THE URBAN ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHIES OF CLUJ-NAPOCA: 1992-2016

Giorgian GUȚOIU, PhD

Teaching Assistant, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania

giorgian.gutoiu@ulbsibiu.ro

Abstract: The present paper explores the electoral geographies in the city of Cluj-Napoca at parliamentary election between 1992-2016. Using spatial statistics, the electoral geographic patterns are analyzed at a global level (the entire city) and at a local level (neighborhoods). The longitudinal perspective is placed in a context of political, economic and social changes experienced by Cluj-Napoca during the two and a half decades. The results show stable and consistent patterns throughout the entire period. However, there are also significant geographic realignments and shifting patterns at a local level. The results also depict a strong correlation between the political, economic and social changes and the urban electoral geographies of Cluj-Napoca.

Keywords: electoral geography, urban politics, Cluj-Napoca, post-communism, Romania.

Introduction

As the contemporary world is experiencing a planetary urbanization, many political or social processes should be more understood in association with their urban socio-spatial context (Brenner and Schmidt, 2015). The objective of this paper is to explore the spatial voting patterns in Cluj-Napoca by framing them within their urban socio-spatial context. For every parliamentary election between 1992-2016, the electoral geographies of Cluj-Napoca are analysed using spatial statistics.

Cluj-Napoca is the second largest Romanian city after the capital Bucharest. The city is a major social, cultural and economic growth pole for the country. During the last decade Cluj-Napoca had progressively become a global city. Cluj-Napoca has consistently the second share of

employees enrolled in the service sector after Bucharest. As a specificity, the city is highly specialized in information technologies. This position and development of Cluj-Napoca as a global city was only arrived at after a first decade of slow economic transition of post-communism during which the local municipality tried to preserve the city's heavy industry and continuously nurtured the nostalgy of a once great blue-collar working class. The city also has an important ethnic minority of Hungarians (23% in 1992; 16% in 2011). Historically, up until the communist regime, the Hungarians were the largest ethnic group in Cluj-Napoca (46% in 1930). Local politics were heavily influenced by the ethnic structure as the Hungarian minority almost entirely preferred voting on a ethnic basis.

The paper opens with a short description of the electoral geography subfield and its low development of studies located in an urban context. Then, attention is moved to the research setting, where different topics are discussed in three separate subsections. One part, provides the discussion regarding the political context of the electoral competition. Here are mentioned the political parties and alliances of interest in the electoral geography exploration. Further, in another section, the politics, economics and society of Cluj-Napoca are briefly discussed. Then, the research setting is described through a longitudinal analysis of the non-geographic aggregate results in Cluj-Napoca for the 1992-2016 elections. Afterwards, the discussion is moved towards describing the spatial modelling used for the exploration of electoral geographies. The rest of the article is represented by the actual exploration and analysis of electoral geographies. Firstly, a short section describes the global geographic distribution of votes for political parties and alliances of interest at every election. Subsequently, for each election, local spatial voting patterns are investigated in separate sections. Finally, some conclusions are offered about the nature of electoral geographies explored in Cluj-Napoca.

Urban electoral geography

Within the field of electoral geography there are three main topics: geography of voting, geography of electoral systems and geography of malapportionment and gerrymandering (Leib and Quinton, 2011). The present paper is part and parcel of the first topic. In the past three to four decades, the research agenda within geography of voting has evolved around the question of dependency between the electoral behavior and its geographic context (Agnew, 1990; Johnston and Pattie, 2006).

The largest body of empirical and theoretical work was produced within the British and the American academic communities. The British geographer Ron Johnston and its collegues placed the voters in their geographic context and produced an impressive series of empirical work showing how the electoral behavior is dependent upon the social construction of geographic space and the geographic structuration of social networks, canvass or economic context (Johnston and Pattie, 2006). Johnston argues that the social composition of population explains the electoral geographic patters. A different approach started in the United States, where John Agnew (1987, 1996, 2002, 2008) proposed place-based explanations for the relationship between electoral behavior and its geographic context. In its empirical studies on Italy, Agnew showed that electoral behavior is mediated through the various social, political, economic and cultural processes acting at various geographic hierarchies.

The vast majority of electoral geography studies are national case studies analysing aggregate electoral data on regional or local levels. Despite of a continuously and rapidly expanding urbanisation, in the past two decades, only a few studies explored the electoral geography of contemporary cities. Past research on western cities revealed salient electoral geographic patterns between the central city more favourable toward left-wing and the suburbs more inclined toward right-wing (Cox 1968; Walks 2004; 2005; 2013; Maeschalk 2013). One study on Moscow has found a highly polarized electoral geography during the first years of post-communism (Loughlin, Kolossov and Vendina, 1997). The subfield of urban electoral geography currently suffers from underdevelopment. This paper makes a contribution to this subject.

Research setting

a. Romanian polity and its political parties

Ever since the fall of communism, the Romanian polity had developed as a democracy with low partisan attachments (Preda and Soare, 2008). In this regard, for mobilization, political parties had to rely heavily on political patronage, personal politics or circumstantial events. The Romanian political system is dependent on its political parties and is placed in the same category as other former communist countries where political parties create and influence the political agenda and strive to use it for electoral mobilization, not so much as a means to gain legitimate representative power within state, but to gain public offices and state resources, which are vital for the party's mere existence (Soared, 2014). The party system is generally regarded as having a high degree of

cartelisation (Barbu, 2004, p142). Because of this, the system displays a striking stability, especially given the low partisan attachments. Over the course of more than two decades, the Romanian party system had been highly dynamic and suffered many top level realignments (Soare, Popescu, Gherghina and Chiru, 2013). For these reasons, Annex 1 and Annex 2 help readers by tracking the frequent name changes, splinters and electoral alliances during 1992-2016.

