in the FRG and GDR and the Soviet Union's for explosion of an atomic bomb, became even more urgent when the Korean War started in June 1950.

However, the French strongly opposed the resurrection of an independent West German army. The Pleven Plan was basically designed to profit from West German manpower, but limiting independent German units to at the most 1000 men. There was to be no separate German

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[4] The original reads: "Hier lag einer der wesentliche Gründe für unsere Ablehnung der EVG".

[5] The original reads: "Alle Zweifel der Sozialdemokratie an der Möglichkeit des Zustandekommens und an der Wirksamkeit der EVG-Lösung wurden als Ausdruck einer uneuropäischen Einstellung und als eine reine Verneinungspolitik beiseitegeschoben […] The sozialdemokratische Bedeutung für die Durchsetzung der Integrationspolitik hat sich als weit realistischer erwiesen als die Vorstellungen der Regierung und der Regierungsparteien".

headquarters, and in many other respects the Pleven Plan was discriminatory as well. The proposal for the European Defence Community (EDC) met with strong opposition and criticism. Nevertheless, in 1952 the EDC-Treaty was signed by the Six Founding Fathers of European integration.

Both the Netherlands and West Germany joined the negotiations about the EDC, but for very different reasons. The former at first only joined as observer, only later, under strong American pressure, did it, paradoxically as the first, sign the EDC-Treaty. The Dutch reservations were above all caused by the fact that Great Britain and the United States were not part of the plan, and the fear of French dominance. The Netherlands were of the opinion that Western European security could only be achieved if the British and above all the Americans were part of the common European defense. Therefore, the Dutch tried to prevent, in tandem with Belgium, the EDC getting a too supranational and political character. In this, these countries succeeded. In the end, the French National Assembly did not ratify the EDC-Treaty, much to the relieve of The Hague, which had always preferred security cooperation in NATO and making a rearmed West Germany a fully-fledged member of the organisation.

The Federal Republic of Germany also signed the EDC-Treaty, but for different reasons. To Adenauer, joining the EDC would offer the chance of regaining (parts of) West German sovereignty, so severely restricted by the Western allies. Although the West German forces were not treated on equal footing in the EDC, it did offer prospects in that direction. Moreover, Adenauer – who initially had been reluctant to establish an independent German army – saw the Pleven Plan as a further step towards European integration, although certainly not all in West German politics agreed to that. With the failure of the EDC-Treaty in August 1954, the British and Americans returned to their old plan, i.e. the rearmament of West Germany and incorporating it in NATO. This indeed allowed the FRG to regain much of its sovereignty, which had after all been the main of Adenauer's 'Westbindung' and 'Westintegration'.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION OF ITALIAN WOMEN IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

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Abstract: *Politics is a field in which the female presence is still very scarce; however, women having attended political positions, as head of governments, have left their marks as to be nicknamed iron ladies. The relationship of women with politics continues to be discussed and is increasingly addressed as a democracy rather than women problem. Although the Italian women have acquired political rights in the last century, they have not been able to participate to a large extent in representative political institutions. The purpose of this article is to analyze the reasons for this phenomenon, and whether it is linked to representation crisis and socio-cultural factors. It is a question of raising public awareness on this issue, and of changing a political culture which even today considers man to be the legitimate protagonist of the State management.*

Keywords: Italian women; politics; leadership; vote; human rights.

Introduction

Despite the fact that in recent years the women's political participation has undergone significant changes both in terms of quantity and quality, several studies continue to emphasize

that the relational network of men still remains not only more extensive than that of women, but also of a stronger political importance.

"The sociological cut allows – thanks also to the amplitude of the examined and proposed material in the context of a problem that remains open, without ideological constraints and without conclusive answers – a careful approach to the current situation as it emerges in today's political affair with its debates, its conditioning, as well as its disappointments. In the base of this claim there is more than a sacrosanct legitimate subjective right: there is the utopia of recomposition, in the collective political project, of the spheres of interests of humanity, the recognition of the historical-political value for the design of the future, demographic and affective problems, daily well-being and life organization". (Nicola, 1983, p. 11)

Given the lower level of political information and a limited sense of effectiveness, the inclusion in groups and organizational structures, even if not specifically political, increases for the women the sense of security in the affirmation of their opinions and stimulates their political participation from voting to active commitment. The greater dependence on political intermediaries would be the consequence of a low confidence in their ability to elaborate autonomous political opinions and of the need to be reassured. This need for reassurance, which often comes from groups and organizations still dominated by male figures, highlights the persistence of the so-called "independence gap".

The issue of the absence of female presence in many positions of political decision-making is a fact that, sixty years after the acquisition of electoral rights by women, constitutes the symptom of a defeat for democracy itself. It leaves open the problem of rebalancing the representation and accomplishing an effective and not halved democracy. Furthermore, concrete measures are needed to be taken in order to promote the political participation of women. Firstly, the electoral system of a majority type tends in itself to exclude minor political forces such as, for instance, the young people, who are today on the margins of politics. In the basic political structures, such as parties and unions, with the women not being present to a considerable extent, a female political movement, capable of constituting itself as a point of reference for the female voters as well as the elected ones, has not been formed yet. In addition, the absence of women in primary party

organizations deprives the candidates from the moral and political support during the election campaign.

The contact with realities such as school, hospitals, parish, acquired during the personal experience of a daughter, wife and mother, has given the women a singular ability to analyze the society, to understand the problems and often successfully try to solve them. By showing a strong sense of civic responsibility, women have chosen other political locations to operate.

The feminist movement and political representation in Europe

"Feminism was the first form of public identity movement started by women, at first as a fierce minority, then in increasingly extended groups, since the end of 1600". (Aistone & Spence: 2010)

At that time, a fierce dispute about the abilities and social role of women was initiated. The problem was on the agenda: economic, social and political transformations had laid the foundations for a broader and more conscious participation of women in the political, artistic and cultural life. Yet many of them still led a wretched and mortifying life, excluded from the high levels of education as well as from every significant role, surrendered to natural life during or through marriage or seclusion.

But we must historically wait for the French Revolution (1789) to find out significant documents related to the image of woman. Thus we find in France Olympe de Gouges (1748-1793) with her "*Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen*" of 1791. The intent of the Declaration was to make women aware of the rights denied to them and then to ask for their reintegration in order to make women become citizens in every respect. The woman – is stated in the Declaration – is born free and has the same rights as the man. Social distinctions can only be based on common utility (art.1) (Santucci, 2004, p. 42); as natural rights are considered freedom, property, security and above all resistance to oppression (Article 2); all the female citizens must be admitted to every public dignity, position and employment, based on their abilities and without other distinctions compared to those of their virtues and talents (art.6); the woman must be free to express her thoughts and opinions (art.11). (Martino & Bruzzese, 1994, p. 181)

In England, just in the same period, there is Mary Wollstonecraft (1739-1797), author of a work entitled "*Claiming the rights of women*" (1792), which intends to place the demands for liberation and social and political equality women in the context of the more general enlightening program of human rights. Women must leave their golden cage of "femininity", which constitutes

the other side of marginalization and subordination; the woman must acquire the ideal of reason, addressing her own sex; no more seductive lovers, but "affectionate mothers and rational mothers". Women must be fully involved in the enlightening and reformist project: education, political rights, personal responsibility, economic equality, rationality and virtue, freedom and happiness. These are the ideals of Wollstonecraft, who also comes to provocatively propose a female demystifying "chastity" of ambiguous relations with man. The female mind has been relegated from male tyranny into a limbo of fatuity to which women, for the most part, have adapted themselves. But women nowadays must know that the rights they claim correspond to duties and that rebellion against male domination must take place in the name of universal values, such as those emerging from modern thought. Intellect, virtue and freedom are the three faces of enlightened reasoning, laid down by Wollstonecraft as principles of her thought. Her goal is the creation of a "new civilization", in which humanity is virtuous and happy. (Wollstonecraft, 1977, p. 78)

In Italy, the women's rights movement was born lagging behind other countries. When the industrial revolution started to include women as a labour force, problems such as working hours arose, in order to be reconciled with housework, as well as the protection of motherhood. Thus, female groups were formed, which at first were mostly formed by women of the bourgeoisie. Later on, movements of socialist women also joined them. *Anna Maria Mozzoni*, with her autobiographical book "*A woman and Anna Kuliscioff*", was among the pioneers of women's rights movement.

The real feminism will only come into being only in the nineteenth century. The ethical-political horizon of nineteenth-century feminism has been that of egalitarianism between sexes and the legal and economic emancipation of women. During the nineteenth century, feminists have committed themselves both on specific objectives as well as on issues concerning human and civil rights in a broad sense: struggles for freedom of thought and association, for the abolition of slavery and prostitution, for peace. Another thing to note is that the feminist movement has coexisted with the socialist movement since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the political sign of feminism changed as a result of urbanization and industrialization processes taking place both in Europe and in the United States. Not only learned and highly educated women, but also women among working class and petty-bourgeoisie were involved by the socialist and feminist movements who finally identified a specific strategy to address the "female question".

In the United States there was Lucretia Coffin Mott (1793-1880), a social reformer and "Quaker" preacher, working on the issues of the abolition of slavery, of the election right for women and of peace in the world. In England, the National Society for Woman's Suffrage, led by Lydia Becker, and the Ladies National Association of Josephine Butler, were also committed to regulation if not abolition of prostitution.

In France, we can remember Hubertine Auclert (1848-1914), who proposed a salary for housewives in 1879 and promoted a women's tax strike up until granting of the right to vote. In 1904, she became protagonist of a news story that made her even more famous: in the course of yet another feminist event, she tore up a copy of the Napoleonic Code, which anniversary was celebrated in those days, for its unfair provisions, according to Auclert, in the field of private law.

But we must wait for the mid-60s of this century, when the Women's Liberation Movement was born as an expression of contradictions of the female social role in the countries of advanced capitalism (Europe and USA): economic insertion at low levels of the system, exploitation of domestic work, consumer use of female image, repressive education, extraneousness of women to traditional political parties, need for new values. During this period, precisely in 1963, in the United States appeared an essay written by Betty Friedan, "The Mysticism of Femininity" (Betty Friedan, 1963), where she claimed that the American society had reached the point of maximum tension between the reality of female life and the woman image proposed by mass media and official culture. According to Friedan, starting from the 1940s, a "mysticism of femininity" was proposed, that is, a model of organic and closed life and happiness: love, children, husband, home, shopping, clothes, etc., that finally was falling into a crisis.

The debate was enriched in 1969 with the publication of "The politics of sex" by Kate Millet (Millet, 1979). With this book, the specifically radical trend of new feminism was inaugurated, a sexist and separatist tendency that eventually combined cultural and literary analysis, the program of a radical opposition against a society intended primarily as a masculine and patriarchal one. Millet explicitly made the action of Feminism a struggle against a power for another and different power. Thus, the aim of the movement was no longer that of equality, but of excellence of the woman, of her superiority: it was a feminism of difference, a feminism that was to be qualified above all as an intellectual movement. Twenty years after the first street demonstrations and winning struggles on divorce and abortion, feminism is still alive, even if it has been transformed into the culture and political reflection of women. (De Leo 1999, p. 265)

Radical feminism has become, in fact, since the 80s, a feminism of complexity, a systemic feminism. But the fact of its having become a cultured, in some respects esoteric feminism, does not constitute the only transformation. Out of a mass social movement, it has become a network of small groups: this has allowed a refinement of the theoretical elaboration, but it has probably lost positions on the political level, while the "rights of women" have become a sort of commonplace of the political agenda for all parties.

The ultimate challenge attempted by the women's political movement in Italy – of which the National Feminine Union represented the most articulate and mature expression – was to consciously assume the partiality of a subject excluded at every level from the totality of a project of change – the women – as a universal measure and paradigm of transformation.

Such a prospect would have been sustainable, but only if the woman had been prepared to live as an autonomous subject that did not take the male meter to check her role in the world, but would simply measure her own self. (Buttafuoco, 1992, p. 27).

Women in Europe: the tools of women's politics

To examine the role and position of European women in political institutions, a brief historical reference should be made starting with the acquisition of the right to vote, as the female political history in this context is recent. At the end of the 18th century, European women did not enjoy civil or political rights, granted only to restricted sections of the population.

In fact, before obtaining the right to vote and eligibility on cantonal and federal level, women could express their political commitment only in the context of women's organizations and professional associations. In some countries, they could also take part in school commissions, commissions for public assistance, ecclesial and parish councils and in some other political authority. Even the first women holding municipal or regional political offices at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s had been active in such forums before trying to reach the big public stage.

In 1971, when women finally entered federal politics, they also began their advance into party functions, in parliaments, in the executive and other political offices. In European comparison, the women's presence in the National Council, with 23.5% of the votes achieved in the federal elections of 1999, is actually in the median band: higher percentages are to be observed in the Scandinavian area and in the Netherlands (between 36% and 42.7%), as well as in Germany (30.9%), Spain (28.3%) and Austria (26.8%). Despite the progress made and although the women

constitute the majority of resident population and electorate, the Swiss women are still decidedly underrepresented at all political levels.

The Nordic countries are all among the top ten in the ranking: in the last five years, the first 4 positions are constantly held by Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden[1], while Denmark is in 7th place. The first 4 countries are among the top 20 in the sub-index of participation and economic opportunities and again get the first 4 places in the sub-index of political participation. In the Nordic countries, in fact, female labour force participation is among the highest in the world and the wage differences compared to men are among the lowest in the world, even though full pay equality has not yet been achieved. The policies of these countries include mandatory paternity leaves in association with generous maternity leaves, incentives and post-maternity programs of re-entry. In some countries, a leave can also last a full year: in Norway, the leave lasts 46 weeks with an allowance equal to 100% of the salary, or 56 weeks with 80% of the salary; in Sweden, the leave lasts 480 days, with an allowance calculated on salary basis for the first 390 days (80% of the salary, within a maximum limit) and a fixed allowance in the last 90 days; in Denmark, it lasts 52 weeks to 80% of the salary (with a maximum ceiling).

Icelandic post-maternity re-entry programs have strongly contributed to positioning the country in first place in the Global Gender Gap Index: in Iceland, it is the legal right to return to work after the child birth and a capillary system of nurseries and kindergartens is offered by the main municipalities. Women also have many opportunities to achieve positions of power, partly because the Nordic countries have adopted policies to promote female leadership. Regarding women's participation in politics, the Nordic countries were among the pioneers of women's right to vote[2], and in the 1970s the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish political parties introduced voluntary quotas, with a consequent increasing in political participation of women. Actually the figures of women's participation in politics in the Nordic countries are among the highest in the world, both in terms of percentage of women in parliament (45% in Sweden, 43% in Iceland, 40% in Norway and Finland, 38% in Denmark), as well as concerning the number of women in the

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[1] Listed in the order in which they appear in the Global Gender Gap Index of 2010.

