# THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE BLACK SEA REGION CREATED BY THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (2022)

**Agnieszka ROGOZIŃSKA, PhD**

Academy of Piotrkow, Poland

arogozinska@op.pl

**Abstract:** *The Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, has demonstrated Moscow's approach to the Black Sea region. Contrary to the provisions of the law on the law, the Russian Federation blocked the freedom of navigation in the inland Sea of Azov and the principle of enforcing the right to act harmlessly in Ukrainian territorial waters off the coast of Crimea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea region has become a place of intensive trade and transit and the transfer of energy resources from the Caspian Sea area and Central Asia to Europe. The events in Georgia in 2008 and the recent developments in Ukraine show that the Russian Federation is trying to rebuild its former influence and take control of the region. This article aims to diagnose the security of the Black Sea Region in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2022). The article discusses the historical security context of the Black Sea Region, the main threats to the security of the region in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2022) and, forecasts for the formation of the security of the Black Sea Region after the end of hostilities. Scientific research conducted that the Battle of the Black Sea may become the cause of a clash in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will affect not only Ukrainebut also members of the people around the world, as well as Russia's blockade of the Black Sea communication routes. The research methods used are literature analysis and criticism, historical methods, comparison, and generalization. Scientific studies have shown that the Battle of the Black Sea could become a key clash in the Russo-Ukrainian war that will affect not only Ukraine but also members of the nation around the world and lead to the Russian blockade of the Black Sea.*

**Keywords:** Black Sea, security, region, threats, Russian-Ukrainian war (2022)

## 1. Introduction

The Black Sea is the border south-eastern between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and is also the only large sea between the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea is an important region for the projection of military power in the Russian direction, as the Carpathian Mountains chain in Romania and the Caucasus Mountains limit the conduct of land operations from the south (Zarychta, 2016, p. 54). The Black Sea represents the only alternative

route by which the Russian Federation can be threatened from this direction. This region is also an important transit route for European countries in international trade, as an important connection for Europe of routes leading from east to west and from south to north (Rogozińska, 2023). According to analysts, control or domination of the Black Sea facilitates the takeover of the entire European continent, especially the Balkans and Central Europe, but also the eastern Mediterranean region, the southern Caucasus, and the northern part of the Middle East (Stępniewski, 2013, p. 166). Over the centuries, the interests of the superpowers have intersected in the area, the main states interested in dominating the region being Russia and Turkey (Andrusiewicz, 2004, pp. s. 173–174). Today, the security challenges in the Black Sea region are interlinked and inextricably interwoven into the wider Euro-Atlantic security context. Three NATO member states are located in the Black Sea area (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) and several NATO partner states, so any manifestation of instability or hostility in the region directly affects the Alliance.

Today, security threats in the Black Sea region are an accumulation of interconnectedness and are an elementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. In the Black Sea region lie the member states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as well as several NATO partner states, which means that any threats in the region directly affect the security of the Alliance. In recent years, the Russian Federation has consistently strengthened its military presence and initiated and supported disinformation activities. The most serious threats to European security that undermine the existing international order became apparent in the Black Sea region during the Russian Federation's conflict with Georgia in 2008 (Kowalczyk, 2017, pp. s. 170–173), the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Zaniewicz, 2020), Russian destabilization activities in eastern Ukraine (Gladii, 2017, p. 64) and the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Bryjka, 2023). In addition to the use of conventional weapons, the Russian Federation also uses asymmetric means of conducting operations in the region, materializing in hybrid warfare (Banasik, 2018, p. 94).

The main research problem of the article was formulated in the form of the question: What threats does the war in Ukraine (2022) create for the security of the Black Sea region and what are the predictions for the formation of future security in the region?

The main research problem is divided into the following specific problems: 1. What is the historical context of the security of the Black Sea region?; 2. In what is the security of the Black Sea region expressed in the context of the aggression of the war of the Russian Federation with Ukraine (2022)?,;3. What predictions can be drawn for the security of the Black Sea region?