Starting with the 90s, indeed, in the Romanian political system one cannot speak of a doctrinal competition based on categories like the left, the right or the centre (Tismaneanu 1996). However, certain cleavages are maintained with a relatively high importance throughout the first decade period (De Waele, 2002). During the entire period, the top-level battles were fought mostly between the successor of the former communist party (FSN/ FDSN/ PDSR/ PSD) (Pop-Eleches, 1999) and its opposition, embodied by various parties throughout the years (Gussi, 2011). This cleavage was stronger during the 1990s, in 2004 and 2016. The 2000 election displayed a strong vote of protest against the incumbent parties of PNTCD and PNL (members in the CDR alliance). The 2008 and 2012 election were marked by personalization politics centered around the charismatic but controversial leader of PDL and head of state - Traian Băsescu. In most occasions, throughout 1992-2016, the successor party engaged in nationalist rhetoric, anti-western stances and promoted paternalistic or welfare policies. The political parties that opposed PSD promoted mostly pro-European stances and liberal economic policies. Understanding the national conflict between the successor party of PSD and its opposition provides a contextual framework for analyzing local politics in Cluj-Napoca. In the highly centralized politics of Romania, top-level national political events have deep impacts on local performance of parties and the electoral mobilization.

The presence of a numerous Hungarian ethnic group with a regional concentration at the geographical centre of the country and the dominance of the Hungarian ethnic party of UDMR among Hungarian ethnic voters created another lasting fixture within the Romanian political system. At every parliamentary election since 1992, UDMR scored more than the 5% votes required to pass the electoral threshold, thus being also the only Hungarian ethnic party to win seats in the Romanian parliament. In Cluj-Napoca, where the Hungarian ethnic minority is more numerous, UDMR has also a larger share of votes and is also one of the most important local parties.

The discourse in this section offered a framework for understanding local politics in Cluj-Napoca. National and regional political cultures and competitions come together with local events in order to create a particular urban electoral geography in the city of Cluj-Napoca. The section of the paper that analyzes the electoral geographies includes more further detailed information regarding the rhetoric and positions of parties and alliances of interest at every election.

b. Politics, economics and society in Cluj-Napoca after 1989

Following the collapse of state socialism in 1989, urban development in Romania has witnessed a full change. An urban development based on heavy industrialisation and large collective residential housings was abandoned for a western type growth embedded in a global economy. However, these transformations only came gradually. For Cluj-Napoca, for a time, the transformation was even more slower. Up until 2004, the local administration of Cluj-Napoca was led by the nationalistic and conservative Gheorghe Funar, elected as mayor three times – in 1992 and 1996 running from PUNR and in 2000 from PRM. In Funar's rhetoric, deindustrialisation was depicted as a major danger for the large numbers of industrial workers located in the socialist housing estates (Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Fox and Grancea, 2006). During this time, transformations were present, but they didn't resemble the extent of those in Bucharest or in other major cities of former communist Central Europe. After this period of hesitation, starting with the 2000s, Cluj-Napoca entered into an era of full-blown neoliberal transformation. The change was triggered by Emil Boc, the newly elected mayor in 2004. Since then, Boc was elected at every election on a neoliberal platform (2004: PD, 2008 and 2012: PDL, 2016: PNL).

After the mid-2000s, Cluj-Napoca strengthened its position as the second major economic center of the country. Of all the major Romanian cities, together with the capital region București-Ilfov, the housing boom of this period was most pronounced in Cluj-Napoca. Also, the job market became differentiated. Jobs in Cluj-Napoca were having a strong tendency to concentrate in the tertiary sector (IT, financial services, etc.). The new developments were favored by a growing share of young population, as Cluj-Napoca is a major university center. Between 2002 and 2011, the city population grew with 108%, higher than in other major cities and much higher than their average, namely 96%, or Bucharest-Ilfov, namely 98% (Benedek and Cristea, 2014).

c. Longitudinal analysis on the non-geographic aggregate voting in Cluj-Napoca

Table 1 shows the results from the parliamentary elections, aggregated at the level of Cluj-Napoca and Romania. For the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, electoral data in Cluj-Napoca was employed only from regular polling location, whilst the special locations organized at hospitals, military units, etc. were excluded. The 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections used only regular locations. This selection of data applies also to the following spatial analysis.

Table 1. Aggregate results for parliamentary election in Cluj-Napoca and Romania, 1992-2016

	party or alliance	Cluj-Napoca	Romania	Cluj-Napoca compared to Romania
1992	PUNR	30%	8%	23%
	UDMR	23%	7%	15%
	CDR	22%	20%	2%
	FDSN	5%	28%	-23%
	PRM	3%	4%	-1%
	FSN	3%	10%	-8%
	PNL	2%	3%	-0,5%
1996	CDR	34%	30%	3%
	PUNR	23%	4%	19%
	UDMR	19%	7%	13%
	USD	7%	13%	-6%
	PDSR	6%	22%	-16%
	PRM	2%	4%	-2%
2000	UDMR	21%	7%	14%
	PRM	20%	19%	0,3%
	PDSR-PUR-PSDR	17%	37%	-20%
	CDR 2000	7%	5%	2%
	PD	7%	7%	-0,3%
	PNL	7%	7%	-0,4%
2004	DA PNL-PD	38%	31%	7%
	PSD+PUR	19%	37%	-18%
	UDMR	18%	6%	12%
	PRM	13%	13%	-0,2%
2008	PDL	48%	32%	16%
	UDMR	18%	6%	12%
	PSD+PC	16%	33%	-17%
	PNL	11%	19%	-7%
2012	USL	44%	59%	-15%
	ARD	29%	17%	12%
	UDMR	13%	5%	8%
	PPDD	6%	14%	-8%
2016	PNL	27%	20%	7%
	USR	22%	9%	13%
	PSD	19%	45%	-26%
	UDMR	15%	6%	9%
	ALDE	6%	6%	0,2%

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

There are some major patterns discernible in these descriptive statistics. I briefly explain them. The parties included in this table are the same as those included in the analysis of electoral geographies. They were selected in regard with their weight of importance within local or national politics at the time of election. For these parties or alliances, I follow longitudinal trends by providing descriptions of past or future performances.

