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NATO-EU COMPLEMENTARITY THROUGH STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE STRATEGIC COMPASS: THE IMPACT OF THE STRATEGIC COMPASS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

ABSTRACT: *The Russia-Ukraine war and the changing geopolitical interests of the major powers have created several new threats for Europe. At the same time, new challenges such as cyber-attacks, hybrid wars and climate change have alarmed the European states. Therefore, these developments required NATO and the EU to take measures separately and proceed by common action. In line with this need, NATO issued the Strategic Concept and the EU issued the Strategic Compass. Examining the two strategies has revealed that they are not competing but completing documents to provide European defence and security. Therefore, the first purpose of this article is to present the idea of complementarity between NATO and the EU in European security. This understanding will also serve the second purpose of the article, which is the manifestation of the impact of the Strategic Compass on European integration. In other words, complementarity will create a structural framework for strengthening the Strategic Compass and the European integration process. In this context, since the Strategic Compass has reflected a consensus of the EU member states to cooperate on defence and security issues, it is essential to know whether it has contributed to the European integration process by deepening policies on defence and security. Thus, the article concludes that, strengthened by NATO's strategic concept in the context of complementarity, the strategic compass has become an important step in the European integration process.*

KEYWORDS: European Security; NATO-EU Relations; NATO's Strategic Concept; EU's Strategic Compass; European integration process.

1. Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 triggered a rethinking of the European security architecture. It also opened a new period for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), two organisations responsible for European defence and security. Starting in 2014, both NATO and the EU have intended to develop defence strategies and security policies on threats and challenges, separately (Hoeffler and Hofmann, 2024, p.8). Therefore, the European states have changed or rearranged their policies. Indeed, some actors have entirely abandoned their previous policy frameworks. For instance, Germany has decided to increase its defence spending. Denmark reversed its 30-year opt-out of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Maybe, more importantly, Sweden and Finland became new members of NATO (Borges de Castro and Lobo, 2022, p.114).

Also, other challenges such as climate change and cyber threats have exacerbated security concerns in Europe. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the following war, among others, have dramatically changed Europe's security landscape (Sus, 2024, p.942). In such a security environment, both NATO and the

EU have intended to improve cooperation. They have also looked for coordination, joint exercises and a sense of complete determination (Blessing, Elgin, and Ewers-Peters, 2021, p.71). In this context, both NATO and the EU have announced new strategies to respond to European military threats and other challenges.

Therefore, this article concerns NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass. NATO and the EU have announced these two strategies as guiding lights to respond to new threats and challenges in Europe. In this context, this article has two interrelated purposes. The first purpose is to affirm the view put forward by other researchers that NATO and the EU are complementary organisations in ensuring defence and security in Europe. The second purpose is to answer the question supported by NATO's Strategic Concept, in the context of complementarity, to what extent have the objectives set out by the EU with the Strategic Compass contributed to the political-military leg of the European integration process?

To reach these purposes, the author of this article has used qualitative research methods. Therefore, documents/data analysis has become the primary source of information throughout the research. In this context, official documents of NATO and the EU and academic journals written by interested authors have been used to make inferences on the subject and reach a conclusion.

The article has seven parts within this framework, including an introduction and a conclusion. The second part is the literature review, which explains the ideas of some other authors on both strategies and the cooperation and the concept of complementarity between NATO and the EU. The third and fourth parts are about the strategy. However, each part also explains the earlier developments paving the way for the strategy. Therefore, the third part explains the "NATO 2030" document before explaining the Strategic Concept. Similarly, the fourth part explains the "EU Global Strategy" and "Defence Initiatives" before explaining the Strategic Compass. The fifth part is about the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 2023. The declaration is necessary because, in a way, it contains a summary of both strategies and emphasises the cooperation and complementarity between NATO and the EU. The sixth part is about the assessment of the findings. This part is also composed of two sections. The first section affirms the complementarity between NATO and the EU. The second section reveals how the objectives announced by the Strategic Compass have yielded practical results for the EU, especially in the last two years. Therefore, it has put forward how the Strategic Compass has contributed to deepening the political-military leg of the EU.