[2] The right of women to vote was ratified in 1906 in Finland, in 1913 in Norway, in 1915 in Iceland and Denmark, in 1919 in Sweden.

position of ministers (63% in Finland, 53% in Norway, 45% in Sweden and Iceland, 42% in Denmark).

Tab. 1 - World ranking of female presence in national parliaments

Rank	Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats	Women	% W	Elections	Seats	Women	% W
1	Rwanda	9 2008	80	45	56.30%	10 2003	26	9	34.60%
2	Sweden	9 2010	349	157	45.00%	---	---	---	---
3	South Africa	4 2009	400	178	44.50%	4 2009	54	16	29.60%
4	Cuba	1 2008	614	265	43.20%	---	---	---	---
5	Iceland	4 2009	63	27	42.90%	---	---	---	---
6	Netherlands	6 2010	150	61	40.70%	5 2007	75	26	34.70%
7	Finland	3 2007	200	80	40.00%	---	---	---	---
8	Norway	9 2009	169	67	39.60%	---	---	---	---
9	Belgium	6 2010	150	59	39.30%	6 2010	71	27	38.00%
10	Mozambique	10 2009	250	98	39.20%	---	---	---	---

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

Recently, the issue concerning the political participation of women has become very current; the EU has undertaken a series of initiatives (polls, surveys, declarations of principle, legislative initiatives), also involving individual national governments, but women still continue to be under-represented in positions involving political and economic responsibilities, even if the percentage has increased during the last ten years. The rate of women's employment, although growing, has yet to increase in order to reach the target set by the Europe 2020 strategy.

History of Italian Women in the 20th century

In Italy, women's long journey towards equality and full political citizenship embraces the period extended from the country's unification to the present day, i.e. from the conquest of the right to vote to the most recent policies of equal opportunities. The struggle for gender equality in Italy took place later than the rest of the European Union.

In the young Italian Republic, women were, in fact, excluded from both political and administrative voting rights. Nevertheless, prominent figures such as Anna Maria Mozzoni denounce the situation of limited citizenship imposed by the Italian State on its own female citizens. Between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century(Morandini, 1988, p. 177), some newly established organizations get involved in the issue of civil and political rights (The National Association for the Woman, The National Women Union, The National Council of Italian Women, The Women's Alliance, the National Committee for Suffrage). The bill for women's voting rights in the life of the Italian Republic will be twenty, but until the World War II none of these will be approved and sometimes not even discussed.

The advent of fascism had heavy repercussions on the women citizenship: in 1925, with the Acerbo Law, the right to vote for some categories of women was granted, but soon after the establishment of the mayoral regime, the recognized rights were cancelled. Many associations were dissolved, while others survived only under the regime control or emptied of any political significance. Fascism promoted an active policy towards the female universe and outlined a specific social figure for women; it braked the participation in the labour market (women's wages were set by law to half of men's, and they were progressively excluded from some careers) and the women's activity was limited within domestic walls through demographic policy, the Family Code and the new Criminal Code.

The Second World War is whiteness of a new female protagonist in the Resistance. In January 1945, the Council of Ministers issued the decree recognizing the right to vote for women who had completed their twenty-first years of age on December 31, 1944. In the Constituent Assembly we find 21 elected women and in the Constitution was established the principle of gender equality (articles 3, 4, 37, 29, 51), with some exceptions regarding the family institution (articles 29, 30, 31 and 37), in which the priority role of women is reconfirmed.

Italy experienced the first female suffrage experiment on June 2, 1946, when 13,354,601 men and 14.610.845 women were called to vote for the Constituent Assembly. Contradicting those who expected women not to exercise their new right, 12.998.131 female against 11,949,056 male voters went to the polls. On that occasion, the percentage of female voters reached the figure of 89.1%. But if women's political participation started in 1945 with their acquisition of active and passive political rights, women's accession to politics and their intervention within the parties is noted already earlier. (Bagnato, 2006, p. 56)

In the immediate post-war period, the objective of giving women the right to vote was included in the program of the Italian Popular Party. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that in the National Council of the party there was a female representative already since its foundation.

Later on, with the beginning of democratic life, beside the right to vote, the woman acquired the right to be elected in municipal and provincial councils and in parliamentary assemblies. All the parties welcomed women as their members and different treatments were granted to them from a party to another.

The Communist Party, in the article 4 of the first post-World War II statutory paper, stated the following related to the political cellule structure: "*The women enrolled in the party can be organized in mixed or female cellules both at work and at home*". Subsequently the statute was modified with the words: "only in exceptional cases, the constitution of female cellules is allowed".

Subsequently, however, there was no longer talk of women's movement, but only of female activities that could be expressed through provincial commissions and a national commission. (Bagnato, 2006, p. 96)

During the 1940s, new work benefits became available to women, including maternity leave, daycare, and counseling. These benefits developed more substantially in Europe, as many countries there were devastated by war, where much of the male population was reduced. (Castledine & Laughlin, 2011, p. 4). On June 2, 1946, after the institutional referendum and the constituent assembly elections, the Italian women exercised for the first time the right to political vote.

The period after World War II sees the first woman named in a government. The practical realization of equality principle between the sexes was achieved after years of hard struggles by women.

Only in 1963, the law was passed admitting the women's competing to become a part of the judiciary and in 1965 appear the first female judges. Also, in 1963, the law prohibiting the dismissal due to marriage was voted.

In the 1970s, the second wave feminist movement expanded and continued to gain momentum. Carol Hanisch published an essay in 1970 titled "The Personal is Political." Hanisch argued that everything was political, including division of household labor, gender roles, and other day-to-day activities. If a woman decided to have an abortion and get a job as a woman in a male dominated

industry, then that decision has political consequences and became politicized in society. Women had to bring their private, household problems into the public sphere because issues were politicized and had consequence far outside of an individual (Man Ling, 2007).

During the 70s, in Italy, following the emerging on the public scene of female and feminist movements, divorce was introduced, the Family Law was reformed ensuring legal equality between spouses, and voluntary termination of pregnancy was legalized. In 1977, the law of parity was approved, amended in 1991 by the new legislation on equal opportunities (Law, 125), providing for positive actions as an instrument for overcoming inequalities. Since the Unification of Italy onwards, the presence of women had been particularly significant, and as expressed by them, the Italian women had exercised their intelligence, talents and feeling capacities: education, work, charity (Italian Women Committee, 1904).

Just in the 80s, in fact, in Italy there was the start of institutional policies in favour of women. Central and local equality bodies have been set up; the presence of women in institutions grew. And we cannot forget the profound change in society due to the emerging of the values and culture of women. This change has produced a diverse way of conceiving the relationships between sexes, and for women, it has favoured the acquisition of "self-awareness": a process made possible even by the massive inclusion into the world of labour. (Cappiello, 1999, p. 17)

In this period, the community legislation accompanies the national legislation, which often anticipates the issues subsequently taken into consideration at state level. Political representation and presence of women in decision-making processes is one of the fronts of greater debate. In 1993, Italy moved from proportional to majority system and the mandatory quotas for male and female applications were approved (Law 125/91). The Constitutional Court however, with the sentence No 442 of 1995, declares such norms as illegitimate. In 1996, the alternation of male and female candidates on electoral lists in Italy was abolished; this provision, added to the adoption of a mixed majority voting system, negatively influenced the political participation of women.

In reality, despite the undoubted successes in the grown presence of women in institutions, work and cultural life, if only we consider, among others, indicators such as the presence of women in the seats of economic and political decisions, we come to realize that gender equality is far from being acquired. In all the working sectors, in fact, men tend to occupy positions of greater power and status; in organizations, the top management positions are mostly occupied by men, and in the political institutions the number of women is constantly lower than that of men.

Female representation in the Italian Parliament

A more articulate and not foregone reflection on the meaning of women's political representation in Italy today also allows us to better understand data and statistics. In this section, I will present some empirical research results with the aim of reconstructing the meaning of women's presence in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies since 1948 (year of entry into force of the Republican Constitution) to date, trying to trace biographical and political characteristics in the phenomenon.

Although women acquired political citizenship in 1946 and thus obtained the right to elect and be elected, their presence has nevertheless remained proportionally limited in spite of its growing over the decades.

In 1946, only 21 women were elected to the Constituent Assembly, or 3.77% of the members. In 1948, with the entry into force of the Constitution and the election of a regular parliament divided into two branches, the female senators were found to be 1.27%, while the female deputies amounted to 6.19%. The historical lows were reached in the Senate in 1953 with 0.32%, while in the Chamber of Deputies in 1968 with 2.7%. 60 years later, in 2008, the female senators rise to 18.32%, while the deputies are at 20.95%.

To date, 51.6% of Italians are women. 52% of the voters are women. These data contrast with the lack of women's presence in both national and local representative assemblies and above all, with the great role women have assumed in Italian society in the field of labour, professions, education, also excelling in sectors that until a few years ago they were the exclusive domain of men.

This reduced level of female participation in the case of Italy constitutes a pathology of the representative system, which in the past has not been dealt with sufficiently. In fact, the proportion of female parliamentarians has never diverged much from 10% and the regulations passed in the early 1990s, in an attempt to heal this gap, were annulled by the Constitutional Court, because they were found in contrast with the principle of formal equality of citizens in the field of active and passive electoral rights. In the last legislature, a bill of a parliamentary initiative, to change the Constitution in this matter, did not go beyond a first reading by the Chamber.

On this subject, in July 2001, a constitutional bill was approved for the amendment of article 51 of the Constitution concerning access to elective offices and public offices. This is a preparatory

and fundamental step for any legislation supporting female representation, because it aims to create a "constitutional umbrella" for positive actions in favour of the women.

The "new" article 51 of the Constitution became a law on May 30, 2003. In the "old" text, at the end of the first paragraph, was added the sentence: "The Republic promotes with equal provisions equal opportunities between women and men", affirming not only the right of all citizens of both sexes to access, in conditions of equality of law and fact, to public offices and elective offices, but also the constitutional "mission" to promote the rebalancing of representation.

This is an issue that Italy wished to be focal also during its presidency of the European Union, in the second half of 2003, dedicating thus to "Women in political and economic decision-making processes" the great event and ministerial conference on equal opportunities. On that occasion the EU ministers approved a document defining as a common political objective that of having in the various countries of the Union a share of female candidates that would be never less than one third. This was an objective to pursue especially in countries where political practice was not already consolidated at a more favourable extent for women, through means including constitutional and regulatory interventions. In fact, the Government's project for women developed during 2004 with the modification of the article 51. This includes initiatives concerning an electoral, as well as social and cultural level.

The first national electoral consultation scheduled after the approval of the constitutional amendment was that concerning the renewal of the European Parliament. And it is on that occasion that under the bill on the so-called "election day", a provision was approved by the Council of Ministers and therefore by the Parliament that introduced the obligation for parties to reserve no less than one third of the candidates for the less represented gender. The measure is temporary and applies to the two European electoral cycles following the approval of this provision.

The violation of this provision is punished by a reduction in the amount of reimbursement of electoral expenses, up to a maximum of half, in direct proportion to the difference of number of candidates considering the maximum allowed for each gender. This law, applied for the first time in the European elections last June, led to the doubling of female candidates, which were about 35% of the total, and a substantial increase in the number of elected candidates, which rose from 11 to 19% of Italian representatives in Strasbourg.

Female representation in the Italian Parliament, although decidedly minor, has strengthened in the last legislature (XVI): in the Chamber of Deputies women are equal to 21.27 of the elected

members while in the Senate of the Republic female senators represent 18.3% of the assembly. Such quotas are absolutely the highest in the parliamentary history for both chambers, and reverse the negative trend of the decrease of female representation in the Parliament produced during the 90s, after the peak recorded in the twelfth legislature.

The data acquire additional positive value considering the distribution of the elected by age group. In fact, relations between gender representations are less unbalanced in favour of men in the younger classes (25-29 and 29-39 in the Chamber and 40-49 in the Senate); this figure, also considering the strong rate of re-election in successive legislatures characterizing the country, would suggest a further consolidation of shares of the elected women even in the older classes, during the course of future legislatures[3].

Tab. 2 – Women senator from 1ˢᵗ (1948) to the 16ᵗʰ (2008) Legislature

THE WOMEN IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT		
LEGISLATURE	**CHAMBER (%)**	**SENATE (%)**
COSTITUENT 1946-48	4,1	
1^ LEGISLATURE 1948	6,7	1,1
2^ LEGISLATURE 1953	5,5	0,4
3^ LEGISLATURE 1958	3,6	1,2
4^ LEGISLATURE 1963	4,6	1,8
5^ LEGISLATURE 1968	2,6	3,1
6^ LEGISLATURE 1972	3,8	1,5
7^ LEGISLATURE 1976	8,4	3,4
8^ LEGISLATURE 1979	8,4	3,4
9^ LEGISLATURE 1983	7,9	4,9
10^ LEGISLATURE 1987	12,6	6,7
11^ LEGISLATURE 1992	7,9	9,0
12^ LEGISLATURE 1994	15,4	8,6
13^ LEGISLATURE 1996	9,5	7,9
14^ LEGISLATURE 2001	11,5	8,1
15^ LEGISLATURE 2006	17,3	14
16^ LEGISLATURE 2008	21,27	18.3
MEDIA	*8.9*	*6.5*

Source:

http://www.istat.it/istat/eventi/2006/partecipazione_politica_2006/partecipazionepolitica.pdf

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[3] Sources: Senate of the Republic; Chamber of Deputies, Prerogative Service and Immunity and Inter-Parliamentary Union, Database Regional Parliamentary assemblies.

Fig. 1. – Women Senators from 1ˢᵗ (1948) to 16ᵗʰ (2008) Legislature

Source:http://www.istat.it/istat/eventi/2006/partecipazione_politica_2006/partecipazionepolitica.pdf

As shown in the graph above, over the decades there has been a substantial increase in the number of female senators and deputies. However, this growth is not only due to greater political sensitivity towards female representation, interest in self-candidacy or implementation of constitutional provisions, but it is related to the intervention of "external" factors and "interior" legislative corrective measures. It is therefore an epiphenomenon determined by the effect of application of international regulations on equal opportunities (UN conventions, including CEDAW against gender discrimination) and the directives issued by the European Union, starting from equal treatment and remuneration.