At the top of the hierarchy, the rankings are quite different between the two geographic levels. Only in 1996 and 2012 the same actors (alliances – CDR and USL) win the election at both scales. In most of cases, there are important differences between the shares of votes parties gain at the national level and in Cluj-Napoca. The same parties are present at the both levels. There is no local party in Cluj-Napoca without national coverage or without important gains at the national level (i.e. seats in the Romanian Parliament). Partially, UDMR can be regarded as a regional party. Nevertheless, the ethnic party has rather a regional coverage that spreads throught most of Transylvania. A similar case is that of PUNR. During the 1990s, the nationalist PUNR has its stronghold in Cluj-Napoca, but it also has important appeals in other parts of Transylvania and even in other regions. In Cluj-Napoca, the party was stronger because Gheorghe Funar, its leader, was also the mayor of the city. At the local election of 2000, when Funar resigned from PUNR and run for the other major nationalist party of PRM, PUNR disappeared as an important party both from Cluj-Napoca and Romania.

In the 1990s, the ethno-nationalist vote in Cluj-Napoca was stronger. At this time, PUNR had polarized the political discourse and manage to mobilize both with a strong nationalistic discourse but also by handling a nostalgic working class rhetoric (Petrovici, 2013). Also, during this time, UDMR recorded its best performances. The electoral base of UDMR diminished through the years due to migration.

Throughout the entire period, Cluj-Napoca was a place where FSN/FDSN/PDSR/PSD, the major party of Romanian politics, has performed poorer than it did at the national level. Generally, the electoral geography of the country displays a pattern with low performances in Transylvania for the successor party throughout the entire post-communist years (Giugăl, Johnston and Constantinescu, 2011). The support for the more liberal and pro-Western parties combined with the weak performance of the nationalist and conservative ones was associated with the distinct historical legacy of this region as part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (Roper and Feşnic,

2003). There is also another reason for the low performance of the FSN/FDSN/PDSR/PSD. It is related to the political context in the city. FSN/FDSN/PDSR had a similar appeal like PUNR. Although less radical than PUNR, the successor party also relied strongly on the working class political culture, ethno-nationalism and conservatorism. In Cluj-Napoca, during the 1990s, the potential electoral base of the successor party was captured by the PUNR. In 2004 the leadership at the local administration changed as Emil Boc was elected as the new mayor. He was constantly reelected running from the main parties that opposed PSD. Starting with 2004 the city became quite a stronghold for parties and alliances opposing PSD (2004: DA, 2008: PDL, 2012: ARD, 2016: PNL and USR).

Spatial statistics for urban electoral geography

For the analysis of electoral geographies, I use spatial statistics that account for the geographic properties of data (O'Sullivan and Unwin, 2010). Over the past two decades, spatial statistics have become a regular practice in electoral geography (O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin, 1994; Agnew and Shin, 2008; Leib and Quinton, 2011). In this study, I use one particular category of spatial statistics, namely those that examine the spatial autocorrelation within the geographic data. Spatial autocorrelation statistics measure the extent of dependence between observations in geographic space (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Griffith, 1987). These tools are useful for identifying and analyzing clusters and spatial patterns of electoral support. I explore patterns at global and local scales. All tests are performed with GeoDa, a free software package that conducts spatial analysis.

Before describing these two level of analysis there are some important mentions regarding the databases used in the study. Databases were created for each parliamentary election. Each database consists of the polling locations (observations) mapped in geographic space. The locations have attributes represented by the vote shares (percentages) obtained by each party or alliance. At every election some polling locations dissaperead and others new were established.

The global analysis refers to a general measure for the degree of spatial autocorrelation (degree of clustering) formed within Cluj-Napoca for each variable. This represents an assessment of the spatial electoral polarization for the entire city. I perform this measurement using the Moran's I. The test gives a global value of spatial autocorrelation for each variable (electoral score) within the geographic database.

The formula for Moran's I is formally expressed as:

$$I = \frac{N}{\sum 0} \cdot \frac{y'Wy}{y'y}$$

where N is the number of observations (polling locations), $\sum 0$ is the sum of all weights, *y* represents the vector of observations, and W*y* are the elements of the spatial weights matrix. The matrix depicts the contiguities formed between observations on the basis of a simple first-order vicinity. With this user-defined definition of vicinity, GeoDa computes the spatial lag of variable, represented for each observation by the mean values at surrounding observations. Moran's I takes values from -1 (lack of spatial autocorrelation) to +1 (perfect spatial autocorrelation). In order to test the significance, a z-score is computed. At a significance level of 0.05, z-score is statistically significant when it is less than -1.96 or greater than 1.96.

The analysis at the local level is conducted with LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Autocorrelation). The test is performed with the univariate function in GeoDa. LISA are computed for each observation and its vicinity. The statistic indicates local clusters of polling locations in terms of electoral support (high values at the center location and high values at its vicinity) or lack of electoral support (low values at the center location and low values at its vicinity) (Anselin, 1995). The LISA also identifies polling locations that are distinct outliers from local patterns. Significant clusters are identified at a level of 0.05. The map used for LISA visualisation yields the cluster location only for the central observation (the vicinity and its spatial association regime is not depicted on the map).

Moran's I and LISA are inferential statistics. Besides these, I will also employ a descriptive tool, namely quantile maps. In this regard, electoral performance in every location are mapped with the distribution of values divided into quantiles with four classes.

Exploration of electoral geographies in Cluj-Napoca

a. Global patterns of electoral support

This part of paper presents an overall longitudinal perspective on the evolution of electoral geographic polarization within the city. In this regard, the global analysis shows the degrees of

geographic polarization for parties and alliances at every election. Table 2 depicts the Moran's I for parties and alliances of interest at every parliamentary election between 1992-2016. Other columns show the z-score used for inference and the vote share scored in Cluj-Napoca. This latter column has a role of benchmark for comparison.