The article aims to identify and diagnose the threats created by the Russian-Ukrainian war (2022) to the security of the Black Sea region and forecast future security in the region. The research area is situated in the discipline of security sciences. The research methods used are literature analysis and criticism, historical methods, comparison, and generalization.

## 2. The historical context of security in the Black Sea region

For geographical reasons, the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was decisive in the Black Sea region. The Empire controlled two major straits, the Dardanelles, connecting the Aegean Sea to the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, connecting the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea. The role of these straits, dubbed the Turkish Straits, is fundamental tothe reason that they constitute the only entrance to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. Confirmation of Ottoman dominance in the Black Sea region came with the conquest of Crimea in 1475. Foreign ships were then excluded from sailing the Black Sea, creating Ottoman domination of the area for three centuries. This domination lasted until 1774, when the Ottomans decided to support Poland in the war against Russia (Morawski, Szawłowska, 2006, pp. 90–91). Empress Catherine the Great then placed the Crimea under a Russian protectorate, guaranteeing its merchant shipping free passage through the straits (Serczyk, 1974, p. 220). Over the following years, the issue of the Black Sea straits remained the subject of international rivalry. Some agreement was not reached until 1923 in Lausanne (Batowski, 2001, p. 75). The treaty adopted at that time stipulated that all ships, even warships, had the right of free passage through the straits but only in peacetime. The International Straits Commission was to supervise the provisions of the treaty by overseeing the implementation of the various provisions of the treaty, including their demilitarisation. Changes in this regard came in the 1930s when Turkey claimed that the demilitarisation clause of the Lausanne Treaty was contrary to Turkey's right to self-defence. The change of the previous provisions was forced by developments in international politics: the remilitarisation of Germany accelerated the erosion of the post-war collective security system

established by the League of Nations. Turkey therefore returned to the subject of the straits at another conference, this time in Montreux, Switzerland.

Russia was also a power vitally interested in regulating access to the Black Sea straits. Its demands included that the Black Sea be closed to all but the littoral states. These conditions were a consequence of the fact that Ukraine and Georgia were then part of the USSR, while Romania and Bulgaria were Russian allies. However, Russian ideas for the shaping of order in the Black Sea region did not meet with the approval of the Western powers. Britain and other European states took steps to limit the ability of Russian warships to explore the waters of the Black Sea unfettered in the event of a naval war and to seek refuge there. Western states also sought to limit Turkey's ability to block the Black Sea straits. Faced with the impossibility of reaching a compromise, a compromise solution was eventually adopted by the states concerned with the Black Sea Straits issue. The provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to remilitarise the zone of the straits, granting it some control over them (Batowski, 2001, p. 276). At the same time, the agreement regulating the passage of ships increased Soviet influence in the Black Sea.

In the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, the Montreux Convention provides the legal basis for regulating traffic in the Black Sea. Already at the beginning of hostilities, Ukraine asked Turkey to close the strait to Russian warships, pointing to Turkey's crucial importance in maintaining peace in the Black Sea region. The Turkish government agreed to the proposal on 28 February 2022 (Respect, 2022). However, this didn't stop Russia from placing several warships in the Black Sea waters. In response, Turkey stated that it would not prevent Russian warships from entering the Black Sea if Russia claimed that they were returning to their home ports (Respect, 2022).

The key provisions of the Montreux Convention governing the entry of ships into the Black Sea during wartime read: 1) Turkey may close the strait to warships of belligerent parties in time of war or when Turkey itself is a party to the war or is threatened with aggression by another state, 2) Turkey may close the strait to merchant ships belonging to states at war with Turkey, 3) Any state with a coastline in the Black Sea - Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia or Ukraine - must give Turkey eight days' notice of its intention to send warships through the strait. Other countries, those that don't border the Black Sea, must give Turkey 15 days' notice. Only

Black Sea states may send submarines through the strait, but only after prior notification and only if the submarines were built or purchased outside the Black Sea, 4. Only nine warships may pass through the strait at any one time, and there are restrictions on the size of the ships, either individually or in groups. No group of ships can exceed 15,000 metric tonnes. Modern warships are heavy, with frigates around 3,000 metric tonnes and destroyers and cruisers around 10,000 metric tonnes. Modern aircraft carriers are too large to pass through, and under Turkish regulations are not allowed anyway (Tulun, 2020).