But there are also other reasons. It is not, in fact, a case that the greatest surge in female presences since the post-war period, with 14.44% in the Chamber and 9.21% in the Senate, occurred in 1994, a year after the entry into force of the law No 81 of 25-3-1993, which admitted quotas or "reserved" places for female candidates. However, a subsequent ruling by the Constitutional Court had judged this as an unconstitutional law (No. 422, 1995) on basis of the

principle of freedom, according to which every citizen can choose whether to vote or be voted, regardless of gender.

The so-called debate on "pink quotas" has then continued to this day, provoking countless polemics, ended with an unusual but understandable bipartisan coalition between male parliamentarians, united by gender solidarity and fear of losing the privileges acquired. But the commitment to promoting women's participation in political life is not limited to the regulatory side. Cultural action, information and training are essential in this matter.

A first step in this direction was made by starting in 17 universities in the central-southern area of the country a project called "Women, politics and institutions – Training courses for promotion of equal opportunities in decision-making and political centres". This is a training course for women with a high school diploma, aimed at promoting their affirmation and inclusion in political life and decision-making centres, both at national and local level, in elective assemblies, in Councils and Consultative Committees, where women are generally in a minority position.

At a local level, the female presence in Italy is decidedly consistent, especially when compared to data relating to Parliament; the number of women in the Regions and Provinces is growing moderately, while in municipalities there is a significant female participation. Consideration should be given to why women are more politically present at local level than at central level. It is increasingly clear that wherever women have embarked on a training path that would lead them to demanding professional and responsible outcomes, this could only happen by paying higher prices, significantly higher than men.

However, there is still no awareness that the participation of women in politics can bring that typically feminine pragmatism, concreteness and determination in pursuing objectives with a spirit of sacrifice and dedication to the common good. As the women – compared to men – are less worried in search for positions of power out of pure personal gratification, they constitute in fact the half of free beings. (Aristotle, 1955, p. 60)

The presence of women in politics, in an area still purely masculine, could therefore favour fundamental changes both at the methodological level and in the content of the debate.

A democracy is based on the dual citizenship of women and men, both subject to the right of citizenship and representation. Not a recovery quota for women, but a guarantee of 50% of presence is to be considered with both male and female candidates composing alternately the electoral lists. And this is the other substantial aspect of the proposed law, because the politics

among men and women is finally put back on the public level of confrontation and it is no longer forced into the private bottleneck of struggle between genders. Because there can be no effective policies for women without having the women themselves as protagonists of choices; because one can't have a promotion of empowerment "in the name" of women, but "with" the women (Donno, 2010: 148).

Having more women in elective assemblies, means being able to offer a style of government capable of interpreting at all levels different necessities and offering diversified responses to all men and women, with a more adherent representation of reality. Because no difference will ever be a value if the reality that surrounds us is described and interpreted with a single colour, a single glance, from a single gender. (Donno, 2010, p. 148)

Italian Women and the European context

In different surveys on political participation, at least relying on the chosen indicators, Italy appears to be the European country with the greatest difference between men and women: the gap decreases decidedly among the younger people, but it is still substantial. (Inglehart, 1988, p. 420-422) The increasingly massive access to higher levels of scientific and professional training has been a factor of increasing emphasis on the quality of women's presence in society and the importance of contribution women can provide to civil development of the country. This has not happened without effort and without encountering obstacles. (Papa, 2010, p. 153)

In the EU countries, the gender composition of political representation is often more balanced than the situation in Italy. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the "public" presence of women has a more distant tradition compared to Italy. It is therefore not surprising that in these countries, the female presence in politics is superior to the others. The increase in the number of women present in political institutions has been a consequence of the initiatives of individual governments, aimed at promoting their political participation. The EU, after a series of declarations about principle and non-binding generic opinions, invited the member countries to develop concrete projects that would remove the obstacles encountered by women in politics.

The presence of women in political representation in Italy is low in most international comparisons. In recent years, international statistics have shown a growing gap between men and women in terms of employment and management. In the European Union, Italy is along Greece the country marking the greatest difference between male and female unemployment. Moreover,

among the industrialized countries, Italy is lagging behind the percentage of women in top positions in political, economic and social fields.

The *Global Gender Gap Report 2010* has further highlighted this distance. In the *Report*, the gap between men and women is measured in terms of equal opportunities, referring to four main areas: participation and economic opportunities; educational level; political power; health and survival. Looking at 134 countries, the *Report* shows a clear deterioration of our country's position compared to the previous year. Italy has moved from the 72nd to the 74th place, overtaken by Malawi and Ghana. Only 3 out of 7 women have the opportunity to take on leadership positions. The comment of the Reports editors is lapidary in this regard: "Italy continues to be one of the lowest-ranking countries in the EU and deteriorates further over the last year." (World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap, Report 2010,* p. 21) Regarding the presence of women in the Parliament, Italy occupies the 54th place out of a total of 188 countries internationally, as shown by the statistics produced by the *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, on basis of data provided by the respective Parliaments, within December 31, 2010.

In an international view, the female reality in Italy is still characterized by the "persistence and pervasiveness of the patriarchal attitude and stereotypes rooted in the roles and responsibilities of women and men in family and society". To build a society based on equal opportunities, it would be necessary to focus the spotlight on men and women, starting from these two distinct and indissoluble cores, for a future of substantial equality.

In spite of over thirty from the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which called for the removal of discrimination that restricts women's participation in public and labour life, women are not yet fully represented in decision-making positions.

Italy's marginalization of women is particularly marked, especially in decision-making positions in politics. The comparison with the main European countries shows a gender imbalance in elective representation at national, regional and local levels. At the same time, recent surveys show a growing disaffection of women with respect to traditional forms of political participation. Women manifest also increasing levels of participation in the social life of local realities through a commitment that expresses the necessity to strengthen the women's presence in decision-making positions, as well as to introduce in politics a perspective which is sensitive to gender and diversity in institutions and in political choices.

Conclusions

There are various causes of the low presence of women in politics. First of all, the lack of time penalizes women due to the difficulty in reconciling their requests with the family care and home management activities. The problem becomes more serious when added to the scarcity of economic means that also limits the possibility of undertaking expensive and costly electoral campaigns.

Women's position in the Italian society has been deeply affected by socio-cultural changes since the beginning of the 1970's (second-wave feminism). However, transformations in the structures of the society have not been always consistent with it. Political parties were slow to respond to the requests of civil society movements including women's movement. (Roselli, 2014, p. 8)

The lower political participation of women has multiple causes. For example, women are almost entirely responsible for family issues and therefore for social duties that make them less available for a political career. Women are also less easily accessing politics because they generally occupy less senior positions than men in professional life and are less represented in economic lobbies. As for the opportunities of profiling on political scene, they do not yet have models or a tradition to draw inspiration from. And finally, many women prefer to engage in extra-parliamentary institutions or carry out voluntary activities in the social or ecclesial field.

But it is above all the perception of distance between their own world and that of politics that keeps women away from such activity: "Women emphasize the value of concreteness, of the necessity to measure proposals, to confront each other, to build, to work for objectives, and politics appears to them to be a self-referential space, in which powers and vetoes are exercised, that are neither clear nor objectives, neither the rules nor the places of expression". (Zajczyk, 2007, p. 69)

The temporal factor is also identified by Gelli as an element that makes it difficult for women to access the political dimension, in the sense that "there is no a history, there are missing models of action and interventions/changes on the social reality to which women individually and in group can refer to. The memory of a power, that is an exercise of politics, is lacking" (Gelli, 2009, p. 132) In identifying the factors that in other countries have hindered women's access to politics and institutions, Gelli, alongside the "Catholic religion with more or less direct influence on the model of femininity and the role of women in the family to the majority voting system", places the "delay in granting of suffrage" in the first place.

We have seen that hitherto cultural prejudices have in fact relegated women to the family sphere or have caused them to be entrusted with roles borrowed from domestic life and of little strategic importance. To reverse this trend, we should start from a sort of education and awareness on equal opportunities for men and women. We need to start initiatives aimed at modifying a culture, in which man is still considered the protagonist of management of the republic and implement ways of sensitization to facilitate access to politics of that half of humanity that, as men, must have the same rights in the name of a more balanced representation and in compliance with the principles of democracy and equality.

The most difficult task is to promote a rising of awareness through a new culture that recognizes the values and indispensability of women's contribution to decision-making processes. It must be an action not only in favour of women, but also and above all aimed at women, so that they become aware of the role they must play in institutions. The great revolution consists above all in the way women think, in their courage to present themselves with their specificity instead of making the own old male models their own and masculinising their behaviour; in their abandoning scepticism and starting to become aware of their own qualities and potential with audacity, conviction, and with the ability to grasp new needs and facilitate change.

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A NUCLEAR TEST FOR DIPLOMACY: IRAN AND THE (NEW) EU-US SANCTIONS DEBATE

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Abstract: *Europe and Iran have had important political, cultural and commercial relations that date back several centuries, but these relations have been steadily strained since 2002 when the uncertainty with regard to Iran's nuclear program became an issue of international concern. In the attempt to demonstrate its role as an important foreign policy actor capable of taking the lead in resolving a global crisis, through the leadership of France, United Kingdom and Germany (EU3) the European Union spearheaded efforts to obtain a solution to the deadlock between Tehran and the international community over Iran's nuclear program. Nowadays, after the nuclear agreement with Iran was sealed, the EU can move beyond its exclusive nuclear focus with Iran, and shift to a relationship based on engagement, not containment. However, this goal encounters an unforeseen obstacle: the new American Administration, who wants to shift the US policy on Iran toward aggressive containment and away from the diplomatic openings created by the precedent one. Therefore, it looks that the divide between Europe and the US is set to deepen over Iran, as long as the Trump Administration's heated rhetoric and actions will continue. The EU made it clear, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy statements that it will continue to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Furthermore, the European leaders understood that a constructive relationship between Iran and the EU is essential for the latter, and it could help to achieve its common security and defense objectives while safeguarding its commercial and energy interests. This article aims to present the relation between Europe Union and Iran post-JCPOA and the European agenda on Iran and to explain how and whether the nuclear agreement could become the reason of a European-American cleavage.*

Keywords: European Union, Iran, Constructive Engagement, Nuclear Deal/JCPOA, European Union Global Strategy.

Introduction

Few international challenges seem quite as intractable as the continuing dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community over the development and the direction of Iran's nuclear program. While relations between Washington and Tehran remained subject to

mutual hostility, the European Union constituted a channel of communication since 2003, and has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework and followed a policy of constructive engagement toward Iran. The EU-3 – France, the United Kingdom, and Germany – have spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions. During the 12 years of negotiations with Iran, the EU's role went to several phases: if in 2003 the EU-3 began as a unified and autonomous negotiator and in 2015 it had become a more pragmatic facilitator between Washington and Tehran. However, it seems that Donald Trump's administration is not one to easily get along with it, and on many global security issues, the EU's leaders had very different approaches than the American president. But perhaps nowhere the difference is more profound than on the Iranian issue. Given the president's harsh rhetoric and his decision to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced on May 8th, 2018, a transatlantic clash over this file seems almost inevitable. However, the question is not one between *saving the JCPOA* and *siding or not with the US*, rather is one deciding what the EU's interests at stake are, and which is the best option in order to pursue them. These interests have not changed much since 2003 when the EU-3 states embarked on high-level diplomacy with Iran against the backdrop of the US invasion in Iraq. At the time, the EU was following three main purposes: to prevent the ascendance of an allegedly nuclear Iran, to avoid another war in the already tormented region and to prove its own role as a global player. By adding the issue of European energetic security to this list, so the EU can escape Russia's gas monopoly, one can see the entire picture of the European interests in preserving the JCPOA.

While Donald Trump firmly condemned the Iranian regime and referred to the nuclear agreement as being an "embarrassment" (Trump, 2017: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/), the other parties of the JCPOA are firmly behind it. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel vigorously lobbied President Donald Trump to remain in the agreement during their visits to Washington on the week of April 23, 2018, and the British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson made a similar appeal as the deadline of the withdrawal announcement was approaching. Also, shortly after Donald Trump's decision, the EU-3/EU leaders issued a joint statement expressing "regret" (Katzam, Kerr, Heitshusen, 2018: 3) over the American President's decision. European leaders stated that they remained committed to the JCPOA because it is "important for our joint security" (*Ibid.*) and the European diplomats have consistently asserted that the JCPOA is a binding international

commitment under United Nation Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the agreement. The European reaction appeared to reflect disappointment in the failure of their efforts to address President Trump's concerns through a supplemental agreement or pledges of joint action. Moreover, the European stance on safeguarding the JCPOA is complying with the provisions of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy – a substantial document with many complex dimensions, released only a few days after the June 2016 Brexit referendum – which argues that diplomacy is one of the clear strengths of the EU.

Every time when the EU undertakes a strategy-defining exercise related to some aspect of foreign policy, the core question is how to balance interests and values. If during the Cold War Western Europe yielded its interests almost exclusively to the United States in exchange for security guarantees and for a junior role in the partnership that ran the world, nowadays the EU is looking to affirm itself as a major global power. As paradoxical as it may seem, Donald Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA might be a real opportunity for the EU to assert itself as a major global player. However, the question is whether the EU is ready to take a stand in front of the US because preserving the JCPOA could cause fallout of the transatlantic relationship.

The US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement comes as the latest in a series of flashpoints in the EU-US relationship, following the US departure from the Paris climate agreement, giving up the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, President Trump's frosty meetings with a number of European leaders or repeated public criticism over European defense spending levels. Even if the Europeans spent much of 2017 and 2018 trying to convince Donald Trump to keep the JCPOA in place, at this point Washington's policy trajectory on the nuclear agreement is clearly at odds with the European interests, and the divide between the EU and the US is set to deepen. Moreover, in opposing Trump's policy toward Iran, the European governments find themselves in the unusual position of being closer to Russia and China than to their traditional transatlantic partner.

Drawing from all the above-presented circumstances it is easy to conclude that the sanctions debate is, once again, in full bloom. However, the question *Do sanctions work?* is hardly new, and once the nuclear agreement in place is obvious that the European member states (at least most of them) are looking to keep the JCPOA in place, and work on it further on. A failed diplomacy might leave the international system with a choice between the use of force or a world where restraint

has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of some important actors to keep their end of the bargain.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump was a vocal critic of the agreement. At times, he pledged to seek to renegotiate it, to strictly enforce its terms on Iran, or to abrogate it outright (Nicoullaud, 2016). The JCPOA does not contain a provision for any party to end the agreement; nevertheless, the President could decide to stop implementing some or all of the U.S. commitments in the deal, but doing so leaves open the possibility for the agreement to be implemented by the remaining parties, including Iran.