Table 2. Moran's I and performances in Cluj-Napoca for parties and alliances of interest

Year	party/ alliance	I	z-score	votes	Year	party/ alliance	I	z-score	votes
1992	PUNR	**0.51**	**7.79**	30%	2004	DA PNL-PD	**0.25**	**3.8**	38%
	UDMR	**0.26**	**4.11**	23%		PSD+PUR	**0.16**	**2.5**	19%
	CDR	**0.47**	**7.4**	22%		UDMR	**0.13**	**2.11**	18%
	FDSN	**0.15**	**2.45**	5%		PRM	**0.4**	**6.26**	13%
	PRM	**0.15**	**2.59**	3%	2008	PDL	**0.35**	**5.38**	48%
	FSN	0.11	1.76	3%		UDMR	**0.14**	**2.36**	18%
	PNL	0.12	1.88	2%		PSD+PC	**0.34**	**5.04**	16%
1996	CDR	**0.28**	**4.38**	34%		PNL	**0.44**	**6.62**	11%
	PUNR	**0.52**	**8.08**	23%	2012	USL	**0.31**	**4.81**	44%
	UDMR	**0.26**	**4.12**	19%		ARD	**0.42**	**6.02**	29%
	USD	**0.2**	**3.24**	7%		UDMR	**0.18**	**2.93**	13%
	PDSR	**0.38**	**5.59**	6%		PPDD	**0.25**	**3.82**	6%
	PRM	-0.07	-0.95	2%	2016	PNL	**0.37**	**5.46**	27%
2000	UDMR	**0.24**	**3.79**	21%		USR	**0.46**	**6.96**	22%
	PRM	**0.43**	**6.2**	20%		PSD	**0.44**	**6.42**	19%
	PDSR-PUR-PSDR	-0.02	-0.1	17%		UDMR	**0.17**	**2.76**	15%
	CDR 2000	**0.46**	**6.9**	7%		ALDE	**0.23**	**3.51**	6%
	PD	**0.15**	**2.25**	7%					
	PNL	**0.29**	**4.56**	7%					

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

At every parliamentary election there is an important electoral geographic polarization. The longitudinal analysis shows several significant temporal patterns. Geographic electoral polarization is at high levels in the 1990s and afterwards starting with 2008. Lower degree of geographic polarization is present in 2000 and 2004. The most stronger geographic polarization is

found in 1992 and 2016. I believe this pattern is best explained by the competition within the national political system and the socio-spatial structure of the city. The national political culture and party politics were highly radicalized during the 1990s. Parties had strong stances on issues regarding the national communist legacy. At this time, major Romanian cities, including Cluj-Napoca, emerged after decades of socialist developments that decisively transformed their socio-spatiality. In the first half of the 2000s, the political competition was more centripetal. At this time, the city was also gradually transforming under the neoliberal project. Former working class neighborhoods were changing, the historical center was undergoing gentrification while in the suburbs new houses were being built. Beginning with the 2008 parliamentary election, Romanian politics increasingly became more personalized, polarized and confrontational. High levels of ideological competition reappeared at the 2016 election. At this time, Cluj-Napoca was a global city fully developing under the neoliberalism.

b. Local patterns of electoral support

This part of the paper analyses local geographic patterns of electoral support in Cluj-Napoca at parliamentary elections during 1992-2016. The analysis follows each election and discusses patterns for parties and alliances of interest. Due of the large number of parties at the top-level politics of Cluj-Napoca, an approach that deals individually with each election is preferable to one which would have analyzed longitudinally the patterns for each party. This latter approach would have been preferable if we had a stable party system and with the same parties competing over the years.

b.1. The 1992 parliamentary election

Electoral geographies at the 1992 parliamentary election depict high geographic clusterization. The electoral patterns follow the socio-spatial structure of the city. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the quantile map and LISA map for this election. For most of the political parties the patterns depict a strong cleavage between the historic part of the city (the pre-socialist tissue) and the socialist developments (large collective housing ensembles).

Figure 1. LISA maps for the 1992 parliamentary election

Figure 2. Quantile maps for the 1992 parliamentary election

Quantile (values in percentages)			
PUNR	45,7 thru 35,4	34,8 thru 30,2	30,1 thru 24,6	24 thru 14,7
UDMR	49,3 thru 30,3	29,6 thru 21,4	21,4 thru 17,5	17,5 thru 1,1
CDR	37 thru 25,5	24,8 thru 21,7	21,5 thru 19,1	19 thru 13,6
FDSN	9,5 thru 5,8	5,7 thru 4,6	4,6 thru 3,9	3,8 thru 2,8
PRM	5,8 thru 3,4	3,4 thru 3	3 thru 2,3	2,3 thru 1,3
FSN	4,8 thru 3	2,9 thru 2,5	2,5 thru 2,1	2,1 thru 0,1
PNL	4 thru 2,6	2,5 thru 2	2 thru 1,7	1,7 thru 1

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

PUNR ranked first with 30% of votes. Its electoral support was clustered mostly in the working class neighborhood of Mănăștur, located in the south-west of the city. Other small clusters are located northern of Mănăștur and in the rather semi-urban eastern periphery of the city. The electoral base of UDMR is formed from ethnic voting. The party is stronger in places where large groups of Hungarians are located, meaning in the old town and in the northern part of the city, largely unaffected by the socialist urban developments. UDMR is weaker in the industrial parts of the city. The map of UDMR is strongly in opposition with that of PUNR. The electoral geography of CDR also shows strong patterns. The alliance was solid in the old town and in other surrounding low-density residential areas at west and south. CDR also has important support towards south in Zorilor. This is a rather smaller neighborhood and less industrialized (in comparison with Mănăștur), comprising of socialist collective ensembles and low-density areas. CDR was weakest in the rather poorer areas from the north and north-east and in the working class neighborhood of Mărăști – located east of the historical city and composed mainly of large collective ensembles.