Dominion of the Black Sea entails many advantages. Ships of coastal countries sailing on it have much greater rights than vessels from outside the Black Sea. Ships of coastal countries sailing there have much more rights than non-Black Sea vessels. Foreign warships, for example, cannot stay in the basin for more than 21 days, Black Sea navies are exempt from such restrictions (Łomanowski, 2023). In addition, non-Black Sea navies have a permissible total tonnage of 45,000 tonnes with no non-Black Sea power having more than two-thirds of this figure. Ships of countries involved in hostilities are not allowed to enter the Black Sea, making it impossible, for example, to replace, the sunken cruiser „Moscow". Turkey's situation in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war is difficult. Both sides in the conflict are important partners in key energy and military trade agreements (Olech, Potera, 2022). Turkey is a member of NATO and seeks to strengthen its ties with the West, at the same time the Russian Federation is one of its key partners. Turkish control of key straits may prove decisive for its future relations with both partners.

3. **The security of the Black Sea region in the context of the aggression of Russia's war against Ukraine (2022)**

The Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 had serious implications for the security of the Black Sea region. Russian actions in the region reduced the role of the Black Sea to a „Russian lake" (Korbut, 2023). To this end, contrary to the provisions of international law, Russia blocked the freedom of navigation of ships in the inland Sea of Azov and the exercise of the right of passage in Ukrainian territorial waters off the coast of Crimea. Since the beginning of hostilities, the Kremlin has used terrorist acts against the Black Sea fleet, launching drifting „anchor" mines into the sea lanes, shelling merchant ships, occupying foreign

territories and, blocking commercial ports (Pedrozo, 2023, pp. 15–58). Examples of this type of action included the shelling of the Turkish bulk carrier "Yasa Jupiter" near Odessa (Grotnik, 2022), the Panamanian ship "Namura Queen" in Odessa (Payne, 2022), and the Romanian chemical tanker "Millennial Spirit", the annexation of Crimea, the seizure of Mariupol and Snake Island (Ukraińska, 2022).

In the case of the latter, the seizure already took place on the first day of the war, 24 February 2022. This rocky islet, which has no strategic importance, has become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance to the Russians, as exemplified by the sinking of the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the missile cruiser Moskva (Flota, 2022).

The Russian blockade of Black Sea ports is not only exacerbating the collapse of the Ukrainian economy but also contributing to increased access to food to in the world's most backward countries. It was via the Black Sea sea routes that Ukraine shipped more than half of its foreign trade. Ukraine is the world's first exporter of sunflower oil, the world's fourth supplier of maize, and the fifth exporter of wheat (Matuszak, 2022).

In the first year of the war, more than 24 million tonnes of grain (14 million tonnes of maize, 7 million tonnes of wheat, and 3 million tonnes of sunflower seeds) were in Ukrainian warehouses, putting Ukraine at risk of losing around 6 billion dollars in a year, with no storage space for new crops and wasted old ones (Matuszak, 2022).

The blockade of Black Sea ports was an instrument of non-military influence, by blackmailing with hunger the Russian Federation was not only seeking financial gain but additionally wanted to force Western countries to lift some of the economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation. A break of the maritime blockade was successfully negotiated with the involvement of the United Nations Organization and Turkey on 22 July 2022 (Jest porozumienie, 2022). The agreement was extended three times (Szymczak, 2023). The grain agreement has ensured the safe passage of ships carrying grain from Ukrainian ports. To date, the agreement has allowed almost 33 million tonnes of food to be exported through Ukrainian ports. The negotiated agreement covered only three Ukrainian ports:  Yuzhno, Odessa, and Chernomorsk, their export capacity is estimated at over 7 million tonnes per month. Goods went to 43 countries, the support was planned to include mainly nations facing a hunger crisis: Egypt, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

The agreement expired on 17 July 2023, and Russia did not agree to extend it. At the same time, the Kremlin authorities in public statements, such as that of Dimitry Peskov, suggest that it is possible to return to talks on the extension of the agreement, the condition being the fulfillment of the provisions of the agreement obliging the UN to facilitate free access of Russian fertilizers and other products to world markets (Rudnik, Matuszak, Michalski, 2023).