In this context, authors studying European defence and security have contributed to the subject by expressing their ideas. Therefore, it would be helpful to refer to some of their studies to learn more about what topics they generally focus on.

2. Literature review

Some writers have analysed NATO's new Strategic Concept in depth. For example, Gottemoeller et al.

(2022) have underlined cyber, space, and technology as emerging domains in the Strategic Concept. They have also demonstrated how to address these domains through pre-emptive consensus on actions, communication of capabilities, and cooperation with industry partners. In this sense, they argued that NATO must integrate these domains to increase the effectiveness of the Alliance. Similarly, Webber et al. (2022), noting the return of great power rivalry, emphasised the emerging domains of the Strategic Concept and identified “cyber” as the most vulnerable area for the member states. Moreover, they highlighted climate change and the Arctic as additional areas of competition among major powers. Ringsmose and Rynning (2021) have stressed the multiple purposes of earlier Strategic Concepts, including providing the Alliance with strategic direction, codifying piecemeal decisions, and serving as a vehicle for public diplomacy. They also pointed to the Strategic Concept’s role in facilitating compromise and unity of thought. Becker, Duda, and Lute (2022) have viewed the new Strategic Concept as part of global security competition, helping manage rivalry with China and Russia. Szenes (2023) has defined the Strategic Concept as NATO’s long-term vision and explained its updated perceptions of deterrence and defence, as well as its planned measures. He regarded the Strategic Concept as an usher leading NATO into a new era of great power competition. Finally, Calmels (2020) reminded readers of the cohesion among member states and explained that the 360-degree approach is an integral part of the Strategic Concept.

Some other writers have identified similarities in the explanation and definition of both the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass. For example, Hoeffler and Hofman (2024) have examined organisational overlap and revealed its role in empowering international bureaucracy. They found that such overlap strengthened the European Commission’s ability to consolidate its position within the EU. Similarly, Tangör (2021) has sought to determine whether the NATO-EU strategic partnership has created specific institutions to enhance complementarity between the two organizations. He has also shown that Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) have positively contributed to improved security governance practices. Ewers-Peters (2023), on the other hand, has focused on the roles of EU member states within NATO-EU interactions and examined the strategies enabling them to cooperate. Likewise, Daehnhardt (2022) has emphasised the urgency for NATO and the EU to enhance their partnership, strengthen NATO-EU cooperation, and maintain the unity and cohesion of the transatlantic relationship under the shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Therefore, according to the literature on the subject, we understand that the authors mainly focus on new threats and challenges that the European states have faced in the context of a competitive and complex international system, based on power politics. Accordingly, the authors have emphasised that Russia and China are important threats militarily, economically, and strategically. Also, they have highlighted hybrid wars, cyber-attacks, and climate change as new challenges. To solve these problems, the authors have primarily drawn

attention to the cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU and the complementarity of the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass. Within this framework, the authors underline coming together around a standard view before taking action, improving communication skills and collaborating with industry partners as new goals to implement the policies announced by the strategies. In this context, in the following two parts, explaining the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass with their earlier developments can give us an insight into new principles and conditions on European security and defence.

3. NATO's strategic concept

After the Second World War, NATO was established in 1949 as the leading organisation to defend European countries and has continued this function until today. During this period, NATO put forward eight strategic concepts that fit the changing conditions of international politics. The seventh Strategic Concept, "The 2010 Strategic Concept, Active Engagement, Modern Defence", became a political document. The 2010 Strategic Concept explained three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. In this context, it identified threats such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, cyber-attacks, and fundamental environmental problems (Szenes, 2023, p.541). It also confirmed NATO's purpose to improve international security through coordination.