The electoral geographies of FDSN, PRM, FSN and PNL were less polarized than those of PUNR, CDR and even UDMR. Nevertheless, some smaller local patterns of support are still visible. FDSN and FSN had fairly similar patterns and were stronger mostly in the old town and in some scattered parts of the socialist ensembles. For these two parties, low support was clustered in the eastern Mănăștur and in the south. Higher support for PRM was clustered in Mănăștur. Having a strong nationalistic rhetoric, the PRM was weakest in places where UDMR recorded its best performances. For PNL patterns of support are clustered in the south, but higher shares of votes are scattered throughout the city. As it was the case with other parties, clusters of low support for PNL were exactly the same as UDMR hot spots of higher support.

b.2. The 1996 parliamentary election

The 1996 parliamentary election was won by CDR with a significant margin both at the national level and in Cluj-Napoca. CDR, being the main opposition during the past years, highly benefited from an economic voting against PDSR (FDSN), who was in office almost since 1990. From Figure 3 and Figure 4 it is visible that electoral geographies at this election show a strong consistency with the patterns from the previous election.

For CDR, the electoral geography is less clustered than four years before. The alliance now had a catch-all rhetoric and was composed also of the PNL. CDR is stronger in the south-central area and southern in Zorilor. Weaker performances are found in low-density residential areas located in the central-western neighborhood of Gruia and in the north-westerly neighborhood of Dâmbul Rotund. However, apart the places mentioned above, other CDR's good performances are scattered throughout the entire city. UDMR's and PUNR's maps are powerfully consistent with the previous performances from 1992. PUNR has stronger displays in Mănăștur and weaker in the central area. UDMR is stronger in the central and northern areas and weaker in the socialist urban developments (mainly Mănăștur). Again, the maps of PUNR and UDMR are in opposition. In 1992, FSN was slightly stronger in the central area and weaker in Mănăștur. At the 1996 election, together with a minor party, forming the USD alliance, the former FSN, now with a name change in PD, proposes a modified electoral geography. USD is more solid in the industrial and working class neighborhoods and visible less solid in the central area and its vicinity (Gruia). Areas of support or lack of support resemble those of 1992, but the degree of clusterization is stronger in 1996. PDSR hot spots are found in a large portion of the central area together with its low-density

vicinity area and also in the socialist developed neighborhood of Gheorgheni. This area of collective ensembles was built on the principle of microrayons (Maxim, 2009) including many green spaces and other amenities. PDSR's lower performances are recorded in Mănăștur and Mărăști. The LISA map for the nationalistic PRM is the least clusterized. Nevertheless, some support for the party is scattered throughout the working class neighborhoods while low performances are generally correlated with the ethnic voting for UDMR.

Figure 3. LISA maps for the 1996 parliamentary election

Figure 4. Quantile maps for the 1996 parliamentary election

	Quantile (values in percentages)			
CDR	44,6 thru 35,7	35,6 thru 33,3	33,3 thru 31,1	31,1 thru 22,5
PUNR	32,3 thru 26,5	26,4 thru 22,8	22,7 thru 19,4	18,8 thru 11,5
UDMR	44,3 thru 23,9	23,2 thru 18,4	18,3 thru 16	15,5 thru 6,4
USD	11,4 thru 8,1	8,1 thru 6,9	6,8 thru 5,9	5,7 thru 4,3
PDSR	11,3 thru 7	6,9 thru 5,1	5 thru 4,4	4,4 thru 3,3
PRM	3,5 thru 2,7	2,7 thru 2,4	2,4 thru 2	2 thru ,2

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

b.2. The 2000 parliamentary election

At the 2000 election, there was a big dissatisfaction with the CDR due to the poor governing performance of the incumbent alliance. The election was far less polarized than the previous two. In the past years, at the national level, the main fixture was the fight between

FSN/FDSN/PDSR and CDR (PNTCD, PNL). Now, this competition becomes irrelevant after the alliance proved unable to govern more efficiently than the successor party. The maps for the 2000 parliamentary election are displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The electoral geographies at this election are less polarized and with few larger clusters.

Figure 5. LISA maps for the 2000 parliamentary election

Figure 6. Quantile maps for the 2000 parliamentary election

	Quantile (values in percentages)			
UDMR	47,9 thru 26,9	26,2 thru 20,7	20 thru 17	16,9 thru 7,7
PRM	32,3 thru 23,4	23 thru 18,5	17,9 thru 14,9	14,6 thru 9,5
PDSR-PUR-PSDR	26,5 thru 18,1	17,6 thru 16,2	16,1 thru 15,1	15,1 thru 12
CDR 2000	16,5 thru 8,6	8,5 thru 6,7	6,7 thru 5,2	5,2 thru 2,9
PD	9,1 thru 7,6	7,5 thru 6,5	6,5 thru 5,6	5,6 thru 4
PNL	10,9 thru 7,3	7,2 thru 6,5	6,5 thru 5,6	5,5 thru 2,8

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

UDMR recorded the highest score (21%). However, other players had similar performances - PRM (20%) and PDSR-PUR-PSDR (17%). UDMR has largely the same electoral geography. The ethnic vote is stronger in the central areas. However, the pattern of support in the northern city is significantly diminished than in 1992 or 1996. Clusters of weaker support are again located in Mănăștur. PRM became PUNR's succesor and colonised its electoral geography. The party is stronger in Mănăștur and weaker in the central area. The traditional opposition with UDMR is active again. PDSR ran inside the PDSR-PUR-PSDR alliance as the major actor. Its electoral

geography lacks solid patterns. The global Moran's I indicates no overall clustering while the local patterns are few. Nevertheless, the support is still stronger in the central area's vicinity and Gheorgheni and weaker in Mănăștur. Because of the negative vote, the CDR is reduced to its core of electoral support. The geography is very similar to the 1992 one. Major clusters indicate a stronger support in the central area, with its low-density vicinity and lower performances concentrated in Mănăștur, Mărăști and the northern peripheries. As in previous elections, PD's electoral geography is one of the least clustered. As a general pattern, PD lacks support in the central areas and Gruia. Better performances are scattered incoherently through the socialist developments. PNL has higher shares of vote in the central-southern area. Lower performances are clustered in the central-north and in the northern peripheries. PNL's electoral geography is coherent with previous patterns from 1992 and 1996.