For virtually the entire duration of the grain agreement, Russia has complained about obstacles to fertilizer and grain exports. Although European Union and United States sanctions do not affect crops or fertilizers, restrictions in the financial, insurance, and ship leasing sectors hit Russian exports hard. The Kremlin decided to sign the agreement in return for, among other things, allowing the Kremlin to export ammonia, an important component of nitrogen fertilizers. The Russian Federation had demanded the resumption of ammonia shipments using a pipeline running through Ukraine to the port of Odessa (Ukraine 2023). Currently, Russia "no longer needs Ukrainian ports for ammonia exports" (Koniec, 2023), its export can take place via an alternative route. To this end, a special terminal is being built in Russia for the transport of ammonia, which could replace the pipeline running to Odessa. The terminal is being built on the Taman Peninsula, on the Black Sea (Ukraine, 2023).

Anticipating the possibility of the Kremlin withdrawing from the grain agreement, Ukraine has secured a special insurance fund of around 547 million dollars for companies whose ships will come through the Black Sea to Ukraine after Russia withdraws from the agreement (Rudnik, Matuszak, Michalski, 2023). In such a situation, the alternatives for Russian food exports will remain smaller river ports on the Danube or the land route, via European Union countries, including Poland.

It should be noted that food products are not the only goods exported by Ukraine by sea. For example, two companies (Inagas and Cryoin) located in the south of Ukraine secure 45-54% of the world's needs for neon needed for lasers cutting so-called silicon „wafers" for microprocessors (Ukraine, 2022). Ukraine is also a leading supplier of wire harnesses for the automotive industry (through the Leoni plant built there by the Germans). Supply restrictions in this sector have affected companies such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes, reducing vehicle production by up to 700,000 in the first and second quarters of 2022 alone (Amann, Carey, 2022).

Safeguarding the waters of the Black Sea and the Black Sea Fota is the continued rearmament of Ukraine with long-range anti-ship systems.

The transfer of this type of equipment is already underway, with the UK providing Ukraine with a batch of Brimstone-type short-range 'ground-to-ground' missiles, which are also highly suitable against small surface targets (Allison, 2023). Admittedly, beyond the reach of the Brimstones is the maritime exclusive economic zone, but securing it is possible with external assistance. An example of this is Denmark, which has offered to give Ukraine coastal mobile Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers with a field of fire of almost 300 km (Jeong, 2022). In this way, the Ukrainian armed forces could have at their disposal 24 NSM missiles (12 on launchers and 12 in reserve), which would be sufficient to stop any Russian, ship-based landing craft (Dura, 2023). It should be noted that the situation of strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities, obviously necessary, could lead to a repeat of the „Tanker War" that occurred during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s (Navias, 2023). Then it blocked the flow of oil to Europe, now it could block the flow of grain to Africa.

Taking a long-term view, it should be taken into account that the blockade of Ukrainian ports does not necessarily end with the war in Ukraine. The Russian Federation may use the instrument of hunger blackmail in other parts of the world, aware of the lack of response from Western countries. After all, similar actions have already taken place, if only about the airspace over, for example, Syria (Conflict, 2023).