Throughout some of its first year, the Trump Administration indicated support for the agreement. On February 10, 2017, following meetings with the Administration focused on the JCPOA, the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Frederica Mogherini, stated that Administration officials "reassured" her that the Administration intended to fully implement the JCPOA (Wroughton, 2017). However, on January 12, 2018, President Trump stated, "the United States will not again waive sanctions" pursuant to the JCPOA absent "our European allies' agreement to fix the terrible flaws of the Iran nuclear deal" (Trump, 2018: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/). A few months later, on May 8, President Trump, noting that the two sides had been unable to reach an agreement, announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would re-impose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the JCPOA (Presidential Memoranda, 2018). President Trump ordered Secretary of State Pompeo to "take all appropriate steps to cease the participation of the United States in the JCPOA," and, along with Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, immediately "begin taking steps to re-impose all United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection" with the agreement (*Ibid.*). The United States has notified the other P5+1 states that the United States will no longer attend meetings of the joint commission, the working group concerning the Arak reactor, and the procurement-working group (Kerr, Katzman, 2018: 23).

The US exit from the JCPOA attracted broad criticism among the other parties of the agreement, and the remaining of the P5+1 states immediately reiterated their support for the JCPOA, announcing their intentions to fulfill their commitments and protect their companies from the effects of any US-imposed sanctions. In a joint statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared their intention to remain a party to the JCPOA and to "work with all the

remaining parties" to the deal to ensure that Iran continues to receive "the continuing economic benefits ... linked to the agreement" (Kerr, Katzman, 2018: 25). EU High Representative Mogherini stated that, if "Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments ... the European Union will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation" of the agreement (Joint Statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron Following President Trump's Statement on Iran, 2018).

Therefore, it looks that the divide between Europe and the US is set to deepen over Iran, as long as the Trump Administration's heated rhetoric and actions will continue. The EU made it clear that it will continue to support the JCPOA. Furthermore, the European leaders understood that a constructive relationship between Iran and the EU is essential for the latter, and it could help to achieve its common security and defense objectives while safeguarding its commercial and energy interests.

The theoretical framework of the scientific approach focuses on the paradigm of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, which will be used as methodological tools of argumentation, comparison, and analysis of the process of nuclear and economic negotiations.

The basic tenants of *neorealism* enable the systematic approach to studying shifts in state behavior. Six fundamental neorealist concepts are to be considered when analyzing the behavior of the actors involved in the Iranian file: anarchy, structure, capability, the distribution of power, polarity and national interest. Out of these six concepts, national interest is the one capturing most of the attention when discussing the reasons behind the American administration's decision to exit the JCPOA. In striving for security, states seek to expand their capabilities in relation with the rival states. Thus ensuring territorial, economic and military security constitutes the national interest calculus of a state. At the same time, the level of capability a state possesses vis-à-vis others, constraints or equips states to pursue such interests are driven by its level of capability (Telhami, 2003: 109). Capability, distribution of power and polarity are related to the regional role of Iran and the balance of power in the Gulf region. Thru this concepts it can be explain why the whole process of keeping in place vs. tearing the agreement down, is not only about nuclear deterrence, is also about the geopolitical role of Iran. Beyond the rhetoric regarding the "nuclearization", there is more of the US concern – fuelled by the Israeli and Saudi governments – regarding Tehran's hegemonic ambitions in the region.

The debate between *neorealism* and *neoliberal institutionalism* has dominated IR debate for decades. The two schools of thought have jostled overviews of the international system in an attempt to define the world of international politics. These two paradigms have been important to defining policymaking and the research within international relations (Lamy, 2005: 207). The debate is characterized by their disagreement over specific issues such as the nature and consequences of anarchy, international cooperation, relative versus absolute gains, intentions versus capabilities, institutions, regimes, and priority of state goals. Where neorealists were seen to focus on security measures, neoliberal institutionalists are believed to have placed greater emphasis on environmental and economic issues, with a specific focus on the latter. Keohane and Nye (2001) argue that interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, is now an important feature of world politics. Furthermore, Keohane and Nye argue that states are dominant actors in international relations; equally, there is an assumption that hierarchy exists within international politics and force can be used as an effective instrument of policy. Globalization represents an increase in interconnectedness and linkages; this mutual interdependence between states positively affects behavioral patterns and changes the way states cooperate (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Withdrawing from a theoretical approach of neorealism, the *cons camp* behavior regarding the JCPOA it is quite easy to be explained. States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival, as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is based in the development of offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a mean to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard at all the time. Given the fact that the JCPOA was built, agreed and sign on lack of trust on both sides – P5 countries group and Iran – neorealism seems to fit very well in this sensitive file. Where survival within the anarchic international system is paramount for the realists, cooperation is more likely to be assumed by liberalists. Neoliberal institutionalism it is defined as the principal view on the role that international institutions ought to have in international relations among states, both economically and politically. Its main purpose is to serve as a mediator to find solutions to interstate issues. The European camp, the *pro* nuclear agreement one, extracts its ideology from this paradigm. EU is willing to look for political and economic cooperation, using this tools to also implement its global strategy. For European decision-makers, the JCPOA could become the mean

in reaching EU's international agenda, and an opportunity to assert its global role as an honest and trustable partner.

The map of concepts drew within this article is quite wide, and while some of them are pretty known and even used in day-to-day language, some of them belong particularly to the diplomatic discourse, or to the political one. *Constructive engagement* is seen as a foreign policy strategy intended to seek and maintain a dialogue with anathematized or authoritarian regimes. Since constructive engagement still holds a rather elusive status in international relations literature, it is vital to clarify the idea behind it. Constructive engagement constitutes a non-coercive strategy and set of diplomatic practices for bringing "outlaw" or "rogue" states to conform to what are held by the Great Powers to be legitimate international norms. Its underlying goal is avoidance of conflict, reduction of tension, re-socialization into international society through non-coercive means (George, 1993: 50).

The new *Global Strategy* focus on security issues reinforces a widespread perception that the EU is experiencing a shift from a transformative-liberal power to a realpolitik actor. However, the familiar framing of "interests versus values" (Youngs, 2016) somewhat distorts EU foreign policy debates. The relationship between values and interests is complex, and sometimes there will be a trade-off between the two, while other times certain values can enhance self-interests, further complicating the process of arriving at a definition for what is a *value* as opposed to an *interest*. The Iranian file represents both the means and the aspiration of European foreign policy.

This article uses the negotiation process and its final outcome – international agreements – as a prism to interpret the potential geopolitical role of the Iranian nuclear deal. Moreover, states are considered as the main actors at play, as realism's fingerprints are all over the JCPOA. In addition to discourse analyze, which has been used as analytical method for this article, qualitative research methods, such as content analysis, is used. Apart from the qualitative research of primary and secondary literature, different databases, country reports, and annually updated country profiles were used as well.

Without proposing an exhaustive treatment of this sensitive issue, as long as the events are ongoing and the European leaders (along with their Russians and Chinese counterparts) are looking for the best options to keep the nuclear agreement in place, this article seeks to shed some light over the EU-US relations regarding the Iranian file and to assess how and whether the JCPOA could become the reason of a European-American cleavage.

Assessing the Iranian Deal in the Light of European Interests

Relations between Europe and Iran have a long history and have often been characterized by stumbling blocks in the political and diplomatic process of rapprochement since the Islamic revolution from 1979. Trust has been a political capital failing, in both parties' perceptions, to be adequately built and strengthened. And yet, engagement, either critical, constructive or dual track diplomacy has never ceased to see both sides deeply involved in some sort of diplomatic relations (Santini, 2010: 467). The challenge for the EU policymakers is to devise strategies and policies that will build trust and confidence with Tehran and avoid a further downward spiral of relations while increasing European leverage that could be used to alter the cost-benefit analysis, decision-making, and behavior of the Iranian regime. A constructive relationship between the EU and Iran is essential for the former, not least to achieve its common security and defense objectives while safeguarding its commercial and energy interests. As it seems to remain the only Western entity willing to deal with Iran, a constructive engagement toward Iran can offer to the EU leverage over Iran, leverage that can be used to prevent the latter from obtaining nuclear weapons, as well as to ensure that *if* it goes nuclear, Tehran will act rationally. The EU has yet to develop a unified, independent and long-term strategy vis-à-vis Iran, a strategy that would enable it to maintain a constructive relationship with Tehran and achieve its strategic objectives without compromising its core values. For the past decade, the EU made a conscious choice to condition progress in relation with Iran on a single issue: ensuring that the country's nuclear program is of an exclusively peaceful nature. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed on July 14, 2015, presents Europe with an opportunity to move beyond its exclusive nuclear focus and shift to a relationship based on engagement, not containment. This would allow the EU to pursue its interests with Tehran across a range of issues, such as energy and trade, de-escalating conflicts in the Middle East in which Iran is involved, in environmental and sustainability issues or combatting the drug trade in Afghanistan.

The signing of the JCPOA has set the stage for subsequent cooperation between Iran and the international community. However, maintaining cooperation is often an even more delicate and complicated endeavor that establishing it. Because it is a process of creating joints and gains, cooperation is only possible if parties are willing to reciprocate. Reciprocity, however, should not be expected to produce immediate returns. Parties reciprocate because they are interested in developing relations based on trust and the expectation that, within the future, the other party will

reciprocate when necessary. Thus, the expectation of future reciprocal behavior becomes an essential component of the ongoing relationship (Hopmann, 2010: 95-110). The JCPOA could open the door to a more mutually beneficial rapport between Iran and the West. With the opportunity present, the challenge remains to make use of it, and it looks like the European decision-makers understood very well this aspect, planning to fully use this opportunity. The gradual and coordinated dismantling of sanctions called for by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Federica Mogherini's most recent statements could represent an opportunity to test the willingness of both sides to cooperate.

The EU facilitation was pivotal for the achievement of the JCPOA. One day after announcing the deal with the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini issued a statement stressing that "the Iranian nuclear deal has been reached thanks to the facilitation of the EU...with courage, the international community has made a historical step toward peace. With pride, I can say the European Union made it possible" (2015). Mogherini, who won global praise for her role as a mediator, was able to uphold and promote good relations with Iran – which were established by her predecessor, Catherine Ashton – and by chairing the meetings, setting agenda and driving the process she was "putting oil on the wheels of the deal and pushing negotiators to come up with something solid" (de la Baume, 2015). Therefore, a window of opportunity has opened up for Iran and the EU, and there is no secret that intense lobby by large EU companies – such as Siemens, Daimler-Benz or Bayer – leveraged the negotiations. The lifting of the sanctions was beneficial not only for Iran but also for the many EU companies that were eager to exports their goods to a market of nearly 80 million people.

Given all these aspects, on July 15, 2015, Federica Mogherini convened a behind-closed-doors meeting of EU policy-makers and ask that the EU immediately start high-level talks with Iran on energy issues. During this meeting Mogherini, asked the EU Commission to "provide support for preparing the resumption of economic and trade relations with Iran following the lifting of the international sanctions, once the agreement [has] entered into force" (Reuters, 2015). Mogherini also proposed "an official visit to Iran by several members of the Commission (...) to discuss a number of subjects of common interest with the Iranian authorities, such as trade, research, energy and culture" (*Ibid*.). Moreover, at her press conference in Vienna, the High Representative emphasized that, with the nuclear agreement signed after a decade of tenuous talks, the EU should

strive to create a broader network of key actors in the Middle East, including Iran, "to see if some forms of regional cooperation is possible" (Norman, 2015, *WSJ*). At the time, due to the strong European determination to re-launch the ties with Iran, some observers agreed, "there is definitely an assumption in Brussels that any deal will lead to a greater cooperation with Iran" (*Ibid.*). Also, some analysts have already pointed out that the EU could use the moment to reestablish a framework of energy, trade, economic and geopolitical ties that existed during Mohammad Khatami's presidency but have since dissolved (*Ibid*.)

One of Europe's strategic concerns in the region – and probably the most important – is **energy security**. Iran's neighborhood provides the source and access routes for a large part of Europe's energy supplies, and this will be undermined if regional instability grows. Europe's energy imports have already been dealt a blow by the Libyan civil war, and complicated by the standoff with Russia over Ukraine. Iran used to be Europe's sixth most important supplier of energy. Given its geographical location and the fact that Iran has the world's second largest fossil energy resources, it has the potential to become the most important supplier of energy to Europe, as well as the most economic transit route between the oil-rich Caspian Sea states and Europe. Before the JCPOA, due to the political turmoil created by the international concern over the Iranian nuclear program, the European energy firms have been pulling out of Iran, and the EU sanctions prohibited any further investments in the Iranian energy sector[1]. Keeping closer trade and energy ties with Iran will help the EU to address other critical issues. For example, equitable economic growth is essential for fostering political stability in the entire region, and this might marginalize those extremist forces that benefit from poor economic conditions, unemployment and underdevelopment. The promotion of a win-win scenario in regional relations through expansion of energy interconnectivity – through pipelines and electricity grids – and cross-border energy projects (such as investments in refineries that receive their feed from neighboring markets) will definitely be a win for international players. Besides the gain in regional cohesion and interdependence, the European companies can benefit as technology providers and commercial partners in this development.

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[1] EU sanctions were adopted on July 26, 2010. The sanctions do not, however, prohibit the purchase of oil and gas. See https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=889f7d87-.

The EU could take advantage of the opening toward Iran and propose Tehran an energy cooperation agreement. Europe would have great leverage in this deal since Iran is in dire need of Western technology to help it to efficiently explore and export its vast oil and gas revenues. While Chinese and Russian technologies have been unable yet to match Europe's energy know-how, the EU is likely to find Iran eager to collaborate on energy ties. The European Commission has made similar energy cooperation arrangements with other resource-rich countries, and by negotiating such an agreement with Tehran, the EU could highlight the need for stability in Iran's neighborhood, reducing so the risk and encouraging the European investors. Once as actual energy partnership would be in place, it would secure Europe's energy demands and serve its goal for diversifying oil and gas imports, as well as provide it with a share in Iran's emerging market and enhance protection for European investors (Geranmayeh, 2015: 6). This would also have potentially geopolitical ramifications. The option of exporting its surplus gas supplies would facilitate quicker economic development in Iran, after suffering under the sanctions regime. The fact that the existing pipelines cannot meet Europe's growing demand for gas may represent an opportunity after all. The initial transport of gas to the EU by ship might serve as a cornerstone in reinforcing the trust between parties, albeit to a lesser extent than a pipeline would, not only in terms of maintaining a steady exchange of goods, but also upholding the terms of the JCPOA agreement.