After the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO was silent for a while before announcing a new strategy. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, however, the member states discussed improving their capabilities and achieving a fairer burden-sharing. In this context, the member states launched the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) at the Summit to adopt several solutions to lead the Alliance to adapt to a rapidly changing and challenging security environment. In this context, NATO defence ministers approved a document called "Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area" (DDA) in June 2020, which adopted "military effects" and placed them in a geographical context (Ringmose and Rynning, 2021, p.155). In this sense, thanks to these developments, NATO was able to respond to the Russians' aggressive attitudes. In other words, NATO has focused on force employment to deter and defend (Szenes, 2023, p. 554). In this context, NATO presented the "NATO 2030: United for a New Era" report on 25 November 2020, leading to the Strategic Concept 2022.

3.1. NATO 2030 document

The NATO 2030 document is about policy recommendations. It reveals significant challenges that NATO will face in the upcoming years, such as the rise of China, technological acceleration and climate change. Within this framework, the document has proposed to realise deeper political coordination and strengthen defence issues. The report highlights the need for a new strategic concept that reflects the recent changes in NATO. Similarly, it has revealed the need for allies to comply with the consultative process and the idea of

consensus (Tardy, 2020, p.4). In this context, the NATO 2030 document intends to reconfigure NATO globally and strengthen its political capacity. In this sense, the NATO 2030 document is a guideline for the alliance and the member states (Panke, 2019, p.122).

Therefore, after the 2010 Strategic Concept, and the announcement of the NATO 2030 document, NATO's security understanding has rapidly changed to include new challenges such as cyber, space, and "Emerging and Disruptive Technology" (EDT) (Gottemoeller, et al., 2022, p.516). In this sense, NATO has sought to enhance its capability to protect energy-related issues and ensure energy supplies (Gjoreski and Nacev, 2022, p.31). In this context, the strategic concept underlines communication as a catalyst for properly integrating cyber and space. Thus, following the NATO 2030 report, the Madrid Summit, which was held on 29 June 2022, approved the new Strategic Concept and started implementing it simultaneously, introducing the new NATO Force Model (Szenes, 2023, p.554).

3.2. The new strategic concept of 2022

The eighth (last) strategic concept, the new Strategic Concept, announced in 2022, aims to respond to the latest challenges the European states have faced in the international system. In other words, NATO's new strategic concept is crucial in terms of defining principles that will ensure the security and defence of Europe, as shown by the newly formed geopolitical structure, reshaped after the Russia-Ukraine War. Therefore, Article 1 of the Strategic Concept presents the determination of NATO to safeguard the freedom and security of allied countries. Article 2 identifies NATO as the transatlantic tie between states and describes it as indispensable to security. It brings members a shared understanding of the security environment (Becker, Duda, and Lute, 2022, p.490). This framework outlines NATO's purpose and core missions.

Hereunder, NATO's basic purpose is to provide defence to its member states, based on a 360-degree approach. According to Article 20 of the Strategic Concept, NATO will deter and defend all domains. In this context, the so-called "360-degree Threat Analysis" aimed at showing NATO's will to adapt by supporting its Eastern front defence while not neglecting Southern challenges (Calmels, 2020, p.416).

Also, the new Strategic Concept defines NATO's three primary missions. The first is "collective deterrence and defence" based on the collective self-defence principle. According to Article 21 of the Strategic Concept, for this mission, NATO will strengthen its deterrence and defence position to deny any potential adversary and possible opportunity for aggression (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2021, p.154). The second is "crisis prevention and management", where NATO has a set of security capabilities. In this sense, Article 8 defines the Russian Federation as a chief threat to the allies' security. The third is "cooperative security", where the Alliance actively consolidates international stability through like-minded countries (Piechowicz and Maliszewska-Nienartawicz, 2020, p.27).

Without a doubt, these missions require strength and resilience, which encourages an in-depth engagement with the endogenous structures and capacities of member countries (Wagner and Anholt, 2016, p.416). Moreover, the Strategic Concept has highlighted the EU as a special partner for NATO. Article 43 of the Strategic Concept explains NATO-EU cooperation as complementary. According to the article, both organisations increase cooperation on issues of common interest (Panke, 2019, p.120).