b.4. The 2004 parliamentary election

Starting with the 2004 parliamentary election, the total number of significant actors within the national and local party system reduces consistently. In this regard, only four actors are analysed at this election. As a result of the system concentration, the total share of votes in Cluj-Napoca for the four actors in 2004 was similar to that of the seven actors analyzed for 1992 (88%). In Cluj-Napoca, the election was won with a large margin by the DA alliance composed of PNL and PD, at that time two rather medium parties within a national party system dominated by PSD. The overall geographic clusterization is slightly lower than in 2000. The maps for the 2004 election are displayed in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Clusters for DA are at medium to lower strength. The electoral geography of DA is consistent in a high degree with the legacies of CDR and PNL at previous elections and to lower extents with the former electoral geography of PD. Clusters of higher support are located in the central-southern area in Zorilor and in the low-density neighborhood of Andrei Mureșanu. The places with lower scores are traditionally located in UDMR's spaces of support, within the central-northern and northern parts of the city. As seen from the quantile map, DA has above average performances also in the socialist developments in Mănăștur, Mărăști, Grigorescu and Plopilor. The electoral geography of PSD+PUR shows little concentration. Clusters of support are located on a small area of the central city and in Gheorgheni. Some of the lowest performances are present in Zorilor. To a important degree, the electoral geography for PSD in 2004 continues to depart

from the electoral geographies set by the party in the 90's, which were characterized by clusters of support in the central city. A decrease in polarization can be seen also in the map of UDMR. Clusters of support are concentrated within the central city, its near low-density vicinity and to a lesser extent in the northern city. Spatial patterns for lack of support are reduced to a smaller area of Mănăștur. PRM depicts the most polarized electoral geography. The patterns have a strong consistency with the party's map of 2000 and PUNR's maps. The party is stronger in eastern peripheries, Mărăști, Între Lacuri (a smaller neighborhood comprising mainly socialist developments together with some single-family houses), Mănăștur. Lower support is clustered in the central city, central-western, central-southern, southern and south-eastern parts.

Figure 7. LISA maps for the 2004 parliamentary election

Figure 8. Quantile maps for the 2004 parliamentary election

	Quantile (values in percentages)			
DA PNL-PD	49,9 thru 40,6	40,5 thru 37,1	37 thru 35,1	35 thru 21,6
PSD+PUR	25,2 thru 20,5	20,4 thru 19,2	19,1 thru 17,3	17,3 thru 12,9
UDMR	44,9 thru 22,1	21,6 thru 17,3	17,3 thru 14,7	14,4 thru 8,5
PRM	27,3 thru 15	14,9 thru 11,2	11,1 thru 9,5	9,5 thru 7

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

b.5. The 2008 parliamentary election

At the time of the 2008 parliamentary election, the city was already experiencing patterns of increasing socio-spatial diferentiation following the urban neoliberal developments that began to develop steady after 2004. The political polarization within the party system and political culture was somewhat important but was far from the intensity of the political fights of the 1990s.

Nevertheless, as we shall see, despite the lower political polarization, the electoral geographies of 2008 had clear cut patterns. The maps for the 2008 parliamentary election are showed in Figures 9 and 10.

Figure 9. LISA maps for the 2008 parliamentary election

Figure 10. Quantile maps for the parliamentary election

	Quantile (values in percentages)			
PDL	65 thru 53,1	52,8 thru 46,5	46,5 thru 39,9	39,6 thru 30,6
UDMR	45 thru 23,5	23,5 thru 18,6	18,5 thru 14,1	14,1 thru 8,9
PSD+PC	24,6 thru 19,2	19,1 thru 16,1	15,8 thru 13,7	13,5 thru 7,6
PNL	24,1 thru 13,8	13,6 thru 10,8	10,8 thru 8,7	8,7 thru 6,6

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

PDL is the first to win two consecutive election. The party has a landslide victory achieving the highest share recorded in Cluj-Napoca at parliamentary election (48%). At this election the party had a catch-all rhetoric. Its electoral geography has extensive clusters that depicts parts of the former electoral geographies of PUNR and PRM. PDL stronger performances are concentrated in the western socialist developments in Mănăștur, Grigorescu and Plopilor. Weaker performances are clustered in the central area, Gruia, Gheorgheni and Andrei Mureșanu. PDL also has above average scores in Zorilor, Mărăști and in the other peripheries. UDMR portrays its traditional electoral geography. Clusters of support are located in the central and central-northern area. Lower support is clustered in Mănăștur. At this election, PSD has an electoral geography resembling the patterns of the 90's with stronger support in the central city and in Gheorgheni. Weaker performances are clustered in Mărăști and in the northern low-density peripheries. The quantile map also shows important above average scores in Mănăștur. This latter pattern is consistent with

the 2000's developments within PSD's electoral geography. PNL has the most polarized electoral geography. Its clusters show clear cut patterns. The geographic structure of the vote for PNL has some similarities with previous patterns for CDR, DA and PNL at previous elections. In this regard, the party is stronger in parts of the central city, Andrei Mureșanu and partially in Zorilor. However, unlike previous performances, PNL has clusters of support also in Gheorgheni (its socialist developments and its pre-socialist low-density areas). Also, unlike previous patterns, PNL has its large clusters of weak performances located in Mănăștur.