While **trade** might be not the most critical component of the EU-Iran relationship, it is still important and does affect the EU member states' political decision-making. The EU has been Iran's number one trading partner over a decade, accounting for almost a third of its exports. In 2008, EU exports to Iran totaled 14.1 billion euro, while EU imports from Iran totaled 11.3 billion euro. EU imports from Iran are 90% in energy and energy-related products. EU exports to Iran in 2008 were mainly in machinery and transport equipment (54.6%), manufactured goods (16.9%) and chemicals (12.1%)[2].

The environmental and sustainability issues could be another link for the EU-Iran cooperation. Iran has been suffering from deteriorating environmental conditions and the water supply in various parts of the country is not replenished in a stable and satisfactory manner due to more unstable weather with unpredictable rainfall as well as unsustainable consumption and waste

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[2] European Commission: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113392.pdf.

of groundwater (Madani, 2014: 315-328). Environmentally sustainable development and water management are areas where EU institutions and industries are at the forefront in terms of capacity building, technology and know-how (Parsi and Esfandiary, 2016: 17).

Due to the fact that Iran is a major transit and consumer for opiate-based drugs from Afghanistan[3], it would be unwise for the EU to not cooperate with the Iranian authorities to contain the **drug trade phenomenon**, especially because the EU is one of the major markets for these drugs. The EU, as well as individual member states, has had various kind of cooperation and support for Iranian authorities combatting drug addiction and trade. Over time, the Iranian use of the death penalty to punish drug traffickers has generated huge criticism from human rights organizations and the EU has a long-standing policy of opposing capital punishment. Therefore, the EU could make an effort to convince Iranian counterparts that greater transparency on this issue would be helpful for enhancing cooperation in combating trafficking and drug use and the joints efforts are required for this matter.

Given its **strategic position** in the Middle East, Iran is also a major regional player, albeit a relatively isolated one. Iran is heavily involved in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and also used to spearhead the fight against ISIS, through its Hashd-Al Shabi, Shia militias and material support for the Iraqi army. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the EU that the Middle East be stable. The spread of sectarianism and violent religiously inspired extremism has plagued the Middle East for several decades, and this extremism also spread to groups living in the EU, adding to a dangerous element to an already difficult and complex fight against violent subversive groups across Europe. Keeping closer ties with Iran, in order to consolidate the entries' region economic development will also help the EU to address this critical issue because an equitable economic development is essential for fostering political stability. This will, in turn, marginalize those extremist forces that benefit from poor economic conditions, unemployment, and underdevelopment. The EU's mediation could pave the way to the negotiations of a new Middle East regional security framework.

By capitalizing on its reputation as a "civilian power" (Magri and Perteghella, 2015: 118), EU should work with the US to facilitate regional dialogue, and, eventually, bring Iran and Saudi

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[3] For an overview of the drug trade in Iran see UNODC Iran fact sheet (Paris Pact): https://www.paris-pact.net/upload/e20e615974dd55f94302f60fce36e05d.pdf.

Arabia at the negotiating table with the aim of promoting a new regional security architecture. Notwithstanding the prevalence of contentious issues in which interests differ, it is important to at least kick-start a frank dialogue on realistic options for de-escalation. In order to do so, the EU needs to fine some sort of unity of purpose. Europeans spent much of 2017 trying to convince the trump administration to keep the JCPOA intact, but at this point, Trump's policy trajectory on the nuclear deal seems to be at odds with European interests. There is also a potential risk that the current exchange of words will create a spiral of extremist dialogue between Washington and Tehran leading to escalations in the Middle East. Given the current uncertainty that's surrounding the nuclear deal, European leaders should prepare for and seek to minimize the consequences of further deterioration of relations between Iran and the US.

Given Trump's administration lack of certainty regarding the JCPOA, the European governments will need to prepare for continual battles with Washington over how the deal is implemented. European actors will also need to be far more proactive in fixing the existing problems in the deal. Under Trump, the US government will be far less flexible and cooperative in resolving the banking and financial problems currently facing European companies. European governments and EU regulators will need to take a greater lead in tackling these constraints, including allowing the European Investment Bank to be a provider of financing to European companies undertaking legitimate investments in Iran. European governments should also reinforce existing coordination over contingency plans if the US obstructs the nuclear deal. The EU and E3 should assume leadership of a political initiative that, together with Russia and China, offers Iran enticements to continue to abide by the core elements of the current deal (Geranmayeh, 2017: 8-9). Essentially, Iran should be expected to maintain the critical restrictions and inspections on its nuclear program in return for an economic assistance package offered by the remaining parties to the JCPOA. This contingency plan needs to be communicated clearly to reassure European companies and signal to the US that Europe is serious about its commitment to the deal (*Ibid*).

While defending the JCPOA, Europe should not lose sight of pursuing the opening created by the nuclear deal to test diplomacy with Iran in other areas where it is urgently required. After four years of gradual engagement between Iran and Europe, it is time to address some of the more contentious issues. The E3 have both the capacity and a strong stake in leading this European effort. European leaders should communicate clearly to both Washington and Tehran a serious

intent to begin diplomatic talks beyond the nuclear issue (Geranmayeh, 2017: 10-11). The position of the Trump administration on Iran poses a considerable challenge to this effort; however, it is still possible for Europe to push for meaningful diplomacy with Iran in some limited but significant areas, such as freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, the Yemen humanitarian crisis or the Syrian civil war.

More likely the Trump administration will increasingly pressure the EU to limit its engagements with Iran. In response, Tehran is likely to seek to widen existing divisions between Europe and the US over the nuclear deal. European governments will need to resist both sides and instead maintain good relations with both Washington and Tehran. Europe's distinct role in helping to de-escalate political crises in the Middle East hinges on its ability to engage with all relevant powers, including Tehran, Riyadh, and Washington. At a time when unpredictability and conflict in the Middle East are at a peak and when Iran-US relations have deteriorated, Europeans should seek to nurture channels of engagement that they have developed with various branches of the Iranian leadership and across the US government. European countries and the EU should use these channels to help counterbalance the impact of Trump's dangerous narratives on regional developments. A symbolic but significant step towards countering the Trump administration's containment policy would be for more European heads of state and governments to visit Iran (Geranmayeh, 2017: 10).

A more normal relationship between Europe and Iran would allow cooperation and competition to coexist across different areas. This would put Europe in a better position to encourage all regional stakeholders, including Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, to take ownership of de-escalating conflicts in their neighborhood in ways that are increasingly necessary and yet still glaringly absent. This would lay the groundwork for a European-supported regional settlement to which all key regional stakeholders are partners – even if this settlement cannot be achieved for a long time. To reach this stage, Europe will need to create a formal political structure and establish organizational support to take forward its engagement with Iran. Europe's expectations from Iran should take into consideration the geopolitical realities and Iran's priorities. Under existing conditions, Tehran will not be persuaded to overhaul its regional security strategy or to withdraw the support given to some local actors such as Hezbollah. Neither will more intense engagement result in a new regional alliance between Europe and Iran. Europe should not disregard the grave scale of problems faced by both sides in the region, so its relationship with

Iran should go beyond merely ad hoc cooperation on areas of common interest. While time and confidence building are required to reach a more normalized stance, Europe now has the political space to engage with Iran on more contentious issues – even if progress advances at a slow rate (Geranmayeh, 2015: 9-10).

The JCPOA gives policymakers the liberty to step out of the nuclear-centric vision on Iran and to highlight areas in which Europe can benefit from engaging with Tehran, notably on regional security. Difficult though it may be, to make the greatest contribution towards establishing regional order, Europe should distance itself from taking sides in regional struggles and allow for maximum flexibility in policy choices by considering the option of actively dealing with Iran where this best serves European security (*Ibid*.). Europe now has the capacity to take on a more ambitious and critically important role in recalibrating regional security approaches after the nuclear deal.

EU-US: A Coming Clash over the Iranian File?

John Limbert is an American diplomat who has gone through one of the darkest pages of the US-Iran relations, the hostage crisis. However, he still believes in the rapprochement between the "Great Satan and the Mad Mullahs" (2005: 49, 69). Limbert wrote: "Under the right conditions, with balanced judgments and sound negotiating strategy, we can still reach an understanding that suits the interests of both sides. Most important, we do not have to be friends to do so. After all, if Americans and Iranians could never agree on anything, then today I and my embassy colleagues would probably still captives in Tehran" (Limbert, 2009: 6). And yet it took 35 years of diplomatic estrangement and almost 13 years of failed negotiations over Iran's contested nuclear program to get to the agreement signed on July 14, 2015. It was the chance that the Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama's presidencies overlapped, and the professed intention of the latter to initiate an ambitious reassessment of the Middle East policy, combined with the moderate policy proposed by Rouhani, led to a shy warming of relations between Washington and Tehran. However, while triggering vocal criticism from America's traditional allies in the region – especially from Israel, already nervous about the potential consequences of normalization of relations between Iran and US – the nuclear deal fuelled hopes among the supporters of a new season in US Middle East policy. Yet, under the new American administration, the honeymoon between Washington and Tehran seems to be short-lived.

Donald Trump expressed his intentions to shift the US policy on Iran toward aggressive containment and away from the diplomatic openings created by his predecessor. The primary focus

of this shift is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Trump called an "embarrassment and disastrous"[4]. On May 8th, 2018, president Trump announced that the US is set to leave the Iran nuclear deal, even if all the European leaders tried to convince out the American president to not do so. After few month of speculation and a flurry of last-minute European diplomacy, Donald Trump has taken perhaps the most consequential decision of his unconventional presidency with the announcement that he is re-imposing US sanctions on Iran in a deliberately provocative breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. By torpedoing US adherence to the accord Trump has all but guaranteed its collapse, a move that opens the door to the unfettered resumption of Iran's nuclear program and unleashes unpredictable escalatory pressures in an already volatile Middle East. Even more, the French Foreign Minister reportedly described the deal as being a warranty for peace, and France and Germany vowed to respect the agreement, while British Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, in Washington on May 7th, 2018, stated that as far as he knows, the American administration has no clear Plan B for what to do next.

Is not news that Donald Trump is not easy to get along with. On many global security issues, Europeans take very different approaches than the new American president. But perhaps nowhere is the difference more profound than on the question of Iran. Given the president's harsh rhetoric and his recent efforts to put that talk into practice, a transatlantic clash on the issue seems almost inevitable. European countries should prepare now to minimize the damage and preserve their strategic interests on non-proliferation and the pursuit of stability in the Middle East. The divide between Europe and the US is set to deepen over Iran. The Trump administration's heated rhetoric and recent actions indicate US strategy is exclusively focused on isolating and containing Iran. The ramifications of US policy go beyond damaging the non-proliferation architecture Europe has helped build. It could lead to even greater instability in the Middle East and severely limit diplomacy with Iran to resolve regional issues. The current trajectory not only endangers European non-proliferation goals, but it also heightens the risk of a nuclear arms race and further military escalation in Europe's backyard. Direct or indirect, a confrontation between American and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East will further fuel the regional conflicts, particularly in Iraq and Syria, that have already imposed heavy costs on Europe (Geranmayeh, 2017: 1-2).

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[4] *** (2017) *Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy*, October 13, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/.

President Trump did not waste any opportunity to broadcast his animosity toward Iran. He has called for the country's international isolation and sought to pressure foreign companies not to do business with the country. Moreover, the influence of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, over the American president is not to be neglected. The recent show put up by Netanyahu, within he stated that Israel has strong evidence of the continuation of the Iranian nuclear program, evidence which actually never been made public, being exposed only at the level of rhetoric. What is interesting to underline is that Netanyahu's recent allegations about Iran are not his first endeavor to influence the American administrations' on Middle East foreign policy lines. In 2002 he stated in front of the American Congress that Israel has indubitable evidence about Iraq's nuclear weapons program. One year later, George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq, and yet, no trace of nuclear capabilities has been found.

The premeditated American dismantling of an agreement that was the product of more than a decade of intense diplomacy and economic pressure marks a staggeringly counterproductive step. That it was undertaken over the vocal objections of Washington's closest allies and without a clear strategy of mitigating the newly heightened risks of Iranian proliferation and conventional retaliation represent an abdication of American leadership on the international stage that is unparalleled in recent history (Maloney, 2018). Trump's decision might weaken even the American security while breaking Washington's credibility on the international stage. Also, it isolates the US from its European allies, puts Israel at risk, empowers Iran's hardliners and reduces the global leverage to address Tehran's misbehavior, while damaging the ability of future American administrations to make international agreements. Donald Trump and his newly reconstituted foreign policy and national security team are not only highly suspect of organic reform in Iran; they have become hell-bent on regime change in Tehran. Ripping-up the JCPOA deal makes this policy choice clear. In 2018, Iran and America are entering a new phase of their ever-strained relationship and it seems never to work out for the best.

Shortly after Donald Trump's public statement, Federica Mogherini issued a statement regarding the EU's Iran strategy and assessing the JCPOA as being "a key element of global nuclear non-proliferation architecture" (Mogherini, 2018). Also, she reassured Tehran that as long as "Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments, as it is doing so far, the European Union will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal" (*Ibid.*). Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the Iranian nuclear deal has triggered a

new environment of unpredictability in the Middle East and the European governments will need to prepare for what it might come next. The EU member states will also need to be far more proactive in fixing the existing problems in the deal and to do their best to preserve it, also to assume leadership of a political initiative that, together with Russia and China can offer Iran the incentives to continue to abide by the core elements of the current deal. Also, in defiance of US President, the European leaders began drawing up plans to preserve the JCPOA. Just a few hours after Trump's announcement, British Prime Minister Theresa may, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron published a joint statement in which they expressed their commitment to the nuclear agreement, which they described as very important for the international security. As part of the efforts to salvage the deal, foreign ministers from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are expected to meet in London with the Iranian counterpart. Also, Russia and China have also reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPOA, but to convince Iran to stick with the deal, the Europeans will need to demonstrate that they still can deliver most of the economic benefits that Tehran was promised in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons program and allowing a robust system of international inspections.

Although European capitals share some of the US concerns about Iran, Europe is quickly parting ways with the Trump administration over two fundamental issues. First, they disagree on what they are trying to achieve with Iran. Trump's statements on Iran move US policy aims towards efforts to weaken the Islamic Republic and perhaps to the idea of regime change. The former US secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, for example, effectively backed a regime change approach when he outlined that the administration would "work towards support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government" (Tillerson, 2017). The second source of European-US differences over Iran relates to the tools used to achieve these goals. European governments are moving away from isolating Iran using containment and sanctions towards engaging the country using diplomatic and economic tools. The Trump administration has moved in the opposite direction, seeking to isolate Iran through political measures and tougher sanctions. Perhaps the clearest example of this division occurred in May 2017. During Trump's visit to Riyadh, he called for all nations to isolate Iran. Within hours, the EU High Representative together with other European leaders publicly congratulated the re-elected president, Hassan Rouhani, on his victory and expressed hope for further political opening with Iran (Bolongaro, 2017). Similarly, on the same day as Trump made his speech on the new US Iran strategy, the

French president discussed with Rouhani a potential trip to Iran, which would be the first by a French head of state since Iran's 1979 revolution. In parallel, a number of giant European companies have ignored Trump's calls to refrain from doing business with Iran and instead announced new deals with their Iranian counterparts.