4. The EU's strategic compass

Historically, the foreign and defence ministers of NATO had decided in their respective meetings in Brussels (1994) and Berlin (1996) to develop European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the alliance. The ESDI requires at least some standard European defence capability and a European defence industry and technology development (Batora, 2009, p.1076). In this context, another significant step was taken in St. Malo, where Britain and France decided on a common defence policy and independent military operation capability of the EU (Merand, 2010, p. 364).

4.1. The EU global strategy and defence initiatives

On the road to ensuring security and consolidating defence, the EU member states announced the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The ESS identified the threats facing the EU, defined its strategic objectives, and defined the political implications for Europe. It was the first attempt for the EU member states to demonstrate a will to act together on security and defence issues. (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.88). In 2016, a survey found that 74 % of Europeans want to see a stronger EU globally (Tocci, 2016, p.462). In response to this request, the EUGS calls for the EU to be more assertive, confident, determined, and resilient while confronting its challenges and fears (Davis Cross, 2016, p.405). Therefore, in 2016, the EU realised that transformation rather than more preservation was necessary to safeguard multilateralism (Tocci, 2017, p.497). Also, the policy-making of the EUGS reveals integration dynamics in the institutional structure of EU foreign policy (Barbe and Morillas, 2019, p.761).

Therefore, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), with its specific logic and focus (Bargues, 2022, p.2), underlined that the EU should consider the concept of “strategic autonomy” seriously. In this context, the EUGS noted that NATO cannot be the only security framework for the entire EU, as member states are not a part of the alliance. In this sense, Strategic Autonomy is intended to make Europe more independent from other actors (Blessing, Elgin, and Ewers-Peters, 2021, p.79). To do that, Strategic Autonomy has put forward three elements. The first is the territorial security of the EU and deterrence provided by NATO. One should remember that Strategic Autonomy is about acting without the US, not without NATO (Biscop, 2016, p.440). The second is that the EU must build up its defence capabilities to be operational at the periphery of the EU. The third element is defence industry initiatives that should be directed to the future, interoperable components of the

European defence architecture (Pascu and Chiriac, 2021, p.29). In this context, industrial autonomy is developed through increasing defence potential to achieve autonomy in military activities (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.74).

Therefore, Strategic Autonomy has become the foundation to assess the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) (Sweeney and Winn, 2020, p.225). Also, they are the necessary steps for Strategic Autonomy, a prerequisite of the ultimate goal, which is the Defence Union (Koppa, 2019, p.4). In this context, the EU member states have intended to use PESCO, the EDF, and CARD as new defence initiatives to develop military capabilities (Tardy, 2018, p. 126).

Therefore, the Council approved PESCO in 2017 to achieve results for a more effective defence of Europe. In this context, PESCO allows EU member states to cooperate in shared projects to develop their defence capabilities further. In this sense, PESCO is intended to increase the capabilities and interoperability of European armed forces and therefore can be seen as a tool for military-security integration of EU member states (Ivasechko, et al. 2023, p.81). It is also important to note that PESCO is compatible with the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which was designed to enhance European integration (Tangör, 2021, p.85).

The EU member states established the EDF in 2017 to support defence research and development. In other words, they intended to promote defence-industrial collaboration through the EDF (Besch, 2019, p.5). Therefore, the EDF has acted as a centre for defence expenditures and development incentives and as a national coordination centre (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.85).

In addition to PESCO and EDF, the EU launched the CARD in 2017 to rationalise military spending across the EU as the mechanism of collective defence planning (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.83). In other words, it is designed for mutual adaptation of national security organisations (Fiott, 2017, p.1). Therefore, the establishment of PESCO, EDF, and CARD has consolidated the defence policies of the EU member states on the road to the integration process.

However, a major geographical challenge is the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that the EU member states have encountered in recent years, revealing a necessity of arranging a new strategy to fulfil the new need (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.78). Therefore, the need to solve the security problems that the EU member states have faced has triggered the EU member states to agree on an EU policy leading to the Strategic Compass (Sweeney and Winn, 2022, p.196).