## 4. Security outlook for the Black Sea region

The battle for the Black Sea may be the most important clash in the Russo-Ukrainian war, with not only Ukraine's economic future but also the food security of millions of people worldwide at stake. In this context, it seems reasonable to consider scenarios for the development of the future situation in the Black Sea region, depending on the hypothetical end of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The first scenario under discussion envisages a split in NATO and European Union countries, leading to a weakening of sanctions against the Russian Federation and a reduction in the supply of arms to Ukraine. In this scenario, the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention remain unchanged and the Black Sea remains a „Russian lake" (Korbut, 2023). However, based

on an assessment of the recent successes of Ukrainian forces and the symptoms of a possible collapse of the Russian army, this scenario seems increasingly unlikely.

The second scenario envisages the defeat of the Russian Federation by Ukraine, the balance of political power, however, does not allow for a change in the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In the context of developments in Ukraine, this scenario can be considered likely.

The third scenario envisages Russia losing the war, after the end of hostilities the United States, European Union, NATO, and the Black Sea states undertake a redrafting of the Montreux Convention to restore and ensure long-term stability and security in the region. As a result of the changes, the Montreux Convention is updated, but Turkey's position remains unchanged and it retains control of the straits unchanged. At the same time, the Turkish straits are no longer treated as a separate legal regime under the Montreux Convention but are subject to the rules on international straits set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is the least likely scenario, primarily due to Turkey's resistance to any infringement of its sovereignty.

To generalize, it must be said that how to secure the sea lanes in the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports is not just a Ukrainian problem. Of course, in the first instance, it is the Ukrainians who will lose financially from the blockade of Odessa, but the lack of their exports will be felt by dozens of other countries, and not just the poorest ones. Russia's blockade of Black Sea transport routes, which is illegal under maritime law, cuts off access to Ukrainian foodstuffs for many countries, causing famine and directly related regional armed conflicts. By blackmailing hunger, the Kremlin not only wants to benefit financially but also to force Western countries to lift some of the sanctions already imposed on the Russian Federation. The Russians, by the way, are not hiding about this at all, as evidenced by a statement made by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko on 25 May 2022. In an interview with the Interfax agency, he stated that 'Russia is ready to provide a humanitarian corridor for ships carrying food from Ukraine in exchange for the lifting of certain sanctions' (Russia ready, 2022). If the Kremlin succeeds in its ongoing war, Russia will feel so confident and impunity that it is likely to pursue further annexations: starting with Transnistria - a Russian-backed enclave in Moldova (Rogozińska, 2023) - and extending its influence across Ukraine, and possibly into Romania, all the way to the Black Sea (Rogozińska, 2022).

## 5. Conclusions

Due to the current unstable situation in the Black Sea region caused by hostilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, transport and trade in this basin have been severely hampered. For centuries, there has been an unresolved dispute over the dominion of the Black Sea. It is of particular importance in the case of the war in Ukraine - Russia, in violation of international law, is illegally deploying its ships and blocking food supplies.

For centuries, the Black Sea region has been the intersection of important communication routes between Europe and the Middle East, between the Eastern Balkans and the Southern Caucasus. Ensuring the security of these trade and communication routes is an essential condition for the development of both the region and the countries using these routes. The right of access to the sea in the Black Sea straits is governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, providing Russia and Turkey with a privileged position in the region. However, the Kremlin is violating the Convention by illegally deploying its submarines in the Mediterranean and blocking food and energy supplies. The battle for the Black Sea could be the most important clash in the Russo-Ukrainian war, which could have dire consequences for hundreds of millions of people around the world and trigger a wave of migration of people at risk of starvation. It will also automatically be linked to riots and local armed conflicts, which are most often linked to food crises. If this is a deliberate action by the Kremlin it means that the Russians are introducing a new way of waging hybrid warfare that will bring millions of casualties and a global crisis without the need for military instruments of influence.