While there were no concrete steps immediately agreed upon, the refusal of European allies to accept Trump's decision was likely to draw the president ire. Also, some analysts and EU officials and diplomats questioned why North Korea would ever agree to a deal with Donald Trump to limit its own nuclear weapons program given that Washington was not necessarily committed to its international agreements from one administration to the next. Nevertheless, the decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA demonstrates that Washington has decided that confrontation with Iran is both necessary and inevitable, regardless of what European allies think (Herszenhorn, de la Baume, Vinocur, 2018).

In sum, the European leaders are determined to try to salvage (Dehghan, Boffey, 2018) the Iran nuclear deal even though this potentially puts them on a collision course with an uncompromising US President, determined to confront Iran as the "leading state sponsor of terror" (Borger, Dehghan and Holmes, 2018). The coming clash represents a huge test of durability of the surprisingly concerted alliance that Germany, France and the United Kingdom have managed to maintain in their humiliatingly fruitless bid to prevent Donald Trump from explicitly withdrawing from the deal signed by his predecessor Barack Obama.

Conclusions

What the EU and Iran need is a strategic and structured dialogue. Strategic here means that it must reach beyond the list of specific (usually contentious) issues, look at the larger picture and set more long-term goals for what kind of relationship the two parties want to have. Structured, in that it is underpinned by regular interaction on civil servant and technical levels dealing with a variety of sectors; thus, establishing an institutionalized process for pursuing a variety of solutions and exchanges.

As unpredictable as seems to be, this situation, however, might be a gift for the EU to prove itself as a global leader. The EU-Iran dialogue should be maintained, and also extended beyond the common concerns in the Middle East. Both the nuclear issue and regional turmoil highlighted that for the EU not to have a functioning relationship with Iran is politically very costly. Iran is too

big and too important of a regional actor for it to be ignored: the EU must engage with Tehran and make it a stakeholder for regional dialogue and stability to occur. Iran has its own policy objectives in much the same way as any other state. It is not always responsible in ways that we would like it to be, nor does it always make calculations of what is prudent policy in ways we can comprehend. In essence, Iran may not be an indispensable interlocutor, but it is in many regards an unavoidable one: the cost for the EU to pursue its policies vis-à-vis the region will be much higher and less effective with Iran absent from the table. Neither does the absence of an EU-Iran relationship mean that such a relationship void will remain empty. If Europe is not present on the Iranian scene, be it in trade or politics, other actors (China, Japan, India etc.) will claim that space. As a result, in order for the EU to make any headway in addressing issues of concern and build a more stable relationship with Iran, the EU must devise a medium to long-term strategy for regular, sustained dialogue with Iran. In other words, the EU must have a clear notion of what a structured and strategic relationship with Iran can and should look like. Such a rethink is not about rewarding or punishing the Islamic Republic of Iran, but rather, about the role and position of the EU in the Middle East in general and how it can pursue its interests most effectively.

However, out there is the risk that the unity forged by European trio (France, Germany and the UK) over the need to preserve the deal bow falters as disagreements surface on how far are prepared to antagonize a determined US president, not to mention Israel and Saudi Arabia, to keep the deal alive. Also, the viability of Europe's plans to keep Iran committed to the deal will depend on how aggressively the US Treasury ensures that any economic sanctions it now imposes on US firms that continue to trade with the central bank of Iran also impact on European firms. The first sanction that is being re-imposed by Trump, as a result of ending the waiver, is a requirement for firms to show they are significantly reducing the number of oil deals they are striking with Iran via the country's central bank. That will take as long as 180 days to measure. But in an uncompromising mood, Trump implied other much wider sanctions would also be re-imposed, even though he gave no timeframe for doing so.

Europeans spent much of 2017 trying to convince the Trump administration to keep the JCPOA intact. But at this point, Trump's policy trajectory on the nuclear deal is clearly at odds with European interests. The EU and leading European member states need to see beyond the security crises in their immediate neighborhood and take the lead in pursuing the strict implementation of the JCPOA, engaging Iran in regional cooperation, and strengthening global nonproliferation.

Without the US, Iran is unlikely to accept all the obligations outlined in the JCPOA. However, keeping Iran on board with the JCPOA's material restrictions is likely to limit Iran's ability to expand its nuclear program. This, in turn, will reduce the possibility of military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel or the US.

However, there is a possibility that, despite sustained diplomatic efforts, the EU cannot maintain the nuclear agreement. Reportedly, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told French President Emmanuel Macron, in a phone conversation, that Europe has "under the current conditions, a very limited opportunity to preserve the nuclear deal, and must, as quickly as possible, clarify its position and specify and announce its intentions with regard to its obligations."[5]

The JCPOA has opened a new chapter in EU-Iran relations and Europe should do its best to take advantage of it. Beyond the economic advantages, especially energy security, the EU has a unique chance to prove its capacity to play as a major global actor. Europeans need to begin a deep conversation among themselves and with Iran on the future of their relationship and to explore ways that Europe can contribute toward order in a fractured region on its doorstep. The EU has now the opportunity to take on a more ambitious and critically important role in recalibrating regional security approaches.

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"BREXITOLOGY": A STORY OF RENEGOTIATIONS, REFERENDUMS AND "BREGRETS"?

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Abstract: *The United Kingdom's path inside the European Union can be defined as a roller-coaster ever since its first years as a member state. As BREXIT talks are touching key issues such as the unity and prosperity of the European Union, this article seeks to analyze BREXIT through a comparison between the two referendum campaigns UK held, first in 1975 - two years after joining the Union – and then in 2016. Although not entirely a mirror image of Wilson's strategy, Cameron's decision to hold a referendum followed the same line of thinking but within a completely different political and economic context.*

Keywords: Brexit, United Kingdom, referendum, "brexitology", "bregrets".

Introduction

Starting with Kalergi's Pan European Union and continuing with Churchill's United States of Europe, the European Union project and its architects had sought to secure peace and prosperity on the continent through the concept of unity. This drive for unity manifested itself very differently from one country to another and there were many differences of opinion regarding the principles that might help internalize it. As argued by Tombs, Britain has never quite succeeded to internalize the European project due to its very particular history during the 20th century. Thus, this might constitute the main reason why Britain was less concerned with the consequences brought by Brexit. (Tombs, 2018)

Moreover, Britain appeared to detach itself from post-war efforts to foster European unity and did not perceive it as a necessary requirement for obtaining peace and progress. On the contrary, its application for membership of the European Economic Community was a tacit and convenient agreement, a move determined by obvious financial concerns rather than an expression of attachment to European goals or a decision made out of concern for Europe's future. This lack of enthusiasm was reflected in political discourses and British media prior and post accession. Although Churchill played a great role in Franco-German post-war reconciliation that later lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, he did not cease to emphasize the British national sovereignty by stating that "…we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed." (Churchill, 1930)

The fact that the British EC accession had a very practical dimension that contained almost no emotional commitment can be clearly seen from the way in which the accession subject was treated in the British press at the time. On January 1st 1973 *The Guardian* wrote with uncanny detachment "We're in-but without the fireworks. Britain passed peacefully into Europe at midnight last night without any special celebration. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories of Britain are written, was taken by most people as a matter of course." (Mckie and Barker, 1973)

The British long march towards Europe included two failed attempts in 1963 and 1967 and was marked by Britain's inability to decide whether it should keep its close ties with USA or join the European bloc. When eventually Britain decided to join the EEC, it retained its special connection with the USA. According to Churchill, maintaining this tight connection should represent a priority for the British government in foreign affairs and this position has been later adopted by Thatcher, Blair and to a certain degree even by the current PM, Theresa May. (Troitino, 2018)

Keeping its pragmatic stance, Britain sought to secure for itself a privileged position within EEC and later within EU by managing to opt out of the European Monetary System, the Eurozone and Schengen, enjoying several opt-outs in the areas of justice, security and freedom as well. Moreover, Britain's opt-outs were never simple demands that emanated from its member state position but elaborated conditioning plans as it was the case in 1992 when its decision to opt out

of the third stage of the European economic and monetary union was conditioned by its adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. (D'Addonaa, 2013)

The current study attempts to identify the reasons why the state with the most opt-outs in the EU, to which the EU legislation applies selectively, would leave all its privileges in the hands of a popular vote. Why would Britain trade its "special status" gained through decades of exceptional diplomatic efforts for a public decision heavily influenced by brutal domestic politics and "Leave" campaigns that took advantage of a very unfortunate EU context?

In order to answer this question we will focus our analysis on emphasizing the differences and similarities between the two British referendums (1975, 2016) while drawing parallels between the arguments that the two Prime Ministers at the time (Harold Wilson and David Cameron) used for granting the British citizens the right to decide upon leaving or remaining within EU.

Contrasts and similarities between the 1975 and 2016 British referendums on membership

Although a latecomer to the European club, Britain has immediately displayed a rather transactional attitude towards it. This had led many to believe that its EC membership was nothing more than a practical method of imposing its own will from within. In February 1974 the Labour's election manifesto asked for a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry:

"Britain is a European nation and a Labour Britain would always seek a wider co-operation between the European peoples. But a profound political mistake made by the Heath Government was to accept the terms of entry to the Common Market, and to take us in without the consent of the British people. This has involved the imposition of food taxes on top of rising world prices, crippling fresh burdens on our balance of payments, and a draconian curtailment of the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital British interests. This is why a Labour Government will immediately seek a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry." (Politicsresources.net, 2018)

Britain did not organize a referendum when it decided to join NATO and EEC or when it became the third state in the world to gain the atomic bomb. All these foreign policy decisions were safely delegated to the Cabinet government answerable to Parliament and were not

considered to be issues that should be submitted to a popular vote. Yet, after only two years of joining EEC, Britain decided to organize in 1975 its first referendum on membership.

By this time, many Brits were dissatisfied with different aspects of Britain's EEC membership which in their opinion marked the erosion of national sovereignty and an inescapable road towards federalism. At the same time, Britain had been severely hit by the 1973-1974 oil crisis coupled with a double-digit inflation and the coal miner's strike which led to the so called "three day week", a government measure meant to drastically reduce power consumption. However, the result of the 1975 referendum was clearly in favor of remaining within the Common Market with seventeen million votes for "Remain" and only eight million votes for "Leave". Even Margret Thatcher, which would be later considered the "spiritual mother" of British euroscepticism, was in favor of remaining within.

Back in 1973-1975, the unfavorable domestic economic and political conditions had a double-edge effect on the referendum vote and analyzing them is crucial for understanding the outcome of the 1975 British referendum. On the one hand, the fact that the country was experiencing its worst crisis since the Second World War, triggered discontent among numerous British political figures that easily blamed EEC membership for this economic decline. The Labour's left wing (which included the current famous Brexiter Jeremy Corbyn), led at that time by Tony Benn saw the EEC as a capitalist club that would increase the level of unemployment and would destroy British economy. (Wheeler, 2016)

On the other hand, the anxiety created by this crisis warned that leaving the EEC might have disastrous repercussions for the British economy which will no longer have access to the market. Therefore, probably one of the loudest arguments in favor of remaining during the 1975 referendum was the fact that Britain had no other viable alternative to stop its economic decline but to continue its redevelopment plans within the European economic environment. Although there was no certainty that British economy will prosper within EEC, remaining inside the community appeared to be for many Brits the only rational choice. Moreover, after experiencing only two years of membership the British population could not draw yet a conclusion on whether continuing as a member would be beneficial or not for them and had to rely on the information provided by the political elite.

Since 1973 British electorate remained the most Eurosceptic electorate in the EU. In the early 1980s, Labour pledged once again for withdrawal. During the 1900s Margaret Thatcher, already a

well-known figure in British politics, reinforced the British Euroscepticism by stressing (in her now famous Bruges speech) EU's extreme interference in Britain's domestic policy. It was during this time that Tories pledged for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty replacing Labour as the main British eurosceptic party. Starting with 2000 a new generation of eurosceptic Conservative MPs is elected to Parliament while political campaigns and petitions are asking for an in-out referendum to be organized. By this time, the level of British euroscepticism had significantly increased and when PM David Cameron delivered his famous Bloomberg speech on January 2013, he promised to finally settle the EU membership question by promising a renegotiation and a referendum given his party will triumph after the elections. Thus, over a forty-year period there has been considerable continuity regarding Britain's position within EU and in 2016 the level of British Euroscepticism reached again a critical stage opening the possibility of a new referendum.

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and Cameron entered the history as the prime minister who took Britain out of EU. Although there was a narrow margin between the two votes, "Leave" won by 51.9% to 48.1%. Immediately after the vote the British Prime Minister announced his resignation, Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon announced that Scotland intends to pledge for a second independence referendum and the pound fell to its lowest level against the dollar since 1985. Although it should have not, the Brexit result came as a surprise even for the "Leave" side which admitted not having a post-Brexit plan. As Troitino observed, "The Brexit vote was clearly a vote against the status quo. What is less clear is what it was a vote for." (Troitino, 2018)

Looking back at the British history, we can observe how opinions based on past experiences were tempered or accentuated by different on-going crises and by the manner in which they were interpreted by trusted political leaders. (Towel, 2017) The 2016 referendum occurred during a period when EU was facing numerous crisis: the financial crisis that started in 2008, the Eurozone crisis that started in 2010, the Ukrainian crisis that started in 2014, the "Greek crisis" and the "refugee crisis" both since 2015, the rising tides of Euroscepticism within the member states coupled with the growing popularity of the extremist parties. (Wodak, 2016) It is thus safe to assume that all the insecurity experienced within this time frame had a strong impact on the British referendum vote.

As argued by Smith, comparing the 1975 referendum with the 2016 one is a very difficult task since the political and economic transformations that happened during this time frame have placed Britain on a totally different position. In 1975 the European Community was less prominent as a global actor and less institutionalized. EU has drastically changed meanwhile and so did the other UK's spheres of interest. A "Leave" vote back then would have meant a returning to a known alternative whereas now Britain has literally stepped into unknown. (Smith, 2016)

Analyzing the 1975 referendum we cannot help but wonder whether it indeed set a dangerous precedent serving as an inspiration for Cameron's decision. There is also the question whether the actual result of the 2016 referendum would have been the same if this was the first national plebiscite regarding EU membership in the British history. Furthermore, Brexit itself created a dangerous precedent within the EU and this prompts the question of whether there would be other countries that would like to leave EU in the future. In other words, who is to be blamed for fighting this expensive battle? Would this remain in the British history as a terrible miscalculation, a historical deception or as the day when British people took Britain back?