4.2. The EU strategic compass of 2022

Following the EUGS, some other developments have prepared a foundation for creating a Strategic Compass in the EU. For example, in 2019, as a first step, Germany proposed drawing up a Strategic Compass, co-authorised by the civilian and military sides of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Also, in January

2020, the European Commission created a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS), responsible for EU policy on defence industry and space. Moreover, the EU Threat Analysis of 2020 explained threats and challenges on both global and regional levels that the EU member states would face in the coming years. According to the threat analysis, climate change and interstate conflicts have become new threats and challenges for European countries (Rehri, 2021, p.44). In this context, the Council decided to launch the process of developing the Strategic Compass in June 2020, and then formally approved it as a part of the Defence and Space packages on 21 March 2022 (Sus, 2024, p.956). In this sense, the Strategic Compass is about a shared strategic vision for EU security and defence policy over the next 5-10 years. Maybe more importantly, it is intended to describe a specific role for the EU in collective defence (Perot, 2024, p. 15).

The Strategic Compass has revealed four dimensions: crisis management, resilience, capability development, and partnership. These dimensions directly relate to four directions: act, secure, invest, and partner (Branda, 2022, p.239). Therefore, in the Strategic Compass, the EU member states have agreed, first, to act rapidly in crises, which needs strengthening the EU's situation as an effective crisis management actor in defence of EU interests. Second, they have agreed to guarantee secure access to strategic issues. Third, they have endorsed investing in innovative technologies. Fourth, the EU member states have decided to strengthen cooperation with partners.

Therefore, the Strategic Compass is interested in developing the capabilities of the EU member states in terms of defence (Branda, 2022, p. 245). In this sense, the Strategic Compass is a "mid-range strategy" that underlines urgent situations (Sweeney and Winn, 2022, p.196). In a way, it tries to fill the gap between the common objectives of the EU set out in the earlier strategies (EES and EUGS) and the instruments for building up military forces and capabilities (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.69).

Following the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass, the latest development in understanding the relationship between NATO and the EU has announced the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, dated 10 January 2023.

5. Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 10 January 2023

The EU-NATO Joint Declarations announced in 2016 and 2018 signalled a turning point for consolidating relations between NATO and the EU. In this sense, the Joint Declaration of EU-NATO Cooperation (2016) has defined seven areas in which NATO and the EU sought coordination, such as hybrid warfare, cyber security, and space security (Blessing, Elgin, and Ewers-Peters, 2021, p.71). On the other hand, the Joint Declaration of EU-NATO Cooperation (2018) has stressed the need for cooperation in certain areas, namely cyber security and hybrid threats. It has also welcomed the recent EU efforts in security and defence, which would also strengthen NATO (Koppa, 2019, p.7).

Following the joint declarations of 2016 and 2018, a third joint declaration, the "Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation", was signed on 10 January 2023. This declaration is based on the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, shared values, and collective determination against common problems. According to the declaration, the main objective of the strategic partnership is to maintain peace and security and ensure stability among member states (Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, Article 1). In this sense, the declaration underlines NATO's continued role as the basis of collective defence for Euro-Atlantic security. The Joint Declaration has also emphasised that a stronger European defence will contribute positively to global security so that the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU will complement each other in strengthening security both in Europe and outside Europe (Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, Articles 8-9).

In this context, some writers have emphasised the significance of the Joint Declaration, which aligns with the priorities of NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass. For example, according to Simonet (2023), the Joint Declaration is important in conveying that a strong union has been formed against the most serious threat that Euro-Atlantic security has faced in decades. Thus, while the declaration emphasises the importance of NATO in ensuring the security of Europe, it also mentions the need for a stronger and more qualified European defence. Giuglietti (2023) sees the Joint Declaration as a critical step towards a more united transatlantic community. For him, the declaration carries an important political value, including expanding and deepening cooperation. For Monaghan, et al. (2023), the Joint Declaration is symbolic and emphasises the importance of NATO and the EU against today's increasing security concerns. Therefore, the declaration's language emphasises NATO's superiority in collective defence and highlights the complementary roles of NATO and the EU.