### References

1. 'Afrykańscy przywódcy naciskają na Putina. "Ta wojna musi się skończyć"' (2023). Available at: https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art38873841-afrykanscy-przywodcy-naciskaja-na-putina-ta-wojna-musi-sie-skonczyc (Accessed: 6 June 2023).
2. 'Ukraine halts half of world's neon output for chips, clouding outlook. The Economics Time' (2022). Available at:

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/ukraine-halts-half-of-worlds-neon-output-for-chips-clouding-outlook/articleshow/90153722.cms?from=mdr (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

3.  'Ukraine war Russia says ammonia pipeline blast may end grain deal' (2023). Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65845441 (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

4.  Allison, G. (2023). 'UK 'not ruling out' giving Ukraine missiles to rach Russia'. Available at:
    https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-not-ruling-out-giving-ukraine-missiles-to-reach-russia/23 (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

5.  Amann, Ch., Carey, N. (2022). 'Ukraine invasion hampers wire harness supplies for carmakers'. Available at:
    https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/ukraine-invasion-hurts-flow-wire-harnesses-carmakers-2022-03-02/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

6.  Andrusiewicz, A. (2004). *Cywilizacja rosyjska. T. 2*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

7.  Banasik, M. (2018). *Wojna hybrydowa i jej konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego*. Warszawa: Difin.

8.  Batowski, H. (2001). *Między dwiema wojnami 1919-1939: zarys historii dyplomatycznej*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

9.  Bryjka, F. (2022). 'Wpływ wojny na Ukrainie na politykę NATO w regionie Morza Czarnego'. Available at; https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/wplyw-wojny-na-ukrainie-na-polityke-nato-w-regionie-morza-czarnego (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

10. 'Conflict in Syria' (2023). Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

11. Dura, M. (2023). 'How Ukraine Can Use Polish-Delivered NSM Missiles in its Offensive [COMMENTARY]'. Available at: https://defence24.com/armed-forces/navy/how-ukraine-can-use-polish-delivered-nsm-missiles-in-its-offensive-commentary (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

12. 'Flota Czarnomorska straciła krążownik Moskwa, ale ogłasza sukces' (2022). Available at:

https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art36773921-flota-czarnomorska-stracila-krazownik-moskwa-ale-oglasza-sukces (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

13. Gladii, A. (2017). Konflikt zbrojny w Donbasie w latach 2014/2015 – rozłam wewnętrzny czy ukraińsko-rosyjska wojna? Scenariusze dalszego rozwoju konfliktu. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, nr 10, pp. 95–118.

14. Grotnik, T. (2022). 'Wojna morska o Ukrainę'. Available at: https://zbiam.pl/artykuly/wojna-morska-o-ukraine/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

15. Jeong, A. (2022). 'Denmark offers Ukraine Harpoon missiles to fight Russia's Black Sea blockade'. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/ukraine-denmark-harpoon-missiles-russia-war/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

16. 'Jest porozumienie o odblokowaniu eksportu zboża z Ukrainy przez Morze Czarne' (2022). Available at:
 https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8497640,porozumienie-o-odblokowaniu-eksportu-zboza-z-ukrainy-przez-morze-czarne.html (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

17. 'Koniec "porozumienia zbożowego"? Ukraina: Na 99,9 proc. tak będzie' (2023). Available at: https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art38643241-koniec-porozumienia-zbozowego-ukraina-na-99-9-proc-tak-bedzie (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

18. Korbut, O. (2023). 'Russia's Lake: How to Liberate the Back Sea'. Available at: https://cepa.org/article/russias-lake-ow-to-liberate-the-black-sea/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

19. Kowalczyk, M. (2017). 'Przyczyny wojny gruzińsko-rosyjskiej w 2008 roku'. *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, vol. II, 2017, pp. 169–184.

20. Łomanowski, A. (2021). 'Nowy szlak na Morze Czarne. Z antyrosyjskim wydźwiękiem?'. Available at: https://www.rp.pl/kraj/art61601-nowy-szlak-na-morze-czarne-z-antyrosyjskim-wydzwiekiem (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

21. Matuszak, S. (2022). 'Produkcja i eksport żywności z Ukrainy w warunkach wojny z Rosją'. Available at: https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2022-05-06/produkcja-i-eksport-zywnosci-z-ukrainy-w-warunkach-wojny-z (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

22. Morawski, W., Szawłowska, S. (2006). *Wojny rosyjsko-tureckie od XVII do XX wieku*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO.