In order to answer these questions, we will center our analysis on several pivotal elements that came into play at the time when the two referendums were held. Firstly, this comparative synthesis would look at the motivation that each PM had in order to initiate renegotiations and later pledge for referendums. Secondly, we will compare the two referendum campaigns by examining several forces that shaped the decisions of the British voters such as: the immigration issue, the national sovereignty issue and the role played by the media during referendum campaign.

Renegotiation of EEC/EU Membership and referendums

According to Butler and Kitzinger, "referendums are imperfect devices for making basic decisions about the direction in which a country should move." (Butler and Kitzinger, 1996) When there is a great disagreement within a party coalition regarding the desired direction, this "imperfect device" becomes a political tool that mediates between parties assuring an instant boost of popularity and legitimacy. Thus, as Dennis Kavanagh concluded, "referendums have more to do with political expediency than constitutional principle or democracy". (Dennis, 1996)

The Labour administration that replaced Heat's government in 1974 had very heterogeneous views regarding EEC membership, a fact that determined the newly elected PM at that time, Harold Wilson, to promise his colleagues that he will renegotiate the terms of membership and make them

the subject of a national referendum. More than four decades later, David Cameron would repeat the same offer but with a very different outcome. (Saunders, 2018) The renegotiation process initiated by Prime Minister Harold Wilson had very clear objectives (see Table 1). Namely, he wished not to reform the EC but to create an opportunity for his Eurosceptic party members to reconsider their opinions. (Saunders, 2016) His demands were focused mainly on economic issues that were considered to be disadvantageous for UK.

Table 1. Britain's renegotiation agenda under Harold Wilson and David Cameron

Harold Wilson's areas of reform	David Cameron's areas of reform
The Common Agricultural Policy	Powers flowing away from Brussels, not always to it
The UK contribution to the EEC Budget	National parliaments able to work together to block unwanted EU legislation
The goal of Economic and Monetary Union	Businesses liberated from red tape
The harmonization of VAT	UK police forces and justice systems able to protect British citizens without interference from the European institutions
Parliamentary sovereignty in pursuing regional, industrial and fiscal policies	Free movement to take up work, not free benefits
	Removing the concept of "ever closer union"

Note. Data compiled by authors from David Cameron's Bloomberg Speech in January 2013 and from Vaughne Miller, *The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum*, Briefing Paper, Number 7253, House of Commons Library, 13 July 2015.

Almost a mirror image of Wilson's action, Cameron's promises shared the same "party salvation" ideal but unlike his predecessor he put forward a set of objectives that were less specific and touched several areas: welfare and free movement, competitiveness, sovereignty and economic governance. (Williams Lea Group, 2016) As Sanders concluded, "where Wilson sought practical improvements that targeted specific grievances, Cameron was driven back onto the 'theology' of the EU, negotiating an opt-out from a commitment to 'ever closer union' that governments had always insisted was meaningless." (Williams Lea Group, 2016, p.2)

Additionally, replicating Wilson's outcome proved to be a harder task for Cameron now with the development of the EEC with nine member states to today's EU of 28 states and the rise of social media. Hence, Cameron had to handle a much more hostile environment at home and abroad and could not afford to approach the renegotiation with Wilson's detachment.

Following negotiation in Brussels, both Prime Ministers returned home claiming that they have secured better deals for Britain hoping this will convince people to vote for remaining but this tactic had little success. Then as now, the economic issues were at the heart of the debate. However, in 2016 Britain was more prosper unlike EU, which was experiencing numerous crises that severely affected its economy.

If in 1975 at the heart of the referendum debate was people's fear of losing national sovereignty and their jobs coupled with the fear of increased prices, in 2016 there was a lot more to be feared. Probably one of the most salient issues that were debated during the 2016 debate was the immigration issue which was almost non-existent in 1975. The net migration from the EEC in 1975 was the equivalent of one-week migration from the EU in 2016. Leave campaigners and their media supporters have strongly exploited the issue describing this flow of persons as an uncontrollable invading force. Moreover, whereas Wilson's campaign was taking place in press and at the television, Cameron had to conduct the referendum campaign in a much more hostile media context with a higher level of engagement coming from the social media environment.

While the 2016 "Remain" campaign set its agenda on stressing the potential damaging effect on the British economy brought by a "Leave" vote, the "Remain" campaign started questioning the campaign leader's honesty and their actual motivation "by presenting the whole economic narrative as a cynical strategy to frighten people into voting for the status quo." (Moore and Ramsay, 2017) The British national mood has thus "gone from being worried about the future to being angry about the present." (Comfort, 2018)

Conclusions

The UK's relationship with EU has always been rocky and characterized by a series of shifting attitudes which gradually morphed into a contagious surge of Euroscepticism. Although not entirely a mirror image of Wilson's strategy, Cameron's decision to hold a referendum followed the same line of thinking but within a completely different political and economic context characterized by a myriad of issues that back in the 1970s. Wilson did not have to address.

Although comparison can be drawn between the 1975 and 2016 campaigns, the debate during 2016 campaign was far more complex and the decision to leave more consequential. As Brexit talks are touching key issues, the tensions during negotiations are increasing also suggesting that Britain will most probably have to leave the EU on rather acrimonious terms.

More than two years after Brexit, the British cabinet still has no clear direction regarding the deal it wants with EU but the general message both parties are conveying seems to tell us that at the moment there is definitely no time for "bregrets". Additionally, all the hope that was invested in May's ability to negotiate a convenient trade agreement with the EU seems to slowly fade away especially after the recent EU summit in Salzburg. May's refusal to give up on her Chequers Brexit plan coupled with the intransigency of the European side had deepen the gap between the two sides which most probably will result in a hard Brexit with no deal reached until the October EU summit. The pressure that came from the trade unions and left-wing activists determined Jeremy Corbyn, Labour leader, to commit to a second referendum focused on the deal rather than on repeating the 2016 question of remaining or leaving the EU. The question of organizing new elections that would change entirely the British negotiation team has been also brought into discussion as an alternative preferred by Corbyn (Heffron, 2018). On the 12 September the State of the Union address, President Jean-Claude Junker stressed that "the remaining EU member states ask the British government to understand that someone who leaves the Union cannot be in the same privileged position as a Member State. If you leave the Union, you are of course no longer part of our single market, and certainly not only in the parts of it you choose." (Junker, 2018) The only sensible alternative to a no deal Brexit is no Brexit at all. Similarly, there cannot be more or less Brexit, it can only be done or undone.

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SME: CULTURAL SCOPE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY

AN ESSAY ON THE STRENGTH AND OPPORTUNITIES OF ENTERPRISE EUROPEAN STYLE REFLECTED FROM ITS CULTURAL PROFILE

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Abstract: *This paper is about entrepreneurship European style and European economy as a culture, by means of a theoretical model that is constructed of the distinctive features of Small and Medium Enterprise (SME). This is not a quantitative but a qualitative model, stemming from historical experience, that can be considered as a visionary image of the future form of European economy and its position in the globalising world. Based on such a forecast a back-casting analysis can be developed: a problem-solving-oriented analysis of the extremely complex crisis where the European Union finds itself in at present. The cultural identity as well as the success of the economy European style lays in the incalculable risk factor of the human involvement in the enterprise, that in the neo-liberal shares-value oriented economy is systematically factored out; involvement of man, not just as 'manpower' (knowledge and labour force), but the central presence of man as such, determining the whole of the organisation by 'proximity'.*

Keywords: polycrisis, European economic culture, SME cultural model of enterprise, proximity, EU a social project.

Introduction

This paper is an essay: it presents a critical reflection on the weakness and strength of European economy, a logical initial step towards eventual further research.

The theoretical framework and layout structure of this paper are outlined. Firstly the weak and threatened side of Europe is briefly sketched in terms of the continue and extremely complicated crisis situation where the European Union finds itself in (section: Crisis).

The reflection is entirely centred on the concept of economy and enterprise as cultural phenomena. A social – ethical definition of 'European culture' is formulated (section: European culture).

The strong side of European enterprise is perceived in the unique cultural dimension of European economy. This is clarified by means of the SME form of enterprise as the model of European economic and enterpreneurial culture. Characteristics of the SME are summarised in the one key characteristic 'proximity', that is: direct personal engagement (section: SME as the model of European economic culture).

'Proximity', including the involvement of all stakeholders in the enterprise, is the essential core of the SME cultural model of European economy, rooted in European history and the unique competitive asset of European economy in the future, amidst the globalisation race dominated by the (neo)liberal financial - economic system based on shareholders value. Within the theoretical framework of this essay the SME model shows how European economy should be working: it offers a *forecast*, a future destination perspective, implicating a problem-solving-oriented *backcasting analysis* of the current complex crisis (section: Economy European style in the globalising world).

Some examples and data may illustrate the significance of the SME model of European economic culture (section: Cases).

Threats and opportunities of European economy confronted with globalisation are summarised in terms of scale, internet and innovation (section: The SME model in the globalising economy, is it sustainable?)

Reflection on European economy as a culture is situated in the context of the European Union as a social project (section: Europe: a social project?)

Crisis

The situation Europe currently finds itself in can be characterised as a stack of crises, a *polycrisis* (expression from Edgar Morin (Morin 1999, p.73). Perceptible in daily life on top of the stack lays the social aftermath of the worldwide financial–economic crisis, especially in Europe:

(youth) unemployment, increasing inequality of income and equity, precariousness of human labour and labour earned income in the future. Deeper layers of crisis – populist division between political, economic and cultural 'elite' and 'the people', division between eurosceptic nationalism and confidence in the European project, division between northern and southern and between western and eastern European Member States, the migration wave from war-ravaged and developing regions to supposed land of milk and honey Europe, climate change - cannot be seen in isolation from the crisis of the dominant, neo-liberal financial-economic system, underlying the *polycrisis* in the world and in Europe. This system is not a mere coincidence of historical circumstances or fortuities, it is an ideology. The deepest layer of the polycrisis in Europe and in the world is a crisis in thinking about man and world, morality and politics, macro- and micro-economic relationships and behaviour, in fact a crisis in culture.

European culture

At first must be emphasized the integral character of the concept of culture. Here we touch a vital element in philosophy and history of culture: everything is linked with everything. This general insight has been focused by Pierre Bourdieu on the economic value of culture and vice versa (i.a. Bourdieu, 1972, 1986, pp.241-258). Jenniskens et al. (2011, pp.39-55) take the theory on culture as capital of Bourdieu as point of departure of a plea for a new paradigm of research on enterpreneurial innovation (on innovation see below) and cultural diversity in European context. And Tomáš Sedláček (2009) in a series of paradigmatic episodes from world history shows the connection of economy and ethics, imagination and practice, of mind and matter. Culture is economy and economy is culture. An economic system is in fact the product and the expression of culture, in its practical application as well as in its theoretical groundwork.

Europe is a unity in a much older, broader and deeper sense than the European Union, the European single market, let alone the Eurozone. Europe is a cultural unity. The anchor concept in this paper is the concept of culture. Thinking about the crisis and of the future of Europe as a unity must start here.

The concept of 'European culture' may seem in contradiction to the multitude of differing ethnic, regional and local cultures, that is so characteristic for the European continent. In this essay cultural diversity is seen more as an argument in favour than as an objection against Europe envisioned as one culture. 'Our diversity is an asset, our unity brings strength' (European Council

2014, p.1). From old this continent was the magnetic terminus for successive groups of migrants, each with their own cultural identities. Then what is it that attracts all these diverse groups up till today and brings them together here? What is it that they – with relative preservation of their identity – bring about of shared historic awareness, way of life and fundamental values? Living together in Europe in cultural diversity presupposes the deep underneath supporting reality of one shared 'European culture'. In this essay this unique culture, consciously or subconsciously sought after and shared in Europe, is defined by means of three essential elements:

1) The ideological continuum in European cultural history (in contrast to the in historiography generally expressed view of a radical ideological break):

- from the biblical image of man as God's image, having dominion over all the earth and knowing good and evil, via the Enlightenment principle of freedom for all citizens, to the modern, universal human rights of freedom of communication, conviction and conscience;

- from pre-modern care for the weak and the needy based on Christian charity, via the Enlightenment-principle of equality for all, rich or poor, strong or fragile, to modern, legally structured economic and social justice and security in 'the social state'.

2) Solidarity in the sense of the political, democratic, legal principle that forms the basis of the modern social state European style: the sharing of interests and costs by all stakeholders in society. Solidarity is essentially a moral behavioural norm; this makes the political principle extremely vulnerable, but also gives it a unique, society-creating strength.

3) The conversion of those high-minded values of freedom, equality and solidarity into concrete practical, elementary freedom of movement and settlement and equal access to social-economic quality and security of existence for all.

This ethical focus on the basic social and economic living conditions for all provides a definition of 'European culture' that is essentially different from current definitions which focus on aesthetic heritage (Chartres, Shakespeare, Bach) and even more so on scientific and economic achievements.

SME as the model of European economic culture

The label SME suggests a limited scope in activities, turnover and personnel. However, the essence of this form of economic activity does not lie in the physical size but in the personal

relationship between the owner / employer, the workers, and the other stakeholders. In this general sense the SME is the source and the first stage of all economic activity, providing an existence firstly for the own family. The prototype of the SME is the family company. This is the case across the world but especially in Europe from of old up till now: the farm, the workshop of 'the patron', the owner and master tradesman with his co-workers and apprentices, the corner shop, the specialised retailer, the local bank with its clients as owners.

Fayolle et al. (2005a, pp. 1-33, 2005b, pp.227-253) have theorised about a specific European view of entrepreneurship, in comparison with a prevailing USA approach. They state that US entrepreneurship often precedes innovation, whereas in Europe innovation generally comes first, leading then to entrepreneurial activities, eventually to new startups.

In the theoretical framework of this essay innovation is a specific concept in the context of knowledge economy and business. The in this essay proposed model of European economic culture may be regarded as a model of innovation in the comprehensive (neo-schumpeterian) sense of a 'disruptive' development fase, not just in technology and economy, but also and above all in social and cultural life in society. 'From a general point of view the future developmental potential of socio-economic systems i.e. innovation in a very broad understanding encompassing besides technological innovation also organizational, institutional and social innovation has to be considered as the normative principle of Neo-Schumpeterian Economics' (Hanusch and Pyka 2007, abstract). Radically deviating from the large-scale anonymous organisational structures and shareholders-value-orientation of the prevailing economic system the SME cultural economic model - inspired by the highly succesful qualities of European economy in history – means innovation by direct human involvement in all sections and levels of the enterprise.