Therefore, the declaration defines the factors that pose a threat to the EU and NATO, determines the areas of cooperation against the threats, and emphasises the importance of NATO in the security of Europe, while emphasising the necessity of the two international organisations to act together (Clapp, 2023).

6. Assessment of the Findings

This article concerns NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass. The Strategic Concept concerns how NATO member states and their partner countries plan to defend themselves (Becker, Duda, and Lute, 2022, p.494). In this sense, they are expected to prioritise collective defence and intensify internal political-military dialogue (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2021, p.160). According to the Strategic Concept, China's inclusion in the document for the first time has been an absolute novelty. In this context, the Strategic Concept has stated China's coercive policies that could challenge NATO's interests, security, and values (Szenes, 2023, p.546). The Strategic Concept has also explained new threats and challenges such as hybrid threats, climate

change, cybersecurity, and maritime security. It has even underlined some of them as a source of intensifying the effects of the threats and challenges. For example, the Strategic Concept has labelled climate change as a threat multiplier (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2021, p.147).

On the other hand, the Strategic Compass has revealed a wide range of geographic interests, including Russia, China, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, the Arctic, the Southern Neighbourhood, and Asia (Branda, 2022, p.239). In this context, the analysis of threats in the Strategic Compass has emphasised the need for “hard power” as necessary for the EU (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.79). The Strategic Compass has also combined the Strategic Autonomy with the 2030 Action Plan to fill the EU’s specific military gaps and intensify the already started initiatives (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.89). In this framework, the increased autonomy of bodies such as HR/VP and the EEAS has facilitated the merger of initiatives in security and defence (Morillas, 2020, p.231). In this sense, Strategic Autonomy is a potential cause for a de-linking between Europe and NATO. Some writers have even suggested that the Strategic Autonomy complement NATO’s collective defence (Credi, Marrone, and Menotti, 2020, p.6).

Within this framework, Military Mobility became a prime project between NATO and the EU, announced in December 2017 when members decided to act together. (Hoeffler and Hofmann, 2024, p.14). In this sense, it has consolidated the strategic interests of the European states in both ordinary military activities and crises (Perot, 2024, p.10). Therefore, the Military Mobility project facilitates military and civilian logistics and has the potential to grow into a “military Schengen Zone” (Ivasechko, et al., 2023, p.89). In this context, it requires troops and capabilities to be transported across the Euro-Atlantic security space (Blessing, Elgin, and Ewers-Peters, 2021, p.80). Also, the project is intended to consolidate EU-NATO relations in security and defence (Hakansson, 2023, p.437). This initiative is a shared strategic interest for both NATO and the EU and could be a chief example of intense cooperation. Consequently, Military Mobility has signified the beginning of a strategic collaboration between NATO and the EU. Therefore, NATO and the EU are complementary and coherent, leading to security governance in supporting international peace and security.

In this context, the article has two purposes. The first is to show that the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass are documents that complement each other. The second purpose is to investigate to what extent the Strategic Compass is effective in the European integration process; with the complementary support it receives from NATO’s Strategic Concept. Therefore, this assessment part evaluates the findings to achieve both purposes separately.

6.1. NATO and the EU as two complementary organisations in providing security and defence of Europe.

Following the Russian-Ukrainian War, both NATO and the EU announced their new strategies, the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass, respectively, to respond to new threats and challenges the European

states have recently experienced. Since both methods have been intended to realise a similar purpose, providing security for the European states, researchers studying European security have begun to discuss whether the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass are created to replace or complement each other. As confirmed by others, the findings have revealed that NATO and the EU complement each other in their strategies

Even before these strategies, the relationship between NATO and the EU has indicated its non-zero-sum characteristic (Dyson, 2008, p.737). For example, the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), announced in 2002, has defined the NATO-EU relationship as a "strategic partnership" (Duke, 2008, p.28). The characteristics of a strategic partnership have been quoted on different occasions. For example, the strategic concept has described the EU as the strategic partner of NATO (Borges de Castro and Lobo, 2022, pp.126-128). Similarly, the EU-NATO Joint Declarations have emphasised that the EU and NATO are strategic partners. Even the third EU-NATO Declaration of 2023 has underlined that NATO and the EU have complementary roles in ensuring security within and outside Europe (Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, Articles 8 and 9). Article 43 of the Strategic Concept defines the relationship between NATO and the EU as a relationship based on a strategic partnership and "complementing each other".