At the 2008 election, Cluj-Napoca is divided in clear cut spatial patterns. Each of the four electoral geographies of interest has patterns in high opposition with the others. Unlike previous elections, there is no major geographic overlapping between the parties or alliances.

b.6. The 2012 parliamentary election

At the 2012 parliamentary election, PDL is hit by an economic vote. During the financial recession, as a governing party, PDL used heavy austerity measures and with little concern for social protection. This sparked a great dissatisfaction towards the governing party. However, Cluj-Napoca was still a favorable place for PDL. This situation is depicted in Table 1. PDL running in the ARD alliance gains 29% in Cluj-Napoca in comparison with the lower 17% at the national level. The election is won by the USL alliance composed of PSD, PNL and other minor parties. USL recorded 44% of the votes in Cluj-Napoca, much fewer than it did at the national level – 59%. The electoral geographies at this election show a degree of geographic polarization consistent with 2008. The maps are displayed in Figure 11 and Figure 12.

The electoral geography of USL is consistent with 2008 patterns of PSD and PNL. The alliance is stronger in the central city, its low-density vicinity in the south-east, and the socialist developments of Gheorgheni. However, these patterns of support are less small and less clustered than those of PSD+PC and PNL in 2008. Small patterns indicating little support are distributed in all suburban low-density northern areas. As seen from the quantile map, in these places ARD scores above average performances. The electoral geography of ARD is consistent with previous PDL patterns. ARD is stronger in Mănăștur and Zorilor. Other above average scores are recorded in Mărăști. The alliance lacks support within the historical city, Gruia and the central-northern area. These latter patterns are consistent with lower performances of DA in 2004 and PDL in 2008. UDMR continues its traditional patterns. The party is stronger in the central and northern city.

Lack of support is clustered in Mănăștur and as a novelty also in Zorilor and the southern parts. These latter places developed massively during the real estate boom following the extensive neoliberal policies. Newer neighborhoods developed in this southern area for upper-middle class citizens – Europa and Bună Ziua (both villas and collective housings). PPDD was a populist party with an ephemeral existence. The party has better performances within the northern and eastern peripheries and in the Mărăști area. PPDD is much weaker in affluent areas – in central city, Zorilor, Andrei Mureșanu, Grigorescu.

Figure 11. LISA maps for the 2012 parliamentary election

Figure 12. Quantile maps for the 2012 parliamentary election

Quantile (values in percentages)			
USL	61,1 thru 48,1	47,7 thru 43,7	43,3 thru 39,9	39,8 thru 27,5
ARD	40,8 thru 31	30,9 thru 27	26,7 thru 23,5	23,3 thru 16,5
UDMR	37,9 thru 16,4	16,3 thru 12,8	12,7 thru 10,9	10,5 thru 5,6
PPDD	12,1 thru 7,6	7,4 thru 5,9	5,7 thru 4,6	4,6 thru 2,2

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

b.7. The 2016 parliamentary election

Unlike the previous election, in 2016 the results were much closer. There was no landslide victory. PNL, who had merged in 2014 with PDL, scored 27% of votes. Closely behind was the new party of USR gaining 22% and PSD gaining 19%. At the national level, PSD managed to obtain a massive win, but Cluj-Napoca continued to be a favourable place for the political party of mayor Boc. The electoral geographies at this election produced major spatial patterns resembling the polarization at the 1992 election. The maps for the 2016 parliamentary election are displayed in Figures 13 and 14.

Figure 13. LISA maps for the 2016 parliamentary election

Figure 14. Quantile maps for the 2016 parliamentary election

	Quantile (values in percentages)			
PNL	38,9 thru 30	29,3 thru 26	25,9 thru 24	24 thru 16,6
USR	40 thru 25,3	25 thru 21,6	21,4 thru 18,6	18,6 thru 11,8
PSD	26,8 thru 21,6	21,5 thru 18,9	18,9 thru 16,4	16,3 thru 10,5
UDMR	42,1 thru 19	19 thru 14,6	14,4 thru 12,2	11,9 thru 5
ALDE	8,9 thru 6,8	6,8 thru 5,8	5,8 thru 5,1	5 thru 3,6

Source: Values computed by the author using electoral data from http://alegeri.roaep.ro

The electoral geography of PNL is different from the traditional one of the party. This is caused by the electoral legacy inherited from PDL. PNL clusters of high support are located in Mărăști, Între Lacuri and the eastern and northern low-density areas. Also there is important above average support in Mănăștur and Zorilor. Unlike the previous election, but as a consequence of PDL's legacy, PNL's lack of support is concentrated within the central city. Other clusters of low support are located in Gruia. USR is a new political party with an electoral base composed mainly of highly educated and urban citizens. Clusters of high support are located in the central-south, Andrei Mureșanu, Zorilor and the new developments of Europa and Bună Ziua. Lower support is clustered in Mănăștur, Mărăști and the other peripheries of north and north-east. PSD has an electoral geography distinctive from the previous patterns (mostly those of the 1990s). The party scores better performances in Mănăștur. Lack of support is clustered through an extensive area within central city, Gruia, Zorilor, Andrei Mureșanu, Europa and Bună Ziua. Other above average performances are recorded in Mărăști and Între Lacuri. The electoral geography of UDMR is

consistent with the patterns from 2012. The ethnic vote is stronger in the central city and Gruia and much weaker in Mănăștur, Zorilor and the more southern areas. ALDE is a small center-right party with liberal stances formed in 2005 and composed of PC and a splinter of PNL. Clusters of higher support are located in Grigorescu, Cetățuia, Gruia and Gheorgheni. Clusters of negative performances are located in the same places as those for USR.