Based on historical research the mentioned authors argue that entrepreneurship in Europe was more a collective social effort than in the USA. The issue seems highly topical nowadays, to judge from very popular TV series like *Undercover Boss* (CBS, BBC) and recent publications like *Six Reasons Why Companies Lose Their Best Employees* (SmartDraw Software 10-07-2018). In accordance with the mentioned authors in the research paradigm for economic enterprise European style should be included at any rate:

- the characteristic European cultural diversity as an asset,
- enterprise as a collective social activity,
- innovation preceding entrepreneurial activities.

Starting at this threefold outcome of research, what follows is a more or less complete outline of economic activity European-style with the SME as qualitative, cultural model.

- The SME is pre-eminently placed for technological and economic innovation, through personally involved co-operation and exchange in the interest of all, through the creative contribution of every fellow worker. This essay is following the position of those researchers who define technological and economic innovation in the enterprise primarily as social innovation (i.a. Volberda and Bosma 2011).

- Innovation within and from the SME is directed by long term vision: the enterprise is not in first instance concerned with the immediate financial gain of the shareholders, but aimed at the interests of the stakeholders i.e. co-workers, customers, society, the planet.

- SME operates on a scale that corresponds with 'human size', not in physical terms of scale, but in terms of social and human relationships: SME characterised not, as in mega concerns, by distance, abstraction and anonimity, but by 'proximity': mutual familiarity between and direct involvement of all employees, from high to low in the company.

- In the SME all co-workers, from high to low, share the responsibility and the risks. This is not a threat but an opportunity for all the workers. The SME ties all workers to the business through recognition of their individual, irreplaceable contribution and through great work satisfaction.

- SME stands for high quality of product through 'artisanal' skill and productivity, and a combination of commerce and services.

- SME generates good and stable jobs, instead of the multitude of senseless, superfluous or even damaging 'bullshit jobs' in today's private and public sector as well (Graeber 2018).

- The SME has an irreplaceable function promoting social cohesion in society - in neighbourhoods, cities and regions.

The above-listed characteristics of the SME as the model for European economic culture can be summarised in the one key characteristic 'proximity', that is: direct human engagement. Stripped back to its essence the SME can be looked at as a 'family': an organisation based on joint relationship as well as on the economic interests of all parties involved.

Economy European style in the globalising world

The guild in the high-medieval European free city is the early-modern form of corporate organisation of entrepreneurship, with freedom and equal dignity for all workers with different

skills taken into the enterprise, with its ideology modelled on the religious fraternity, the precursor of the modern social-political principle of solidarity.   The guild lives on in the modern SME. Just as the guilds exchanged their products and their professional expertise via the networks of the cities across early-modern Europe, so does the European economic activity of today show a growing number of examples of co-operation between cities and urban regions, based on the 'triple helix'. This formula indicates the special focus in innovation on exchange and sharing of knowledge and potential in general between enterprise, innovative science and government. 'The Triple Helix model of university – industry – government relations … has been used as an operational strategy for regional development and to further the knowledge-based economy' (Leydesdorff 2012, p.1; p.3).

Like the guilds the SME as economic model shows two sides: domestic as well as border-crossing. The situation at home is not an end in itself but the beginning of an open economy and a border-crossing, outward looking culture.

In order to remain a prominent economic player Europe has to look for a gap in the world market which is dominated by the (neo)liberal capitalist financial system based on shareholders value, the marketable value of companies, the system that disconnects economy from immediate human engagement and interest (Marx's 'alienation'). Europe has to play differently on the world market. It must find its own economic strength in holding on to the 'human size' as its unique competition power in the globalising world.

The SME is a theoretical model of entrepreneurial culture. We should not cling therefore to 'small and medium size' in physical sense. There are various kinds of SME, depending on scale (personnel, turnover), type of organisation, the type of product or service. Large concerns can still sustain or even encourage the characteristics of SME and SMEs can expand in investments as well as turn-over. There are hundreds of SME suppliers dealing with mega-concerns. Not only are the small ones dependent on the large ones, the large ones are also dependent on the small ones, as regards price / quality rate, product quality, continuity, expertise and reliability.

This essay on SME as representing the unique cultural dimension of European economy provides a double perspective: it is focussing on 'what is' and at the same time on 'what should be'. The given factual crisis situation is approached, looking 'back to the future' - so to say - as the desirable perspective. The SME model shows how European economy should be working because that is what economy European style in essence is.

The conceptual approach within the theoretical framework of this paper certainly does not mean that it would not have connection or consequence as regards to concrete practical questions. On the contrary this paper wants to deliver a relevant contribution to a critical insight in the strengths and weaknesses of European economy face to face with globalisation. Neither does the in this paper developed vision on European economy as fundamentally a cultural reality offer directly ready for use political or economic solutions. What it intends to offer is a *forecast* based on the fundamental cultural nature of the European unity, including European economy. The practical problem-solving orientation of this essay might implicate a *backcasting analysis* of (elements of) the current complex crisis situation in the light of the cultural perspective (Stead & Bannister, 2004).

Cases

A paradigmatic example of an SME currently experiencing a stormy development from small to large scale whilst maintaining its genuine cultural-economic SME character is the Dutch VDL concern now globally operating in transport technology. Characteristics of this concern: manifacturing industry is kept under its own management with its own personnel; within the fast and spectacular scaling-up of the organisation the direction of each department remains fully responsible for the specialized, small size operating risks and opportunities; thus on department or franchise level stakeholders value has priority.

Characteristics of SME as the model of economy European style can be seen pre-eminently in the co-operative structure. Unique in its kind is the Rabobank, today a globally operating banking organisation grown out of several mergers of small Dutch banks, among which the 'Coöperatieve Centrale Boerenleenbank', that was established more than a century ago by a local cleric concerned with the small holder farmers' misery. The bank had a physical presence in the community in the shape of hundreds of small, relatively autonomous branches owned by the customers on a co-operative basis. This formula has been a sensational success - economically as well as socially and culturally: it has had an important emancipating and elevating function for the rural population in modern society. The present ongoing reorganisation deviates from the original small scale service bank to the large centrally controlled business bank.

More eloquent than individual cases are recent figures showing a shift in the labour market. By mere coincidence my eye falls on an article in my daily paper (Charlot Verlouw, editor

economics, *Trouw* 17 – 11 – 2018) headed: 'On search of the ultimate happiness at work': 'A qualified nano technologist says: "I sat there in the lab doing what a manager wanted me to do, without that manager exactly knowing what I was doing, and I not knowing what the person next to me was doing, becoming such a manager as my only perspective." Research bureau Gallup says 70% of employees is not really involved in the work. The technologist again: "They are physically present, but not mentally." A happy independent employee thinks in the interest of the company and so he is involved. This is good for the company.' (cf. https//corporate-rebels.com)

On LinkedIn the number of employees in firms with less than ten employees saw an increase of 44%. According to this network platform cultural factors play an important role in this development: young people want to work for non-hierarchical and traditionally run organisations; they want to feel involved in the organisation. According to MKB-Nederland that works out better in an SME than in a multinational. Recent research by the employment advise organisation Young Capital shows similar tendencies.

Can we detect a common denominator present in the characteristics of the SME cultural profile and in the discussed casuistry where it demonstrates a specific European culture? Competition power of European technology and economy seems to lay precisely where technological and economic systems indicate the weak point, namely in the human asset and risk factor, the value of the human person, his personal involvement in the technological and economic enterprise, in one word 'proximity' as the heart of European economic culture.

The SME model in the globalising economy, is it sustainable?

No more unfavourable moment than just now - the economy after the 2008 crisis apparently picking up worldwide and also in Europe - to elevate SME as the most successful if not the unique model of European economy in the globalising world. Small and medium-sized enterprises are pushed away from the street scene in the city and village centres, on the one hand by invisible and untouchable powerful property developers and owners operating from the other side of the Atlantic on great distance of the social network of the city, who force up rental in an exorbitant way; on the other hand by increasing internet shopping. Yet small and medium-sized shops and companies apparently have a reasonable chance of survival if they innovate timely and adequately, in the sense of innovation as articulated hereabove. They must dare to distinguish themselves from the big store chains, not so much by competition on prices, but by distinctive assortment and quality

of supply, added experience value (design, opening hours, coffee-stop, chat) and above all by the physically present personal reception and service, information, advice, that the internet cannot possibly provide.

The political climate favouring economic growth by means of large-scale organisations on national as well as on European level has been changing lately in favour of the SME. There is recognition of the dynamic potential of the SME with regards to the provision of new services, the creation of new jobs and the promotion of social and regional development, knowledge, commitment and flexibility in the new economy in Europe. 'The priorities we set for the Union for the next five years are to … promote a climate of entrepreneurship and job creation, not least for SME' (European Council, Strategic Agenda 2014, p.2)

And once again the argument of this essay, prior to the fate of the individual SME enterprise is concerned with the SME as a model of entrepreneurial culture. It states that the survival and the success of European enterprise, of whatever scale or structure, depends on its affinity to the sketched model, the extent to which its organisation and business policy are defined by human proximity.

Europe: a social project?

European economy reflected from its cultural profile should be viewed in the broad context of the European Union as fundamentally a social project. The European integration process is characterised by the contrast between the values, principles and goals in the Treaties - and their political and practical implementation. From the start, Europe is an economic project. If one can speak of European social policy at all, until now this has almost exclusively been in connection with the economic factor labour, in the framework of a single internal market which is supposed to bring a social market economy, high level employment and social progress. Redistributive social policy (social inclusion, combating poverty, minimum income, social benefits, pensions) is, according to the Treaties, the shared competence of the Union and the Member States, regulated by the principle of subsidiarity, rigorously applied by the Member States. Basicaly this principle is intended to serve European policy *as closely as possible to the citizen*; in fact it frustrates the much needed co-operation between Memberstates in the field of social policy. It is assumed in this essay that social policy in that wider sense is just as much of border-crossing importance as climate

change, energy supply and security. Convergence of social policy is the absolute condition for the political existence of the European Union (Vandenbroucke 2012; 2014, pp. 151-175).

From the start peace and prosperity for the European peoples were the highest end with economic co-operation by the national states the means. However, partly under pressure of the crisis it seems that the means, the economic project, has become disconnected from the end: Europe as a social project. The European democratic deficit is a broad-based reaction in society to the way in which the Union and the Member States have been trying to control the financial-economic crisis - through a rigorous policy of austerity neo-liberal-style. Once austerity seems to have turned now into spectacular economic growth the middle classes are confronted with increasing difference between well-doing and needy - between social participation and exclusion. Politicians do not have a convincing European 'grand narrative', or even reject a wider vision; at the homefront they hide their impotence behind 'Brussels' bureaucracy', they do not give the citizens the true facts and so – with hiccups of old and new nationalism – they undermine the democratic support for Europe (and for themselves).

The approach of the European Union in the light of European culture does not stop at the national geopolitical borders of the states. At this time social and cultural insecurity and disquiet seem to extend all over Europe among the lower and middle classes. See the recent radical political changes in Italy, in Spain, the street violence in the cities of France … similarly within the Brexit issue may be perceived a convergence of motives related to social and cultural dissatisfaction among 'the people'.

Europe is fundamentally not a geopolitical but a cultural entity; Europe does not consist of nation-states but of cultural communities and these plainly consist of human beings, European citizens. Europe is a Community of Values, which manifests and realises itself concretely in the basic quality of life and social security for every citizen. Europeans are becoming alienated from Europe and the democratic support for the European integration process is weakening because of the factual and or experienced threat to that basic quality of life and social security through the economic politics. The solution for the European democratic deficit has to be looked for in that direction. 'People are not necessarily anti-Europe, anti-globalisation or anti-foreigner. They just ask simple things: work, a fair income and protection of their cultural capital' (Guilluy 2018). The democratic support of the European Union will only be safeguarded, not by reform of the institutions of the EU, but by the concrete transition of the ideological ground and essence of

European integration, that is the value of solidarity, into the quality of social and individual life for all Europeans. Solidarity in the sense of direct human engagement and the central position of the stakeholders in economy, that is exactly the significance of the SME model of European economic culture.

Conclusion

European culture comprises a pragmatic economic strategy and tactics, based on ideological values and moral rules of behaviour. Almost three decades ago Michel Albert already posited that a revaluation of the Rhineland capitalism would generate more growth in the long run than its Anglo-American counterpart, precisely because of its focus on the human involvement rather than mere profit as its goal (Albert 1991). The historical success of post-war economy in Europe can be explained and understood with the help of the in this essay developed theoretical SME model. It wishes to argue that the same is valid for European economy in the future in the globalising world. The future competitive strength of the European technology and economy will stand or fall with the incorporation of the human being into the technological and economical systems: human competence, engagement and co-operation as well as human unpredictability and fallibility, precisely those factors that in knowledge economy and in large-scale concerns with centralistic top-down management are kept as much as possible extra parenthesis.

What does Europe have to offer the world in the short and long- term future? As far as geographical extent and the scale of economy are concerned, Europe is inferior to its American cousins and losing its lead on the Asian continent. Whether Europe can continue to compete in the fields of science and technology is uncertain; Europe seems to suffer from the handicap of the lead. The competitive potential of Europe in a globalising world lies not in economic and financial superiority, but in the model of a society based on the political and legal principle of solidarity, in which freedom of communication and conscience, social justice and high social-economic quality of life are within everybody's reach.

Slowly but surely it is beginning to dawn at all levels and in all sectors that the polycrisis in the world and in Europe is not cyclical but is here to stay - that this crisis is the beginning of entirely new political and economic relationships worldwide. This realisation does not spring from naïve idealism (moral, social, cultural) or utopian visions for the future, but from hard-nosed, objective observations about the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant system until now. This

paper is about the extremely intricate changeover from an apparently utopic forecast to a realistic backcasting analysis of the polycrisis in Europe and the whole world. The idea of a radical overturn of the global, capital-intensive economic system - from an industrial, unsustainable, climate-changing, largely imaginary needs creating mass-production to a sustainable, meeting of real needs, innovative balance economy - that idea will remain a non-committal, un-articulated mirage unless it is converted into concrete new patterns of behaviour, social structures and economic conditions, which in this essay are put in order with the help of the SME as the model of European economic culture. In such a radical overturn of economic relationships Europe can take the lead in the world on the basis of its culture of technological – economic innovation as in essence 'social innovation' and human 'proximity' as the essence and the success secret of enterprise.

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