Similarly, the EUGS defined the EU as the organisation responsible for the security of Europe and NATO as the organisation responsible for the defence of Europe and referred to the complementary views of the organisations (Pascu and Chiriac, 2021, p.29). It also stated that initiatives such as PESCO, CARD, and EDF are important tools for fulfilling the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. In this sense, the EUGS emphasised a deep cooperation between the EU and NATO based on "complementarity" (Piechowicz, Maliszewska, and Nienartawicz, 2020, p.25).

The concept of NATO-EU "overlap" has occupied academic circles since the Cologne Summit of 1999, when the EU member states agreed to develop capabilities for autonomous action. Although the "overlap" is a negative word, it is supportive in facilitating the ironing out of problems the organisations have faced and strengthening their policy-making mechanisms. For example, organisational overlap can empower bureaucratic actors between the organisations by improving communication between them. Similarly, functional overlap means that both organisations are active in a broad range of security and defence activities such as crisis management and cyber-security, which entails coordinating and sharing material resources, personnel, and expertise (Hoeffler and Hofmann, 2024, p.6). On the other hand, membership overlap refers to the number of states that are members of both organisations simultaneously. That is, 21 members of NATO are members of the EU. This means that issues discussed at NATO's North Atlantic Council are transferable to the EU's Political and Security Committee, and vice versa (Ewers-Peters, 2023, p.29). Therefore, contrary to popular belief, NATO-EU overlap can be evaluated as a development that strengthens the relations between NATO and the EU. It even eliminates the deficiencies of activities between the two organisations. Thus, we can think

that the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass are complementary documents.

Consequently, NATO and the EU complement each other because both organisations have constituted different puzzle pieces. For example, NATO is primarily a political-military organisation, while the EU is mainly an economic organisation, underlined through the framework of a political organisation. Therefore, while NATO is the prominent defence actor, the EU is a security actor (Tangör, 2021, p.78).

6.2. The deepening effect of the strategic compass in the European integration process

The institutional structure established by the EU with the Strategic Compass and the common policies and regulations agreed upon by its members will seriously strengthen the political-military leg of the EU in the European integration process. Accordingly, the European Commission has shown that it is determined to take the integration process to a new stage in the military-security field with Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space. Also, the Threat Analysis, announced in the same year, showed that the EU will face increasing economic competition between global powers, climate change, and competition for natural resources. The EU has explained how to deal with these threats with the Strategic Compass announced in 2022.

The Strategic Compass has revealed four goals and four directions to achieve these goals. Crisis management, resilience, capacity development and partnership are the goals, and act, secure, investment, and partner are the directions determined to achieve these goals. Therefore, to understand to what extent the Strategic Compass contributes to European integration, it is important to investigate how the four directions became effective and active in achieving the goals. The findings have revealed that these directions have yielded positive results, in a short time, not only for implementing the pillars and therefore serving the EU's defence and security policies but also for contributing to the European integration process.

For example, first, "acting" rapidly in crises, the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine has trained 60000 soldiers. Similarly, the EU Partnership Mission to the Republic of Moldova, launched in May 2023, helped enhance the Moldovan security resistance in crisis management and hybrid threats. Also, the EU provided 137 million Euros in assistance for these missions (for the 2021-2024 periods) through the European Peace Facility (EPF) (Annual Progress Report, 2024, pp. 10- 11). At this juncture, the EPF was adopted by the Council on 22 March 2021 as an off-budget fund. It totalled 5 billion Euros from 2021 to 2027 to be financed through contributions from EU member states (Christian, 2023, p.174). It is intended to enhance efforts to help defence capacity and complement CSDP crisis management efforts.