Conclusion

In the present paper I explored the electoral geographies of Cluj-Napoca at parliamentary elections during 1992-2016. The electoral patterns for political parties and electoral alliances were explored using spatial statistics at global and local level. The research identified strongly stable spatial patterns of support within the city. For example, the vote for the Hungarian ethnic party of UDMR is consistent clustered in the central city and its near vicinity. In another example, up until the 2004 election, the neighborhood of Mănăștur – the largest socialist developed area comprising of large collective housings built for industrial workers – was a solid stronghold for nationalistic and populist parties. The more affluent and younger areas in the south were mostly in all cases associated with large vote shares for the liberal and pro-western parties. The longitudinal analysis also revealed over the years important changes and realignments within electoral geographies. With the exception of the UDMR, the other major parties had colonised, replaced, occupied and inherited various places throughout the years, sometimes almost completely changing their electoral geography during consecutive elections. The electoral geographies we explored are polarized in many instances by two major areas within the city: Mănăștur and the central historical town. The following two paragraphs point out some important conclusions on the development of electoral patterns within these spaces.

Mănăștur appears as the main cluster area (positive or negative) for most of the electoral geographies. Over the years, many political parties have realigned within this space, without establishing a solid stronghold for more subsequent elections. Mănăștur is the most populous neighborhood in Cluj-Napoca and was designed during the socialist era mostly to accommodate the workers from the nearby large factories. For UDMR, Mănăștur was always the weakest spot in its electoral geography. The neighborhood was consistently sympathetic towards political parties with the patriotic, working class, catch-all and polarized electoral discourses. During the 90s, PUNR was the strongest in this area. At the 2004 election, PRM had its hot spots in Mănăștur.

In 2008, the parties realigned again, and PDL with a catch-all rhetoric became the main party in this space. After 2009, PDL departed from the catch-all rhetoric and moved towards a more neoliberal and austerity platform. However, the party still preserved its legacy. In 2012, running as the major party in the ARD alliance, PDL maintained hot spots in Mănăștur. At the 2016 election, the electoral geography of PSD – now the main catch-all party - had its stronghold in this neighborhood.

The historical area had a smaller role as a stronghold than Mănăștur did. At the begginning of the transition, the central space had a much older than the large socialist housing estates. Catch-all, working class and nationalistic stances were less successful in the historical city than they did in Mănăștur. At every election, UDMR had recorded its best performances within this space. The Hungarian ethnic party was the only one with consistent high scores in the historical city. Hot spots developed by other parties were not so strong and extensive as those in Mănăștur. During the 90s, the other parties that did well in the historical area were CDR, FDSN/ PDSR, FSN. These were parties with more centrist themes than those of PUNR which were directly primarily towards the working class. In the early 2000s, the overall electoral polarization decreases, and the historical city also shows fewer and smaller patterns of support (with the exception of UDMR). During the 2008-2012, as PDL develops strongholds within the large socialist estates, the other major party, namely PSD, scores its better performances within this historical area. As the gentrification intensified, attitudes became more post-material. In this context, at the 2016 election, USR was the only party, together with UDMR, that displayed clusters of high performances in the historical part of Cluj-Napoca.

The paper shows the importance of urban socio-spatial structure for political behavior in cities, since evidence from Cluj-Napoca has shown how current and past urban dynamics are correlated with transformations within electoral geographies. A point is stressed here on the need to study electoral behaviour also in other urban contexts. Further research could expand on the findings regarding the politics of Cluj-Napoca and the Romanian political system.

Annexes

Annex 1. Acronyms and names for political parties and alliances

Acronym	Name	
	Romanian	English
ALDE	Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
ARD	Alianța România Dreaptă	Right Romania Alliance, also translated as Just Romania Alliance
CDR	Convenția Democrată Română	Romanian Democratic Convention
DA	Dreptate și Adevăr	Justice and Truth
FDSN	Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale	Democratic National Salvation Front
FSN	Frontul Salvării Naționale	National Salvation Front
PC	Partidul Conservator	Conservative Party
PD	Partidul Democrat	Democratic Party
PDL	Partidul Democrat Liberal	Democratic Liberal Party
PDSR	Partidul Democrației Sociale din România	Party of Social Democracy in Romania
PNL	Partidul Național Liberal	National Liberal Party
PNTCD	Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat	Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party
PPDD	Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu
PRM	Partidul România Mare	Greater Romania Party
PSDR	Partidul Social-Democrat Român	Romanian Social Democratic Party
PUNR	Partidul Unității Națiunii Române	Romanian National Unity Party
PUR	Partidul Umanist Român	Romanian Humanist Party
UDMR	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
UNPR	Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României	National Union for the Progress of Romania
USD	Uniunea Social-Democrată	Uniunea Social-Democrată
USL	Uniunea Social-Liberală	Social Liberal Union

Annex 2. Name changes for parties/ alliances and composition of alliances

	party/ alliance in election	name changes and associated parties in alliance
1992	FDSN	-
	FSN	-
	PNL	-
	CDR*	*PNTCD/ other minor parties*
	UDMR	-
	PRM	-
	PUNR	-
1996	CDR*	*PNTCD/ PNL/ other minor parties*
	PUNR	-
	UDMR	-
	USD	*PD (name change - from FSN)/ PSDR*
	PDSR	*name change from FSN*
	PRM	-
2000	UDMR	-
	PRM	-
	PDSR-PUR-PSDR*	*PDSR/ PUR/ PSDR - latter two are minor parties*
	CDR 2000*	*PNTCD/ other minor parties*
	PD	-
	PNL	-
2004	DA PNL-PD*	*PNL/ PD*
	PSD+PUR*	*PSD/ PUR*
	UDMR	-
	PRM	-
2008	PDL	*name change from PD*
	UDMR	-
	PSD+PC*	*PSD/ PC (name change - from PUR)*
	PNL	-
2012	USL	*PSD/ PNL/ other minor parties*
	ARD	*PDL/ other minor parties - including PNTCD*
	UDMR	-
	PPDD	-
2016	PNL	-
	USR	-
	PSD	-
	UDMR	-
	ALDE	-
	* - alliance	

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