23. Navias, M.S. (2023). The First Tanker War. Available at: https://www.historytoday.com/history-matters/first-tanker-war (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

24. Olech, A., Potera, A. (2022). 'Kluczowy członek NATO stawia na energię z Rosji. Jak zareaguje na to Sojusz?'. Available at: https://energetyka24.com/elektroenergetyka/analizy-i-komentarze/kluczowy-czlonek-nato-stawia-na-energie-z-rosji-jak-zareaguje-na-to-sojusz-komentarz (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

25. Payne, J. (2022). Ukraine says two commercial ships hit by Russian missiles near Odessa port. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-flagged-tanker-hit-by-missile-ukraine-coast-2022-02-25/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

26. Pedrozo, R. (2023). 'Russia-Ukraine Conflict: The War at Sea'. *International Law Studies*, vol. 100, 2023, pp. 1–35.

27. 'Respect closure of Black Sea access,' Turkey tells Ukraine and Russia (2022). Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/01/respect-closure-of-black-sea-access-turkey-tells-ukraine-and-russia (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

28. Rogozińska, A. (2022). 'Naddniestrze jako drugi etap wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej'. Available at: https://ine.org.pl/naddniestrze-jako-drugi-etap-wojny-rosyjsko-ukrainskiej/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

29. Rogozińska, A. (2023). 'Zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa regionu czarnomorskiego kreowane przez wojnę rosyjsko-ukraińską'. Available at: https://ine.org.pl/zagrozenia-dla-bezpieczenstwa-regionu-czarnomorskiego-kreowane-przez-wojne-rosyjsko-ukrainska-2/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

30. Rudnik, F., Matuszak, S., Michalski, A. (2023). 'Rosyjska gra z Zachodem: Moskwa wycofuje się z umowy zbożowej'. Available at: https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2023-07-18/rosyjska-gra-z-zachodem-moskwa-wycofuje-sie-z-umowy-zbozowej (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

31. 'Russia ready to set up corridor for ships leaving Ukraine with food, with conditions' (2022). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ready-set-up-corridor-ships-carrying-food-leave-ukraine-ifax-2022-05-25/ (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

32. Serczyk, W. A. (1974). *Katarzyna II, carowa Rosji*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.

33. Stępniewski, T. (2013). 'Region Morza Czarnego w polityce Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki w XXI wieku', in Fiszer, J. M., Olszewski P. (ed.), *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym ładzie międzynarodowym*, pp. 163–180. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.

34. Szymczak, J. (2023). 'Rosja wypowiada umowę zbożową. Co kieruje Puitnem?'. Available at: https://oko.press/rosja-wypowiada-umowe-zbozowa-co-kieruje-putinem (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

35. Tulun, T. E. (2020). 'The Montreux Convention: a regional and global safety valve. Report, Ankara: Center of Euroasian Studies', p. 57. Available at: https://avim.org.tr/tr/Rapor-KonferansKitaplari/79/pdf (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

36. Ukraińska armia: Rosjanie chcieli kilka razy odbić Wyspę Węży (2022). Available at:

37. https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art38679921-ukrainska-armia-rosjanie-chcieli-kilka-razy-odbic-wyspe-wezy (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

38. Wójcicka, K. (2023). 'Umowa zbożowa daleka od ideału. Najwięcej towarów z ukraińskich portów płynie do Chin'. Available at: https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8639578,handel-umowa-zbozowa-ukrainskie-porty-towary-chiny.html (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

39. Zaniewicz, M. (2020). 'Znaczenie i konsekwencje militaryzacji Krymu przez Rosję'. Available at; https://pism.pl/publikacje/Znaczenie_i_konsekwencje_militaryzacji_Krymu_przez_Rosje (Accessed: 6 June 2023).

40. Zarychta, S. (2016). Strategiczne znaczenie Morza Czarnego w kontekście bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i euroatlantyckiego. *Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego*, nr 1, pp. 54–66.