Second, guaranteeing "secure" access to strategic issues, in April 2023, the EU proposed a Cyber Solidarity Act to increase cyber protection and strengthen cooperation at the Union level. In this context, the first threat analysis was made in January 2024 by the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity. Also, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre has become functional since September 2023. In this context, the EU Hybrid Toolbox has improved the collective capacity to investigate possible hybrid threats. In this context, the EU has established

the EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams to help member states and like-minded partners (Annual Progress Report, 2024, p.14-18).

Third, “investing” in innovative technologies, the EU has adopted the 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities to understand the need for high-intensity and conventional warfare. Also, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production was adopted in July 2023 with a budget of 500 million Euros. Similarly, the EU adopted the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Procurement Act in October 2023 with a total budget of 300 million Euros. Therefore, the EU launched a Defence Equity Facility in January 2024 with 175 million Euros to support innovative dual-use technologies with potential defence applications. The European Defence Fund has dedicated around 3 billion Euros to support defence-related research and development actions (with 101 projects) within this framework. Moreover, Denmark joined PESCO in May 2023 as the 26th participating member state (In 2023, 11 new projects were added). Similarly, in February 2024, the EU member states agreed to establish the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform to support EU technological sovereignty and investments with an additional 1.5 billion Euros for defence investment (Annual Progress Report, 2024, pp. 21- 22).

Fourth, strengthening cooperation with “partners”, a partnership with NATO remains indispensable for Euro-Atlantic security. In this context, the first structured dialogue on space occurred in December 2023 (Annual Progress Report, 2024, p.10). Also, the two Schuman Security and Defence Forums took place in March 2023 and May 2024, respectively. In this framework, the Strategic Compass provides the strategic perspective to provide more rapid, decisive and robust EU action.

Strategic Compass are being quickly put into action by the member states. This means the EU members have made effective decisions on military-security issues in the last two years. In other words, the EU has made greater strides in strengthening the military-security leg of the integration process in the previous five years than in the fifty years before that (Bunde, 2021, p.244). Therefore, these actions, of which the Russian-Ukrainian war was the primary trigger, show that the EU has begun to take bold steps on defence and security-related issues. Accordingly, the transformation of these goals into actions reveals that the EU has started implementing the decisions it needs towards political integration. Thus, these developments indicate that the EU, which has taken necessary steps towards political and economic integration, has significantly contributed to the European integration process with the Strategic Compass.

7. Conclusion

As a conclusion, in the last two years, NATO and the European Union (EU) have considered the Russia-Ukraine War as the most critical threat to European security. Also, they have described China as a systemic rival and a challenge to both organisations. They have emphasised other challenges to European security, such

as climate change, hybrid threats and cyber challenges. Therefore, both NATO and the EU announced the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass in 2022 as new steps to defend Europe and consolidate European security.

Within this framework, NATO has emphasised a pool of military forces in high readiness with the “Strategic Concept”. In this context, it defined this new formation as the “New Force Model”. Accordingly, NATO has revealed its intention to pre-allocate the military forces in this pool to specific defence plans. The European Union, on the other hand, has explained its goal of becoming a stronger and more capable “security provider” with the “Strategic Compass”. To achieve this goal, the EU has emphasised its aim to establish a rapid deployment force to respond to crises and challenges by 2030.

Therefore, NATO and the EU have agreed on the cooperative use of security and defence tools belonging to these two strategies, which complement each other. They consolidated this agreement when they announced the Third Joint Declaration in 2023. This means we can expect more positive results from NATO and the EU in the coming years. Accordingly, eliminating hesitations over concepts thought to evoke competition, such as “Strategic Autonomy”, may enable us to see the real functioning of the strategic partnership between these organisations.

In a way, European states evaluated the Russian-Ukrainian War and other challenges as a new European crisis. As Jean Monnet emphasised years ago, European states can unite in crises and create opportunities for themselves. In that context, the Strategic Concept and the Strategic Compass represent opportunities for the European states to strengthen European defence and security and integrate on the political-military level within the EU.

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